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Abstract 
This study empirically explores the phenomena of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), corporate restructuring and their relationships with firm's performance in the 
context of economic reform in China from three main perspectives: the study begins 
with investigating how Chinese managers perceive CSR, to what extent, managers' 
attitudes influence their behaviours in restructuring, whether those who are more in 
faviour of CSR may engage in more socially responsible restructuring; then the study 
examines the relationship between socially responsible restructuring and firm's financial 
performance, and the study also analyzes a case study of enterprise restructuring in 
China defence industy. 
The three perpectives covered by the study are logically interrelated. It is assumed 
that by understanding an individual's attitudes toward something, we can predict the 
individual's overall pattern of response to the object, therefore, an assessment of a 
manager's attitude toward CSR may provide an indication of the manager's 
predisposition to respond in a particular way to CSR. Thus, different attitudes toward 
CSR (in faviour of or against) may result in the different actions (socially responsible or 
socially irresponsible), and different behaviours may lead to various firm's performance. 
By analyzing the case study, we can have comprehensive and deep insight into the CSR 
issues, and have a fuller understanding of the process of socially responsible 
restructuring in China. 
The result of the study provides more evidence for the theories about relationship 
between CSR and firm's performance. The result suggests that there be a positive 
relationship between attitude and behaviour with regard to CSR, socially responsible 
value-oriented managers pay more attention to social issues in restructuring. The result 
also shows that there is a positive association between CSR and financial performance, 
more social responsibility leads to better financial performance, and financial 
performance drives socially responsible performance in restructuring. The result further 
reveals that after restructuring, firms didn't significantly improve profitability as 
expected by government and management. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The study of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and its relationship with 
firm's financial performance has been the hot topic in the academic world, however the 
interests of researchers have more focused on investigating the phenomena of CSR in 
the developed countries than in the developing world. Little study has been done in 
investigating the relationship between socially responsible restructuring and financial 
performance. 
This study intends to empirically explore the phenomena of CSR, enterprise 
restructuring and the relationships with firm's performance in the context of economic 
reforms in China from the three important perspectives. The first investigates how 
Chinese managers perceive CSR, whether managers' attitudes toward CSR influence 
the extent of managers' socially responsible behaviours in restructuring. The study also 
examines relationship between socially responsible restructuring and financial 
performance in the listed firms. Finally the study ends up investigating the case study of 
enterprise restructuring in China defence industry. 
The three perpectives covered by the study are logically interrelated. It is 
assumed that by understanding an individual's attitudes toward something, we can 
predict the individual's overall pattern of response to the object, therefore, an 
assessment of a manager's attitude toward CSR may provide an indication of the 
manager's predisposition to respond in a particular way to CSR. Thus, different 
attitudes toward CSR (in faviour of or against) may result in the different actions 
(socially responsible or socially irresponsible actions), and different behaviours may 
lead to various levels of firm's performance. By analyzing the case study, we can have 
comprehensive and deep insight into the CSR issues, and have a fuller understanding of 
the process of socially responsible restructuring in China. 
The study also examines whether the firm's performance was improved after 
restructuring as expected by government and management, and identifies the sources 
that influence changes in financial performance after restructuring. 
This study was motivated by the desire to provide a convincing rationale for 
managers to adopt socially responsible practices, assist non-shareholder groups in their 
battle against corporate decisions that ignore social stakeholder interests and contribute 
10 
to the academic arguments claiming a broad "stakeholder theory" is better than 
shareholder theory. 
This is the first study devoted to empirically exploring the phenomena of CSR in 
the People's Republic of China, particularly, the relationship between socially 
responsible restructuring and firm's performance. The result of study provides more 
evidence for the theories about relationship between CSR and firm's performance, and 
contributes to the growing knowledge in CSR by using the specific Chinese case. The 
study bridges a gap between the research on relationships between restructuring, CSR 
and financial performance in transition economies. The previous researches on CSR 
used to concentrate on the cases of Fortune500 or S&P500, and to be dominated by the 
researches in the developed world. The study suggests multiple dimensions for 
measurement of corporate social performance based on the stakeholder theory. 
This chapter will analyze the phenomena of SOE restructuring and privatisation 
in recent years in China, particularly the issues and problems arising from the 
restructuring, and the social impact of restructuring on the stakeholders. Against the 
background and context, the research questions will be developed and justified 
afterwards. 
1.1. Introduction 
State-owned enterprise (SOE) reform has been regarded as the central link in 
China's economic reforms and strategic restructuring. Since 1980s, SOE reform has 
gone through different stages such as delegation of powers and interests, instituting the 
contract operational responsibility system, and establishing a modem enterprise system. 
China's government has been determined to proactively restructure the overall SOE 
sector, intensify enterprise reform, and speed up the pace of privatization of SOEs by 
selling off SOEs to private and foreign investors. As Li Rongrong, Chairman of State 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), emphasized that after 
more than twenty years of market-oriented reforms, especially after the fast growth of 
the past ten years, and in light of 16`s Party Congress, it is time to accelerate the pace of 
selling off SOEs to private domestic and foreign investors (Cheng 2003). 
Since 1997 when the 15th Chinese Communist Party Congress (CCPC) 
advocated a radical transformation of state-owned enterprises with the new restructuring 
11 
strategy, i. e. `Grasp the big and release the small' (zhuada fangxiao), SOE reform 
stepped up to a new stage, numerous small- and medium-sized SOEs have been 
converted into shareholding companies with mixed public and private ownership, sold or 
leased to private individuals (either domestic or foreign), merged with one another, or 
just allowed to go bankrupt. The state was carrying out the restructuring program for a 
twofold purpose, on the one hand, the programme was intended to improve the efficiency 
and profitability of SOEs by reducing excess capacity, shedding surplus labour, 
lowering debt loads, and upgrading productive capacity; and on the other hand, it is to 
transform SOEs into market players by changing their ownership and management so as 
to improve the competitiveness in the global market. 
The economic effect of the restructuring programme has had great impact on 
enterprise development and growth, but its social consequences are even troublesome. 
Figure 1-1 shows that one of these consequences, as some scholars already note, is a 
rapid transfer of state assets into the hands of managers and other private individuals 
(Ding 2000), and other ethical issues emerging in corporate governance. Another 
consequence is that the restructuring program has led to a systemic erosion of labour 
interests, as it has been accompanied by severe measures against workers, including 
collective layoffs, deprivation of benefits, ruthless labour rights abuses, and brutal 
working conditions. Lacking effective state protection as well as organizations of their 
own, workers have become increasingly vulnerable to the "whip of the market" and to 
despotic managerial power (Lee 1999a). 
These problems have brought about social turmoil, and influence the pace of 
SOE reform and severely impaired social instability. The following sub-sections will 
explain and analyze the issues and problems illustrated in Figure 1-1. 
In 1997, the 15'h CCP national Congress and the Central government required 
that the loss-making large and medium-sized SOEs must get out of the debt crisis and 
improve their profitability by setting up modern corporate system within three years 
from 1998 to 2000, mainly in the industries such as coal, nonferrous metal, sugar, textile, 
iron and steel, and defence industries. Especially since 1999, when the government 
adopted the policy and strategy of SOE restructuring "Laying off redundant workers and 
12 
downsizing employees to improve efficiency and profitability", 1 SOEs have been 
encouraged to terminate and lay off redundant workers and employees on a large scale. 
The widespread and aggressive enterprise restructuring has become more prevalent, 
particularly, downsizing has been regarded as the first resort to cut costs and improve 
economic performance. 
Figure 1- 1 Process and Impact of SOE Restructuring in China 
... ------------------ ...... ---......  _..... - .... _-.. -_. ý_ ----- ...... ------ ..... W......... 
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The goals ofSOE profitability of SOEs 
restructuring Strengthening competitiveness 
in the global market 
The strategies for 
- 
Privatization 
- 
Shareholding reform 
achieving the 
- 
Bankruptcy 
- 
State assets transfer 
goals Lay-offs 
. 
Reform of corporate = 
gövemänce (CC) 
..................................................... Consequences 
-Erosion of worker 
caused by the interests 
restructuring 
- 
Labour disputes 
intensi Cied 
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............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
The two quantitative changes were most visible during the latter 1990s 
-a rapid 
decline in the number of SOEs and declining employment within surviving SOEs. From 
' "Decision on Major Issues Concerning the Reform and Development of SOEs", China News 
Agency, 26 September 1999. 
Behaviours 
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1998 to 2003, the number of SOEs was significantly reduced by 40% from 238,000 to 
150,000, and the stated-owned SMEs were down from 245,000 to 145,000,85% of state 
ownership was transformed into different system through restructuring, spin-off, 
mergers and acquisitions, sell-off and shareholding corporative reform. 2 State-owned 
SMEs have been the biggest beneficiaries of restructuring programme, 80% of national- 
level SOEs and 60% of municipal-level of SOEs had been privatized. By 2003,4223 
large and medium core SOEs in China were transformed to shareholding companies 
with diversified shareholders (Andrew 2003) 
The restructuring has had a profound impact on employees, communities and 
society as a whole. Workers and employees become the forefront victims of 
restructuring. It was reported that the lay-offs in SOEs increased from 5.9 million in 
1998 to 6.6 million in 2000, and the total laid-ff workers accumulated to 28.43 millions 
within the period of 1998-2003 (Ministry of Labour & Social Security 2003). Some 4.1 
million workers were laid off from SOEs along with 2 million from non-state 
enterprises by the end of 2002. The re-employment rate for laid off in SOEs slid from 
42% in 1999 to 36% in 2000, and 30% in 2001. The registered jobless in urban areas 
reached 7.1 million, or 4% of overall labour force by the end of 2002 (Xie 2003). 
1.1.2. Social Consequences of SOE Reform: Labour Unrest 
One of the consequences of the radical restructuring coupled with mass lay-offs 
has intensified and sharply increased the labour disputes between workers and 
management over a variety of issues, ranging from job contracts, wages, benefits, 
pensions, and unemployment compensation to working conditions, and led to labour 
unrest across the country. According to official statistics, there were 226,391 cases of 
labour disputes happened in 2003, and an increased 21 % over 1996, and 801,042 
workers have been affected. 3 
Since the mid-90s, the reports on workers' protests arising from enterprise 
restructuring have frequently appeared in the media. Chen's study (2003) shows that the 
labour protests in question reflect workers' strong opposition to restructuring process 
2 South China Morning Post, Nov. 20 2003 
3 China Labour Statistical Yearbook, various versions. 
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that excludes their participation, ignores their interests, and infringes their rights. 
National statistics on labour protests are not available, but scattered reports from 
both the official media and the media outside China reveal that restructuring is conflict 
prone. Some local authorities have openly admitted it. For example, a report by the 
Provincial Trade Union of Henan indicates that 37.7% of protests in the province in 
1997 resulted from the infringement of workers' legal rights during restructuring. 4 The 
Shanghai Municipal Trade Union also attributes some large-scale collective contentions 
to restructuring. 5 
Table 1-1 presents some striking incidents happened over the past few years. The 
case in 1997 was a starting point when four thousand silk workers in Sichuan province 
demonstrated outside government offices demanding unemployment benefits when their 
factories were closed. The reports of workers' protests over sudden redundancies, plant 
closures, bankruptcy and takeover about which they have not been consulted and about 
the non-payment of unemployment allowances or pensions have become extremely 
common in many parts of urban China since 1997. One of the most influential events 
happened in March 2002 when tens of thousand of workers went on street to protest 
over pay, layoff and pensions in the cities of Daqing, Fushun and Liaoyan (Robers, 
Einhorn, and Balfour 2002). 
Table 1- 1 Incident of Workers' Protests Arising from Restructuring 
Year Place Cause outcome 
06.2000 Shanghai Second Managerial corruption in the Over 100 workers went on 
Leather Shoes process of shareholding a collective petition from 
Factory restructuring June to August 2000. 
01.2001 Dyeing and The closure of the factory The furious workforce 
' Henan Sheng Zongonghui Bangongshi (The General Office of Henan Federation of Trade 
Unions) (1999) "Analysis of Workers' Street Demonstration in Henan Province during 1998 
China Labour Bulletin, No. 50, available online: http: //www. china- 
labour. org. hk/99122/henan_demos. htm 
5 Shanghai Shi Zonggonghui Yanjiushi (Research Office, Shanghai Municipal Federation of 
Trade Union) (1999) "A Study on the State of Labour Relations during the Change of Property 
Rights", Pp353-359 in Research Office, ACFTU, ed, 1997, Survey of the Status of Chinese 
Staff and Workers in 1997. Beijing, Xiyuan Chubanshe. 
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Chemical 
Fertilizer Factory 
(Jilin Industrial 
Chemicals 
Group) 
03.2002 Oil Companies in 
Daqing, Fushun, 
and Liaoyang in 
China Northeast 
09.2002 Chuandong Oil 
Exploration & 
Drilling 
Company in 
Chongqing 
11.2003 Xiangfan 
Automobile 
Earing Company 
Ltd in Hubei 
Province 
04.2003 Sichuan Dongcai 
Insulating 
Material 
Enterprise 
09.2004 Tianwang Textile 
Company, 
Shaanxi Province 
09.2004 The Chemical 
Plant in Dazhou 
in Sichuan 
Province 
owing to manager corruption 
led to 4000 workers out of jobs. 
The corrupt and murky deals 
led to direct losses of 14 billion 
Yuan in 1998 and 13 billion 
Yuan in 1999. 
5000 workers were laid off 
from state-owned oil firm, with 
unpaid benefits and back pay 
due to the managerial 
corruption. 
The retrenched workers demand 
unemployment allowances, 
adjusting the premium for their 
pensions and job placement or 
reinstatement for retrenched 
young workers. 
The privatization of the former 
state-owned company resulted 
in job losses of workers. 
Illegal buy-out of the profit 
- 
making SOE by management at 
a lower market price brought 
about state assets loss. 
The new owner of China 
Resources, a Hong Kong-listed 
firm after acquisition, imposed 
the unfair contracts on the 
workers. 
Unfair share purchase and 
allocation scheme between 
employees and management, 
and lack of communications 
with workers and the workers' 
committee in restructuring. 
promptly blocked a local 
public highway for three 
days to protest at the 
sudden closure of the 
factory. 
Over 10,000 workers went 
on street to protest and 
surround government 
buildings in the cities 
Daily sit-ins outside the 
company building. 
10,000 Workers blocked 
roads and railway lines 
across the city to force the 
government to guarantee 
their rights and interests. 
More than 1,000 workers 
launched a strike to stop 
the restructuring 
programme. 
6,800 textile workers went 
on strike and protesting for 
about seven weeks. 
Over 100 workers blocked 
the entrance to the factory's 
dormitory and demanded 
the city government to 
terminate the factory's 
allegedly illegal 
restructuring plan. 
Source: Business Week, European edition, April 8 2002; Chen (2003), and China Labour 
Bulletin, in Hong Kang, various versions, (www. china-labour. org. hk). 
The "injustice" commonly complained about by workers is their total exclusion 
from the restructuring process. In many enterprises, as in all the cases as shown in Table 
1-1, management made decisions on restructuring behind the scenes, deliberately kept 
knowledge of them from workers until they were formally announced. While official 
policies stipulate that in formulating a major restructuring scheme, especially when it 
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will affect workers' interests, workers must be consulted, 6 management seldom brings 
such issues up for open discussion in enterprises. Managers argues that open discussion 
would only create a mess and hinder restructuring measures since restructuring almost 
inevitably alters workers' existing economic status. But very often, the move to keep 
workers away from decision-making indicates that managers have something to hide 
- 
since many of them have taken advantage of restructuring for their own private benefit. 
1.1.3. Ethical Issues in Corporate Governance 
As a result of the more rapid pace of corporatization and privatization of SOEs 
since the early 1990s, corporate governance has assumed an increasing prominence in 
the reform agenda as government tried to promote enterprise performance and to look 
after its ownership stakes in various forms. The widespread and persistent financial 
distress experienced by many SOEs has added to the urgency of establishing the 
country's institutional framework for corporate governance. 
Corporate governance is concerned with the processes by which organizations 
are directed, controlled and held accountable; it requires balancing the interests of 
various stakeholders and society as a whole with economic goals of the organization 
(Bonn and Fisher 2005). China's attempt to develop a modem corporate sector in the 
last decade has been conducted under the government's primary goal of raising 
productivity and maintaining political stability and economic growth. Despite the fact 
that the traditional SOEs provided nearly cradle-to-grave services to most urban 
workers and their families, their transformation into corporate entities to compete in 
open markets has basically been a technical exercise of getting the prices right and 
making the enterprises financially viable. As a result, opportunistic and strategic 
behaviour by managers to advance their interests at the expense of the company's 
shareholders and other stakeholders has been a major governance and ethical issue. 
Figure 1-1 shows that such behaviour has even taken the form of illegal activities such 
6 For example, according to a document issued by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security 
regarding the enforcement of the Labor Law, an enterprise must notify the union and workers of 
the layoff play 30 days in advance. The union and workers have the right to express their 
opinions about the plan and revise it (see Zhongguo gongyun xue yuan gonghi xi, 2000: 231). 
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as looting of company assets and various forms of corruption within and outside the 
company, weak protection of shareholders, insider trading, self dealing and collusion in 
market manipulation; falsification and fabrication of financial data (Tam 2002). 
These opportunistic and irresponsible behaviours often take place in the 
restructuring, due to poor-quality auditing, manipulated figures for asset evaluation, 
lack of transparency and standards in property right transactions. In terms of illicit 
assets stripping of state assets, some executives took the restructuring as the entire 
withdrawal of the state from competitive sectors and advancement of the private sector. 
They were aggressive about the state asset sales, some measures employed during the 
process infringed the lawful interest and rights of the owners, creditors, and employees. 
Managers also have taken the chance of selling state assets cheaply and taking them 
over as personal property. 
One of the cases in Table 1-1 shows that in Sichuan, Dongcai Insulating Material 
Company was a profit-making SOE, in April 2003, the firm's management attempted to 
privatize the enterprise through management buyout (MBO), and it was approved by its 
supervisory ministry and the local authorities. The firm's assets were worth over 90 
million Yuan (11.1 million dollars), but the management tried to buy out the factory at 
as much lower price as possible. Thus, they worked with their own accountanth to 
manipulate the evaluation process, excluding the workers' congress in the process. As a 
consequence, the value of firm's assets was assessed as only 30 million Yuan (3.7 
million dollars), but the management brought out the firm at 60 million Yuan (5.5 
million dollars), the state lost about one third of its assets. The workers' strike and 
protest was trigged by the the irresponsible behaviour. The collective action eventually 
forced the local government to intervene, and the proposal was aborted. 
One of other ethical and moral issues is managerial corruption; it is also another 
major incitement to workers' protest, especially when workers perceive it as a serious 
encroachment on their interests. When converting their business to a shareholding 
company, the management of Shanghai Second Leather Shoes Factory put forward a 
proposal that allowed only managerial personnel to hold shares and denied workers' 
right to do so. The management also hid information on factory assets and profits from 
the workers (Chen 2003). 
In terms of protection of shareholder rights, Table 1-2 and 1-3 show that in the 
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restructuring transactions, 172 listed firms violated the security laws and regulations 
between 2000 and 2004 because they disclosed false information or failed to disclose it 
timely and accurately, falsified and fabricated financial data to the shareholders. 178 
listed firms in both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were punished by China 
Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and other authorities between 2000 and 2004. 
Table 1- 2 Incident of Infringing Interests of Stakeholders by Listed Firms 
between 2000 and 2004 
No. of firms % of total firms 
Not timely disclosure of important events 
Incorrect performance prediction or delayed 
Falsification and fabrication of financial data 
Total 
79 45.9 
48 27.9 
45 26.2 
172 100 
Source: China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) online database: data. cninfo. com. cn; Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Table 1- 3 Listed firms Punished by CSRC 2001-2004 
Shanghai Shenzhen 
Cases No. of listed firms Cases No. of listed firms 
2001 18 841 38 548 
2002 18 841 26 554 
2003 19 844 19 551 
2004 20 668 20 450 
Total 75 103 
Source: China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) online database: data. cninfo. com. cn; 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
BBC News (2001) also reported that in 2001, the CSRC found that half of 56 
companies that issued shares on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange misled shareholders; 
these companies advertised new shares to raise funds to expand their businesses, and 
then ploughed the money into stock speculation. 
Some local governments in collusion with enterprise management have been 
rushing to sell small SOEs or even profitable large and medium-sized ones by 
administrative measures, even worse, some managers and directors have seized the 
opportunity to make up fraud accounts and engage in illegal deals in the disguise of 
"selling enterprises" and have been putting state assets into their own pockets (China 
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Daily 1998). Thus, it consequently hurts SOE reform, stakehoders' rights and interests, 
and severely influences social stability. 
1.1.4. Reactions to Social Impact of Restructuring 
As being seen from the above sections, the socially irresponsible behaviours 
have resulted in severe problems of social instability, and a wide range of stakeholder 
reactions such as labour protests and strikes. It may slow down, and in some cases, stall 
the restructuring. This fact has been increasingly recognized by governments, enterprise 
management and academic researchers. Larry Lang, professor of the Chinese University 
of Hong Kong, over the past years, has written many articles targeting alleged 
wrongdoings of SOEs executives who abused their rights and powers to seek personal 
gains in SOE restructuring, and suggested that authorities suspend the large-scale selling 
of state assets until it builds an efficient regulatory scheme. His remarks have aroused 
public concerns about the loss of state assets during the SOE restructuring and related 
legal loopholes (China Daily 2004). 
Corporate stakeholder theory (Cornell and Shapiro 1987) also suggests that a 
firm must satisfy not only stockholders and bondholders, but those with less explicit, or 
implicit, claims. The stakeholder theory further contends that the value of a firm depend 
on the cost not only of explicit claims but also of implicit claims. If a firm does not act 
in a socially responsible manner, parties to implicit contracts concerning the social 
responsibility of the firm may attempt to transform those implicit agreements into 
explicit agreements that will be more costly to it. 
If a firm fails to meet promises to government officials in regard to actions that 
affect workers and other stakeholders, government agencies may find it necessary to 
pass more stringent regulations, constituting explicit contracts, to force the firm to act in 
a socially responsible manner. Moreover, socially irresponsible actions may spill over to 
other implicit stakeholders, who may doubt whether the firm would honour their claims, 
thus, firm with an image of high corporate social responsibility may find that they have 
more low-cost implicit claims than other firms and thus have higher financial 
performance (Cornell and Shapiro 1987). 
China's Supreme People's Court (SPC) promulgated a new regulation in early 
2003 to deal with the issues arising from the irresponsible enterprise restructuring 
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involving evasion of debts, wilful concealment and omission of debts, which have 
seriously impaired the interests of stakeholders such as employees, creditors, and 
business communities that have stake in the enterprises (China Daily 2003). In 
December 2003, the Chinese government issued another document to crack down on 
irregularities or malpractice in restructuring SOEs, and relevant policies have been put 
forward to regulate the approval of an SOE restructuring programmes, checks of 
company assets, audits, assets evaluations, property trade, pricing and payment in the 
guideline (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 2003). The guideline emphasizes the protection 
of employees' rights when the company starts restructuring. For example, the 
restructuring of an SOE, especially, to transform it into non-state enterprises, has to be 
discussed at the conference of workers or workers' representatives. The company will 
not start the procedure until it reaches an agreement with workers about their pay and 
benefits after restructuring, such as salary, health care insurance and housing funds. 
Payment of a state-owned property trading deal will be first used to pay compensation 
to lay off workers, defaulted salaries and social insurance premiums. 
The rigid rules have been imposed on MBO (management buyout) in SOE 
restructuring (China Daily 2004). Executives of an SOE are banned from engaging in 
any critical step of restructuring, borrowing money from the company for a buy-out and 
raising a mortgage on its state-owned property for loaning from banks, according to the 
guideline. SOE executives who steal and misuse the state-owned property will be 
penalized seriously. It pledges to crack down on the intermediary organizations that 
provide fake audits, evaluations and pricing reports in SOE restructuring programmes. 
1.2. Research Questions 
The social issues and problems Chinese government and management of firm 
faced were how to restructure/privatize enterprises with a strong socially responsible 
sense to minimize large scale job losses, and mitigate negative impact on the 
stakeholders such as workers/employees, shareholders, community, etc.. The cases 
reported in Table 1-1 reveal that most of workers' protests were triggered by the socially 
irresponsible actions, e. g. when restructuring/privatizaion occurred, workers were 
totally excluded from the restructuring process, managerial power and decisions. 
Management made decisions on restructuring behind the scenes, deliberately keeping 
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knowledge of decisions from workers until they were formally announced, not to 
mention open communications with those who are affected by restructuring. They 
seldom brings up issues arising from restructuring for open discussion in enterprises. 
In this study, therefore, I will empirically explore the questions and phenomena: 
How do Chinese managers perceive and interprete CSR and socially responsible 
restructuring (SRR)? To what extent do the managers' attitudes affect their behaviors 
with regard to SRR, are the managers whose attitudes are more in faviour of CSR may 
engage in more socially responsible restructuring? Does socially responsible 
restructuring improve firm's financial performance or does financial performance drive 
socially responsible restructuring? Whether was firm's financial performance improved 
after restructuring, and what factors might influence the change in performance 
improvement? 
In this study, there are several key concepts playing an important role for us to 
understand the relationship between CSR and firm's performance. The first concept is 
CSR, which means that a corporation should be held accountable for the consequences 
of their actions affecting the firm's stakeholders while they pursue economic goals, 
integrating social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their 
interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis. The second is SRR that is 
defined as the restructuring a firm undertakes to balance and take into consideration of 
the interests and concerns of stakeholders who are affected by the changes and 
decisions, involve the affected stakeholders in the process of restructuring through open 
communication and consultation, adopt social support programme to assist those who 
are affected after restructuring. The third one is stakeholders that is defined as all the 
groups affected by, or that can affect, an organization's decisions, policies and 
operations. The last one is CSP which is defined as "a business organization's 
configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, 
and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm's societal 
relationships" (Wood 1991a, p. 693). With a performance perspective, it is clear that 
firms must formulate and implement social goals and programmes as well as integrate 
ethical sensitivity into all decision-making policies and actions. Based on the 
definitions, the study employs two basic approaches to assess company's social 
performance in restructuring: a focus on process and a focus on outcomes. The 
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indicators for measuring socially responsible performance are developed in the survey 
instrument. 
1.3. Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised in 9 chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction; Chapter 2 
presents theory and literature review, which covers corporate social responsibility; 
enterprise restructuring, corporate governance and socially responsible restructuring; 
Chapter 3 presents the overview of enterprise reform and restructuring and its social 
impact in the People's Republic of China during the 1990s. Chapter 4 develops the 
conceptual framework and hypotheses, and Chapter 5 presents data and methodology. 
Chapter 6 examines the relationship between managers' attitudes toward CSR and their 
socially responsible behaviour; Chapter 7 discusses the relationship between firm's 
financial performance and socially responsible performance in restructuring; Chapter 8 
presents a case study of Chinese defence industry, and Chapter 9 are summary and 
conclusions. 
In Chapter 2, the literature on CSR, enterprise restructuring, corporate 
governance and socially responsible restructuring is reviewed. The review of CSR 
focuses on what CSR is; how CSR emerges and develops in China; and how to examine 
corporate social performance, and its relationship with financial performance. The 
review of enterprise restructuring presents an overview of the empirical phenomena in 
the transitional economies, the relationship between enterprise restructuring and firm's 
performance. Literature on corporate governance in the developed economies of the 
west and in the transitional economies is reviewed to highlight the governance issues 
and problems encountered in transition in order to learn lessons for China. The issue of 
management empowerment and ownership control is discussed to assess its influence on 
socially responsible restructuring. The review of socially responsible restructuring 
focuses on the definition, the examination of factors that affect the extent of socially 
responsible performance in restructuring; the role of corporate governance system in 
shaping the patterns of restructuring, and how the different corporate governance 
models influence the degree of CSP. 
Chapter 3 discusses the macro-economic background and policies of China's 
government, particularly, its impact on economic restructuring and enterprise reforms. 
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The important turning points of economic reform and policymaking since 1978 are 
reviewed to provide us with assessment of environment in which enterprises are 
restructuring and developing, and to identify the progress and constraints in 
restructuring and privatizing enterprises in China. This chapter also analyzes China's 
enterprise reform process and its impact on corporate governance, social security. 
In chapter 4 and 5, the conceptual framework for this study is designed and the 
methodology of this research is presented. The research employs both quantitative and 
qualitative methods. The management survey was conducted to assess the perceptions 
of managers toward CSR, and a case study is comprehensively analyzed to give insight 
of phenomena of socially responsible restructuring. In addition, the relationship 
between socially responsible restructuring and financial performance was investigated 
by using the data of sampled 318 listed firms. 
Chapter 6 presents the empirical study on how the managers perceive and 
interpret CSR in China, and especially, on whether socially responsible value-oriented 
managers tend to behaviour in restructuring activity in a more socially responsible 
manner. 
Chapter 7 presents the empirical examination of relationship between socially 
responsible restructuring and financial performance. This Chapter also employs 
econometric estimation model to explore the sources of firm performance changes; 
focus is placed on examining the relationship between social responsible performance 
and firm's performance in pre-and post-restructuring. 
Chapter 8 presents the empirical result of a case study of Chinese defence 
industry. The case study illustrates how a Chinese firm attempts to balance the 
economic and social priorities in enterprise restructuring, and to provide us with an 
insight into how socially responsible restructuring actions can lead to successful 
outcomes and not always entail job losses, and thus minimizing the negative aspects 
associated with restructuring. 
Finally in Chapter 9, a synthesis of the results of the study is presented. The 
findings of the study are elaborated, implications of the study are assessed and some 
policy recommendations are derived from the findings. 
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Chapter 2 Theory and Literature 
2.1. Introduction 
In this Chapter, I will review and discuss the theory and literature which can 
provide theoretical framework for defining the concept of socially responsible 
restructuring, and the methodology for examining the relationship between socially 
responsible restructuring and firm's performance. 
The literature review is organized around and related directly to the research 
questions. I will look at issues of theory, methodology in the fields of CSR, enterprise 
restructuring, corporate governance and socially responsible restructuring. The literature 
review is done by a guiding concept 
- 
stakeholder theory. The stakeholder theory is a 
core concept in this study, because gaining a better understanding of the firm's 
performance and social responsibility has been accounting for and managing the 
interests or "stakes" of key players inside and outside of the organization. Difference in 
and conflict among various stakeholders can have a dramatic effect on the ability of any 
organization to perform efficiently and in socially responsible way (Becker and Potter 
2002). 
The stakeholder theory is applied to evaluate corporate social performance in 
restructuring by analyzing corporation's relationships with its stakeholders. The 
concepts of CSR, and corporate governance and restructuring are also devloped and 
defined against stakeholder theory. 
The Chapter is organized in four Sections, in addition to this introduction. 
Section 2.2 investigates what CSR is, and what issues and problems of CSR that 
China's firms face. The relationship between CSP and financial performance is 
examined in the previous researches. Section 2.3 defines the concept of restructuring, 
and takes an overview of the empirical phenomena in the transitional economies, and 
then examines how restructuring has been constructed as both positive development and 
antisocial behaviour in different social science literature. The relationship between 
enterprise restructuring and firm's performance is also explored. In Section 2.4, 
corporate governance was reviewed to draw out implications about the relationship 
between corporate governance and corporate restructuring. I present the different 
models of corporate governance, and its impact on the extent of socially responsible 
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performance. The issues of corporate governance in transitional economies are also 
analyzed. Section 2.5 intends to examine what is socially responsible restructuring, what 
factors affect the extent of socially responsible performance in restructuring; what is the 
role of corporate governance system in shaping the patterns of restructuring. 
2.2. Corporate Social Responsibility 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has grown exponentially in the last decade. 
A larger number of companies have been increasingly engaged in a serious effort to 
define and integrate CSR into all aspects of their businesses. An increasing number of 
shareholders, analysts, regulators, activists, labour unions, employees, community 
organizations, and news media are asking companies to be accountable for an ever- 
changing set of CSR issues. Managers continually encounter demands from multiple 
stakeholder groups to devote resources to CSR. These pressures emerge from customers, 
employees, suppliers, communities, governments, and stockholders, especially 
institutional shareholders. 
Freeman (1984) argues that firms have relationships with many constituent 
groups and that these stakeholders both affect and are affected by the actions of the firm. 
Stakeholder theory, which has emerged as the dominant paradigm in CSR, has evolved 
in several new and important ways. When business interacts so often and so closely 
with society, a shared interest and interdependence develops between a company and 
other social groups. When this occurs, corporate stakeholders are created. Stakeholders 
are all the groups affected by, or that can affect, an organization's decisions, policies, 
and operations. The concept of stakeholder personalizes social or societal 
responsibilities by delineating the specific groups or persons that business should 
consider in its CSR orientation. Management challenge is to decide which stakeholders 
merit and receive consideration in the decision-making process. A company's success 
can be affected negatively or positively by its stakeholders. In an era when business 
strategies are changing because of such forces as global competition, new political 
arrangements, shifting public values, and ecological concerns, managers are challenged 
to achieve good economic results while also considering the needs and requirements of 
their business's stakeholders (Post, Lawrence, and Weber 2001). Clarkson's long-term 
study of corporate behaviour (Clarkson 1995) indicates that companies deal with 
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stakeholders, not society, and that CSR must distinguish between stakeholder needs and 
social issues; managers can address stakeholder requirements but not abstract social 
policy. 
Carroll (1979) suggests CSR has different layers: economic, legal, ethical and 
discretionary categories of business performance and those business leaders must decide 
the layer at which they choose to operate. Carroll proposed a four-part definition of 
CSR that was embedded in a conceptual model of CSP. His basic argument was that for 
managers or firms to engage in CSP they needed to have (a) a basic definition of CSR, 
(b) an understanding/enumeration of the issues for which a social responsibility existed 
(or, in modem terms, stakeholders to whom the firm had a responsibility, relationship, 
or dependency), and (c) a specification of the philosophy of responsiveness to the issues 
(p. 499). I will restrict my discussion here to the basic CSR definition. 
At the time of his proposal, Carroll noted that previous definitions had alluded to 
businesses' responsibility to make a profit, obey the law, and "go beyond" these 
activities. Also, he observed that to be complete, the definition had to embrace a full 
range of responsibilities of business to society. In addition, some clarification was 
needed regarding that component of CSR that extended beyond making a profit and 
obeying the law. Therefore, Carroll offered the following definition: "The social 
responsibility of business encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary 
expectations that society has of organizations at a given point in time" (Carroll, 1979, p. 
500). 
Carroll argued that business has a responsibility that is economic in nature or 
kind: Before anything else, the business institution is the basic economic unit in our 
society. As such it has a responsibility to produce goods and services that society wants 
and to sell them at a profit. All other business roles are predicated on this fundamental 
assumption (Carroll, 1979, p. 500). The economic component of the definition suggests 
that society expects business to produce goods and services and sell them at a profit. 
This is how the capitalistic economic system is designed and functions. Just as society 
expects business to make a profit (as an incentive and reward) for its efficiency and 
effectiveness, society expects business to obey the law. The law represents the basic 
"rules of the game" by which business is expected to function. Society expects business 
to fulfil its economic mission within the framework of legal requirements set forth by 
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the society's legal system. Thus, the legal responsibility is the second part of the 
definition (Carroll, 1979, p. 500). 
The next two responsibilities represented Carroll's attempt to specify the kind or 
nature of the responsibilities that extend beyond obedience to the law. The ethical 
responsibility represents the kinds of behaviours and ethical norms that society expects 
business to follow These extend to behaviours and practices that are beyond what is 
required by the law. Although they seem to be always expanding, they nevertheless exist 
as expectations "over and beyond legal requirements" (Carroll, 1979, p. 500). In later 
writings (Carroll 1981; Carroll 1991), Carroll elaborated on the ethical responsibility 
component, which he saw as growing in importance. Finally, there are discretionary 
responsibilities. These represent voluntary roles that business assumes but for which 
society does not provide as clear-cut an expectation as it does in the ethical 
responsibility. These are left to individual managers' and corporations' judgment and 
choice; however, the expectation that business perform these still exists. This 
expectation is driven by social norms. The specific activities are guided by businesses' 
desire to engage in social roles not mandated or required by law and not expected of 
businesses in an ethical sense, but which are increasingly strategic. Examples of these 
voluntary activities, during the time in which it was written, included making 
philanthropic contributions, conducting in-house programs for drug abusers, training the 
hard-core unemployed, or providing day-care centres for working mothers (Carroll, 
1979, p. 500). 
In 1983, Carroll further elaborated on his 1979 four-part definition of CSR: In 
his view, CSR involves the conduct of a business so that it is economically profitable, 
law abiding, ethical and socially supportive. To be socially responsible 
... 
then means 
that profitability and obedience to the law are foremost conditions to discussing the 
firm's ethics and the extent to which it supports the society in which it exists with 
contributions of money, time and talent. Thus, CSR is composed of four parts: 
economic, legal, ethical and voluntary or philanthropic (Carroll, 1983, p. 604). In his 
statement, Carroll reoriented the discretionary component as involving voluntarism 
and/or philanthropy, because this seemed to be the arena from which the best examples 
of discretionary activities came. 
28 
In 1991, Carroll revisited his four-part CSR definition (Carroll, 1991). By this 
time, Carroll was referring to the discretionary component as philanthropic and 
suggesting that it embraced "corporate citizenship. " He stated that for CSR to be 
accepted by the conscientious business person, it should be framed in such a way that 
the entire range of business responsibilities is embraced. It is suggested here that four 
kinds of social responsibilities constitute total CSR: economic, legal, ethical and 
philanthropic. Furthermore, these four categories or components of CSR might be 
depicted as a pyramid. To be sure, all of these kinds of responsibilities have always 
existed to some extent, but it has only been in recent years that ethical and philanthropic 
functions have taken a significant place. (p. 40) 
The pyramid of CSR depicted the economic category as the base (the foundation 
upon which all others rest), and then built upward through legal, ethical, and 
philanthropic categories (Carroll, 1991, p. 42). Carroll made it clear that business should 
not fulfil these in sequential fashion but that each is to be fulfilled at all times. It also 
should be observed that the pyramid was more of a graphical depiction of CSR than an 
attempt to add new meaning to the four-part definition. Stated in more pragmatic and 
managerial terms, Carroll summarized, "The CSR firm should strive to make a profit, 
obey the law, be ethical, and be a good corporate citizen" (p. 43). In this same article, 
Carroll provided segue from CSR to stakeholder theory/management by observing, 
"There is a natural fit between the idea of corporate social responsibility and an 
organization's stakeholders" (p. 43). He argues that the term "social" in CSR has been 
seen by some as vague and lacking in specificity as to whom the corporation is 
responsible, Carroll suggested that the stakeholder concept, popularized by Freeman 
(1984), personalizes social or societal responsibilities by delineating the specific groups 
or persons business should consider in its CSR orientation and activities. Thus, the 
stakeholder nomenclature puts "names and faces" on the societal members or groups 
who are most important to business and to whom it must be responsive. 
2.2.1. Concept and Definition 
In academic debates and business environments, hundreds of concepts and 
definitions have been proposed referring to a more humane, more ethical, more 
transparent way of doing business. 
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Marrewijk (2003) provides an overview of the contemporary debate on the 
concepts and definitions of CSR and corporate sustainability (CS). The conclusions he 
made, based on historical perspectives, philosophical analyses, impact of changing 
contexts and situations and practical considerations, show that "one solution fits all"- 
definition for CS(R) should be abandoned, accepting various and more specific 
definitions matching the development, awareness and ambition levels of organizations. 
In academic literature, various authors have referred to a sequence of three 
approaches, each including and transcending one other, showing past responses to the 
question to which an organization has a responsibility. According to the shareholder 
approach which is regarded by Quazi and O'Brien (2000) as the classical view on CSR, 
"the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits" (Friedman 1962). The 
shareholder, in pursuit of profit maximization, is the focal point of the company and 
socially responsible activities don't belong to the domain of organizations but are a 
major task of governments. This approach can also be interpreted as business 
enterprises being concerned with CSR "only to the extent that it contributes to the aim 
of business, which is the creation of long-term value for the owners of the business" 
(Foley 2000). 
The stakeholder approach indicates that organization is not only accountable to 
its shareholders but should also balance a multiplicity of stakeholders' interests that can 
affect or are affected by the achievement of an organization's objectives (Freeman 
1984). According to the societal approach, regarded as the broader view on CSR (and 
not necessarily the contemporary view), companies are responsible to society as a 
whole, of which they are an integral part. They operate by public consent (licence to 
operate) in order to "serve constructively the needs of society 
- 
to the satisfaction of 
society". 
The philanthropic approaches might be the roots of CSR, but the different 
approaches to corporate responsibility clearly show that CSR is a new and distinct 
phenomenon. Its societal approach especially appears to be a (strategic) response to 
changing circumstances and new corporate challenges that had not previously occurred. 
It requires organizations to fundamentally rethink their position and act in terms of the 
complex societal context of which they are a part. This is a new perspective. 
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In summary, CSR means that a corporation should be held accountable for the 
consequences of their actions affecting the firm's stakeholders while they pursue 
traditional economic goals, integrating social and environmental concerns in their 
business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis. 
2.2.2. Perceptions of Managers toward CSR 
Many studies argue that the attitudes and intentions of top management are 
central to the strategy process of a firm. Katz (1960) claims that attitudes provide people 
with a framework within which to interpret the world and integrate new experiences. 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) further suggested that by understanding an individual's 
attitudes toward something, one can predict that individual's "overall pattern of 
responses" to the object. They argued that a single behaviour is determined by the 
intention to perform the behaviour in question. A person's intention is in turn a function 
of his attitude towards performing the behaviour. Not only will, therefore, managerial 
values frame the issues evaluation process but they are also likely to directly shape the 
issue management process as well. 
Wood (1991a) underscores individual or managerial intentions as the motivators 
of socially responsible behaviour, the management of stakeholder expectations as an 
integral part of the process, and an emphasis on programmes and policies as the primary 
outcomes of those processes, an assessment of a manager's attitudes toward to corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), then, may provide an indication of the manager's 
predisposition to respond in a particular way to CSR. One striking case could illustrate 
their arguments. It is reported in Europe, the French-based food group Danone has long 
had an image as a "socially responsible company". Antoine Riboud, who was head of 
the company until 1996, cultivated a reputation as a "socially-oriented boss". He and his 
successors always live up to the socially responsible-oriented value, although since late 
1990s, Danöne Group has undergone restructurings in different sectors, have been 
undertaken in a more socially responsible manner, and become the model of socially 
responsible restructuring in Europe. 
Keith Davis's landmark article laid the foundation and benchmark for the 
researchers to assess attitudes of managers toward CSR (Davis 1973). He stressed some 
of the important arguments relating to the case for and against the business assumption 
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of social responsibility. Later, most of researchers (Rashid and Ibrahim 2002; Quazi and 
O'Brien 2000; Ostlund 1977; Orpen 1987; Ford and McLaughlin 1984) incorporated 
many of the same arguments in their studies, aimed at measuring managerial attitudes 
toward social responsibility. Although the statements used in their studies modified in 
terms of language, style and direction to suit their research purposes, the format used in 
their studies is similar to each other. 
Some of the studies attempted to examine the attitudes of different groups in one 
country. Ostlund (1977), Ford and McLaughlin (1984) surveyed two different groups in 
US and examined different attitudes. Ostlund (1977) conducted survey of Fortune 500 
executives to compare the attitudes toward social responsibility expressed by corporate 
policy makers with those of a group of operating level managers. The study centred on 
six areas of greatest concern among top executives, which included the arguments for 
and against corporate CSR involvement; the CSR priority; the extent of difficulty which 
managers see their corporations experiencing these same CSR areas; the extent of 
manager involvement in policy formulation and implementation within each CSR area; 
the difference between top management and operating management attitudes toward 
specific aspects of CSR areas, and finally, the implementation difficulties. The results 
of his research showed that operating managers were at least as inclined as top 
managers to agree with statements in support of CSR. Moreover, their degree of non- 
acceptance of commonly recited obstacles or barriers to CSR policy implementation 
was found to be no different from that of top managers. Ford (1984) compared the 
perceptions of corporate executives and business school deans about CSR to determine 
whether or not business leaders and business educators are in agreement as to what 
practices are evidence of socially responsible behaviour, how intensely these activities 
are being supported by business leaders, and what arguments for and against the 
acceptance of corporate social responsibility have merit. Ford's study claims that both 
dean and CEOs recognizes very similar priorities for socially responsible activities, with 
the CEOs having the more sanguine viewpoint. In addition, there appears to be more 
sceptical perspective among the dean than the CEOs in their statements about the basis 
of support for social responsibility. 
Orphen (1987) and Quazi (2000) used the same approach to study the two 
groups in different countries and investigated the cross-national model of CSR. Orpen 
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(1987) assessed the attitudes of 164 US and 151 South African managers toward 
corporate social responsibility. It was found that the US managers held much more 
favourable attitudes toward corporate social responsibility. Also, the US managers 
agreed with more pro-responsibility arguments, whereas the South African managers 
agreed with more anti-responsibility arguments. The US managers felt that their society 
expected more corporate involvement in social responsibility activities than the South 
African managers believed was expected from their society. The results were explained 
in terms of the susceptibility of social responsibility attitudes to cultural norms and 
values, which show the different nature of the two societies. Quazi (2000) attempted to 
develop a two-dimensional model of corporate social responsibility and empirically test 
its validity in the context of two dissimilar cultures-Australia and Bangladesh. It was 
concluded that corporate social responsibility is two-dimensional and universal in nature 
and that differing cultural and market settings in which managers operate may have 
little impact on the ethical perceptions of corporate managers. 
Some of the researchers investigated the change in the attitudes of the executives 
over time. For example, Holmes (1976) examined the executive perceptions of CSR in 
the USA and how their opinions and the philosophies of their firms concerning social 
responsibility have changed over the past five-year period (1970-1975), and what future 
changes they a nticipate. The results showed that a significant change in executive 
opinions and corporate philosophies of social responsibility has occurred over the past 
five-year period. Executive anticipated more positive than negative outcomes from the 
social efforts of their firms, and almost all executives believed that corporate reputation 
and goodwill would be enhanced through social endeavours. Factors relating to the 
special competencies of the corporate and the seriousness of a social need were believed 
to be the most influential in the selection of areas for corporate social involvement. The 
majority of executives was optimistic about the ability of business to alleviate social 
problems and believed that the level of corporate social efforts was only partially 
determined by general economic conditions. Rashid and Ibrahim (2002) examined the 
attitudes of Malaysian managers and executives toward social responsibility and also 
the extent of socially responsible activities involved, corporate disclosure, and the 
factors determining the attitudes towards social responsibility over the past ten years 
(1991-2001). The findings of the study indicate that although the Malaysian executives 
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and managers had positive attitudes toward CSR, the extent of their involvement in 
CSR was lower in year 2002 than a decade ago. The extent of corporate disclosure on 
CSR was nevertheless slightly higher in 2001 than in 1991. It implies that while CSR is 
not a recent phenomenon in Malaysia, the level of awareness appears to have improved 
slightly. 
Lerner and Fryxell (1994) study the issue from the different perspective. They 
employed Wood's corporate social performance model (1991) to investigate CEO 
stakeholder attitudes and corporate social activities. In this study, various corporate 
social activities were regressed on self-report measures of stakeholder-orientations from 
220 CEOs from large Fortune500 industrial and service firms. The results demonstrated 
that at least, with regard to discretionary activities, such as charitable activity, the 
preference of the CEO may have a direct, albeit modest, influence. The relationship 
between CEO attitudes toward certain stakeholder groups (e. g. stockholder, employees, 
customers, managers, government, and community) and actual corporate activities 
geared toward those groups are unclear. CEO intentions or preference are constrained 
by a combination of external conditions and internal inertia or simply diluted in their 
passage down the organization. This study empirically reveals that CEOs do attribute 
varying degrees of importance to different stakeholder groups, and to some degree, 
these prioritizations actually translate into corporate actions. 
Some researchers turned the attention to developing countries in this area. Teoh 
and Thong (1984) focused their research on attitudes of management in developing 
countries. They believed that the philosophy of top management and legislation are 
primary factors contributing to corporate social awareness. Nearly 50 percent of 
respondents considered the view that the social responsibility of business is reflected in 
the active concern for the social impact of the economic activities of business. This 
study examined the variations in social involvement by the type of business activity, and 
found some differences. 
Gill and Leinbach (1983) conducted a survey in Hong Kong to identify what 
attitudes concerning social responsibility prevail in Hong Kong corporations. After 
examining the attitudes of senior and middle managers toward consumerism, 
shareholders, employees, society, customers, the survey found that there appeared to be 
little room for the practice of social responsibility, Although there were some positive 
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attitudes toward CSR, there were also negative attitudes toward it. For instance, whereas 
81 percent of respondents agreed on the statement that firms should be concerned about 
the environmental and social consequences of their business activities even to the extent 
of sacrificing short-term profitability, only 35 percent agreed that a company should 
subscribe to charities for humanitarian reasons rather than for public relations of self- 
interest. In examining the determinants of the managers' attitudes toward CSR, the 
study found that family training and upbringing, and traditional beliefs and customers 
are primary factors. Rashid and Abdullah (1991) judged that family upbringing was 
rated as the most important factor, followed by religious training. The conduct of 
superiors was ranked third, followed by traditional beliefs and customers. 
2.2.3. CSR in China: Issues and Problems 
In China, CSR or corporate citizenship has been introduced to practitioners and 
academic researchers only in recent years. The introduction is driven by both external 
and internal factors. Externally, over the past few years, particularly after China's entry 
into WTO, more multinational corporations have expanded their businesses in China, 
with the rise in trade, the requirements for good quality of products and services are 
increased, and hence the attention of trading with China has caused the tension between 
business practice based on profit-making and anti-capitalist campaign promoting 
operation standards, best business practices, western values and moral standards. 
Internally, more Chinese corporate activities have expanded into the global market; it is 
imperative that managers adopt different business culture. Such cultural expectations 
from host countries include CSR behaviour of their firms, dealing with different culture- 
based corporate conduct for managers in international business. It is important for these 
enterprises to better understand and anticipate the expectations different host countries 
may have for CSR in the context of international business. These companies may serve 
as agents of change promoting ethical and responsible business behaviour in China. 
CSR has been of major concerns in China's society in recent years. Since 
economic reform, role of the Chinese businesses in the new division of social 
responsibilities has been changing, but often changing in the opposite direction to that 
prescribed by advocates of increased CSR. The goal of economic freedom and 
individual wealth has grown rapidly in China and has replaced the former Confucian 
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and Maoist values. More and more attention is paid to economic gain, while balancing 
profits and moral standards is becoming less important. These changes have led to and 
influenced CSR and definition of key stakeholders. More and more Chinese business 
people are generally more motivated by profit and view profitability as the primary 
overriding goal. Professional morality has weakened, social responsibility has dimmed 
and the phenomenon of money-worship has grown. Problems have grown with over- 
stressing material interests, putting profit before everything and over-emphasizing 
competition by fair means or foul and engaging in local protectionism. Under increasing 
pressure from market competition, enterprises may pay too much attention to economic 
gains and leave loopholes in balancing profits and moral standards. 
Chinese SOEs are increasingly liberated from welfare provisions and allowed to 
get down profiting maximization. Some of the most economically dynamic sectors of 
the economy, such as the nominally "collective" rural industries have driven in an 
almost complete unregulated environment. Many of these frontier industries have been 
highly polluting and have offered low wages and minimal health and safety standards to 
non-unionized rural migrants, of whom there is nonetheless a steady supply. Such 
industries have been highly profitable (Young and MacRae 2002). The paradoxical 
phenomenon is that the more profits people are making, the less social responsibility 
they are assuming. The integrity and ethics of managers have been questioned, and it 
leads the heated debate with regard to whether the corporate responsibility to society 
should be one of the most important standards to assess firm's performance. 
The issues and problems of CSR that Chinese firms are facing reflect in the 
corporate governance arrangements as well which are required to be established in firms 
during the transformation of SOEs into the modem enterprise system 
China is establishing its corporate governance structures by emulating the 
stylized Anglo-American model. However, the country does not yet have the necessary 
formal and informal institutions or the financial infrastructure to make these structures 
work effectively. Corruption, stock market manipulation, tax cheating, fraudulent 
dealing, all manners of plundering of state assets and the lack of protection of 
shareholders' rights are some of the more conspicuous manifestations of the ethical 
issues that have emerged in this mismatch. 
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In many ways, nowhere are such new ethical issues brought into sharper focus 
than in the development of corporate governance in China's listed companies, the 
supposedly most modem and market-oriented business organizations in China. Tarn 
(2002) examines the key corporate governance and ethical issues associated with this 
type of companies. As a result of the more rapid pace of corporatization and de facto 
privatization of state owned enterprises since the early 1990s, corporate governance has 
assumed an increasing prominence in China's reform agenda as the Chinese government 
tried to promote enterprise performance and to look after its ownership stakes in various 
forms. The widespread and persistent financial distress experienced by many SOEs has 
added to the urgency of getting the country's corporate governance right. 
Tam's study (2000) reveals that the business ethical issues associated with 
China's corporate governance arrangements are the product of several interacting 
factors. They stem firstly from the struggle between the desire to install "modem" 
institutions and instruments, and the unbalanced progress in the development of 
complementary social, political, legal and economic infrastructures. Another equally 
important factor can be attributed to the approach taken by the Chinese government to 
establish a corporate governance system based on the stylized Anglo-American model. 
Tam identifies and explains the emerging ethical issues in the context of the 
China's evolving macro environment as well as its corporate governance arrangements. 
He argued that in China's listed firms, the opportunistic and strategic behaviour by 
firms' directors and managers to advance their interests at the expense of the company's 
shareholders and other stakeholders has been a major governance and ethical issue. 
Such behaviour has even taken the form of illegal activities such as looting of company 
assets and various forms of corruption within and outside the company. 
Protection of shareholders rights 
The current ownership structure of China's listed companies, the constraints and 
interventions exerted by the state on them, and the inability of the government to 
effectively exercise its rights as the majority shareholder combine to produce a 
multitude of governance and ethical issues for policy makers, investors as well as 
company board chairman and chief executives. First, the state is the majority 
shareholder but is not exercising its ownership rights effectively. Instead the insider 
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managers and their Party-ministerial associates who personally have negligible 
shareholding hold the control of the company. Thus, in reality the governance and the 
purpose of the firm are determined by the insiders, often involving government agencies 
other than the designated holder of the state shares. 
In the Czech and Russian privatization process, the insiders rapidly gained 
concentrated ownership. This has not happened in China. However, the corporate 
regulatory regime in China is in principle geared to accommodate diverse share 
ownership as the Anglo-American model is the object of emulation. Unfortunately, it 
has been shown that the primary purpose for Chinese state enterprises going public is to 
raise capital, not to transfer ownership from state to private citizens'. Indeed raising 
capital from the capital market can mean survival for many of the SOEs that have been 
partially privatized in this manner. 
From an analytical perspective, the board of directors can be interpreted as a 
security feature in support of the contract for equity finance, but China's partially 
privatized listed companies are in a peculiar position as the individual minority 
shareholders that actually provide much of the equity finance are quite powerless in the 
entire governance scheme. As the state shareholders cannot manage their equity 
investment because their shares are not tradable on the market, and because state 
budgetary constraint means they will have little access to fiscal resources to participate 
in capital augmentation such as rights issues, their ownership stake is highly constricted. 
The result is that, even if there were no self-serving strategic behaviour on the 
part of directors and managers, there will be the difficult issue of resolving the different 
interests and pursuits of the central and sub-national levels of government in setting the 
goal and direction of a company's business and governance aspirations. Examples of 
such conflicting interests may include employment creation and maintenance, welfare 
for workers, social stability, and government revenue collection. The actual reality in 
China where the rights of the numerous individual minority shareholders are often 
disregarded does not help in providing directors and executives a basis for the resolution 
of this issue. A conclusion that can be drawn from the above discussion is that given the 
' Su, Dongwei, 2000, Leverage, Insider Ownership, and the Underpricing of IPOs in China. 
Department of Economics, University of Akron, Ohio. 
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circumstances in China, the protection of minority shareholders' interest is ironically a 
precondition for the state to better manage its own majority shareholder interest. 
Insider trading, self dealing and collusion in market manipulation 
It was after the Securities Law came into effect in July 1999 that the Chinese 
authorities (notably the China Securities Regulatory Commission [CSRC]) began a 
more active campaign to investigate cases of insider trading and market manipulation. 
Although details are not always readily available, such activities seem rampant and 
persistent as evidenced by the revelations made in recent prosecutions and by the 
popularity of books on how individuals can take advantage of such activities. The 
common practice seems to involve a company, either acting on its own or in collusion 
with others. Borrowed or own funds are channelled through a large number of factitious 
or personal investor accounts to engage in buying and selling of its own shares (i. e., self 
dealing) or other companies' shares to influence market prices and trading volume to 
attain personal financial gains. Clearly such activities would have been detected quite 
easily should there be effective corporate governance arrangements and regulatory 
surveillance and enforcement mechanisms. 
Market manipulation activities of this nature would be difficult to succeed 
without the consent or cooperation of securities investment firms or brokerage 
companies. China's fledging securities industry is certainly under-developed and has on 
many occasions not been able to deliver the supporting governance role expected of 
them. 
More significant is the fact that some of the securities firms actually engaged on 
their own in similar kind of activities on an even grander scale. The recently reported 
case of the alleged market manipulation and corruption by a provincial branch head of a 
major securities and brokerage firm is indicative of the problem. " The manager in 
question was alleged to have opened 900 factitious investor accounts in the name of her 
associate to apply for new scribes from Initial Public Offerings (IPO), using company 
funds and unauthorized mortgage credits. Since most IPO in China are under-priced, 38 
successes in getting scribes is therefore almost a certain way of making quick profits. 
This may indeed be an important factor that has contributed to the tendency of some 
companies to falsify financial statements to gain new listing or to expand share issues. 
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Falsification and fabrication of financial data 
Under China's current conditions, obtaining a public listing for many companies 
is a cheap way of finance that will also bestow enormous legitimate and illegitimate 
benefits to a company's managers and employees. Because the listing procedures are 
based on a national quota system, regional and sectional interests may dominate 
commercial considerations in the selection of companies. The standards and integrity of 
professionals such as accounting, legal and securities firms are seriously compromised 
when falsification of a company's financial performance occurs. China's formal and 
informal institutions needed to support its corporate governance system are still at a 
very early stage of development. Because of the asymmetrical nature of these 
institutions to the needed development of some of the prerequisites of the Anglo- 
American corporate governance model, issues such as the above are bound to inflict 
damages. 
In conclusion it is clear that specific ethical issues such as protection of 
shareholders and other stakeholders rights, corruption, plundering of state and company 
assets, and fraudulent dealings are the product of weaknesses in China's corporate 
governance structures as well the asymmetrical development in formal and informal 
institutions under which all companies have to operate. China has patterned its formal 
corporate governance structures on the Anglo-American model but lacks the required 
institutional and market conditions. These institutions will take some time to develop to 
suit the country's particular economic, financial and political circumstances. Ethical 
issues that have arisen in the process of the country's reform and development are path 
dependent and intertwined with the formal and informal aspects of the economy, society 
and polity. 
2.2.4. Corporate Social Performance and Firm's Performance 
2.2.4.1. What is Corporate Social Performance? 
The evolution of corporate social performance (CSP) research is marked by 
several distinct generations of work. Initially, there was an energetic push to develop 
and define CSR construct as a rebuttal to the notion that a corporation owed a duty only 
to its stockholders. That is, firms owe a duty to society stretching beyond shareholders 
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(Jones 1980). Next did the operationalization of this definition (CSP) come, which 
researchers used to test the social responsibility notion by outlining the various duties or 
constituency groups that corporations must honour? 
CSP can be defined as a business organization's configuration of principles of 
social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and policies, programs, and 
observable outcomes as they relate to the firm's societal relationships (Wood 1991a). 
Building on this definition, Wood and Jone (1995) propose that stakeholder theory is the 
key to understanding the structure and dimensions of the firm's societal relationships. 
They redefine the policies, programs, and outcomes as "internal stakeholder effects, 
external stakeholder effects, and external institutional effects" and argue that 
stakeholders set norms for corporate behaviour, experience the effects of corporate 
behaviour, and evaluate corporate behaviour. 
2.2.4.2. Measurement of CSP 
Single Dimension as Proxies for CSP 
Wood (1991) develops a hierarchy of interpenetrating dimensions: principles, 
processes, and outcomes. Clarkson (1995) categorizes CSP dimensions according to 
different stakeholder groups surrounding the focal organization. In addition, other 
schemes include dimensions corresponding to particular issues. For example, Post and 
Baer (1980) examine the issues involved with the use of infant formula in less 
developed countries. In addition, the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) database, 
an extensively utilized measure of CSP, includes "exclusionary screens" (Domini Social 
Investments 1997), which identify social issues from which firms should not gain 
economic rents, such as alcohol, gambling, smoking, weapons manufacturing, and 
nuclear power generation. 
Although CSP is a multidimensional construct, many researchers rely on a single 
dimension in their operationalization. Generalizations about the CSP-financial 
performance (FP) link have been made from studies that operationalize CSP using air 
pollution (Chen and Metcalf 1980; Freeman and Jaggi 1994; Shane and Spicer 1983), 
illegal activity (Davidson and Worrell 1988; Baucus 1989) and product recall (Hoffer, 
Pruitt, and Reilly 1988; Bromiley and Marcus 1989). Two criticisms are commonly 
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directed at the practice of performing single dimension studies. First, these studies do 
not capture firms' social performance as they "inadequately reflect the breadth of the 
construct" (Griffin and Mahon 1997) and thus lack an appropriate level of validity. A 
clean record on air pollution does not uncover other aspects of CSP, such as illegal 
activity (antitrust, insider-trading), employee relationship issues (sweatshop labour in 
less developed countries), or products deemed socially undesirable (weapons or nuclear 
power). For example, through the stakeholder lens, CSP is a measure of a firm's 
behaviour toward several constituent groups (see Jones, 1980). As such, attention to 
anyone stakeholder group, or issue for that matter, neglects other groups/dimensions and 
cannot independently serve as a proxy for CSP. 
Second, in addition to validity problems, the reliability of this approach is 
suspect. Generalizations from these studies and comparisons to other CSP studies have 
little credibility and provide few insights. In the set of studies they examine, (Reed et al 
1990) find that social performance is measured in at least 14 different ways. How do we 
compare empirical CSP studies employing firms' toxic release profiles to those 
exclusively focusing on illegal activity? There is no reason to assume that these studies 
will lead to consistent findings or that comparisons would have any meaning. Moreover, 
this comparison problem is exacerbated because many CSP-FP studies involve multiple 
industries (Griffin & Mahon, 1997), which are characterized by distinct issues and 
stakeholders. These industry-level factors make comparisons across studies meaningless 
as there is no way to control for heterogeneity related to the dependent variable. That is, 
we cannot assume that the appropriate dimensions of CSP in a given organizational field 
(or industry) are also relevant and form a comprehensive set for another operational 
setting. Thus, single dimension research designs lack the validity and reliability 
necessary for generalizing study findings beyond the research setting. As a result, this 
design significantly limits our ability to build understanding of CSP phenomena. 
Aggregating Multiple Dimensions 
Another common research design has been to aggregate several CSP dimensions 
into a composite measure. However, there are a number of issues related to composite 
measures. For example, by aggregating multiple dimensions into a composite measure, 
much of the meaning and richness in the data might be lost, and comparison across 
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firms (and studies) might be more difficult; there is also a question of whether all the 
dimensions comprising the measure should receive the same weight. Moreover, multiple 
dimensional studies do not necessarily rely on the same set of dimensions, which raises 
two issues: What are the appropriate dimensions required to build a comprehensive CSP 
measure? How can we make comparisons across studies without a common measure? 
Griffin and Mahon (1997) offer a solution that addresses the problems inherent 
in each of these multiple dimension measures. They build an aggregate measure based 
on a firm's average rank across multiple measures: Fortune Reputation Survey, Toxic 
Release Index, Corporate Philanthropy Index, and Domini Social Index. "The 
combination of both perceptual and numerical information (KLD) allows us to 
triangulate toward a representative measure of a firm's corporate social performance 
while mitigating the limitations and impacts of any single one of the measures". 
However, there is no reason to assume that the combination of these independent (but 
perhaps overlapping) measures will actually address the problems in each one. The 
dimensions that overlap across these measures, such as the pollution prevention 
category in the KLD data and emission levels in the Toxic Release Index, gain more 
importance (weight), whereas other categories gain less power in determining a firm's 
CSP. The relative weights assigned to each dimension are a by-product of this particular 
operationalization rather than a theoretical rationale that argues why this approach better 
captures the latent construct. 
In addition, Rowley and Berman (2000) argue that the stream of work that 
aggregates multiple CSP dimensions utilizes an inappropriate research design. More 
specifically, in many cases, the choice of analytical model is mis-specified given the 
nature of the data and dimensions combined to represent CSP. For example, consider the 
components of the commonly used KLD measure: community (charitable giving, and 
support for housing, education, and other social initiatives), diversity (female and 
minority promotion, special interest group policies), employee relations (union relations, 
retirement benefits and employee profit sharing, and empowerment), environment 
(product attributes, pollution prevention, and recycling), and so on. Researchers 
employing this and other multidimensional operationalization have not provided a 
theoretical rationale suggesting these dimensions are correlated. Moreover, we suggest 
that there is no general theoretical reason to assume that charitable giving, employee 
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profit sharing, and pollution prevention are significantly correlated. Also, there is 
empirical evidence that the KLD dimensions are not strongly correlated (Berman, Wicks, 
Kotha, & Jones, 1999; Johnson & Greening, 1999). Thus, the aggregation of dimensions 
does not represent a coherent latent (unobservable) variable. 
As such, what can be expected from studies that perform correlation or OLS 
regression analyses of the relationships between CSP and other factors, such as financial 
performance? What would a significant finding indicate? Given the weak correlation 
structure among CSP dimensions, a positive and significant CSP-financial performance 
relationship would mean that some subset of the aggregated dimensions of CSP are 
related to financial performance, but the overall relationship has no meaning. Because 
the CSP measure is not internally correlated, suggesting that certain empirical findings 
show an association between CSP and financial performance is inaccurate and 
misleading. In addition, the explained variance is likely to be small because the 
unrelated CSP dimensions would contribute to the model's error term. Thus, this 
research design is mis-specified as it introduces unnecessary noise into the model and 
leads to incomprehensible findings. The problem is not a matter of degree. These 
approaches are not simply suboptimal but, rather, are wrong given that they produce 
results that cannot be interpreted. 
Alternative research designs and analytical models are required. Structural 
equation modelling is more appropriate because researchers can simultaneously 
examine the measurement model-the relationship between each (latent) CSP dimension 
and each item used to capture it- and a structural model-the relationships among each 
latent variable including the dependent variable (e. g., financial performance). 
One of the reasons that we lack a theoretical justification for a universal CSP 
measure relates to the underlying problem that pervades CSP research. Ullmann (1985) 
argues that CSP research is no more than "data in search of theory. " Mitnick (1993) 
specifies these theory development problems, arguing that attempts to build theory in 
the field have neither failed to employ a sorting logic to justify the models nor 
considered the comprehensiveness of the phenomenon. As a result, the models "are little 
more than heuristics or graphical displays of lists; they are not conceptually operational" 
(p. 4). Mitnick's comments describe the field's attempt to define and operationalize the 
CSP construct: That is, the aggregation of multiple categories representing pieces of 
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CSP is no more than a list, which is not supported by an underlying understanding of 
CSP or a rationale for including the various categories as appropriate and 
comprehensive. Thus, Ullman's (1985) criticism stems from the observation that CSP 
lacks a "good sorting logic" that brings meaning to these lists of categories (Mitnick, 
1995). 
Thus, CSP-financial performance research lacks the appropriate level of theory 
to suggest why and how these constructs are related. Oftentimes, law-like statements 
identify the researchers' belief or opinion with regard to the CSP-financial performance 
relationship. However, law-like statements with regard to the connections between a set 
of variables do not constitute theoretical contributions in the realm of social science 
because there is little understanding generated from these claims in terms of explaining 
why (how) these relationships occur (Mitnick 1995) 
Rowley and Berman (2000) adopt Wood and Jones' modification of Wood's 
definition of CSP. To operationalize this definition, they use outcome measures on five 
relationships that firms have with stakeholders. While their CSP measure is not 
comprehensive of all stakeholders, it is consistent with Wood and Jones's internal and 
external stakeholders. The outcome measures reflect firm relations with employees, 
consumers, environment, community, and society as whole. 
Therefore, to assess a company's C$P, the researchers would examine the 
degree to which principles of social reasonability motivate actions taken on behalf of 
the company, the degree to which the firm makes use of socially responsive processes, 
the existence and nature of policies and programs designed to manage the firm's 
societal relationships, and the social impacts of the firm's actions, programs, and 
policies. 
Many researchers have attempted to measure CSP employing various ways such 
as forced-choice surveys (Aupperle 1991; Aupperle, Carroll, and Hatfield 1985a), the 
Fortune reputation index and social responsibility index (McGuire, Sundgren, and 
Schneeweis 1988), content analysis of firm's reports and documents (Wolfe 1991), 
behavioural and perceptual measures (Wokutch and McKinney 1991), and case study 
(Clarkson 1991), however, it's difficult to measure it consistently because of the 
limitations. Now, researchers use social data from Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) & 
Co. to assess CSP, for example, since 1996, business Ethics has ranked the 100 Best 
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Corporate Citizenship using KLD data. It looks at the strength and concerns in the areas 
of environment, community relations, employees relations, and diversity and customer 
relations. 
2.3. Enterprise Restructuring 
Since early 1990s, the extensive and aggressive political and economic reforms 
began to implement in Central and Eastern European transition economies. Enterprise 
restructuring or privatization has been widely used in these transition economies to 
remedy some problems of state-owned enterprises and to achieve a higher level of 
performance or to survive when the given structure becomes dysfunctional. 
Restructuring takes place at different levels. At the level of the whole economy, it is a 
long-term response to market trends, technological change, and macroeconomic 
policies. At the sector level, restructuring causes change in the production structure and 
new arrangements across enterprises. At the enterprise level, firms restructure through 
new business strategies and internal reorganization in order to adapt to new market 
requirements. 
In recent years, a substantial theoretical literature has emerged on the process of 
economic restructuring in transition economies. As described by Blanchard, et al 
(1995); Black, et al (2000), there are two extreme views of transition. The first is that 
the main force behind the reform process involves the collapse of the state sector, which 
is not adapting to the changed market environment, combined with a slowly emerging 
private sector. The growth in the private sector is not sufficient to pick up the slack in 
the state sector, leading to high and persistent unemployment. Hence, unemployment 
slows down the desired restructuring of the state sector and other general reforms. It is 
for this reason that the optimal sequencing of reforms matters. While Aghion and 
Blanchard (1994b) stress the role of unemployment in "blocking" reforms, Roland 
(1994) stresses the role of political constraints that necessitate a gradual approach to 
restructuring. The second extreme view is that the main force behind transition is the 
rapid growth of the private sector, which is sufficient to absorb the laid off workers in 
the state sector. In this case, unemployment is a consequence of a healthy process of 
reallocation. This does not exclude the possibility of a high unemployment pool; what 
matters is a high turnover of that pool resulting in efficient reallocation. 
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2.3.1. Conception and Definition 
Restructuring is a set of non-marginal changes in the structure of an existing 
firm's output mix, including the closure of some activities, which in turn requires 
significant non-marginal changes in resource use (Commander, et al 1999). In market- 
oriented economies, such restructuring is usually motivated by an attempt to restore or 
regain competitiveness and enhance long-term shareholder value in response to a radical 
change in the business environment or to a gradual erosion of competitiveness. To 
promote the transition from command to market economies, restructuring requires profit 
orientation as the overriding objective of the enterprise. By definition, restructuring is a 
process of radical adjustment that will break some vested interests. Restructuring 
encompasses both survival-driven cost-side changes aimed at reducing existing 
inefficiencies and growth-oriented revenue-side changes to re-orient the enterprise's 
processes and products to current market requirements and thereby achieve 
improvements in performance over the longer run (Carlin 1998). Survival-driven 
restructuring, which may involve labour shedding, plant closures and the search for new 
markets for existing products, is commonly a necessary first step to deeper 
restructuring. However, those survival-driven restructuring decisions that are motivated 
by a desire to make the minimum defensive changes necessary to avoid either more 
radical changes in output mix or exit will generally not be sufficient or even desirable. 
Such decisions will tend to tie up resources that could be more productively employed 
elsewhere. Growth-oriented restructuring, in contrast, generally involves substantial 
new investment in fixed and human capital as well as strategic changes in product mix. 
To be effective in a market economy context, such deeper restructuring generally 
requires the appropriate human capital expertise to identify profitable opportunities and 
sufficient financial resources to implement the associated investments. 
Those growth-oriented restructuring decisions that lead to the highest feasible 
value of the enterprise (net of the cost of required resources) raise the level and rate of 
growth of enterprise-level productivity through both static efficiency effects and 
dynamic innovation. Even more important from an economy-wide perspective, the 
restructured firms will have a new mix of resources that better meets the requirements 
of downstream firms and final consumers. Resources which may have been subsidizing 
inefficient production can in turn be released and re-allocated to growing new and 
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restructured enterprises, allowing over time better economy-wide resource allocation, 
higher employment, income and consumption levels. 
Ericson (1998) argues that conceptually, restructuring of an enterprise must 
involve some substantial change in the organization, activities and relationships in 
which the enterprise is involved. However, to be analytically useful, the concept of 
restructuring must also involve a specific conscious orientation and motivation towards 
success in a future market environment, as well as significant change in operations and 
interactions. Aghion, Blanchard, and Carlin (1997) define restructuring as the changes 
that state-owned enterprise has to undergo in order to emerge as equivalent to a private 
sector firm. It typically entails changes in internal organization such as the separation of 
core from non-core activities, the closure of unviable units and spin-off of social assets; 
labour shedding and the reform of the incentive structure for employees and managers; 
and the modernization of equipment. A characteristic feature is that costly in short-run 
but offers the prospect of gains in the future. 
Grosfeld and Roland (1997) introduce the distinction between two types of 
restructuring: defensive and strategic restructuring. The "defensive" part of restructuring 
means basically taking measures aiming to reduce costs and scale down enterprise 
activity: cutting the obsolete production lines, shedding labour, getting rid of non- 
productive assets, etc. The "strategic" part of restructuring is based on a thoughtful 
business strategy responding to the necessity of a profound redeployment of assets. It 
implies the introduction of new product lines and new processes, new technologies and 
new investments. It necessitates a great deal of entrepreneurial skills and imagination, a 
good judgement about investment opportunities and adequate incentives. It also requires 
sources of finance for the new projects. New investments can be financed from the 
firm's retained earnings, or via financial markets through bank credit and/or issuing of 
equity and debt on the market. 
Obviously, restructuring can encompass a broad range of transactions, including 
selling lines of business or making significant acquisitions, changing capital structure 
through infusion of high levels of debt, and changing the internal organization of the 
firm. In this study, I define restructuring as the activity, which involves the deliberate 
modification of formal relationships among organizational components, such as 
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redesigning work process, delaying, eliminating structural elements through 
outsourcing, spinning off, selling off, and divesting units, activities or jobs. 
2.3.2. The Theory and Practice of Enterprise Reform 
The theoretical work on enterprise-sector reform in transition economies has 
typically focused on how policy can be set so that good managers of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) are induced to exert effort to restructure and subsequently are able to 
expand the activities of the enterprise. Growth depends, as well, on fostering the entry 
of new firms. The other side of the coin is that poor managers must be denied access to 
new resources for expansion and lose the ability to hang onto other valuable resources 
in the enterprise. 
Carlin and Landesmann (1997) draws on microeconomic, industry-level, and 
macroeconomic evidence to investigate the mechanisms of enterprise restructuring in 
transition economies, its outcomes in terms of industry-level export performance, and 
its interaction with macroeconomic policy and constraints. His study takes stock of what 
has happened in the enterprise sector in the leading transition economies and examine 
how that matches up with the orientation and findings of the theoretical analysis of 
transition. He investigates the extent to which the theoretical analysis of the 
determinants of enterprise restructuring has been reflected in practice at the micro level. 
A wide variety of evidence form both leading transition economies and Russia is 
brought to bear on the issue of the efficiency effects on enterprises of the liberalization 
of private sector activity, reductions in government subsidies, changes in ownership and 
control, bank restructuring, and changes in competitive pressure. 
One set of models focuses on managerial career concerns as a key mechanism 
by which good managers of SOEs are separated out from bad ones, and by which the 
good ones are induced to restructure. Roland and Sekkat (2000) show that the existence 
of a private sector offering outside opportunities to the manager (career prospects) is 
necessary to eliminate the 'ratchet effect' for state enterprises, whereby the government 
was unable to commit itself not to increase the targets of enterprises performing well, 
and to elicit effort (restructuring) from good managers. They note that when the skills of 
the manager are asset-specific 
- 
which may be quite common in SOEs 
- 
the prospect of 
privatization rather than simply the existence of a private sector is necessary to induce 
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restructuring by good managers. Moreover, the manager must have the possibility of 
securing some rents from privatization which means that some component of insider 
privatization is required. 
Based on the first formal model of restructuring by Aghion and Blanchard 
(1994a), Kotrba (1996) shows that a separating equilibrium will prevail in which only 
good managers engage in restructuring (the socially optimal configuration) if it is 
assumed that there is a competitive bidding process for enterprises in which rational 
new owners participate. A 'rational new owner' is defined as one who would keep on a 
good manager who had revealed his or her quality through pre-privatization 
restructuring. 
The aspect of restructuring at the heart of the Aghion-Blanchard-Burgess model 
is the inter-temporal problem posed by the fact that restructuring incurs a cost in the 
first period 
- 
not simply in terms of effort or managerial disutility, as in Roland and 
Sekkat, but in terms of output and employment. Restructuring is seen to involve cutting 
employment and there is no gain in output with which the 'losers' from restructuring 
could be compensated. Restructuring, therefore, represents a threat to managers if, for 
example, workers are sufficiently powerful to throw out a 'restructuring manager'. 
Benefits from restructuring are uncertain and, in any case, only come through in the 
second period and the reasonable assumption is made that managers cannot borrow to 
ease the passage of first-period restructuring. In this model, restructuring can be 
promoted by policy measures that increase the threat to the manager's survival if he or 
she does not restructure. This highlights the crucial role of the hardening of the 
enterprise budget constraint. Even if the threat of closure through bankruptcy or 
liquidation is rather remote (as it has been in most transition economies), the elimination 
of subsidies poses a threat to the manager since it impinges on his or her ability to pay 
employees and to pay for inputs. Although the absence of any threat of exit via 
bankruptcy was perceived as a major source of inefficiency in the pre-reform 
economies, formal bankruptcy was unlikely to be useful practical device for 
restructuring enterprises under the conditions of transition. The experience in market 
economies of a 'liquidation-bias' of bankruptcy suggested that in the transition context 
of output collapse and widespread loss-making, the likelihood of destroying potentially 
valuable activities would be too great (van Wijnbergen 1996). 
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If banking-sector reform is neglected, then the pressure for enterprise 
restructuring may be eased through access to soft loans (e. g. Portes and Begg (1993); 
Aghion et al (1996). The successful delegation of restructuring to the banks is 
constrained by the accumulation of non-performing loans by banks, which undermines 
the incentive of the bank to monitor loans because refusal to roll them over threatens the 
capital base of the bank. Because of the systemic threat to the banking system, bank 
managers can pursue a soft-loan strategy in the expectation of a bail-out by the 
government. Hence, the imposition of a very tough policy on the banks, such as firing 
the bank manager in the event of recapitalization, presents risks, since the manager will 
be induced to disguise the extent of the bad loan problem and roll over bad loans. A 
softer approach towards managers of banks runs the opposite risk 
- 
namely, that too 
many loans would be identified as non-performing, producing more liquidations than is 
socially efficient (Aghion et al 1996). To deal with this problem, it is suggested that 
non-performing loans be transferred from the portfolio of the bank to a special 
`hospital' agency. The feasibility of creating appropriate incentives for such an agency 
has been questioned (Van Wijnbergen, 1996). 
The theme that either too lax or too tough a policy can undermine incentives is 
taken up by Perotti (1998), who has examined the interaction between monetary policy 
and the expansion of inter-enterprise indebtedness. Excessively tight credit policies can 
be self-defeating and promote increased inter-enterprise debt if good managers refrain 
from restructuring because they come to believe that a general bail-out is likely. 
A successful initiation of enterprise-sector reform thus requires a hardening of 
enterprise budget constraints, so that enterprises are denied access to subsidies or soft 
loans to finance losses, that private entrepreneurship is encouraged, and, in the case of 
asset-specific skills of managers, that privatization of SOEs is in prospect. A 
privatization process in which managers have some confidence in the existence of 
competitive bidding by 'rational new owners', or where the method of privatization 
promises some rents to the managers, is necessary. The process whereby good managers 
are separated from bad ones and engage in restructuring can be undermined (or 
reversed) if good managers come to believe that general bail-outs of the banks will 
occur. Hence macroeconomic policy and banking reform must be neither too lax nor too 
51 
tough. All of these models assume the existence of sufficient competition in the product 
market to make survival at the status quo difficult. 
The other major direction in theoretical work has been to model the 
consequences of different models of privatization for post- rather than pre-privatization 
behaviour. The new issue raised by transition that has prompted formal modelling 
efforts is the consequences of insider privatization for dynamic efficiency. Otherwise, 
the literature on transition has drawn both on the long-standing body of analysis of the 
employee-owned enterprise and on the literature from the principal 
- 
agent tradition on 
corporate governance and ownership structures. The Aghion-Blanchard (1996) model 
shows that if deep restructuring (assumed to be necessary for growth) requires both 
external finance and further labour-shedding, then insider privatization should be 
avoided. If this is not possible for political reasons, then employee-ownership with 
freely tradable shares is shown to be preferable to manager-ownership as a way to avoid 
entrenchment of bad managers. Moreover, the worse is the state of the outside labour 
market, the slower will be the rate of transfer from inside to outside ownership, since 
insiders will be worried about the implications of a change in control for their jobs, and 
hence the lower will be the dynamism of the enterprise sector as poor managers remain 
entrenched. This analysis highlights a trade-off associated with insider privatization: if 
the state retains ownership, the option of sale to an outsider is kept open, whereas 
insider-privatization may serve to entrench poor managers. 
2.3.3. Enterprise Restructuring and Firm's Performance 
Dimensions of Restructuring 
As we see from the mentioned above, restructuring encompasses multiple forms 
of change in organizations, which can be grouped into three different categories: portfolio 
restructuring, financial restructuring and organizational restructuring (Bowman and Singh 
1993; Gibbs 1993). Portfolio restructuring may occur through the sale or spin-off of lines 
of business as well as mergers and acquisitions. Financial restructuring encompasses 
leverage buyouts (LBOs), stock repurchases, and employee share ownership programmes 
(ESOPs), equity carve-outs, or recapitalizations. Organizational restructuring intends to 
increase efficiency through changes in organizational structure, internal reorganizations, 
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or downsizing. The consequences of restructuring can be conceptualized in terms of a 
sequence of intermediate effects, which may have positive or negative outcomes. In 
the case of portfolio restructuring, these intermediate effects could be increased 
strategic focus, greater economies of scope, and more cogent control of multiple 
business units. In the case of financial restructuring, these intermediate effects could 
be an emphasis on cash flows and changes in managerial incentives. In the case of 
organizational restructuring, these effects could be greater employee satisfaction, 
reduced turnover, increased efficiencies, and better communication. 
Studies of enterprise restructuring in transition economies have also been 
interested in another types of restructuring such as defensive and strategic restructuring, 
pro-active and negative restructuring (Grosfelf and Roland 1997; Frooman 1997; Linz 
and Krueger 1998). The findings of studies show that different types of restructuring do 
have different impact on firm performance. 
Defensive Restructuring vis-? vis Strategic Restructuring 
Grosfeld and Roland (1997) introduce the distinction between two types of 
restructuring: defensive and strategic restructuring. The "defensive" part of restructuring 
means basically taking measures aiming to reduce costs and scale down enterprise 
activity: cutting the obsolete production lines, shedding labour, getting rid of non- 
productive assets, etc. These measures defensive are in the sense that their primary goal is 
the immediate survival of the enterprise. Defensive restructuring does not as such 
necessarily imply the existence of a strategy for reorienting enterprises the activity under 
the new economic conditions. It may be done as a result of survival-oriented behaviour of 
managers and workers. However, it may also constitute the painful but necessary initial 
ingredient of a term strategic plan aiming at maximizing the enterprises value. 
The "strategic" part of restructuring is based on a thoughtful business strategy 
responding to the necessity of a profound redeployment of assets. It implies the 
introduction of new product lines and new processes, new technologies and new 
investments. It necessitates a great deal of entrepreneurial skills and imagination, a good 
judgment about investment opportunities and adequate incentives. It also requires 
sources of finance for the new projects. New investments can be financed from the 
firm's retained earnings, or via financial markets through bank credit and/or issuing of 
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equity and debt on the market. Even though in developed market economies most 
investments are financed from retained earnings (Mayer and Alexander 1990) 
insufficient financial allocation across agents has adverse effects on growth and 
macroeconomic performance (Roubini and Sala Martin 1992; Levine and Zervos 1993). 
In the case of Central and Eastern European countries, the adverse effects of financial 
misallocation are likely to be much stronger than in normal market economies because 
of the bigger change in the structure of output that must take place. For the same reason, 
accumulated debts or surpluses from the past, that directly affects enterprises capacity 
of self-financing, are not a good indicator of future financial prospects. Strategic 
restructuring inside enterprises is thus intimately linked to the degree of development of 
the financial sector and the change in corporate governance. 
Defensive restructuring must not necessarily precede strategic restructuring. 
Both parts should be done more or less simultaneously. The conceptual distinction 
between these two types of restructuring is seful because they address both different 
problems and do not require the same instruments and skills to be conducted 
successfully. Success in defensive restructuring does not necessarily mean that the 
enterprise can be able to successfully reorient its business activities. Defensive 
restructuring may ultimately lead to curtailing of all activities and enterprise closure. 
Deciding redundancies requires overcoming the resistance of workers but can be done 
by managers who are convinced that layoffs are necessary and cannot be prevented by 
bailout subsidies from government. Different skills and institutions are required in order 
to ensure success in strategic restructuring. Managers with good investment projects 
should have opportunities to get adequate finance and investors must have adequate 
incentives to select and monitor the implementation of the projects. 
Building on the studies done by Grosfeld and Roland (1997), Aghion, et al 
(1997); Frydman et al (1999), Domadenik and Vehovec (2002) develop a theoretical 
framework and empirically estimate of the extent of several forms of restructuring in the 
privatized firms in a model transition economies such as Croatia and Slovenia. In view 
of the institutional developments in the transition economies, they divided restructuring 
into defensive (related to short-term cutting costs) and strategic (focused on increasing 
revenues through investment). Using predictions from the theoretical framework, they 
estimated a firm-level labour demand equation to test defensive restructuring and an 
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augmented investment equation to assess strategic restructuring. The labour demand 
estimates point to relatively slow defensive restructuring, while the investment model 
estimates indicate the presence of credit rationing and bargaining in most types of soft 
investment. The research didn't find support for the hypothesis that firms treat 
expenditures on employee training as investment, but there was evidence that they 
behave similarly as those from developed countries in that they display features of profit 
maximizing behaviour. 
Proactive restructuring vs. negative restructuring 
A common theme in the burgeoning literature on transition economies highlights 
the importance of enterprise restructuring in successfully completing the transformation 
from plan to market. In its most general specification, enterprise restructuring is described 
as "the process that enables a firm to operate successfully in a market economy" (Ernst 
1996). This process may be initiated by the firm: "proactive restructuring" (Krueger 
1995). It may include activities that ultimately result in resources going to their highest 
valued use: "positive restructuring" (Jeffries 1996). Earle and Estrin (1996) describe 
"short-term restructuring" as reductions in the labour, energy and material intensity of 
production 
-- 
without offsetting increases in capital intensity 
-- 
to raise the overall 
efficiency of enterprise operations. To the extent that restructuring activities initiated by 
the firm take into account a long-term perspective, that is, are directed toward maximizing 
the long-run value of the firm, the process is termed "strategic restructuring" (Ernst et al 
1996); or "long-run restructuring" if firms undertake investment in new capital to improve 
production techniques or implement new R&D incentives (Earle and Estrin 1996). 
Privatized firms "seeking to change as little as possible while retaining 
substantial insider control" (Ash and Hare 1994) are categorized as in a "defensive 
restructuring" mode. The general consensus in the literature is that the duration of 
transition will be prolonged if firms pursue a "wait and see" strategy with regard to the 
continued availability of government subsidies 
- 
"passive restructuring" (Sutela 1994; 
Linz and Krueger 1996; Ernst et al 1996), or if the manager exploits the firm's assets for 
short-term gain 
- 
"negative restructuring" (Ellman 1994, Jeffries 1996). In such 
instances, the overall cost imposed by the transition process will increase. 
The mechanics of restructuring incorporate a wide range of activities. Blasi 
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(1997) lists nearly seventy "important numbers on restructuring". Perhaps more than 
anything else, Blasi et al (1997) highlight the fact that the existing literature on 
enterprise restructuring in transition economies is in anything but agreement when it 
comes to identifying, much less quantifying, the changes required for former state- 
owned enterprises to survive in the post-transition economy. For example, in one of the 
earliest studies of Russian firms, Commander (1993) focuses on physical indicators: 
changes in output and employment, and on financial indicators: enterprise sales and 
profits, as a measure of the extent of enterprise restructuring. In one of the more recent 
studies, Earle and Estrin (1997), using data compiled by the World Bank, develop an 
index of restructuring that aggregates numerous dimensions into a single weighted 
variable. They use this index, as well as improvements in labour productivity, as a 
dependent variable to be explained by a variety of independent variables, including 
ownership structure and industry. An important contribution of their work is the explicit 
recognition of the endogeneity between restructuring and ownership structure in 
transition economies. 
Carlin and Colin (1992) evaluates alternative forms of corporate restructuring. It 
emphasizes differences in the sequence in which reforms are undertaken in different 
countries. In some countries, restructuring is being undertaken by the state before 
privatization; in some, restructuring is delegated to private-sector institutions before 
shares are offered to the public at large; and in others, public offers of shares are 
preceding restructuring. The article suggests that the recent theoretical literature on 
corporate ownership and vertical integration provides a useful framework for evaluating 
alternative sequences of reform. These points to four factors as being central to the 
reform process: contractual incompleteness between the state, investors and managers; 
complementarity between the assets of different stakeholders; the relative importance of 
assets; and the relative abilities of different stakeholders. The continuing role for the 
state in Eastern Europe is attributable to difficulties of contracting between the state and 
private firms and the complementarity between the assets of state and firms. The slow 
pace of privatization is due to poor public finances and inefficient bureaucracies. There 
is one country in which a substantial amount of restructuring has been undertaken by 
both the state and the private sector, however: East Germany. This paper documents in 
some detail the privatization process in East Germany. It notes that five parties have 
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been central to the reform process: the state, the Treuhandanstalt, banks, Western 
companies and the incumbent management. It records a gradual transfer of control from 
the state to the management of firms. It argues that the central role played by banks and 
companies in restructuring reflects an important complementarity between their assets 
and those of former state-owned enterprises, and the fact that they can offer valuable 
advice to East German management. This raises the question of what East European 
countries that do not possess institutions with equivalent skills and resources should do. 
The experience of East Germany suggests that careful attention should be given to the 
governance of state agencies and private-sector institutions. The role of financial 
institutions in funding restructuring should be supplemented by non-financial 
companies providing management advice. Risk capital will not be available, initially, 
until East European enterprises have acquired adequate collateral or reputations. In the 
mean time, international agencies will play a central role in funding the transition. 
Measurement of enterprise restructuring 
Ericson (1998) argues that conceptually, restructuring of an enterprise must 
involve some substantial change in the organization, activities and relationships in 
which the enterprise is involved. But to be analytically useful, the concept of 
restructuring must also involve a specific conscious orientation and motivation towards 
success in a future market environment, as well as significant change in operations and 
interactions. In the highly volatile environment of the Russian, or indeed any other, 
transition, industrial enterprises will inevitably be making many changes in how they 
function and with whom they deal, just as a matter of continuing operation. Some 
changes will be largely forced by the behaviour of interlocutors, and some will be 
actively chosen by the enterprise management. Some will develop or further the 
capability for, and hence the probability of, success in the evolving (future) market 
environment, while others will enhance the chances of survival on the basis of existing 
capabilities and connections, whether recently developed or inherited from the Soviet 
era Each of these kinds of changes will have a broad impact on measurable outcomes, 
and unless they are purely forced by circumstances those changes will generally be 
positive. Yet, they do not all constitute "restructuring" in an economically meaningful 
sense. 
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An analytically useful concept of restructuring in the transition from a Soviet- 
type to a market-based economy should therefore capture a far deeper process that any 
reflected in typically available, at least in transition economies, statistics. This creates 
serious conceptual problems in identifying and measuring it, a number of which are 
discussed in the Linz and Krueger (1998) piece. As true restructuring involves 
adjustment to market conditions, it should be reflected in improvements in market 
values of the enterprises activities. Possible indicators might then involve profit (- 
ability), labour or general factor productivity, and/or sales increases, or reductions in 
unit costs or input intensities. All of these suffer, in the conditions of transition, from the 
high volatility and often arbitrariness of prices in which all measures of not perfectly 
homogeneous inputs and outputs must he made. Indeed, even labour productivity 
suffers from the need to aggregate output of any industrial firm in some prices, as well 
as the heterogeneity of the input in terms of type, skill, quality, etc. Of course, the 
problems are only worse with using any measure involving profit or capital, even if 
accounting data were available for Russian firms. One measure that might be marginally 
better than others when output is relatively homogeneous, but which I have not seen 
used in the literature, is unit cost reduction. This might capture more of the process and 
technology side of restructuring than the more output oriented measures typical in the 
literature. 
Ericson (1998) also emphasizes that any measurement must also deal with the 
problem that there is far more going on in the transition than just adjustment of the 
enterprise to the future market. Both initial conditions and broader industry-wide and 
macroeconomic processes affect any measure that one might use to capture the extent of 
industrial restructuring at the enterprise level. Thus it is necessary with any measure to 
explore possible alternative explanations. For example, the ability to consistently pay 
wages above the industry average is as apt to reflect transition disequilibrium 
phenomena and/or special rents as it is to indicate restructuring, particularly when it is 
unaccompanied by substantial real investment. The quality of inherited capital 
(imported? recently installed? etc. ), inherited monopoly power, the type of product, 
access to retail (cash) outlets, etc., as well as active asset stripping and financial 
manipulations on GKO, money and exchange markets, could all support above average 
wages in the chaotic environment of the transition. Similarly, substantial improvements 
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in labour productivity need not arise from "pro-active" restructuring, particularly when 
accompanied by a substantial drop in output. They may instead measure extraordinary 
prior inefficiency, and thus arise from the elimination of redundancy and waste, from 
survival retrenchment without active restructuring. This would make "industry" a strong 
explanatory factor in any regression attempting to isolate the sources of productivity 
change. In particular, one might suspect this when improvements are concentrated in the 
Soviet priority sectors such as power, fuel, machine building, construction materials and 
chemicals, where access to inputs and capital was far less a problem than in less 
favoured sectors. 
Such measures may still be correlated with real restructuring. But to be 
convincing, these other explanations should be pursued and rejected, and other, more 
direct, indicators that actual restructuring is taking place should be presented. The 
presence of positive real investment, break-ups and/or spin-offs, new operating 
divisions and/or merger activity, and switches in (sub-) industry, as well as significant 
changes in management, product assortment, suppliers and retailers would provide clear 
supporting evidence for "pro-active" restructuring. 
Measurement of Firm's Performance 
A large and rapidly growing body of the literature has focused on study of the 
impact of enterprise restructuring on firm performance from different perspectives such 
as ownership types and concentration, ownership control, competition, corporate 
governance, etc. For instance, Carlin et al (2001) studied 3,300 firms in 25 transition 
countries to investigate the factors that influence restructuring by firms and their 
subsequent performance and analyze the impact on performance of ownership, soft 
budget constraints, the general business environment and a range of measures of the 
intensity of competition as perceived by a firm. 
Most of the literature considers that corporate ownership structure has a 
significant effect on corporate governance and performance. More recently, the focus of 
the literature has shifted and several theories have been proposed to show the ambiguity 
of the effect of ownership concentration. The study of La Porta, et al (1999) shows that, 
in the majority of countries, large corporations have large shareholders who are active in 
corporate governance. Consequently, they argue, monitoring managers is not the main 
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problem of corporate governance and the real concern is the risk of the expropriation of 
minority shareholders. A similar view has been expressed by the Becht and Roell (1999) 
in their review of corporate governance in continental European countries. In most of 
the countries studied, companies have large shareholders and the main conflict of 
interest lies between them and minority shareholders. On the other hand, dispersed 
ownership may have a beneficial impact on firm performance. If concentrated 
ownership provides incentives to control the management, it may also reduce the 
manager's initiative or incentives to acquire information (Aghion and Tirole 1997). In 
this perspective, Burkart, et al (1997) view dispersed ownership as a commitment 
device ensuring that shareholders will not exercise excessive control. If the principal is 
concerned with providing the manager with the guarantee of non-intervention, he may 
choose to commit not to verify. 
Bevan (1999) takes the form of a comparative study of the body of research upon 
enterprise performance and restructuring in established market economies and transition 
economies. Issues related to empirical studies of enterprise performance and 
restructuring were examined, including the influence of historical cost accounting, 
reverse causality, sample selection bias and transition specific factors. 
Typically, improvements in firm performance would be reflected by such factors 
as increased profitability, efficiency improvements, and possibly increased output, 
whilst restructuring would be reflected by such factors as investment spending on fixed 
capital and/or assets. However, of these, the wealth of literature that has emerged which 
analyses Western market economies has traditionally focused upon measures of 
enterprise profitability and efficiency. 
The majority of applied studies utilize profitability indicators in one of two ways. 
The first approach is to look at the return to the total capital of the firm 
- 
the return to 
both equity holders and debt holders combined, i. e., the entire liability side of the 
balance sheet. In this case, profit is measured before deduction of interest. The standard 
accounting ratio to measure profitability in this case is operating profit-earnings before 
interest, tax and depreciation 
- 
as a percentage either of sales, or as a percentage of total 
assets. The second approach is to look at the return accruing only to equity holders. This 
means that interest charges (the cost of debt) is treated as a cost. The usual accounting 
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ratio used here is profit after interest and depreciation (usually before tax), as a 
percentage of equity (the rate of return on equity). 
In the comparative study of the performance of private, state-owned and mixed 
US enterprises, Boardman and Vinning (1998) use four alternative profitability 
measures, namely net income, return on equity, return on assets and return on sales, 
whilst identical indicators are used by Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh (1994) 
in their study of the performance of newly privatized enterprises. As Boardman and 
Vining (1998) note, the nature of historical cost accounting conventions such as the 
treatment of depreciation, and the timing of profits and capital expenditure causes the 
latter three accounting ratios to differ from economic rate of return. However, in 
defence of such measures they cite previous research which has illustrated that such 
accounting ratios are sufficiently highly correlated with economic rate of return to be 
regarded appropriate proxies. 
Most applied studies (Boardman and Vining, 1989; Megginson et al, 1994; 
Vining and Boardman 1992) also examine changes in efficiency in terms of labour 
productivity. Given that labour productivity may be reflected as the ratio of total output 
(or sales) to labour employed its use as a measure of performance is consistent, in that it 
will be correlated with total factor productivity and hence profitability. 
When deriving the above indicators, it was implicitly assumed that the level of 
capital employed (and hence the level of equity in capital) remained fixed; given that 
this assumption represents the traditional economic distinction between the short and 
long run, analysis was therefore of short-run indicators. Consequently we regard short- 
run restructuring behaviour to include measures which reorganize those components of 
the input bundle which are deemed to be variable in the short run, without influencing 
the level of capital employed by the firm, which narrow product lines, and so on. Whilst 
introducing such a distinction between short-run and long-run restructuring behaviour 
however, we should stress that restructuring remains a dynamic phenomenon. These 
short run developments may therefore be broadly categorized as cost reduction 
measures, which improve the efficiency of the firm and hence increase profitability and 
the aforementioned performance indicators. By contrast, long-run restructuring is 
generally related to revenue enhancing measures, such as changes in the internal 
structure of the organisation, and investment in capital, which will again lead to 
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improved performance. Hence, when Megginson et al include two alternative measures 
of capital investment (capital expenditure to sales and total assets respectively) in their 
analysis, they attempt to analyze long-run restructuring measures at the enterprise level. 
Whilst investment may be regarded as a prerequisite for long-run restructuring 
and performance, it is also considered to be a necessary but not sufficient condition: 
investment spending must be well targeted to enable the future development of the 
enterprise. In this regard, long-run estimates of expected firm performance may be 
reflected by the valuation which financial markets place upon the continuation of the 
firm. Many Western studies have used Tobin's Q (or more precisely the `market to book 
ratio' as a proxy for Q) as a measurement of expected long-run enterprise performance 
(see, for example, (Rajan and Zingales 1995). Tobins' Q effectively illustrates the 
valuation of the firm in terms of its replacement value, and is calculated as the ratio of 
the market value of the enterprise (value of equity plus debt) to the replacement value of 
the assets of the enterprise. Thus higher values of Q illustrate that the firm is considered 
to be more valuable as a going concern than as a collection of individual assets. Notably, 
however, as Tobin's Q depends upon the market valuation of the firm and hence the 
expectations of the financial markets, its reliability is dependent upon financial markets 
being fairly well developed. 
Furthermore, inflation has a variable impact on the market to book ratio as it will 
artificially reduce the book value but not the market value of capital, and hence in order 
to establish reliable measures of Q it is necessary that the economy under study is 
relatively stable at the macroeconomic level. 
A final factor relating to measured profitability can be seen by noting that in 
equation (1) above, we have treated w, the wage paid to labour, or more precisely, to the 
employees working within the firm, as exogenous and entirely market-determined. A 
common theme in the Western literature on wage determination and corporate 
governance is that this assumption is often violated 
- 
both workers and managers are 
often able to appropriate profits in the form of higher wages or other remuneration or 
rewards. In this event, although the textbook short-run profit function suggests a 
negative correlation between wages and profits, a positive correlation may in fact be 
observed, as a result of the power which insiders have to expropriate profits. Under 
these circumstances the causal route is reversed, to run from profits to wages. Moreover, 
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the extent to which these `rents' are then allocated between increased wages and 
employment is the subject of a large literature which examines the bargaining process 
and objectives of the insiders. Whilst we return to these issues in Section 4 below when 
considering the relation between corporate governance and enterprise performance, here 
we additionally note a resulting example of the caution which may need to be exercised 
when interpreting empirical evidence. Rather than reflecting insider power, it may be 
that a measured positive correlation between wages and profits simply reflects labour 
quality, as firms are required to pay higher wages in order to attract more productive or 
skilled staff which in turn increases profits. 
2.4. Corporate Governance 
In the last two decades, corporate governance issues have become important not 
only in the academic literature, but also in public policy debates. During this period 
corporate governance has been identified with takeovers, financial restructuring, and 
institutional investors' activism (Zingales 1998). Many academic studies have attempted 
to investigate systematically what exactly corporate governance is, why there is a 
corporate governance "problem", what role takeovers, financial restructuring, and 
institutional investors play in corporate governance, particularly in the developed 
western economies (Freeman and Evan 1990; Jeffers 2005; Vinten 2001; Letza, et al 
2004; Andrei and Robert, 1997; Zingales 1998; Williamson 1988; Hart 1995). 
Much of the debate on corporate governance has centred on practical issues, 
including corporate fraud, the abuse of managerial power and social irresponsibility. In 
essence, the debate is about how to solve these perceived problems in corporate practice. 
For many commentators corporate governance is about building effective mechanisms 
and measures, either in order to satisfy current social expectations or to satisfy the 
narrower expectations of shareholders (Letza, et al 2004; Fahy, Roche, and Weiner 
2005). 
2.4.1. Concept and Definition 
In the corporate governance literature, there is a disagreement about the 
boundaries of the subject of corporate governance. Depending on their perspective, 
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different authors define corporate governance in different ways. Corporate governance 
can be defined in a number of ways, from very broad to demonstrably specific. 
According to Tricker (1994), corporate governance is an umbrella term that 
includes specific issues from interactions among senior management, shareholders, 
board of directors, and other corporate stakeholders. In its narrowest sense, corporate 
governance can be viewed as a set of arrangements internal to the corporation that 
define the relationship between the owners and managers of the corporation, for 
example, Monks and Minow (2003) define corporate governance as the relationship 
among various participants in determining the direction and performance of 
corporations, which include the primary participants such as the shareholders, the 
management, and the board of directors. 
Iskander and Chamlou (2000) in the World Bank define corporate governance 
from two different perspectives. From the standpoint of a corporation, the emphasis is 
put on the relations between the owners, management board and other stakeholders (the 
employees, customers, suppliers, investors and communities). Major significance in 
corporate governance is given to the board of directors and its ability to attain long- 
term, sustained value by balancing these interests. From a public policy perspective, 
corporate governance refers to providing for the survival, growth and development of 
the company, and at the same time, its accountability in the exercise of power and 
control over companies. The role of public policy is to discipline companies and, at the 
same time, to stimulate them to minimize differences between private and social 
interests. 
From the perspective of stakeholder theory, OECD (2004) claims that corporate 
governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. 
The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the board, 
managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures 
for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure 
through which the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance. Corporate governance is affected by the 
relationships among participants in the governance system. Controlling shareholders, 
which may be individuals, family holdings, bloc alliances, or other corporations acting 
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through a holding company or cross shareholdings, can significantly influence corporate 
behaviour. As owners of equity, institutional investors are increasingly demanding a 
voice in corporate governance in some markets. Individual shareholders usually do not 
seek to exercise governance rights but may be highly concerned about obtaining fair 
treatment from controlling shareholders and management. Creditors play an important 
role in a number of governance systems and can serve as external monitors over 
corporate performance. Employees and other stakeholders play an important role in 
contributing to the long-term success and performance of the corporation, while 
governments establish the overall institutional and legal framework for corporate 
governance. 
Another perspective in defining corporate governance is called `path 
dependence'. Central to the idea of path dependence is that initial historical conditions 
matter in determining the corporate governance structures that are prevalent today. A 
national system of corporate governance evolves in order to exploit the advantages of 
the corporate form of organization while mitigating concomitant agency costs in a 
manner consistent with a country's history and legal, political, and social traditions 
(Gedalovic and Shapiro 2002). Therefore, a nation's system of corporate governance can 
be seen as an institutional matrix that structures the relations among owners, boards, and 
top managers, and determines the goals pursued by the corporation. The nature of this 
institutional matrix is one of the principal determinants of the economic vitality of a 
society (Davis and Useem 2001). In order to understand the problem of corporate 
governance, it is most important to stress that it is, first of all, dependent on the political 
system of any country and the country's historical and cultural characteristics. 
Kuhndt et al (2004) presents the concept of Responsible Corporate Governance 
(RCG). RCG is defined as a stakeholder-oriented policy approach allocating 
responsibilities to societal actors, who will drive corporate accountability. According to 
this view, corporations, aiming at accountability to the societal actors in terms of their 
sustainability efforts, shall follow these principles: assume societal leadership for 
responsibility; identify clearly and specifically their social, environmental and economic 
values in accordance with the demands of their stakeholders; define their social, 
environmental and economic priority areas for action; adopt specific management 
practices to integrate these values into their operations and take measurable action; 
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disclose comprehensive data on their social, environmental and economic impacts; 
involve in comprehensive review of their activities; strive for continuous learning. 
According to their view, the core elements of RCG are: (1) Stakeholder empowered 
corporate governance; (2) Management and performance evaluation systems; (3) 
Transparency enhancement; (4) Stakeholder verification. These elements have been 
deducted from the initiatives of environmental NGOs (ENGOs), Intergovernmental 
Organisations (IGOs), financial institutions, research institutions and multi-stakeholder 
organisations. These actors support one or more of these principles for corporate 
accountability, while RCQ as a supportive policy instrument, aims at gathering all of 
these principles under one roof. 
Fahy et al (2005) argue that enterprise governance is based on the principle that 
good governance alone cannot make an organization successful. Thus, they propose the 
emerging framework which is under three dimensions of Performance, Conformance 
and Corporate Responsibility. The framework addresses the primary concerns that 
boards and senior executives must effectively manage to ensure the delivery of long- 
term value to stakeholders. They claim that in the framework, performance and 
conformance are interchangeable; performance can lead to assurance and conformance 
to value creation. Neatly bridging the two principles is the corporate responsibility. 
Inextricably linked to corporate governance and risk management, as well as `ethical' 
environmental and social stewardship, on which its origins are founded, CR has fast 
gained considerable significance for stakeholders and the corporate community. 
Although the emerging concept of Enterprise Governance originally focused on the 
conformance and performance dimensions, we believe that CR is of sufficient 
importance to create a third element within the framework. Furthermore, evidence 
shows that sustainable value can only be successfully achieved with the adoption of all 
three disciplines; as Dell, Microsoft, Tesco, GE and Alcoa, to name but a few, can 
testify. 
Obviously, corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a 
company's management, its board, its shareholders and its stakeholders. It concerns 
relationships among the management, board of directors, controlling shareholders, 
minority shareholders and other stakeholders. It deals with the rights and responsibilities 
of a company's management, its board, shareholders and various stakeholders. Thus, 
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corporate social performance can be analyzed and evaluated more effectively by using a 
framework based on the management of a corporation's relationships with its 
stakeholders than by using models and methodologies based on concepts concerning 
corporate social responsibilities and responsiveness (Clarkson 1995). Good corporate 
governance should strive to combine the different mechanisms in a way that balances 
the desire to protect different stakeholders of the firm against the need to give managers 
and controlling owner's sufficient incentives and freedom to manoeuvre. The corporate 
governance literature increasingly recognizes that fairness of treatment, job satisfaction, 
high quality of work environment and particularly income and job security are 
important factors in generating investments in firm-specific capital by employees (Blair 
1995; Kelly and Parkinson 1998; Slinger and Deakin 2000). 
The following section will analyze two different models of corporate based on 
agency and stakeholder theory. 
2.4.2. Corporate Governance Models 
As current analyses on corporate governance approach the governance issue 
from different perspectives and base their views on different assumptions and 
presuppositions, there exist quite diverse theoretical models, which can be identified in 
the literature. Major surveys and/or reviews of corporate governance models have been 
conducted by Turnbull (1997); Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Keasey et al (1997); 
Hawley and Williamson (1996). Hawley and Williams (1996) suggest four major views 
in the corporate governance debate in the US, i. e. the finance model, the stewardship 
model, the stakeholder model and the political model. The dominant model in the late 
20th century is the finance view of corporate governance, which is concerned with a 
universal agency problem and how to adopt appropriate incentive systems and/or the 
mechanism of takeover to solve this problem. While the finance model is focused on 
shareholder rights and control in publicly held corporations, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
extend the finance view of the firm to include not only shareholders, but also debt- 
holders and bankers. In contrast to the dominant finance model, the stewardship model 
(see Donaldson and Davis 1994) assumes a different nature of agent/managerial 
behaviour and argues that managers are trustworthy and should be fully empowered. 
The stakeholder model further extends the purpose of the corporation from maximizing 
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shareholders wealth to delivering wider outputs to a range of stakeholders and 
emphasizes corporate efficiency in a social context. Departing from the prevailing 
economic analysis of corporate governance, the political model (e. g. Pound 1992; 
Pound 1993), according to Hawley and Williams (1996), is a non-market approach for 
monitoring management, such as shareholder democracy and negotiation. 
In this research, I attempt to capture the central arguments, core assumptions and 
philosophies of the shareholding and stakeholding perspectives respectively, from which 
the sharp differences on assumptions and presuppositions between the two perspectives 
are clearly observed. These analyses are necessary for my further questions about how 
the impact of different models of corporate governance on social performance of 
enterprise restructuring. 
The Shareholder Model 
The shareholder model (also called outsider system) constitutes the classic means 
of regulation in the Anglo-Saxon countries. The U. S., U. K and Ireland fit into this 
category, although there are differences between these countries. According to this 
model, firms are set up to maximize shareholders' wealth and the main criterion of 
performance is usually their market value. This approach associates corporate 
governance with the principal-agent theory. Paid managers are all-powerful, as opposed 
to dispersed shareholders. The level of information enjoyed by these corporate leaders 
and shareholders is completely unequal, and the costs for the principals (the 
shareholders) to act in relation to their agents (the managers) can run quite high. Control 
of the action of the corporate leaders is exerted through external market mechanisms. 
According to the shareholder model the objective of the firm is to maximize 
shareholder wealth through a locative, productive and dynamic efficiency i. e. the 
objective of the firm is to maximize profits. The criteria by which performance is 
judged in this model can simply be taken as the market value (i. e. shareholder value) of 
the firm. Therefore, managers and directors have an implicit obligation to ensure that 
firms are run in the interests of shareholders. The underlying problem of corporate 
governance in this model stems from the principal-agent relationship arising from the 
separation of beneficial ownership and executive decision-making. It is this separation 
that causes the firm's behaviour to diverge from the profit-maximizing ideal. This 
68 
happens because the interests and objectives of the principal (the investors) and the 
agent (the managers) differ when there is a separation of ownership and control. Since 
the managers are not the owners of the firm they do not bear the full costs, or reap the 
full benefits, of their actions. Therefore, although investors are interested in maximizing 
shareholder value, managers may have other objectives such as maximizing their 
salaries, growth in market share, or an attachment to particular investment projects, etc. 
An effective corporate governance framework can minimize the agency costs 
and hold-up problems associated with the separation of ownership and control. There 
are broadly three types of mechanisms that can be used to align the interests and 
objectives of managers with those of shareholders and overcome problems of 
management entrenchment and monitoring: 
- 
One method attempts to induce managers to carry out efficient 
management by directly aligning manager's interests with those of shareholders e. g. 
executive compensation plans, stock options, direct monitoring by boards, etc. 
- 
Another method involves the strengthening of shareholder's rights so 
shareholders have both a greater incentive and ability to monitor management. This 
approach enhances the rights of investors through legal protection from expropriation 
by managers e. g. protection and enforcement of shareholder rights, prohibitions against 
insider-dealing, etc. 
- 
Another method is to use indirect means of corporate control such as that 
provided by capital markets, managerial labour markets, and markets for corporate 
control e. g. takeovers. 
One of the critiques of the shareholder model of the corporation is the implicit 
presumption that the conflicts are between strong, entrenched managers and weak, 
dispersed shareholders. This has led to an almost exclusive focus, in both the analytical 
work and in reform efforts, of resolving the monitoring and management entrenchment 
problems which are the main corporate governance problems in the principal-agent 
context with dispersed ownership. For example, most of this work has addressed 
concerns related to the role of the board of directors, stock options and executive 
remuneration, shareholder protection, the role of institutional investors, management 
entrenchment and the effectiveness of the market for takeovers, etc. 
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Another critique of the shareholder approach is that the analytical focus on how 
to solve the corporate governance problem is too narrow. The shareholder approach to 
corporate governance is primarily concerned with aligning the interests of managers and 
shareholders and with ensuring the flow of external capital to firms. However, 
shareholders are not the only ones who make investments in the corporation. The 
competitiveness and ultimate success of a corporation is the result of teamwork that 
embodies contributions from a range of different resource providers including investors, 
employees, creditors, suppliers, distributors, and customers. Corporate governance and 
economic performance will be affected by the relationships among these various 
stakeholders in the firm. According to this line of argument, any assessment of the 
strengths, weaknesses, and economic implications of different corporate governance 
frameworks needs a broader analytical framework which includes the incentives and 
disincentives faced by all stakeholders. 
The Stakeholder Model 
In the stakeholder model (also called insider system), the financial markets are 
little developed; the capital structure of the public corporations is characterized by the 
presence of a small number of major stockholders who hold controlling blocks of 
shares. Traditionally, these stockholders (banks in Germany, public or private financial 
institutions, and industrial corporations in France) protect the managing teams in place 
from the threat of hostile takeover bids. The activities of the company are guided on the 
basis of mechanisms in which players with privileged access to information exert their 
influence on corporate decisions. They are insiders. 
According to the stakeholder model, corporate governance is primarily 
concerned with how effective different governance systems are in promoting long term 
investment and commitment amongst the various stakeholders (see Williamson 1985). 
Kester (1992), for example, states that "the central problem of governance is to devise 
specialized systems of incentives, safeguards, and dispute resolution processes that will 
promote the continuity of business relationships that are efficient in the presence of self- 
interested opportunism". Blair (1995) also defines corporate governance in this broader 
context and argues that corporate governance should be regarded as the set of 
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institutional arrangements for governing the relationships among all of the stakeholders 
that contribute firm specific assets. 
Although Berle and Means (1932) are usually presented as the first theoreticians 
of the shareholder model, in fact it was the first expressions of the stakeholder 
perspective that could be found in their writings when they defended the concept that 
employees, suppliers, customers and members of the communities in which the firms 
are located also have stakes in the firm. The creation of shareholder value is not the only 
goal assigned to the managers, who are more inclined than in the shareholder model 
type to humour the interests of various parties involved with the company (banks, public 
shareholders, employees, etc. ). The view of the corporation in continental Europe 
recognizes a public interest in how large firms are managed. In most of these countries, 
corporations are considered not just to be private associations of shareholders. They are 
seen as having obligations not just to their shareholders but also to society at large. 
In this model, hostile takeovers are few and long-term financial relations exist 
between the financial institutions and the companies. For minority shareholders the 
financial market does not function in a transparent manner. The process of allocating 
financial as well as human resources is more a question of internal management than of 
market mechanisms. The companies themselves become part of networks that allow 
them to develop customer/supplier relationships on the basis of implicit contracts that 
favour the long term. German capitalism, structured around the relationship between 
banks and industry, and careful to maintain a social dialogue in its companies, 
constitutes a typical example of this model of corporate governance. 
The stakeholder model takes a broader view of the firm. According to the 
traditional stakeholder model, the corporation is responsible to a wider constituency of 
stakeholders other than shareholders. Other stakeholders may include contractual 
partners such as employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, and social constituents such 
as members of the community in which the firm is located, environmental interests, 
local and national governments, and society at large. This view holds that corporations 
should be "socially responsible" institutions, managed in the public interest. According 
to this model performance is judged by a wider constituency interested in employment, 
market share, and growth in trading relations with suppliers and purchasers, as well as 
financial performance. 
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The problem with the traditional stakeholder model of the firm is that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to ensure that corporations fulfil these wider objectives. 
Blair (1995) states the arguments against this point of view: "The idea [... ] failed to give 
clear guidance to help managers and directors set priorities and decide among 
competing socially beneficial uses of corporate resources, and provided no obvious 
enforcement mechanisms to ensure that corporations live up to their social obligations. 
As a result of these deficiencies, few academics, policymakers, or other proponents of 
corporate governance reforms still espouse this model. " 
However, given the potential consequences of corporate governance for 
economic performance, corporations should have responsibilities to parties other than 
shareholders. What matters is the impact that various stakeholders can have on the 
behaviour and performance of the firm and on economic growth. Any assessment of the 
implications of corporate governance on economic performance must consider the 
incentives and disincentives faced by all participants who potentially contribute to firm 
performance. With this in mind, the stakeholder model has recently been re-defined, 
where the emphasis has been to more narrowly define what constitutes a stakeholder. 
Therefore, the "hew" stakeholder model specifically defines stakeholders to be those 
actors who have contributed firm's specific assets, see Blair (1995). This redefinition of 
the stakeholder model is also consistent with both the transaction costs and incomplete 
contract theories of the firm in which the firm can be viewed as a "nexus of contracts" 
(Williamson 1975; Williamson 1985). The "best" firms according to the "new" 
stakeholder model are ones with committed suppliers, customers, and employees. This 
new stakeholder approach is, therefore, a natural extension of the shareholder model. 
For example, whenever firm-specific investments need to be made, the performance of 
the firm will depend upon contributions from various resource providers of human and 
physical capital. It is often the case that the competitiveness and ultimate success of the 
firm will be the result of teamwork that embodies contributions from a range of 
different resource providers including investors, employees, creditors, and suppliers. 
Therefore, it is in the interest of the shareholders to take account of other stakeholders, 
and to promote the development of long term relations, trust, and commitment amongst 
various stakeholders (Franks and Mayer 1996). Corporate governance in this context 
becomes a problem of finding mechanisms that elicit firm specific investments on the 
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part of various stakeholders, and that encourage active co-operation amongst 
stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound 
enterprises, see the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD 2004). 
One of the critiques of the stakeholder model, or fears of participants in the 
reform process, is that managers or directors may use "stakeholder" reasons to justify 
poor company performance. The benefit of the shareholder model is that it provides 
clear guidance in helping managers set priorities and establishes a mechanism for 
measuring the efficiency of the firms' management team i. e. firm profitability. On the 
other hand, the benefit of the stakeholder model is its emphasis on overcoming 
problems of underinvestment associated with opportunistic behaviour and in 
encouraging active co-operation amongst stakeholders to ensure the long-term 
profitability of the corporation. 
One of the most challenging tasks on the reform agenda is how to develop 
corporate governance frameworks and mechanisms that elicit the socially efficient 
levels of investment by all stakeholders. The difficulty, however, is to identify those 
frameworks and mechanisms which promote efficient levels of investment, while at the 
same time maintaining the performance accountability aspects provided by the 
shareholder model. At a minimum, this implies that mechanisms that promote 
stakeholder investment and co-operation should be adopted in conjunction with 
mechanisms aimed at preventing management entrenchment. Stakeholder objectives 
should not be used to prevent clear guidance on how the firms' objectives and priorities 
are set. How the firm will attain those objectives and how performance monitoring will 
be determined also need to be clearly defined. 
2.4.3. Corporate Governance in Transition Economies 
Corporate governance has increasingly become an important agenda of 
enterprise reforms in transition economies in recent years. It has also attracted more 
international organizations (OECD, World Bank) and academic researchers to 
investigate corporate governance issues in transition economies (Aoki and Kim 1995a; 
Filatotchev et al 2003; McGee and Preobragenskaya 2004; Pucko 2005; Urbanek et al 
1997; Pannier 1996; McCarthy and Puffer 2002; William et al 2003; CLARKE 2003; 
Bai et al 2004; Mallin and Jelic 2000; Aoki and Kim 1995b). 
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Two aspects of post-communist reforms, privatisation and restructuring, have 
made the issues of corporate governance a very active area of research. Both are seen as 
key elements responsible for the success of transition. Privatisation was conceived as a 
crucial step towards efficiency by way of creating "effective owners" (Chubais and 
Vishnevskaya 1993). These were seen as a driving force that would assure the more 
effective employment of assets necessary to prove the superiority of the market 
mechanism of resources allocation over central planning. In fact, however, 
improvements in efficiency have been slow to materialize on the scale originally 
anticipated. As macro-economists were struggling to offer an unequivocal explanation 
of events it was not surprising to see concepts developed within microeconomics and 
organizational theory being increasingly put to use in transition studies. The 
investigation of corporate governance structures emerged as a promising avenue of 
research. 
It is agued that the importance of sound corporate governance for transition 
economies can be explained through its four main influences: (1) creation of the key 
institution, the private corporation, which drives the successful economic transformation 
to a market based economy, (2) effective allocation of capital and development of 
financial markets, (3) attracting foreign investment and (4) making a contribution to the 
process of national development (Babic, 2001). 
However, the development of corporate governance demands the establishment 
of certain market economy institutions necessary for economic growth. Without good 
corporate governance, corporations cannot fulfil their main missions of profit-making 
and contributing to the social welfare with maximum effectiveness. Companies cannot 
operate successfully without adequate rules of governance and the institutions that 
support them, or without the acceptance of a culture of corporate governance among 
managers, owners and other stakeholders. 
For countries in transition, corporations and associated institutions are the key to 
successful economic transformation towards a market economy. Well-developed 
corporate governance requires that all relevant actors recognize and understand their 
roles. Mass privatization gives birth to numerous owners who are not active participants 
in ownership because they do not recognize their roles, rights and responsibilities. Most 
of them simply wait for the paying out of dividends, which are often worthless in their 
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value. Also, managers do not understand their roles of agents when they are compared 
to owners, but they run companies as if they were their property, satisfying own interest 
to the detriment of owners and the company as a whole. Corporate governance requires 
coherent and strict legal regulations which imply an urgent mission for the makers of 
economic policies of countries in transition. Furthermore, it is important to provide for 
systems to recruit, train and reward professional managers who can be held to high 
standards of competency, ethics, and responsibility. 
Main Issues of Corporate governance in Transition Economies 
The issues of corporate governance in transition economies are mainly related to 
the efficiency of corporate governance mechanism. Roland (2000) draws a synthetic 
picture of corporate governance in transition with emphasis on the efficiency 
implications of corporate governance. 
Problems with State Governance 
The initial state of corporate governance in transition economy was that of state 
governance with which numerous inefficiencies were associated. A growing literature 
has tried to understand these inefficiencies. 
A first strand of papers has emphasized the intervention of government to impose 
on managers political objectives such as the excess creation of jobs which create 
political benefits but create economic inefficiencies (Shleifer and Vishny 1994). State 
intervention is also related to the absence of commitment to given incentive schemes. 
Usually in contracts between private parties, the government (and the courts) acts as a 
third party to ensure contract enforcement and commitment to existing contracts. In the 
relations between the government and enterprises, there is no such third party and 
therefore the question of the commitment of government toward enterprises is an 
important issue. Specifically, this means that even if the government cares about 
efficiency from an ex ante point of view, its inability to commit may lead it to ex post 
intervention in enterprises that lead to ex ante inefficiencies. In the literature, this has 
been called the ratchet effect (Laffont and Tirole 1988; Roland 2000). In its most 
general form, the ratchet effect means that the government uses new information 
generated by firm behaviour to renege on its past commitments and "ratchet up" its 
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demands on enterprises compared to its previous commitments. Well known examples 
of the ratchet effect are the ratchetting up of plan targets for enterprises that over-fulfil 
the plan too easily or the reduction of budgets of enterprises or divisions within 
organizations that do not spend all their budgets. The perverse incentive effects of the 
ratchet are well understood: agents keep slack in performance or overspend their 
budgets. 
A second strand of papers has emphasized inefficiencies associated to state 
governance via the intervention of enterprises to obtain soft budget constraints 
(Dewatripont and Maskin 1995; Kornai 1980) and to seek rents. The important question 
raised is: What are the mechanisms by which privatization solves these problems? 
Economic theories today are far more precise than the slogans of "depolarization" that 
one has seen in the transition literature. The question is not trivial. Indeed the above 
problems can all exist with private firms. The state can, for example, intervene in 
private firms to impose objectives that deviate from efficiency. This is the case for 
example with inefficient regulations imposed on private firms. The government may 
renege on its commitment not only towards state-owned enterprises but also towards 
private enterprises. An obvious area where this applies is the field of taxation. It is a 
rather general feature of taxation that governments do not commit to given tax rates. 
Similarly, soft budget constraints and rent-seeking are not unique to SOE's. Private 
firms also lobby to get subsidies and to seek rents. 
Economic theory has been trying to understand what the mechanisms are by 
which these problems are less prevalent in private firms as compared to state-owned 
firms. For example, the model of Shleifer and Vishny (1994) shows that state 
intervention in private firms is more costly than in state-owned firms because in private 
firms, deviations from efficiency imply important profit losses for the owners whereas 
managers of SOEs are depend on the state for their livelihood anyway and do not face 
such high important opportunity costs of accepting state intervention as private firms. 
Therefore, private owners must be paid more in order to be persuaded to deviate from 
profit objectives. Similarly, the commitment problem of the government can be made 
less severe via markets and free mobility. For example, Roland (2000) has shown how 
the existence of a managerial labour market due to the presence of the private sector can 
break the monopsony power of government towards managers and thus reduce the 
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dependency of the latter on government. The literature on soft budget constraints (see 
Dewatripont et al 1998, Roland 2000) shows for example that entry and competition 
reduce the softness of budget constraints because they reduce the opportunity cost to 
government of not bailing out firms in terms of job losses and other costs of hard budget 
constraints. Also, the profit incentives in private firms can be stronger than rent-seeking 
incentives (and thus discourage the latter) when the profit opportunities are big enough. 
These are just a few examples. Much research still needs to be done to understand better 
the deeper reasons for inefficiencies in state-owned enterprises but the current literature 
goes beyond the simple dichotomy between private and state ownership and tries to 
understand the exact mechanisms by which private firms can be more efficient. 
Problems with dispersed share ownership. 
It is well known, at least since Grossman and Hart (1980) that dispersed share 
ownership is associated with a free rider problem in monitoring. Dispersed outside 
ownership has been an inherent feature of voucher privatization in transition economies. 
In the Czech Republic, individual citizens were given vouchers to buy shares of 
enterprises and no mechanism was put in place to encourage the emergence of strong 
blockholders. The Polish program for mass-privatization tried to avoid the dispersed 
share ownership of the Czech plan by having large investment funds hold shares in 
enterprises. However, here again, the issue of dispersed share ownership appeared at the 
level of ownership in the investment funds. Indeed, citizens were to be given vouchers 
to buy shares in the investment funds instead of shares in firms. There was thus 
dispersed ownership in investment funds. 
It is important to note that the most perfect legal environment will not eliminate 
the free rider problem and thus will not lead to an improvement of management if firms 
have dispersed ownership. Perfecting the law can thus be misguided when dispersed 
ownership is an important issue, as is the case with mass-privatization. The law can of 
course still be useful in protecting the rights of minority shareholders from abuse by 
management. It should be noted that full concentration of assets by blockholders also 
has its costs since over-monitoring may stifle initiative by management (Burkart, 
Gromb, and Pannunzi 1997). Some mix of concentrated ownership and dispersed 
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ownership trades off optimally the costs of free-riding with the costs of over- 
monitoring. 
Problems with lack of minority Shareholder Protection 
The issue of minority shareholder protection has become very important in the 
context of transition economies, especially in the Czech Republic and Russia where 
mass privatization programs were introduced. The concept of "tunnelling" has been 
coined in the Czech Republic to denote various methods by which management can 
engage in asset-stripping to the detriment of minority shareholder interests. 
Mass-privatization tends to enhance the net benefit from asset-stripping. Since 
managers or owners have received the asset nearly from free, they can make an 
immense gain from asset-stripping, even when the latter would not be optimal from the 
economic point of view. 
Obviously, the question is raised of why management would want to engage in 
asset-stripping in the first place. There are various possible reasons for this. First of all, 
the owners may not be the most competent. Therefore, even though another owner 
would prefer to restructure the firm, an incompetent owner may prefer to engage in 
asset-stripping. Second, if the general environment in the economy is very uncertain, 
then owners may prefer to reap the sure gains from asset-stripping rather than the 
uncertain benefits from investing to restructure. Such uncertainty can even be 
endogenous and lead to multiple equilibria. Managers who believe that there may be re- 
nationalisation or political instability may engage in asset-stripping thereby leading to 
reinforce political instability. 
Owners who have bought the assets, on the other hand, will have less incentives 
to engage in asset-stripping because they will never, from an ex ante point of view, want 
to engage in actions that reduce the value of the assets below their purchase price. In 
other words, they will not be interested in purchasing firms whose value they could only 
reduce. 
The detailed observation of various tunnelling techniques has sometimes let to 
the conclusion that improvements in existing laws could reduce tunnelling. Indeed, each 
technique of tunnelling is associated to a given loophole in the law. Therefore, it can be 
argued that fixing those loopholes will help reduce tunnelling. Good laws are certainly a 
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necessary safeguard, but they are not a sufficient one. Even if the law is improved, how 
can one be sure that the law will be enforced, that insiders will not bribe regulators, etc? 
Russia, for example, has rather good laws. However, the enforcement of laws is rather 
low (see e. g. BergllJl and von Thadden 1999; Black, eta! 2000). 
Governance and access to outside funds 
Control rights and their distribution change the incentives within the firms but 
access to outside funds is equally crucial to achieve efficiency. Usually, those who have 
control rights over the firm bring outside funds or have the capacity to bring outside 
funds (either internally accumulated or via access to debt and equity). With mass- 
privatization whether privatization to outsiders and insiders, this is not the case. There is 
de facto a decoupling of the transfer of ownership and of the financing of restructuring 
via the access to outside funds. Assets may have been transferred into private hands that 
do not have easy access to outside funds. 
Access to outside funds will depend: 1) on the state of the financial system and 
its liquidity, 2) on whether the internal corporate governance arrangements in the firm 
convince investors to put money in the firm. From that perspective, outside investors 
may ask to be given control rights in exchange for access to funds. This should be seen 
as a positive development as such shift of control rights may correct the initial 
allocation of assets achieved via privatization. This will reduce the possible insider bias. 
However one must be careful not to draw generalizations from this case. As we will see 
later, one must fully recognize the heterogeneity of various situations one is facing. Not 
all firms need outside funds even in cases when outside control does not enhance 
efficiency nor will they necessarily relinquish control rights against outside funds. 
Developing Corporate Governance in Transition Economies 
Babic (2001) claims that there are two basic dilemmas connected with the 
corporate governance problem in transition economies. First, is it possible to have the 
identical framework that has evolved over centuries in developed market economies for 
the emerging markets, or is it better to adapt the system of corporate governance to the 
specific circumstances of a transition economy? The second dilemma involves the 
question of the appropriateness of the mechanism used for corporate governance. The 
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existing corporate governance literature is almost exclusively concerned with external 
mechanisms 
- 
accounting transparency to improve the accuracy of stock market 
valuations, regulatory pursuit of fraud, the role of the shareholders' general meeting, 
"disciplinary" takeovers, legal requirements for the appointment of "external" directors, 
and so on (Monks and Minow 2003). In these external mechanisms the crucial role 
belongs to the well-developed stock market or to the monitoring role of the banks. 
Unfortunately, in transition economics these mechanisms of market discipline hardly 
work because of the lack of such institutions as a stock markets and an efficient banking 
sector. 
At the same time, in the transition economies, the internal mechanisms- owners, 
board of directors and managers 
- 
differ significantly in comparison to the internal 
mechanisms of the developed market economies. First, the concept of ownership itself 
is problematic. Ownership of post-socialist enterprises was often shared between the 
state, public corporate bodies, banks, municipal bodies, managers, employees, other 
state or private companies, private individuals and foreign individuals and corporations. 
The absence of `real owners' leads to neglect of the interests of capital itself and thus to 
degradation in the quality of the capital, damaging the long-term interests of the firm 
(Babic 2001). Second, the boards of directors fail to exercise a true monitoring role. 
Because the state is the key stockholder, there is a misbalance of power among the 
various stockholders. The members of the board of directors are usually the 
representatives of the state, the ruling party, public corporate bodies or even the banks. 
For individual board members the motivation to act is inhibited by their dependence on 
management for benefits such as lucrative appointments to boards of directors. Even if 
they have the motivation to exercise direct control over managers, they lack the 
knowledge to make managerial decisions. As a consequence, the role of the board of 
directors is reduced to financial control, which assumes maximization of the short-term 
results and evaluation of the managers' performance retroactively. Third, the upper 
"echelon" of managers acquired their knowledge and skills in a business environment 
which did not require the development of the skills of transformational or strategic 
leadership. So, transition countries have an archaic cadre of managers who do not 
posses a capacity for strategic thinking, vision creation, team work, risk taking and 
change management. Potentially new managers and leaders are facing a new challenge 
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which comes from the Western countries in the form of ready-made solutions, but they 
are also facing a challenge to respond to specific requirements of the business 
environment encountered in particular countries. Another problem is related to the non- 
existence of a market for management talent and the difficulty of evaluating managers 
in an impartial manner. 
2.5. Socially Responsible Restructuring 
We have noticed from the discussions in the previous sections that wherever 
enterprise restructuring is taking place, it entails significant labour and social costs. 
During restructuring there is often significant downsizing of labour, which has the social 
impact on stakeholders who might be influenced by restructuring. Thus, reaction can be 
such that restructuring is slowed and in some cases stalled. This fact is increasingly 
recognized by development agencies, governments, and enterprise management and as a 
result how restructuring is implemented in a socially responsible way is becoming an 
integral part of the design of restructuring programs. 
Experience of the major restructuring operations carried out in Europe in the 
steel, coal and shipbuilding industries has shown that successful restructuring can be 
better achieved through joint efforts involving the public authorities, companies and 
employees' representatives. This process should seek to safeguard employees' rights and 
enable them to undergo vocational retraining where necessary, to modernise production 
tools and processes in order to develop on-site activities, to mobilise public and private 
financing and to establish procedures for information, dialogue, cooperation and 
partnership. Companies should take up their share of responsibility to ensure the 
employability of their staff. 
2.5.1. Concept and Definition 
The concept of socially responsible restructuring (SRR) was emerging just in 
recent years in the documents of international organizations. It is relative vague concept, 
and there has been little success in the academic literature in making it sufficiently 
concrete and operational in management term, although increasingly more studies have 
been undertaken in this field (Fretwell 2004; Burke and Nelson 1997; Luss and Nyce 
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2002; Smeltzer and Zener 1994; Clark and Soulsby 1998; Cascio 2002b and 2003; Band 
and Tustin 1995; Lei and Hitt 1995; Champlin 1998; Karake 1998; Carroll 1984). 
Wayne F. Cascio, professor of management at the University of Colorado- 
Denver, is one of the first to present systematic longitudinal research on the effects of 
downsizing, particularly, initiated the concept of Responsible Restructuring. While 
writing the U S. Department of Labour's 1995 publication Guide to Responsible 
Restructuring, and 2002 book "Responsible Restructuring: Creative and Profitable 
Alternatives to Layoffs [ he draws on the results of an 18-year study of S&P 500 firms 
to prove that it makes good business sense to restructure responsibly 
- 
to avoid 
downsizing and instead regard employees as assets to be developed rather than costs to 
be cut. Cascio explodes 13 common myths about downsizing, detailing its negative 
impact on profitability, productivity, quality, and on the morale, commitment, and even 
health of survivors. He uses real-life examples to illustrate successful approaches to 
responsible restructuring used by companies such as Charles Schwab, Compaq, Cisco, 
Motorola, Reflexite, and Southwest Airlines. And he offers specific, step-by-step advice 
on what to do-and what not to do-when developing and implementing a restructuring 
strategy. 
He claims that responsible restructuring relies on workers to provide substantial 
competitive advantage by adapting a wide range of practices such as training, 
information sharing, participatory management, flattened organizational structures, 
labour management partnerships, compensation linked to skills, and customer 
satisfaction. 
Cascio (2002a and 2003) provides strategies for socially responsible 
restructuring and highlighted some things not to do. For example, build a plan for 
restructuring into the overall economic plan for firm's business; carefully consider the 
rationale behind restructuring; before making any final decisions about restructuring, 
managers should make their concerns known to employees and seek their input; don't 
use downsizing as a "quick fix" to achieve short-term goals in the face of long-term 
problems. Consider other alternatives first, and ensure that management at all levels 
shares the pain and participates in any sacrifices employees are asked to bear; if layoffs 
are necessary, be sure that the process of selecting excess positions is perceived as fair 
and that decisions are made in a consistent manner. Make special efforts to retain the 
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best and the brightest, and provide maximum advance notice to terminated employees; 
communicate regularly and in a variety of ways to keep everyone abreast of new 
developments and information; give survivors a reason to stay and prospective new 
hires a reason to join; Train employees and their managers in the new ways of 
operating. Restructuring means change, and employees at all levels need help in coping 
with changes in areas such as reporting relationships, new organizational arrangements, 
and reengineered business processes. Evidence indicates clearly that firms whose 
training budgets increase following a restructuring are more likely to realize improved 
productivity, profits, and quality; and examine carefully human resource (HR) systems 
in light of the change of strategy or environment facing the firm Training employees in 
the new ways of operating is important, but so also are other HR systems. These include 
workforce planning, based on changes in business strategy, markets, customers, and 
expected economic conditions; recruitment and selection, based on the need to change 
both the number and skills mix of new hires; performance appraisal, based on changes 
in the work to be done; compensation, based on changes in skills requirements or 
responsibilities; and labour relations, based on the need to involve employees and their 
unions in the restructuring process. 
Luss and Nyce (2002) drew data from a 1993 Watson Wyatt survey on Best 
Practices in Corporate Restructuring, and analyzed how the successful restructured 
companies in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom over the previous two 
years. The study shows that successful restructures managed to cut costs in short-run 
while positioning themselves to significantly outperform their industry peers in the long 
run. They enjoyed significantly higher total returns to shareholders over the next five 
years than any of the other groups they examined. In their research, they identified the 
successful restructuring with downsizing as those communicate effectively, get 
employees involved, use training targeted to skills needed in restructuring, mobilize 
managers to support the effort, reduce the workforce only once, select workers carefully 
to minimize those replaced, pay particular attention to recovery actions and place a 
greater emphasis on improved cash flows and debt reduction. In a sense, it is socially 
responsible restructuring behaviour. 
International Labour Organization (ILO) is always concerned about impact of 
restructuring/downsizing on workers and employees. Over the past years, ILO has 
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carried out series of studies on enterprise restructuring based on enterprise surveys 
conducted in transition economies. The studies have produced a number of country 
reports which investigate the change in labour demands, employment impact of 
privatization and restructuring, human resource development, and in particular, socially 
responsible policies during transition to a market-oriented economy (Evans-Klock and 
Samorodov 1998; ILO 1997,1999a; 1999b; 1999c and 2000; Marcovitch 1999). ILO 
developed the concept of a hierarchy of restructuring and advocates that higher more 
strategic, level of restructuring be studied carefully before decisions are taken to 
downsize or reduce personnel costs. These higher levels include revitalization and 
change in strategy, ownership, financial structures, organization, production, 
outsourcing and non-personnel cost reduction. The result of ILO studies reveals that the 
higher the category and the more strategic the approach, the greater the sustainable 
impact on shareholder value and the less the impact on employees and other 
stakeholders. Thus, companies should focus their attention initially on the "upstream" 
approaches and practice continuous "rightsizing" rather than hurriedly initiating a major 
one-off downsizing programme. ILO defines the socially responsible company as the 
one which rewards shareholders with a reasonable return over time; is customer focused; 
considers employees as its most important asset, provides meaningful work, fair wages 
and benefits, ensures their employability, and provides an enabling work environment; 
contributes to the prosperity and social cohesion of the communities in which it operates; 
applies the golden rule ("do unto others as you would have them do unto you") to its 
business partners (suppliers, alliances, franchisees, etc. ); and practices eco-efficiency 
and environmental sustainability. The concept of the socially responsible restructuring is 
defined as using one or more approaches to consciously take into consideration of all 
the interests of all stakeholders. In practice, the process is often as important as the 
substance of change to the success of restructuring. This means respecting the values of 
the enterprise, seeking the involvement of those affected, practicing open 
communications and treating all employees with respect and dignity. The emphasis must 
be on overall "stakeholder value" rather than short-term shareholder gains. 
In recent years, the widespread restructuring taking place in Europe raises 
concerns for all of the employees and other stakeholders as the closure of a factory or a 
heavy cut in its workforce may involve a serious economic, social or political crisis in a 
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community. Few companies escape the need to restructure, often through downsizing, 
with the year 2000 seeing more mergers and acquisitions than any other year in history. 
More recently in March 2000, the European Council in Lisbon made a special appeal to 
companies' sense of social responsibility regarding best practices for lifelong learning, 
work organisation, equal opportunities, social inclusion and sustainable development. In 
the summer of 2001, the European Commission published a Green Paper launching a 
broad consultation on the European approach to corporate social responsibility. It 
requires both public authorities and business to show a new sense of both social and 
environmental responsibility. The companies should rethink their roles and 
responsibilities not only in relation to their shareholders but also to the needs and 
expectations of all their stakeholders. Adopting measures that limit the negative impact 
of activities on the environment is no longer enough, the focus has broadened to also 
include the dimension referred to as CSR. 
In the Green Paper of (Commission of the European Communities 2001), SRR is 
defined as the restructuring that can balance and take into consideration the interests and 
concerns of all those who are affected by the changes and decisions, which involves 
seeking the participation and involvement of those affected through open information 
and consultation. Furthermore, restructuring shall be well prepared by identifying major 
risks, calculating all the costs and evaluating all of the alternatives which would reduce 
the need for redundancies. 
This definition emphasizes strategies and communication tactics before 
restructuring happens, involvement of stakeholders and alternative approaches in the 
process of restructuring, and as well the support and social service after restructuring. 
Other researchers simply regard restructuring with labour shedding and downsizing as 
the socially irresponsible restructuring, and strategic restructuring with innovative 
products and service, and retaining human capital as responsible restructuring 
(Domadenik and Vehovec 2002; Grosfeld and Roland 1997). 
As I described in Section 2.3, when Grosfeld and Roland (1997) studied the 
restructuring and firm performance in transition economies, they divided the 
restructuring into two types: defensive and strategic restructuring. Defensive 
restructuring essentially means taking measures that seek to reduce costs and scale 
down enterprise activity. This includes cutting obsolete production lines, shedding 
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labour and getting rid of non-productive assets. Strategic restructuring is based on a 
thoughtful business strategy developed in response to a need for a profound 
redeployment of assets. It implies the introduction of new product lines, new processes, 
new technologies and new investments. Judging from the definition, I can term these 
two types of restructurings as the socially irresponsible and socially responsible 
restructuring. 
Grosfeld and Roland (1997) also analyzed the existing evidence on enterprise 
restructuring in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland by distinguishing the two 
types of restructuring, and concluded that there had been significant restructuring 
activities across the board in all countries under review, despite the differences in 
national policies. However, it appears that the adjustment measures have mainly had a 
defensive character, the extent of strategic restructuring being much more limited. He 
argued that more profound strategic restructuring requires effective corporate 
governance which depends upon both changes in the ownership structure and reform of 
the financial system. 
On the base of Grosfeld and Roland's (1997) study, Domadenik and Vehovec 
(2002) developed a theoretical framework and provide empirical estimates of the extent 
of several forms of restructuring in 130 privatized firms in a model transition economy 
(Slovenia) during the period of 1996-1998. In view of the institutional developments in 
the transition economies, they also divided restructuring into defensive (related to short- 
term cutting costs) and strategic (focused on increasing revenues through investment). 
Using predictions from the theoretical framework, they estimated a firm-level labour 
demand equation to test defensive restructuring and an augmented investment equation 
to assess strategic restructuring. The labour demand estimates point to relatively slow 
defensive restructuring, while the investment model estimates indicate the presence of 
credit rationing and bargaining in most types of soft investment. The research didn't 
find support for the hypothesis that firms treat expenditures on employee training as 
investment, but there was evidence that they behave similarly as those from developed 
countries in that they display features of profit maximizing behaviour. 
The World Bank has been concerned about the consequences and impact of 
restructuring and privatization on different stakeholders. The importance the World 
Bank attaches to socially responsible practices is reflected in its increased lending to 
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support public enterprise restructuring in recent years. Since 1987,88 Bank operations 
in 47 countries have contained significant levels of assistance to workers made 
redundant because of enterprise restructuring or privatization. The sums involved for 
such lending more than doubled from 1994 to 1998 (Chen 2001). The World Bank has 
learned that good macroeconomic policies-combined with relevant social policies 
- 
provide a favourable environment for sustained economic growth and poverty 
reduction. 
Two main reasons explain why the Bank is paying more attention to lay-offs. 
The first is the Bank's primary objective in poverty reduction. Lay-offs have been 
referred to as the transient poor (Subbarao and Braithwaite 1995). Most transient poor 
people have the potential to recover income losses and not join the ranks of the long- 
term unemployed if appropriate support in the form of cost-effective labour programs is 
provided. The second reason is the Bank's increasing emphasis on social stability as a 
prerequisite for long-term economic growth. Evidence shows that most lay-offs are 
politically vocal, and strong labour resistances to downsizing can slow down the reform 
process. For instance, the social unrest prompted by the recent Asian economic crisis 
has led international organizations to pay a great deal of attention to social sector 
development. This raises the question of how to ensure long-term economic stability 
and minimize labour losses. 
The major labour assistance programs the World Bank has provided are shown in 
Table 2-1. We found that the most common components of World Bank public 
enterprise and privatization labour assistance projects is training and retraining (18%), 
followed by labour market mobility and information development (11.5%), and the 
provision of severance pay (11%). 
Table 2- 1 Labour Assistance Components to Redundant Workers, 1987-1998 
Component Number Percentage 
Training/retraining 
Labour market mobility/ job information development 
Severance pay 
Employment service/counselling 
Labour adjustment & labour redundancy program design 
Unemployed insurance/ living allowance 
Overall social safety net assistance 
35 
23 
22 
20 
19 
14 
13 
17.5 
11.5 
11.0 
10.0 
9.5 
7.0 
6.5 
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Pension/income support 
Job creation (public work & private sector development) 
Small business assistance 
Voluntary departure schemes 
Earlier retirement 
Shareholding through asset ransfer & employee 
participation 
Revision of labour contract and labour law 
Total 
12 
11 
9 
6 
6 
5 
5 
200 
6.0 
5.5 
4.5 
3,0 
3.0 
2.5 
2.5 
100.0 
Source: Chen, Yi (2001), Jhe World Bank and the Provision of Assistance to Redundant 
Workers: Experience with Enterprise Restructuring and Future Directions? Social Protection 
Discussion Paper Series, No. 0112, P17. 
The studies undertaken by the World Bank on transition economies have 
identified the strategies and policies at different stages of restructuring based on the 
experience of transition economies which underwent a large scale of restructuring and 
privatization (Dar and Tzannatos 1999; Betcherman, Olivas, and Dar 2004; Fretwell 
2004). For example, when the restructuring with downsizing and lay-offs is carried out, 
the main stakeholders that may be affected by or influence the design, implementation 
and outcomes of restructuring and privatization, should be identified. The labour 
adjustment plans for workers prior to dismissal should be developed in order to help 
"assist and push" displaced workers back into the productive employment; and 
temporary income support and labour redeployment services to individual displaced 
workers and support regional development efforts. The communications strategy should 
support and continuously be shaped by consultants with stakeholders on the labour 
restructuring strategy and financial/social packages to be extended to redundant 
workers. In addition, evaluation and monitoring of activities need to be built in as an 
integral part of any social mitigation activity related to privatization and restructuring. 
In undertaking evaluations, the social, political and economic objectives of the 
programs need to be taken into account. 
2.5.2. Socially Responsible Restructuring and Downsizing 
Three types of organizational transition have received increasing attention 
during the past few years: mergers and acquisitions, downsizing and privatization. 
These newly emerging sources of organizational change share some common features. 
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They are interrelated since all represent the effects of the economic recession and 
attempts by organizations to survive and to increase productivity (Burke and Nelson 
1997). 
Downsizing can be and often is an opportunity to reduce costs, improve 
competitiveness and reinvigorate an organization if it is managed responsibly. However, 
it can also strip an organization of valuable human assets and lead to deteriorating 
productivity, morale and loyalty. 
Downsizing has a very negative connotation arising from the perception that it 
means having fewer people do more work; the idea of increasing job demands is a 
major source of stress in the workplace. As a result, company announcements more 
often refer to collective layoffs as restructuring, rationalization or resizing. It is 
important to recognize that downsizing may well be essential for a company to survive 
or remain competitive. 
The real question is how downsizing is done, rather than whether to downsize. 
Companies that downsize through buy-outs and attrition, that help their workers get new 
jobs, and that provides outplacement services, end up much better positioned than 
companies, which simply wield the axe. They have a better chance of retaining the loyalty 
of the surviving workers. Trust is one of the most valuable yet brittle assets in any 
enterprise. So over the long term, it's far better for companies to downsize in a humane 
way" (Reich, 1996). 
Two schools of thought debate on issue of social responsibility and downsizing. 
One school, embraced by advocates of the social responsibility movement, argues that 
layoffs have devastated the industrial workforce, leaving workers with little hope for job 
security and improving economic prospects. Underlying this pro-social responsibility 
view is the belief that legal solutions are not always sufficient. The time-lag problem is 
suggested to be at the heart of this argument in that the law is "primarily a reactive 
institution, " (Stone 1975). This means that there may exist a significant period of time 
between when a problem is recognized and when the legislature can pass a law to solve 
the problem. Until new laws are passed "a great deal of damage- some irreversible 
- 
can 
be done" (Stone 1974). According to Drucker (1993), organizations have to take on 
"social responsibility". There is no one else around in the society of organizations to 
take care of society itself. Yet organizations must do so responsibly, within the limits of 
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their competence, and without endangering their performance capacity. 
Another school suggests that American companies, pressured by global 
competition, increased quality of foreign products, and the emergence of new economic 
alliances among former rivals, have no choice but to restructuring their firms either 
through downsizing, downscoping, or retrenchment. Social responsibility for 
proponents of this school represents a commitment not to waste the resources of the 
society at large in unprofitable plants and lines of businesses. To those, adopting new 
management strategies or using new technologies in order to produce more for less, 
would increase their stockholders' wealth. This improvement of stockholders' wealth is 
assumed to have a trickle over effect on other stakeholders. In terms of goods and 
services, and even increased rate of job creation in the no-so- distant future. 
Is downsizing an indication of a social responsible behaviour? Is it an indication 
of socially irresponsible behaviour? How is company's reputations affected by 
downsizing Does the degree of downsizing affect the social perception of corporations? 
A number of the researchers have attempted to estimate the effect of restructuring and 
downsizing on firm performance in specific countries. Karake (1998) empirically test 
the relationship between a company's social responsibility performance as measured by 
the company's reputation index and the degree of downsizing of employees. His 
research supports the hypothesis that as companies eliminate jobs and layoff workers, 
they are perceived as being less reputable, hence, less socially responsible, and as well 
support the previous research which revealed a positive association between a 
company's social performance, as measured by a company's reputation index, and its 
financial performance as measured by its return on equity. 
Cascio (1993,2002c, 2003) studied the effects of extreme downsizing on the 
financial performance of 25 large firms in United States over a 7-year period. Cascio 
and his colleagues (2000) examined financial and employment data from companies in 
the Standard & Poor's 500 with a view to examine the relationships between changes in 
employment and financial performance. They assigned companies into one of seven 
mutually exclusive categories based upon their level of change in employment and their 
level of change in plant and equipment, or assets. Categories included pure Employment 
Downsizers, Asset Downsizers, Combination Downsizers, similar categories of upsizers, 
and Stable Employers. They then observed the firms' financial performance 
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(profitability and total return on common stock) from one year before to two years after 
the employment-change events. They examined results for firms in each category on an 
independent as well as on an industry-adjusted basis. In our most recent study, we 
observed a total of 6,418 occurrences of changes in employment for S&P 500 
companies during the 18-year period from 1982 through 2000. As in their earlier studies, 
they found no significant, consistent evidence that employment downsizing led to 
improved financial performance, as measured by return on assets or industry-adjusted 
return on assets. Downsizing strategies, either employment downsizing or asset 
downsizing, did not yield long-term payoffs that were significantly larger than those 
generated by Stable Employers-that is, those companies in which the complement of 
employees did not fluctuate by more than +-5 per cent. 
Cascio's study showcases a few of the many approaches which companies have 
taken to avoid involuntary layoffs and to restructure responsibly some reaping great 
benefits for their efforts. He also suggested some of guidelines for how to begin 
responsible restructuring to produce competitive companies and committed workers. 
The results of study suggest companies did not realize cost efficiencies to the extent 
they may have expected prior to making dramatic reductions in levels of employees. 
There is no evidence to indicate that downsizing employees was the sole step the 25 
organizations in question took to become more efficient and productive. However, the 
magnitude of the cuts in employment indicates that it was a major initiative in each of 
the firms. Using real-life illustrations of successful, responsible restructurings at 
companies such as Charles Schwab, Cisco, Motorola, and Intel, Cascio examines the 
specific practices these leading firms use instead of layoffs 
- 
including retraining, 
labour-management partnership, and compensation linked to organizational 
performance. These practices demonstrate that these companies view their workers as 
assets to be developed rather than as costs to be cut. Cascio presents compelling 
evidence showing that businesses adopting these measures fare better than businesses in 
similar circumstances that choose downsizing. 
Karake (1998) examined empirically the relationship between a company's 
socially responsible performance as measured by the company's reputation index, and 
the degree of downsizing of employees and a company's discriminatory practices by 
using 178 sampled large publicly-held US-based corporations which announced their 
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intentions to downsize during the 1990-1992 period. The statistical analysis does 
support the hypothesis that as companies eliminate jobs and layoff workers, they are 
perceived as being less reputable, hence, less socially responsible. The analysis further 
supported previous research which revealed a positive association between a company's 
social performance, as measured by a company's reputation index, and its financial 
performance, as measured by return on equity. Karake (1997) also developed relative 
index for downsizing employees to measure firm performance based on the problems 
survivors' experience. The underlying principle of the model is that by addressing the 
issues that have been observed as survivor syndrome prior to the downsizing, the 
negative outcomes on survivors will be minimized. As with the realistic job preview 
(RJP) (Wanous 1973), the key is to present information prior to the event as if trying to 
vaccinate or immunize employees to the ensuing downsizing. On the basis of Wanous's 
Model of RJP, Appelbaum (2000) developed the Realistic Downsizing Preview (RDP) 
model, which can be effectively used before the downsizing. RDP is implemented to 
prevent survivor syndrome in the aftermath of the downsizing. Appelbuam argues that 
the foundation of RDP model is that by addressing issues that have been observed as 
survivor syndromes prior to a downsizing, the negative outcomes can be minimized. 
2.5.3. Socially Responsible Restructuring and Corporate Governance 
Corporate restructuring and improved corporate governance are essential parts 
of economic reform programs under way in many countries. Thus, many studies attempt 
to examine how corporations can be restructured to promote growth and reduce 
excessive debt without placing undue burdens on taxpayers, and what framework is 
needed to promote better corporate governance. 
Corporate restructuring involves restructuring the assets and liabilities of 
corporations, including their debt-to-equity structures, in line with their cash-flow needs 
to promote efficiency, restore growth, and minimize the cost to taxpayers. Corporate 
governance refers to the framework of rules and regulations that enable the stakeholders 
to exercise appropriate oversight of a company to maximize its value and to obtain a 
return on their holdings (Iskander et al 1999). Both corporate and financial sector 
restructuring are central to ongoing economic reform programs in emerging markets and 
transition economies. Thompson and Wright (1995) argue that the corporate 
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restructuring transaction is regarded as an innovation in corporate governance; it 
can remedy the perceived agency problems associated with management control. 
In the current debate on governance issues there is a widely articulated 
view (Charkham 1994) that the Anglo-American style capital market, with its 
emphasis on liquidity and the separation of institutional shareholders from the 
firms they invest in often results in poor managerial accountability and 
substantial departures from shareholder value maximization. It is further 
suggested that neither of the principal market restraints on managerial behaviour 
- 
i. e. the managerial labour market and the corporate acquisitions market - is 
particularly effective. The former, which might be expected to reward success and 
penalize failure Fama (1980) shows, at best, a very weak average relationship 
between top executive remuneration and performance; whilst the market for 
corporate control hypothesis is flawed if managers can deploy effective costly 
defences, including size, or if errant managers use their discretion to pursue 
takeover targets. The corporate restructuring transaction may be considered as an 
organic response of Anglo-American capital markets to the governance problems 
encountered therein. The description of `corporate restructuring transaction' is 
used to embrace a range of organizational developments -leveraged buy-outs, 
management buy-outs and buy-ins, leveraged recapitalizations and cash-outs, 
employee stock ownership plans etc. - which involve simultaneous changes in the 
ownership, financial structure and incentive systems of firms. Changes which 
typically have the effect of securing: first, a substantial re-unification of share 
ownership and manager control; second, the partial substitution of various debt 
instruments for equity in the firm's financial structure; third, the introduction of 
increased incentives for investors and/or lenders to monitor senior managers; and 
fourth, the introduction of greater incentives at the peak tier of the managerial 
hierarchy and often at subordinate levels as well. Restructuring transactions are 
here distinguished from traditional acquisitions, although it is recognized that the 
underlying motivation may be similar. They are also distinguished from certain 
other recent phenomena affecting the corporate sector, especially voluntary 
divestment (including 'refocusing') and so-called 'downsizing' although it is clear 
that these and other retrenchment activities may be strongly associated with 
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restructuring organizational forms (Liebeskind, et al 1992). 
Two key sets of institutions that influence restructuring are those in the field of 
corporate governance, especially the way that firms are financed and owned, and those 
in the area of industrial relations, particularly the way that managements are required to 
consult and negotiate with their workforces. Important differences in the nature of 
institutions in these two spheres shape the way that firms undertake restructuring 
(Edwards 2004). Dutz and Vagliasindi (1999) identify four main channels through 
which effective corporate governance can affect restructuring: (1). by identifying 
appropriate restructuring/turnaround agents; (2) by ensuring managers take appropriate 
restructuring decisions; (3) by attracting and retaining external finance needed for 
restructuring; (4) by facilitating a broader social and political legitimacy for the 
restructuring process. 
Filatotchev, et al (2003) examine corporate governance in a situation where 
managerial ownership is dominant and to examine the tradeoffs (costs) of such 
ownership relative to the benefits. They go beyond the traditional governance-strategy- 
performance framework by considering organizational capabilities as substitutes for 
managerial ownership. Accordingly, they link agency and learning theories through an 
integrated model on the effects of governance and organizational capabilities on 
corporate restructuring. Their analysis, therefore, considers the organizational level 
implications for restructuring of the differing corporate governance and learning 
associated with different forms of privatization, and provides a link between firm-level 
developments with systemic, national level privatization outcomes that applies across 
all firms. 
As I stated in the preceding sections, national corporate governance regimes 
differ along a variety of dimensions: ownership, finance, corporate law, boardroom 
practices, management pay, and the role of employees. One of the most important and 
controversial differences relates to markets for corporate control. In countries such as 
Britain or the United States, markets for corporate control are thought to perform 
important governance functions in promoting a greater shareholder orientation among 
corporate management. By contrast, Germany is often described as having a bank- 
oriented, blockholder, or stakeholder model. Markets for corporate control have not 
played a significant role in the post-war period. 
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A large literature now illustrates important linkages between finance, 
management, and industrial relations. As I described previously, most comparisons 
contrast two types of corporate governance systems, such as shareholder vs. stakeholder 
or outsider vs. insider systems. These models reflect strong negative correlations 
between national capital market development (e. g. shareholder rights, market 
capitalization, ownership dispersion, or merger and acquisition activity), on the one 
hand, and industrial relations (e. g. co-ordination of wage bargaining and employment 
protection law) or employment (e. g. employee turnover) on the other (Hner 2005). 
It is argued that two key aspects of national business systems, which influence 
nature of restructuring, are the systems of corporate governance and industrial relations. 
As I described in the previous section, systems of corporate governance are divided into 
`insider (stakeholder)' and `outsider (stockholder)' models. In the former, ownership is 
concentrated among a small number of shareholders, and owner-management relations 
are stable and close. Owners use this proximity to assess a range of `organizational 
competencies' as their basis for predicting future performance. It is often argued that the 
stability of ownership in firms in these systems and the criteria used to assess firm 
performance allow managers to respond to changed market conditions in a measured, 
gradual manner and, hence, firms tend to restructure incrementally in the main (Hall and 
Soskice 2001). The ownership patterns and tendency towards incremental restructuring 
are compatible with an industrial relations system that allows employee `voices' to be 
heard, through statutory rights for employees to be represented on company boards and 
works councils as is the case in Germany, or through the negotiation of a `social plan' to 
deal with the consequences of restructuring for employees as is required in France. In 
outsider systems, of which the UK and Ireland are examples, ownership is widely 
dispersed across a large number of shareholders each of which holds only a small 
proportion of the total equity. Shareholders have fluid and distant relations with 
managers and current financial performance is used as the primary indicator of the 
health of the firm. The need to convince shareholders lacking detailed inside knowledge 
of firms that market challenges are being confronted leads managers in this context to 
undertake more rapid and radical restructuring (Hall and Soskice 2001). This 
preoccupation with the interests of distant, and some argue fickle, shareholders makes 
firms in outsider systems reluctant to engage in consultation and negotiation of their 
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restructuring plans with employee representatives. Thus, outsider systems mesh neatly 
with deregulated labour markets, where employees have relatively little scope to 
exercise `voice'. 
The extent of socially responsible performance in restructuring might be 
influenced by the different systems of corporate governance. The comparative research 
undertaken by EIRO (2002) shows that there are two principal channels through which 
employees can influence restructuring. The first is by using those rights that are based 
on systems of co-determination or social concentration. Some national systems of 
employee representation grant employees the right to be informed well in advance of 
any restructuring that will have a significant impact on employment, and allow their 
representatives to negotiate a `social plan' to deal with the consequences. This is the 
case in Austria, Belgium and Germany. Many countries in Europe have rights 
concerning employee representation on company's supervisory or management boards, 
or boards of directors, which have the ability to discuss and decide on proposed cases of 
restructuring. This is the case in Sweden, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Finland, Luxembourg and Norway. To varying degrees, and in various forms, these 
countries have systems of co-determination that are part of a tradition of dialogue and 
that promote a spirit of compromise when it comes to the extent and nature of 
restructuring. Employee representatives are commonly drawn from trade unions, which 
can also be influential through collective bargaining in these systems, of course. Indeed, 
the position of unions is in most cases strengthened by the institutions of co- 
determination. 
The second type of system is where the source of employee influence over 
restructuring is primarily through trade unions and collective bargaining. In some 
countries, this channel is the primary way in which employees are able to exert pressure 
on management, despite the existence of works councils. This is the case in France, Italy, 
Spain, Portugal and Greece. In the remaining, two countries, the UK and Ireland, which 
lack formal institutions such as works councils and do not have a strong tradition of 
social partnership, the influence of employees is largely dependent on the strength of 
unions at firm level. These two countries have a fairly minimalist legal framework, with 
the legal rights that employees enjoy coming mainly from EU Directives on collective 
redundancies or the transfer of undertakings (however, these rights may be increased to 
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some extent by the implementation of the recent EU Directive on national information 
and consultation, which includes rights relating to restructuring plans). In countries 
where employee influence is principally through unions and collective bargaining, 
management-employee relations over how restructuring is dealt with tend to be more 
adversarial, and the ability of employees to influence restructuring varies considerably 
from sector to sector and firm to firm according to union strength. 
Figure 2-1 shows how different systems of corporate governance influence the 
degree of socially responsible performance in restructuring. From the perspective of 
stakeholder theory, the extent to which the socially responsible performance depends on 
the extent of market for corporate control. Countries with more market- or shareholder- 
oriented corporate governance such as the U. S. and UK have weaker provisions for 
employee voice and more market-oriented employment patterns (Gospel and Pendleton 
2004). The owners of firms tend to have a transitory interest in the firm and do not have 
close relationships with those in senior managerial positions within the company. The 
relationships between management and shareholders are fluid and arms-length. This 
system is characterized by the existence of an active `market for corporate control'- 
takeovers, particularly hostile ones, are seen as both a remedy for managerial failure and 
a disciplinary mechanism on managers, ensuring that they act in the best interests of 
shareholders. Indeed, a further feature of this system in the primacy of shareholder 
rights over those of other organizational groups (particularly employees). 
Meanwhile, countries outside the Anglo-Saxon world remain institutionally 
more diverse. Although corporate governance tends to be less market-oriented, some 
countries still have market-oriented characteristics. Likewise, employment tends to be 
more regulated, but patterns of unionization or employee participation still differ widely. 
The diverse patterns among this group make it difficult to disentangle how different 
corporate governance characteristics are specifically related to industrial relations 
(Jackson 2004). 
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Several interrelated arguments can be identified. First, codetermination is often 
related to concentrated ownership. Mark Roe argues that only concentrated owners can 
act as an effective counter-weight to employee representatives, since dispersed owners 
cannot easily exercise control rights (Roe 2003). Another related but inverse logic is that 
the demand for industrial democracy by employees was a response to concentrated 
ownership, since owners constituted an identifiable group whose authority should be 
limited. Second, strong bank-firm relationships may lead to more patients or socialized 
forms of corporate finance and control that are amenable to wider stake-holder 
participation (Hall and Soskice 2001). Third, legal rights for shareholders and legal 
rights for employees may be inversely related (Pagano and Volpin 2005a; Pagano and 
Volpin 2005b). For example, historical codifications of the nature of the corporation as 
a purely private association for shareholders may preclude conceptions of employee 
participation in the corporation (Donnelly et al 2001). Fourth, active capital markets 
may limit the scope or effectiveness of employee participation. For example, hostile 
takeovers may lead to breaches of trust with existing stakeholders and thus undermine 
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the credibility of long-term commitments. 
Countries with less market or shareholder-oriented, but with more stakeholder- 
oriented corporate governance such as Germany, France, Netherlands Spain, etc. have 
strong provisions for employee voice and less market-oriented employment patterns. 
The owners of firms in insider systems tend to have an enduring interest in the company 
and often hold positions on the board of directors or other senior managerial positions. 
These systems are characterized by stable and close relationships between management 
and shareholders. This stability of ownership, often coupled with legal or institutional 
barriers to takeovers, means that there is little by way of a market for corporate control. 
Moreover, insider systems are characterized by the existence of formal rights for 
employees to influence key managerial decisions, often through supervisory boards or 
works council-type bodies. 
2.5.4. A Model of Socially Responsible Restructuring 
Based on the literature review and definitions, a process model for socially 
responsible restructuring is constructed (see Figure 2-2). The model is designed to 
examine the socially responsible performance in restructuring. The model shows that 
four elements shall be incorporated in the process of socially responsible restructuring. 
Enterprise analysis: Before the restructuring is undertaken, a firm should 
identify all stakeholders who may be infected by or influence the design, 
implementation and outcomes of restructuring. The main stakeholders include 
employees, workers' representatives, local community, government (national, regional, 
local), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to develop a consistent communication 
strategy for restructuring based on stakeholder analysis. 
An analysis of local labour markets is also need to be conducted to determine the 
capacity of local labour markets to absorb workers made redundant, and ability of 
public employment services (PES) and other agencies to mitigate the impact of group 
redundancies. 
Staff reduction procedures and contractual obligations towards employees need 
to be determined to identify external and internal labour regulations that affect 
downsizing, layoffs, and determine statutory wage costs and other contractual 
obligations towards employees. 
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Financing plan for pre-layoff services package should be developed, an activity 
to determine funds available, including enterprise own funds (including investor 
financing), revenues from privatization, PES funds, budgetary support, borrowed funds, 
outside donor support, trade unions funds, etc., and to develop an estimate of take-up 
and cost for each type of program. Administrative structure for a labour redeployment 
programme (LRP) should be determined. 
Pre-restructuring assistance: Consultation should be conducted with employees, 
trade union, representatives of local government and employment services. Thus, it can 
provide the parties involved, as early as possible, an opportunity for consultation on 
measures to be taken to avert or to minimize the impact of downsizing and lay-off on 
the workers concerned. Public and internal information on retrenchment and labour 
redeployment program should be open to employees. This is an essential foundation for 
effective labour redeployment and employment services. 
Early communication and consultation with workers is important to ensure 
fairness and transparency of the process. Assistance to management should be provided 
in structuring the dismissal of employees and in preparing a retrenchment plans; training 
for management on redundancy criteria. This provides management with personnel 
tools to do their job effectively, including policies on a formalized system of 
performance evaluation, and provides support to operational unit heads by developing a 
formal communication strategy on restructuring. 
Counselling programs should be provided for individual employees on the 
options and the sources of assistance available; the legal rights of employees; provision 
of information on training and retraining opportunities available; career guidance, job 
search, screening and referral to other redeployment assistance; individual coaching and 
advising; workshops to teach job search skills; health assessment, counselling and 
referral of persons with diminished work capacity, etc. This can examine how to 
increase employability of redundant workers and introduce them to the type of measures 
they can use to find a new job. 
Voluntary redundancy arrangements (prior to final dismissal) should be made 
including voluntary departure schemes, early retirement schemes and compensation 
payments on redundancy. These arrangements and benefits can reduce workers' 
resistance to restructuring and facilitate transition. 
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Figure 2- 2 Model of Socially Responsible Restructuring 
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Post-restructuring assistance. Temporary income support programs should be 
provided including unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance, social assistance, 
early retirement schemes for registered unemployed at pre-retirement age. These 
programs have income and consumption-smoothing impact and provide resources to 
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conduct a job search. If the benefits were too generous and of long duration, they may 
have adverse work incentive, and have negative effects on probability of exit from 
unemployment 
Employment services should be available to employees such as provision of 
information on the local labour market; job counseling and job search assistance; 
provision of information on training and retraining opportunities available; career 
guidance, screening and referral to other assistance; vocational guidance, including 
providing information, vocational consulting services and psychological support to 
unemployed, etc.. 
This assistance is relatively inexpensive and by providing job seekers with better 
information on jobs, it can also help in shortening unemployment spells. On the 
negative side, these interventions usually have "deadweight losses" 
- 
i. e., individuals 
who find jobs through these services are generally more qualified than most job-seekers 
and many likely would have found jobs even in the absence of these services. Training 
and retraining should be provided for lay-offs. Program effectiveness benefits from on- 
the-job training and employer involvement. Specially designed and targeted programs 
and placement services should be provided for the youth, women, disabled, and long- 
term unemployed. Youth employment problems are more effectively addressed through 
earlier, education-related interventions. 
Assistance in self-employment and in other job creation programs should be 
provided including micro credit programs and start-up loans or grants. Although take-up 
is usually very low, some of the programs are relatively inexpensive and can be 
proposed to carefully selected job seekers, including small business advisory services or 
even small-scale micro credit programs. Small business incubators Incubation services 
are rather costly but can contribute significantly to job creation and redevelopment in 
economically depressed areas. 
Local economic development planning studies can be implemented. These 
studies help strengthen capacities, especially of poor communities and municipalities, to 
develop the local economy and generate new employment by identifying and marketing 
regional resources and opportunities to potential investors and finding local solutions, 
including sources of funding. 
Social monitoring and evaluation. Evaluation and monitoring of pre-layoff and 
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post-layoff activities should be undertaken. Monitoring of labour re-deployment 
programmes is critical to ensure that displaced workers get their entitled benefits in a 
timely manner, that they are not rehired via a "back door, " and workers who have 
difficulty in re-entering the labour market are identified early and given targeted 
assistance to ensure they do not slip into poverty. 
2.5.5. Socially Responsible Restructuring: Practices and Experience 
As mentioned before, restructuring often results in significant downsizing of 
labour, when this occurs a negative social reaction can slow and /or tall restructuring. 
This is increasingly recognized by development agencies, governments, and enterprise 
managers and as a result social programme are increasingly becoming part of the design 
of restructuring programs. 
However, the social support programmes which can influence the restructuring to 
be successfully implemented and mitigate the negative impact on the stakeholders, 
particularly, employees and workers (Fretwell 2004). Fretwell (2004 argues that the 
effective social support programs should include elements that combine to "pull" and 
entice excess labour to leave overstaffed enterprises, while at the same time helping 
"push" and assist displaced workers to quickly rejoin the labour market. These measures 
usually include both temporary income support and active labour programs. To be 
effective, the measures must be carefully designed and targeted. Furthermore, there 
should be continuing social monitoring of displaced workers to ensure the services are 
reaching the most needy workers and the most vulnerable are identified early and 
provided with special assistance as needed. 
Fretwell (2004) also provides international experience of implementation of 
social support programmes by examining 12 case studies of enterprise divestiture in 
Europe, Latin America and Asia. Although the design and use of social support 
programs varies considerably between countries and is greatly influenced by the 
economic environment, including the level of unemployment, and type of general social 
support programs already in place in the country where economic restructuring is 
occurring, the social support programs is indeed instituted to mitigate the social impact. 
For example: 
Latin America: In Brazil, a varied set of income support and other support 
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packages were used to retrench workers between 1995 and 1997 in six SOEs, including 
three banks and three utilities. A parallel program was carried out by several states. 
Severance payments were a core element of the program, plus extended medical 
benefits, retraining, help for business start-ups and job search assistance to affected 
workers. Economic restructuring in Latin America was sometimes carried out in a 
manner and in an environment that increased employment, thus making divestiture more 
palatable to labour. For example, in Chile, employment in 10 state owned companies 
privatized between 1985 and 1990 increased 10% because of overall headway achieved 
in economic growth and investment by the firms involved (Larroulet, 1992). In 
Argentina, starting from a base of 222,000 employees in 13 major public enterprises in 
1990, employment was reduced to about 42,000 by 1993 via transferring 66,000 
workers to private firms, retiring 19,000, and providing 95,000 with severance 
payments. The advanced age of many workers, generous severance, multi job holding 
phenomena, reactivation of the economy and expanding labour market are credited for 
producing a lack of opposition from labour (World Bank, 1993; Guasch, 1996). 
- 
Western Europe: In Germany a new institution, the Ttruhandanstalt was 
established to deal with rapid privatization of some 8,000 state companies, with a 
workforce of 4.1 million. The privatization program had an immediate and severe 
impact on employment. Labour reductions were achieved by early retirement, job 
placement in new private firms, employment creation schemes including wage subsidies, 
public works, and retraining; plus unemployment benefits. Special employment 
companies and counselling services were also established to employ and retrain workers. 
In the UK, British Coal divested a total of 204,000 workers, mostly over the age of 50, 
who accepted lump sum redundancy payments. In addition, British Coal Enterprise Ltd. 
was established to assist employees in the sector, and their families, in developing skills 
and securing new employment with a special emphasis on helping displaced workers 
start small businesses. In Sweden, the Uddevalla shipyard was downsized via normal 
turnover, early retirement, a freeze on recruitment, and assistance with job search and 
retraining. The KLAB mine was downsized by normal and early retirement, severance, 
and retraining. 
- 
In Eastern Europe: Privatization in transition economies often took place in a 
difficult environment where the economy in contracting, and unemployment rising. In 
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Poland, restructuring in the Coal Sector was supported by a Miners' Social Package 
which included lump sum payments, early retirement assistance, combined with active 
labour programs (e. g., small business assistance, counselling, retraining) and local 
economic development assistance to affected communities. In Macedonia, severance 
payments were combined with active labour programs to assist workers affected by 
restructuring of 25 large loss-makers. Approximately, one-third of affected workers 
participated in the latter services. An added complication in the transition economies is 
the fact that often a large number of community services (e. g., schools, hospitals, 
heating, housing) are connected with state enterprises; and when these enterprises are 
liquidated or downsized these social assets must be disbursed in a manner that would 
ensure that essential community social services are maintained. In Turkey, a generic job 
loss compensation package is defined in the Privatization Law, and this is supported by 
a broad array of active labour redeployment programs and related social monitoring 
activities. 
Most successful programs include direct dialogue between key stakeholders (e. g., 
the government, enterprise management, workers, and community leaders) both before 
. 
and during the restructuring program. The stress and emphasis on income support (e. g., 
severance) vs. other forms of support (e. g., labour services) vary depending on 
economic and employment conditions, but most programs include both elements to 
varying degrees. Any new SSP should draw on this and on worldwide experience, and 
must be designed in a manner responsive to current conditions in a specific country. 
Finally, enterprise restructuring is not a "one-off' process. Enterprises in the most 
developed economies must continue to reinvent and restructure themselves in response 
to changing economic and market conditions worldwide. As such, developing countries 
need to develop SSPs that have both short and long-run applications 
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Chapter 3 Enterprise Reform and Restructuring in China 
3.1 Introduction 
As a prelude to the empirical study of relationship between socially responsible 
restructuring and firm's performance, this chapter presents the macro-economic 
background and policies, in particular, its impact on economic reform and enterprise 
restructuring. The important turning points of economic reform and policymaking since 
1978 will be reviewed to give us with assessment of environment in which enterprises 
are restructuring and developing, and to identify the progress and constraints in 
enterprise restructuring and privatization in China. This chapter also analyzes China's 
enterprise reform process and its impact on corporate governance and social welfare. 
The enterprise reforms in China have three main components, the first 
component comprises SOE privatization and restructuring to alleviate the problems that 
are impairing enterprises' ability to compete. A second component is to improve 
enterprise behaviour by establishing effective corporate governance mechanisms and 
strengthening financial discipline. A third one is provision of supporting institutions and 
infrastructure needed for a market based enterprise economy. Key in this regard is the 
development of social benefit programs to deal with the economy adjustments entailed 
by reforms, allow enterprises to focus on their commercial objectives, and provide for 
the longer term needs of the population. 
This chapter is organized as following a brief overview of economic background, 
Section 2 examines the main elements and characteristics of enterprise reforms in China, 
Section 3 reviews reforms to bolster enterprise performances and to restructure and 
privatize the SOE sector; to establish effective corporate governance mechanisms 
(Section 4); Finally in Section 5, the social impact of SOE reform and restructuring is 
also investigated. 
3.2. Reforming China's Enterprises: Overview 
This section examines progress on reforms shaping the development of 
China's enterprise sectors. The analysis covers not only state-owned enterprises, which 
have been the main focus of the explicit reform measures, but also non-state enterprises, 
which have been the most dynamic elements of the economy. The basic purpose is to 
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describe the main reforms that are shaping the evolution of the enterprise sectors; the 
problems they are intended to remedy; the progress being made; and the issues that 
remain to be addressed. These reforms involve nearly all the main dimensions of the 
broader economic reform process in China, including policies that, while directed at 
other areas, have an important bearing on enterprise performances. 
The analysis takes as given the basic goals of the reform process in China and 
the distinctive features of the Chinese economy and society that condition that process. 
China's reform process is different from that of other countries in certain respects. At 
the same time, experiences of developed countries and other emerging market 
economies provide insights about the fundamental economic processes involved in 
systemic changes that are potentially relevant to China's reform efforts. 
3.2.1. Objectives, Constraints, and Conditioning Factors 
The overall objective of China's reform process is to create a "market economy 
with socialist characteristics". This means an economy in which substantial public 
ownership of industry is retained; but where enterprises, regardless of their ownership, 
seek to maximise profits in response to market forces in essentially the same manner as 
enterprises in other economies. This objective is not itself unique and indeed is 
compatible with the mixed economy approach embraced by several western European 
countries during the first half of the post-war era, and by several central European 
countries during the 1970s and 1980s. As in other transition economies, creation of a 
market economy is seen as less of an end in itself than a necessary means toward 
realizing the country's full potential for growth and development in a manner consistent 
with its social objectives. These two closely related objectives, the creation of a market 
based economy and realization of growth potential, are the benchmarks against which 
progress on enterprise reforms must ultimately be measured. 
The move toward a market-based economy is already far along. Most products 
prices, and to a lesser extent wages, are free to vary with market conditions. 8 
e World Bank (1994), a number of energy and agricultural prices remain subject to controls, 
although these are being relaxed. Labour markets are quite rigid and labour mobility is still quite 
low, as is the mobility of products and factors among regions. 
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Competition is strong in many although not all industries. The economic behaviour of 
enterprises has become increasingly responsive to market forces as a result of 
competition, the growth of non-state enterprises, and management reforms to SOE 
carried out in the 1980s (Naughton 1994). The main tasks remaining are to convert state 
enterprises into modem commercial entities, restructure and privatize the enterprise 
sectors, develop financial, legal, and other institutions necessary to the functioning of a 
market economy, and to complete the opening of the domestic economy to international 
markets. 
Economic reform in China is shaped by several distinctive characteristics, 
reflecting policy-imposed constraints and other special characteristics of the economy, 
that need to be taken into account in drawing conclusions about the process. The first 
characteristic reflects the fundamental policy choice that significant public ownership and 
control of industry will be retained. This choice partly explains why enterprise reforms 
have been so heavily focused on SOE. Although often viewed as necessary for economic 
development in its earlier stages, public ownership in China is also seen as necessary to 
preserve social equity and other values; in that sense it is an objective (or constraint) and 
not simply a means of reform. These values are also reflected in some remaining 
ambivalence about the appropriateness of wide-scale private ownership of industry and a 
preference for collective ownership forms in the non-state sector. However, the scope of 
public ownership has been substantially narrowed in recent years while the scope for 
private ownership has been widened. 
A second factor conditioning the reform process is gradualism: economic reform 
has been underway for over two decades and under current plans will continue for at least 
the next decade. 5 The choice of gradualism reflects official belief that very rapid reforms 
in an economy as vast as China are prone to go off track and produce socially 
unacceptable disruptions. 6 The need to avoid socially unacceptable disruptions also 
conditions reforms in other ways, although it is recognized that reform inevitably entails 
painful adjustments for some segments of the economy and that reform's benefits will be 
unevenly distributed for some time. 7 Gradualism in reform has also been an evolutionary 
process rather than derived from a single comprehensive "master" plan. The goals of 
reform and the modalities for achieving them have broadened progressively over time. 
Finally, gradualism has not been a smooth process in which all reforms proceed at the 
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same pace. Rather it has been marked by periodic "leaps", such as the freeing of 
agricultural prices at the beginning of reforms and the creation of special economic zones 
in the late 1980s, which have fundamentally altered the forces shaping the economy's 
development. Presently, the severe problems of much of the enterprise sector, the growing 
strains on fiscal resources, and the prospect of WTO entry mean that fairly rapid progress 
on a wide range of reforms is necessary if the overall reform process is to be sustained. 
Apart from these constraints, the economic reform process is strongly conditioned 
by several features of the economic policy process itself. Particularly important is the 
relatively low level of government revenues, which are partly a result of past reforms and 
partly a reflection of structural problems current reforms are trying to address. As will be 
seen repeatedly in the subsequent sections, limits on government revenues constrain both 
the pace of reforms, the specific options available to implement them, and the immediate 
benefits enterprises derive from the reforms. Limited government revenues magnify 
existing distortions in taxation, as a number of key reforms impose implicit taxes on 
successful SOE to support financially weaker enterprises. 
Also important is the substantial decentralization in the implementation of 
reforms, and many other economic decisions, to provincial and other local authorities. 
Most state-owned enterprises are controlled by provincial and urban authorities, while 
local governments have (at least) a major role in township and village enterprises (Che 
and Qian 1998; Naughton 1994). Provincial and local authorities, while subject to 
central government decisions about the overall parameters of individual reforms, 
typically have significant latitude in determining how they will be carried out. This 
decentralization complicates the task of assessing the progress of economic reforms in 
China, since much of what is happening at provincial and local levels is not 
systematically compiled or reported. This regionalism in policy implementation has had 
both adverse and beneficial effects on China's overall reform process. Responding to 
soft budget constraints and regional barriers to competition, regional authorities were 
instrumental in the early 1990s investment boom that has been the source of many of 
the present problems of China's enterprises. At the same time, regional authorities have 
strong incentives to promote development of their regions since their advancement 
depends to an important degree on its success. The result has been a growing regional 
dynamic in the overall reform process that is likely to become increasingly important in 
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coming years. 9 
3.2.2. The Key Reform Stages 
The process of reforming China's enterprises involves many individual measures 
in a wide range of areas. The basic strategy is to improve enterprise financial 
performance in the near term in order to generate resources to upgrade productive 
facilities and other key capabilities; with the ultimate goal of achieving sustained 
improvement in efficiency and competitive viability in the long term. These measures 
are highly interdependent and success depends ultimately on sustaining a positive 
dynamic or "virtuous circle", of mutually reinforcing progress on a wide range of 
reforms. As indicated Figure 3-1, this dynamic involves key "enabling" factors, such as 
improvements in corporate governance to ensure that enterprises make effective use of 
increased profits. Success also requires a positive dynamic between the reform process 
and the growth of the economy as a whole. Adequate real growth is needed to ensure the 
success of measures to boost enterprise profitability, as well as to allow the economy to 
absorb workers displaced in the course of reforms. At the same time, progress on the 
reforms is necessary to contain and ultimately reduce the deflationary forces generated 
by the structural problems of enterprises. 
For the discussion that follows, it is helpful to consider the individual reforms in 
terms of three basic objectives, as summarized in Figure 3-2. The first is to improve 
performances of enterprises so that they are technically capable of competing in a 
market environment. Policies to improve performances are largely focused on problems 
that have accumulated over time because of remaining distortions in the economy. There 
are two related components to these efforts. The first is industrial restructuring to bolster 
financial conditions in the medium term and to improve efficiency over the longer term. 
The second is privatization and restructuring of the. SOE sector so that it is viable on its 
own and can serve as the "core" of China's efforts to secure the international 
competitiveness of its key industries. The effort to improve enterprise performances has 
become perhaps the most pressing element of reform in the near term, in part because it 
9 For extensive analysis of the regional dimensions of China's economic reform processes, see 
Chinalprovinces in reform (1997) edited by David Goodman. 
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is most necessary to reviving growth, facilitating China's adjustment to WTO entry, and 
freeing up government resources so that they can support other areas of reform. 
However reforms that are fundamental in the longer term, such as better corporate 
governance, are unlikely to succeed until enterprises are technically capable of 
competing in a market environment. 
Figure 3- 1 Dynamic of Sustainable Reform 
r-º 
Improved profits in near 
term 
1 Investment to upgrade 
facilities 
i Improved long term efficiency Enabling factors 
Microeconomic 
performance 
" Reorganization (M&A, exit) " Governance and external discipline 
" 
Government financing " Social benefits 
The second key objective of enterprise reforms is to improve enterprise 
behaviour to ensure that enterprises respond appropriately to market forces. These 
reforms are necessary to ensure that near term improvements in enterprise financial 
performances lead to greater efficiency in the long term, and to prevent problems that 
have impaired financial performances (many of which stem from past distortions in 
enterprise behaviour) from recurring. 
Two sets of measures are most critical in this respect. The first are policies to 
establish mechanisms for effective corporate governance by transforming ownership 
structures, clarifying and strengthening property rights, separating enterprise 
management from government operations, and providing internal incentives and 
oversight mechanisms so that management acts in the interest of owners. The key 
priority in this area is to meet a challenge many developed countries have faced and in 
some cases continue to face: namely to ensure effective governance of state-owned 
enterprises. 
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However, there are also governance issues concerning the non-state sector. The 
second set of measures are financial system reforms to ensure that credit is allocated to 
enterprises on the basis of sound commercial principals, rather than on the basis of 
government mandates or other social considerations, as has been the case in the past. 
Reforms to develop and broaden the financial system are also necessary to 
accommodate the development of the non-state enterprise sectors as well as to facilitate 
the ongoing restructuring that is likely to be needed as the economy evolves. As 
historical experience, including that of China has amply demonstrated, good corporate 
governance mechanisms will not prevent enterprises from engaging in economically 
inefficient or disruptive behaviour if they are faced with distorted financial incentives. 
The third set of reform objectives involves the supporting institutions and infrastructure 
needed to allow enterprises to pursue their commercial objectives in a manner consistent 
with the overall objectives of society. These include ongoing efforts to level the playing 
field among various types of enterprises and to provide for the enforcement of 
contractual obligations that are needed to support reforms to corporate governance and 
the external environment. 
A major present priority is social security reforms to socialize as well as broaden 
the quasi-governmental social welfare functions that have largely been provided by 
state-owned enterprises. Policies in this area involve restructuring, consolidation, and, in 
some cases, creation of systems to provide health services, pensions, and unemployment 
insurance and to establish economically efficient arrangements for their financing. 
Figure 3- 2 Schematic of the enterprise reform process 
Major Objectives 
Improving performances 
(Ensuring enterprises are capable of 
competing In the market) 
Industrial Restructuring 
Privatization/Restructuring of the 
Primary Key Tasks 
Focus 
SOE Improve profitability by reducing 
excess capacity; shedding surplus 
labour, lowering debt loads; and 
upgrading productive capacity. 
Facilitate business reorganizations to 
reduce industry excess capacity and 
improve economics of scale and scope; 
release resources by promoting exit of 
unviable firms 
SOE Establish the "strategic core" where 
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SOE Sector 
Improving behaviour 
(Ensuring enterprises respond 
appropriately to market forces) 
Establish effective corporate 
governance mechanisms 
Financial system reform 
Supporting institutions and 
infrastructure 
(Ensuring compatibility between 
commercial objectives and social 
needs) 
Social security reform 
Legal and regulatory reforms 
Fiscal reforms 
SOE will be concentrated while 
facilitating the withdrawal of state 
ownership and control from other 
"competitive" industries where state 
intervention is not needed. 
SOE Establish modem ownership forms 
("corporatization") clarify ownership 
and control rights; separate government 
from enterprise management; establish 
effective oversight mechanisms for 
enterprise owners. 
Financial Provide adequate financing outlets for 
System non-state as well as state enterprise 
sectors; establish credit allocation on 
commercial standards and exert 
financial discipline; provide 
mechanisms to transfer ownership and 
provide a market for corporate control. 
Workers Reduce SOE burdens for social security; 
establish "portable" pension and other 
benefit systems to improve the 
functioning of labour markets. 
Enterprises Clarify property rights; strengthen 
enforcement of contractual obligations. 
Enterprises Reduce tax disparities among 
and society enterprises; increase and broaden 
revenue resources needed to facilitate 
adjustments caused by reforms and to 
socialize certain burdens now borne by 
enterprises. 
Source: OECD, hina in Global Economy: Reforming China'nterprises? 2005. 
3.2.3. China's Enterprise Sectors: the Current Situation 
China's economy has become increasingly diversified over the past two decades 
as the importance of state-owned enterprises has progressively declined. Non-state 
enterprises now account for nearly three-quarters of industrial output and have been the 
dominant contributors to overall economic growth and the main source of new jobs 
during the past ten years. 
The financial performances of enterprises have deteriorated markedly in recent 
years. The majority of SOE are at best marginally profitable and a large portion of 
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collective enterprises are also in serious financial difficulties. The poor financial 
performances are attributable to a range of factors. These include excess capacity built 
up during the investment boom earlier in the 1990s; and heavy financial burdens from 
high debt loads, surplus labour, and social welfare expenses normally borne by 
government or society at large in other countries. SOE as well as large numbers of non- 
state enterprises are also suffering from extensive operating inefficiencies due to sub- 
optimal scale and scope in their operations, outmoded equipment and technology, and 
poor product quality. 
China's Enterprise Sector: A Profile 
China's enterprise sectors include four main ownership classes: state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs); collectives, comprising township and village enterprises (TVE) in 
rural areas and urban co-operatives; foreign-funded enterprises; and individually owned 
or other private enterprises. The oldest class, SOE, is confined to urban areas. These 
enterprises are still mainly wholly government owned and subject to the direction of 
government agencies, although these situations are changing. The majority of large 
SOEs are controlled by central government authorities, while nearly all medium 
- 
size 
and smaller SOEs are under the control of municipal or other local authorities. 
Collectives are usually legally owned by their workers and/or management, but in 
practice local governments often have a controlling or at least major role in their 
management (Che and Qian, 1998). However, many of these enterprises are effectively 
privately owned but registered as collectives. Production of collectives is heavily 
concentrated in consumer and, to a lesser extent, export products. SOEs and collectives 
together make up the public enterprise sector. 
Since the economic reform started, China has developed a highly diversified 
and complicated enterprise sector. In particular, in September 1998, China's economic 
sectors were re-classified because of the changes in the ownership structure in the social 
and economic domains in the past years. According to the new re-classification, the 
economic sector system is categorized as Public Economy 
- 
state-owned economy and 
collective economy; and non-public economy 
- 
privately-owned economy; Hong Kong- 
Macao- and Taiwan-funded economy, and Foreign-funded economy. 
114 
Accordingly, in general, enterprises can be classified according to two basic 
criteria: by ownership and by legal form. A brief description of the definitional categories 
of enterprises are described according to these two criteria 
Enterprises categorized by ownership 
State-owned enterprises (SOE) refer to industrial enterprises where the means of 
production or income are owned by the state. Joint state-private industries and private 
industries, which existed before 1957, have been transformed into state industries. 
Statistics on these enterprises has been included in the state-owned industries since 1957 
when separation of data was no longer necessary. The legal basis was established in 
1988 with the promulgation of the Law on Enterprises Owned by the Whole People, 
which defined an SOE as a legal person with the state as the sole (or majority) owner. 
Its liability is limited to the amount of assets authorized by the state. 
Collectively-owned enterprises (COE) refer to industrial enterprises where the 
means of production are owned collectively, including urban and rural enterprises 
invested by collectives and some enterprises which were formerly owned privately but 
have been registered in industrial and commercial administration agency as collective 
units through raising fund from the public. The COE are subject to the Law on 
Collectively-Owned Enterprises (1991). 
Private Enterprises refer to economic units invested or controlled (by holding 
the majority of the shares) by natural persons who hire labours for profit-making 
activities, including private limited liability corporations, private share-holding 
corporations Ltd., private partnership enterprises and private sole investment enterprises 
registered in accordance with the Corporation Law, Partnership Enterprise Law and 
Tentative Regulation on Private Enterprises. Although their existence and growth were 
allowed after 1978, the legal status of private firms was not established until 1988, when 
the National People's Congress passed an amendment to the Constitution of the PRC 
recognizing their positive role in the national economy and promulgated the Provisional 
Regulations on Private Enterprises. The regulations defined private enterprises as 
economic entities with eight or more employees and whose assets are owned by 
individuals. The regulations further distinguished between three types of private 
enterprises: 1) individually funded enterprises funded and managed by one person; 2) 
partnerships funded and managed, and profits shared and losses borne jointly, by two or 
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more persons under a legal contractual agreement; and 3) limited liability companies in 
which the liability of investors to the company is limited to their respective 
contributions and the company's liabilities are limited to the extent of its assets. 
Foreign enterprises. Foreign enterprises include joint ventures, Sino-foreign co- 
operation enterprises and wholly foreign-owned enterprises. Each of the three types of 
enterprises is subject to a separate set of laws. Where these foreign enterprises are 
incorporated as limited liability companies or limited joint-stock companies, they are 
also subject to the Company Law. 
Enterprises categorized by legal forms 
Prior to 1994, limited liability corporate legal forms of the type dominant in 
other market economies were largely unavailable to Chinese domestic enterprises. This 
situation was changed by the Company Law enacted in 1994, which provided for the 
establishment of limited liability companies (LLC) and limited joint-stock companies 
(JSC). Both types are defined as enterprise legal persons and shareholders enjoy limited 
liability. 
Limited liability companies (LLC). In a LLC, shareholders are liable towards the 
company to the extent of their respective capital contribution, and the company is liable 
for its debts to the extent of all its assets. A LLC is established by capital contributions 
made jointly by between two and fifty shareholders, with the registered capital not less 
than 100,000 yuan for consultancy and services companies, not less than 300,000 yuan 
for retailing companies and not less than 500,000 yuan for manufacturing or wholesale 
trade companies. 
A wholly state-owned company (SOC) is a special kind of LLC. SOC is 
essentially SOE in the guise of a modem corporation 
- 
subject to the Company Law 
rather than to the Enterprise Law. The SOC can be established only by an organization, 
institution or department explicitly authorized by the state to make state-approved 
investments. This corporate form applies mainly to companies engaged in special lines 
of production or trade, such as infrastructure and other strategic industries, specifically 
designated by the State Council. 
Limited joint-stock or share-holding companies (JSC). Ownership of JSC is 
divided into shares of equal value, with the shareholders liable towards the company to 
the extent of their respective shareholdings and the company liable for debts to the 
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extent of all its assets. Normally, the establishment of a JSC requires a minimum of five 
"promoters" (founding shareholders). However the law permits a single promoter when 
that promoter is an SOE. 
The LLC and JSC forms are available to non-state enterprises that were formed 
under the earlier laws based on ownership described above. Many COEs are being 
converted into a hybrid form, known as "joint-stock collectives" in which ownership 
shares are distributed to workers and other stakeholders, but where the shares generally 
cannot be held by outsiders. 
Table 3- 1 Ownership Profile of Chinese industry, 2003 
Total 
State-owned enterprises 
Collective-owned enterprises 
Private enterprises 
Foreign Funded Enterprises 
Limited liability companies 
Wholly state-owned 
companies 
Shareholding companies 
Number Share of Gross Industrial 
of Firms firms (%) Output (100 
million) 
196,222 100 142,271.22 
23,228 11.83 18479.40 
22,478 11.46 9458.43 
67,607 34.45 20980.23 
17,429 8.88 26932.18 
26,606 13.56 26583.94 
1,330 0.68 7073.68 
6,313 3.22 18017.06 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2004, Table 14-1 
Share of 
industrial Output 
(0) 
100 
12.99 
6.65 
14.75 
18.93 
18.69 
4.97 
12.66 
As indicated in Table 3-1, China has totally 196,222 firms, of which, there are 
23,228 SOEs, accounting for 11.83 percent of total enterprises, and contributing 12.99 
per cent of total industrial output in 2003, while 22,478 collective-owned enterprises 
(COEs), which are dominated in output terms by TVE, accounted for 11.46, and 
contributed nearly 6.65 per cent of the total. The number of SOEs has been reduced 
nearly fifty percent since 1998, but SOE share of industrial output has increased steadily 
throughout the same period (Table 3-2), even though during the 1980s, it gave way to 
the rapidly growing TVE. The private-owned enterprises are regarded as the engine of 
economic development and play a central role of China economy and employment. 
Table 3-1 also shows that in 2003, the number of private-owned enterprises 
accounts for 34.45 percent, contributed 14.75% of total industrial output. During the late 
1990s when the Chinese government implement new strategic restructuring programme, 
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with the slogan of "grasping the large and letting go the small" (zhuadafangxiao), the 
government planned to save China's 1,000 largest state enterprises while letting smaller, 
money-losing companies be merged, taken over by private investors, or dissolved. As a 
result of the reform, number of collective-owned enterprises (COEs) has been 
dramatically reduced more than 50 percent from 1998 to 2003, share of COEs' output 
has declined accordingly. 
Since 1992, China has been experimenting with Western-style corporate forms 
as a way to improve the performance of Chinese companies. Dubbed gufenzhi gaizao, 
or transformation through the shareholding system, the objective of this process has 
been the creation of a "modem enterprise system" through the restructuring of state- 
owned enterprises (SOEs) into limited liability companies and joint stock companies 
under the PRC Company Law (1993). Table 3-1 and 3-2 shows us the development 
trends of shareholding companies, which increased about 53.2 percent from 1998 to 
2003. From an aggregate point of view, SOE in no sense dominate the industrial 
economy, although they are much more important in wholesale and retail trade, and do 
dominate transportation, utilities, finance, and education. 
In several key respects, though, the importance of the SOE sector in the 
economy is greater than its aggregate share of industrial output indicates. First, SOE 
account for nearly 30 percent of total urban employment (Table 3-3). Second, SOE 
dominate output of large enterprises and their share of heavy industry is also 
considerably higher than that of industry as a whole. Partly because of their 
concentration in heavy industry, the SOE shares of industry fixed assets and investment 
are significantly greater than their share of output. Third, the SOE share of industrial 
output is well above the national average in the majority of Chinese provinces (Table 3- 
4). SOE shares are lowest in the coastal provinces. These provinces have been the most 
rapidly growing regions; and have the largest share of overall industrial output. TVE 
and other non-state enterprises have generally received the most favourable treatment 
from local governments in the coastal provinces. Finally, partly because of their past 
historical dominance but also because authorities have given more favourable tax 
treatment to non-state enterprises, SOE supply the largest share of tax revenues coming 
from the enterprise sectors. 
From the perspective of their contribution to growth in aggregate output and 
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employment, however, SOE have been even less prominent than their share of total 
output would suggest. Real growth of SOE output has consistently lagged that of 
collective enterprises since the early 1980s and since 1990 has been the slowest among 
the four major ownership classes. Collectives have been the largest contributors to 
overall industrial sector growth for most of the period since 1985, although they have 
been nearly overtaken in this respect in recent years by the private enterprise group. The 
decline in the contribution of SOE to employment is even starker. SOE accounted for 
nearly 35 per cent of the total growth in urban employment between 1985 and 1990, but 
less than 20 per cent of the overall increase between 1990 and 1997. SOE employment 
virtually stagnated between 1994 and 1996 and fell by nearly three million in the 
subsequent two years. With employment in urban collectives also on the decline, the 
private enterprise sector is supplying virtually all of the net growth in jobs that is 
occurring in the urban economy. TVE together with private enterprises are also the main 
source of employment growth in rural areas. 
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Table 3- 2 Number of Firms 1998-2003 
SOEs Collective- 
Owned 
Private-owned Shareholding Foreign funded 
Year No. of Gross No. of Gross No. of Gross No. of Gross No. of Gross 
Firms Industrial Firms Industrial Firms Industrial Firms Industrial Firms Industrial 
Output Output Output Output Output (100 
(100 mil (100 mil. (100 mil (100 mil mil. 
1998 64737 33621.04 47745 13179.67 60338 20372.00 4120 4334.4 10717 8458.43 
6 
1999 61301 35571.18 42585 12414.11 61268 22928.00 4480 5247.0 11054 9960.23 
8 
2000 53489 40554.37 37841 11907.92 22128 5220.36 5086 10090. 11955 12890.25 
29 
2001 46767 42408.49 31018 10052.49 36218 8760.89 5692 12698. 13166 15373.72 
34 
2002 41125 45178.96 27477 9618.95 49176 12950.86 5998 14119. 14920 18790.47 
03 
2003 34280 53407.90 22478 9458.43 67607 20980.23 6313 18017. 17429 26932.18 
06 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook various versions 
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Table 3- 3 Employment by type of ownership, 2003 
Urban Employment-Total 
SOE 
Collective 
Private and Individually owned 
All others 
Rural Employment-Total 
TVE 
Private and Individually owned 
All others 
Total Employment Per cent of total (in million) 
256.39 
68.76 
10.00 
49.22 
128.41 
487.93 
135.73 
40.14 
312.06 
100 
26.82 
3.9 
19.20 
50.08 
100 
27.82 
8.23 
63.95 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2004, Table 5-4 
Table 3- 4 SOE shares of industrial output by region and province, 2003 
Number of SOE Share of SOE Gross SOE Share of 
Region Province SOE Firms Total Firms Industrial Output gross industrial (100 mil yuan) output (! /D) 
Total 34280 53407.90 
North China Beijing 1362 3.97 2051.79 3.84 
Tianjin 1625 4.74 1456.51 2.73 
Hebei 1675 4.89 2360.39 4.42 
Shanxi 1354 3.95 1381.77 2.59 
Inner Mongolia 591 1.72 798.51 1.50 
Northeast Liaoning 1334 3.89 3552.29 6.65 
China 
Jilin 969 2.83 2017.7 3.78 
Heilongjiang 970 2.83 2311.94 4.33 
East China Shanghai 1606 4.68 4466.43 8.36 
Jiangsu 1242 3.62 3422.44 6.41 
Zhejiang 861 2.51 1686.99 3.16 
Anhui 747 2.18 1438.88 2.69 
Fujian 888 2.59 1125.72 2.11 
Jiangxi 1071 3.12 946.60 1.77 
Shandong 1961 5.72 5148.72 9.64 
Central- Henan 2253 6.57 2718.98 5.09 
South China 
Hubei 1617 4.72 2287.46 4.28 
Hunan 1642 4.79 1391.74 2.61 
Guangdong 2103 6.13 3949.03 7.39 
Guangxi 1252 3.65 797.95 1.49 
Hainan 346 1.01 213.56 0.40 
West China Chongqing 570 1.66 852.72 1.60 
Sichuan 1065 3.11 1609.79 3.01 
Guizhou 1037 3.03 667.75 1.25 
Yunnan 943 2.75 1145.91 2.15 
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Tibet 
Northwest 
China 
Shaanxi 
Gansu 
Qinghai 
Ningxia 
Xinjiang 
199 0.58 16.76 0.03 
1235 3.60 1392.06 2.61 
706 2.06 880.76 1.65 
206 0.60 195.01 0.37 
154 0.45 211.74 0.40 
696 2.03 909.99 1.70 
Note: Figures refer to industrial enterprises at the township level or above. 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2004, Table. 14-2. 
The rapid growth of non-state enterprises is partly the result of deliberate 
government policies to encourage their development. Beginning in the early 1980s, 
TVE were largely detached from central planning requirements and their growth was 
promoted by local authorities in order to bolster rural employment and to provide 
revenues to local governments. The creation of special economic zones (SEZ) in the late 
1980s and relaxation of restrictions on foreign investment has fostered the rapid growth 
of foreign funded enterprises. Legal changes sanctioning the growth of private 
ownership have been essential to the development of private enterprises. However, other 
government policies, notably those governing access to bank financing and financial 
support from government agencies have favoured SOE over non-state enterprises. The 
ultimate success of non-state enterprise derives from their more effective economic 
performances. In particular, the growth rate of productivity of collective enterprises has 
been higher than that of SOE. 10 This economic success is attributable in large part to the 
relative freedom of non-state enterprises from government interference in their 
management and their harder budget constraints (Che and Qian, 1998). 
While important, the distinctions among the various ownership classes are not as 
clear cut as is sometimes supposed. This is particularly true of TVE and SOE. While 
their performance and behaviour is often contrasted, in practice their relations are partly 
complementary and partly competitive. In particular, SOE have fostered the growth of 
TVE as a means of getting around central planning constraints and to lower costs. TVE 
and other collectives serve as suppliers to SOE or provide other complementary 
10 For a recent review of studies of factor productivity in China's enterprises, see Jefferson, 
Singh, Xing, and Zhang (1999). Their conclusion that SOE productivity growth has been 
moderately positive contrasts with other analysis suggesting virtual stagnation in SOE 
productivity growth during the 1980s (Woo et al. 1994). 
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productive facilities, while SOE often provide financing for TVE operations. Moreover, 
as discussed further in later chapters, distinctions among the ownership types are 
becoming even more blurred with economic reforms, with both TVE and many SOE 
moving toward forms that more closely resemble private ownership. 
The past ability of the non-state sector to flourish largely on its own partly 
explains why it so far has been given only limited emphasis in enterprise reform plans. 
However, as noted below, many non-state enterprises are now experiencing serious 
economic performance problems. 
Enterprise financial performances: deteriorated or improved? 
As is well known, SOE are facing very serious problems in their economic and 
financial performances in the 1980s, detailed examination of available data on 
enterprise performance through 1998 amply confirms this impression. Many of China's 
large and medium-sized SOEs reported deficits in 1997. At the end of the year, the 
Chinese government set a goal for these enterprises to climb out of poverty and 
establish a modem corporate system within three years. By the end of 2000,70 percent 
of China's large and medium-sized SOEs had built up a corporate system, and the 
proportion has topped 85 percent among those ranked as national key enterprises. 
A first observation is that profit rates of SOE along with much of the non-state 
sector have been declining since the late 1980s (Table 3-5 and 3-6). The industrial SOE 
after-tax profit rate (relative to fixed assets) was nearly 18.21 percent in 1978 but had 
fallen to below six percent by 2000. This secular decline is substantially attributable to 
the increasing competition engendered by the entry of non-state firms. Initially, SOE 
and the new entrants, which were primarily TVE, enjoyed substantial monopoly rents 
that were progressively eroded over time as competition intensified and as constraints 
on prices were relaxed (see Naughton 1994; Jefferson and Rawski 1994). SOE and TVE 
profitability have come under further pressure from the rapid growth during the 1990s 
of foreign-funded and domestic private firms. However, it has been SOE that have been 
most severely affected by increasing competition. 
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Table 3- 5 Losses and Profits of Industrial SOEs, 1978-2000 
Year 
1978 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
Losses (1978 Losses/gross Return on 
prices in profit (%) assets" (%) 
billion Yuan) 
4.21 7.64 16.09 
2.89 4.21 14.53 
1.54 8.71 12.35 
4.85 7.20 12.37 
5.66 8.41 12.37 
10.50 19.52 10.14 
19.53 47.33 5.96 
19.35 47.71 5.35 
18.23 40.83 5.82 
18.02 35.64 4.07 
16.08 36.79 4.85 
18.54 49.00 4.45 
22.28 65.71 3.52 
23.48 66.01 3.02 
33.91 68.66 2.72 
29.19 49.21 2.99 
20.69 22.63 4.33 
Social Profit/sale Profit+taxes/ 
Return on s revenue' sales 
assetsb (%) (%) revenue' (%) 
24.70 18.21 28.30 
25.17 14.08 25.44 
22.38 11.59 22.53 
22.12 11.01 21.17 
22.64 9.95 19.80 
20.13 7.38 17.60 
15.19 3.66 14.18 
14.29 3.17 13.11 
14.57 3.50 12.72 
9.09 3.89 11.69 
10.17 3.88 13.47 
9.10 2.63 11.35 
7.92 1.57 10.41 
7.21 1.58 10.74 
6.52 1.61 10.35 
6.82 2.86 11.69 
8.46 5.87 14.32 
Note: a. Return on assets denotes sWrofrt plus (net) financial charges, per unit of assets? where assets prior to 1993 
comprise only average annualfixed-quota working capital plus year-end net fixed assets. 1993 assets are the sum of 
liabilities and equity. Net financial charges prior to 1993 are approximated as average annual interest rate on short- 
term (i. e. working capital) loans of maximally 6 months duration times total short-term borrowing (i. e. borrowing of 
less than 1 year maturity) by industrial SOEs; in 1993 the approximated value exceeds the actual value by 4.36 
percent 
b. Social return on asserts denotes Mrofit plus taxes plus (net) financial charges, per unit of assets? 
c. Sales revenue is net of all sales-related taxes. 
Source: Carsten A. Holz (2002), Long Live China's State-owned Enterprise: Deflating the Myth of Poor Financial 
Performance", Journal of Asian Economics, Vol. 13, P497. 
Profit rates continued to decline throughout the 1990s and have now reached 
very low levels. The industrial SOE after-tax profit ratio to fixed assets fell to 3.0 per 
cent in 1996-1997, and then dropped further to about 2.99 per cent in 1998,11 although 
there was some rebound in 2000, The after-tax profit rate of collective enterprises has 
also fallen but it remains higher than that of SOE. These profit ratios are low, at least in 
after-tax terms, compared to OECD countries, and particularly low given that China is a 
rapidly developing country. These low profit rates suggest serious structural problems in 
SOE performances. 
Other indicators of SOE performance have also deteriorated over time. Total 
losses of loss-making SOE rose sharply during the latter half of the 1990s and reached 
11 OECD (2000), "China in the Global Economy: Reforming China's Enterprise". 
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their peak in relation to output in 1990 (Table 3-5); the ratio then fell through 1995, but 
has since risen back. SOE losses now account for about half the losses of all industrial 
firms but are only slightly more than 1 per cent of GDP. The ratio of total liabilities to 
assets for SOE increased from a fairly low level in the early 1980s to reach a peak of 
nearly 70 per cent in the mid-1990s, although it has since fallen back somewhat. The 
current average ratio (62.4 per cent) corresponds to a debt-equity ratio of nearly two and 
is high compared to those of most OECD countries, although not out of line with the 
ratios in Korea, Thailand, and a number of other Asian countries. Moreover, a 
substantial fraction of SOE as well as collectives have liability asset ratios of 70 per 
cent or more. Nearly 10 per cent of all enterprises, and a greater portion of SOE, have 
ratios above 100 per cent, indicating that equity is technically negative. 
Year 
1978 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
Table 3- 6 Losses and Profits of Industrial Non- SOEs, 1978-2000 
Losses (1978 Losses/gross Return on 
prices in profit (%) assets' (%) 
billion yuan) 
0.30 3.25 n. a. 
0.72 3.77 n. a. 
1.54 8.71 n. a. 
1.88 9.79 n. a. 
1.71 7.65 n. a. 
3.14 17.32 n. a. 
5.88 37.94 n. a. 
5.72 31.08 n. a. 
4.93 18.59 n. a. 
7.41 19.17 6.65 
9.66 23.05 6.66 
16.21 36.58 6.47 
18.05 37.30 5.72 
21.36 37.21 5.34 
17.27 38.59 5.25 
15.00 27.80 5.53 
12.68 17.87 6.40 
Social Profrt/sale Profit+taxes/ 
Return on s revenue` sales 
a ssetsb (%) (%) revenue` (%) 
n. a. 14.46 20.50 
n. a. 10.64 17.05 
n. a. 8.45 14.57 
n. a. 7.65 13.31 
n. a. 7.57 13.05 
n. a. 5.72 11.16 
n. a. 3.57 9.22 
n. a. 3.80 9.04 
n. a. 4.99 9.78 
10.81 5.32 9.95 
11.18 4.84 10.31 
10.27 3.65 8.19 
9.30 3.53 7.90 
8.85 3.63 8.07 
8.85 3.08 7.09 
9.18 3.83 7.79 
10.31 4.76 8.72 
Note: a. Return on assets denotes "profit plus (net) financial charges, per unit of assets", where assets prior to 1993 
comprise only average annual fixed-quota working capital plus year-end net fixed assets. 1993 assets arc the sum of 
liabilities and equity. Net financial charges prior to 1993 are approximated as average annual interest rate on short- 
term (i. e. working capital) loans of maximally 6 months duration times total short-term borrowing (i. e. borrowing of 
less than 1 year maturity) by industrial SOEs; in 1993 the approximated value exceeds the actual value by 4.36 
percent. 
b. Social return on asserts denotes "profit plus taxes plus (net) financial charges, per unit of assets". 
c. Sales revenue is net of all sales-related taxes. 
Source: Carsten A. Holz (2002), Long Live China's State-owned Enterprise: Deflating the Myth of Poor Financial 
Performance", Journal of Asian Economics, Vol. 13, P498. 
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The deterioration in SOE performance appears particularly stark when viewed in 
terms of the incidence of loss-making firms. The proportion of industrial SOE incurring 
(after-tax losses) has risen from 31 per cent in 1994 to 42 per cent in 1997 and nearly 50 
per cent in 199820. Although a substantial number of enterprises in even very strong 
economies incur losses from time to time21, the loss ratio for China's enterprises is quite 
high compared to most OECD countries. SOE are not alone in experiencing weak 
financial performances. As noted earlier, profit rates for collective enterprises as whole 
are also low by international standards. A high proportion of collective firms are also 
experiencing losses, although the fraction is only about half that of SOE. Urban 
collectives, however, appear to be doing significantly worse than the group as a whole 
(World Bank 1999). Liability-asset ratios are higher for collectives than for the SOE 
(see Table 3-6). Furthermore, the profitability of foreign-funded enterprises, while it has 
been substantially higher than that of the other segments, has fallen markedly: from 15 
per cent of assets in 1995 to 4 per cent in 1996-1997 (World Bank 1999). 
The pattern of declining profits and increasing incidence of losses for SOE as 
well as much of the non-state sector suggests a more general characterization: a large 
proportion of all enterprises, including the majority of SOE, are at best marginally 
profitable. That is, in addition to those making losses, a further significant portion of 
firms are making only small profits. 
This impression is supported by results from an OECD statistical analysis with 
the assistance of the China National Bureau of Statistics (CNBS) in 2000. The analysis 
is based on a panel data set on the financial conditions of roughly 20,000 large and 
medium-sized industrial enterprises of all ownership types for the years 1995 through 
1998 compiled by the CNBS22. The result of the analysis shows that the middle range of 
the distribution of after-tax profits (as a ratio of total assets and after deduction of 
corporate income as well as other taxes paid) of the full sample of enterprises is very 
close to zero. The situation for SOE is similar but worse, in the sense that their mean 
return is below the average for the entire group of enterprises. As these observations 
suggest, the marked increase in the incidence of losses since 1995 is partly the result of 
the migration of marginally profitable firms into the red. However, while losses of many 
unprofitable enterprises are fairly modest, the majority are large in the sense that the 
firms are incurring losses even before payment of their sales and other business taxes. 
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As discussed in the research, financial problems are significantly worse for some 
industries and regions than others but they are also quite pervasive. The incidence of 
SOE losses is noticeably above the industry average in textiles (which is the single 
biggest loss-maker) as well as several heavy industries including steel. SOE financial 
performances are also typically worse for central and western provinces than for those 
along the coast. At the same time, a large number of industries and regions are 
experiencing low or negative profit rates. While the worst performing industries account 
for a disproportionate share of total SOE losses, a substantial fraction of the losses are in 
relatively better performing sectors. This indicates that measures to restore the financial 
health of SOE need to be broadly applied: concentration on only the worst performing 
industries or regions will not be sufficient by itself. 
All of these figures must be regarded with great caution. In particular, there are 
reasons to believe that official statistics significantly exaggerate SOE profits and 
understate their losses (e. g. (Lardy 1998; Steinfeld 1998)). Under the cash-basis 
accounting standards employed in China and most other developing countries, interest 
due on loans to enterprises that goes unpaid is not included in the calculation of profits 
and losses. Since, judging by the reported level of non-performing loans in the banking 
system, unpaid interest is sizeable, the biases in the reported profit and loss figures 
could be quite large. However, there may be some partially offsetting biases in the data. 
Costs of goods produced are attributed to the year in which they are sold and so 
inventory accumulation in a period of high inflation tends to overstate profits (Hussain 
and Zhang 1996). This overstatement should be smaller when inflation is low, as it is 
now, and to this degree the fall in profits since the early 1990s may be somewhat 
exaggerated. Moreover, there are incentives for firm management to appropriate profits 
that would otherwise go to the state and to exaggerate losses to obtain tax forgiveness 
and soft loans from banks (Zhang 1998), Hussain and Zhuang, 1996). The scope for 
such behaviour has probably increased as the result of reforms to increase management 
autonomy (World Bank 1997) and 1999). 
As analyzed in the previous sections, the SOEs as a whole had seen a continuous 
decline in profits before 1998, but since the Chinese government launched a campaign 
to turn around the money-losing SOEs in three years 1998, officially reported at least, 
the performance of SOEs has improved in recent years. Profits have increased each year 
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since 1998, to total RMB238.9 billion in 2001. Table 3-7 reveals that since 1998, the 
economic efficiency of SOEs has been improved, by the end of 2003, total assets to 
industrial output almost doubled from 6.52% to 10.09%, profit to industrial costs 
increased over four times, and also assets to liability declined from 64.25% to 59.24%. 
What's more, if we compare the efficiency of SOEs with other collective-owned and 
foreign-funded enterprises (see Table 3-8), we found that SOE efficiency has been much 
better than collective-owned enterprises. 
By 2002,52.5 percent of China's state owned and state holding enterprises have 
moved out of the red and into the black. According to the official statistics, of the 6599 
large- and mid-sized SOEs and state holding enterprises losing money, 3463 have 
stopped losing money. SOEs from twenty-two provinces, autonomous regions and cities 
have already started to turn a profit while eight provinces' SOEs continue to lose money. 
Out of fourteen major industries, only the coal and military industries remain 
unprofitable. By the end of June 2002, the 519 major enterprises chosen by the State 
Council earned a total profit of 85.7 billion yuan, a 100 percent increase from last year. 
Money-losing SOEs decreased by 18 companies to 116. Losses dropped 22.3 percent. 
Money-losing SOEs lost a total of 8.22 billion yuan, down 19.8 percent. 12 
Turning around money losing SOEs on schedule would be good news for 
China's economy because it would provide a better environment for SOEs reforms. But 
there is another consensus in China's economic circles that is the "three year goal" is 
only a phase. There are many problems with the SOEs, such as bad debts, separating the 
government from the enterprise, injecting new management, etc, that have accumulated 
over the years, which remain unsolved. 
The state's policies to reform SOEs have basically been put into effect. The 
SOEs will undoubtedly get less leeway from the state policies in the future. Although 
many policies such as the government setting up financial management companies to 
handle bad debts have helped SOEs a little, some of the trickier problems or vital 
reforms have been put off; many problems with the SOEs are a result of delaying 
reforms too long. 
12 People's Daily, 2002. Beijing, China. 
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Year 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
Table 3- 7 Economic Efficiency of SOE 1999-2003 (In percentage) 
Total Assets Assets- Profits to Overall Labour 
to Industrial Liability industrial costs Productivity 
Output 
6.51 64.26 1.61 29054 
6.77 61.98 2.89 35741 
8.43 60.99 6.15 45998 
8.17 59.19 5.75 54772 
8.71 59.30 5.93 65749 
10.09 59.24 7.25 87095 
Note: Figures refer to all industrial SOE with independent accounting systems. 
1. Ratio of total assets to industrial output: total assets / gross industrial output. It reflects 
the profit-making capability of all assets of the firm and is a key indicator manifesting the 
performance and management and evaluating the profit-making potential of the firm. 
2. Assets-liability: total debts divided by total assets. It reflects both the operation risk and 
the capability of the firm in making use of the capital from the creditors. 
3. Profits to industrial costs: refers to the ratio of profits realized in a given period to total 
costs in the same period and as well the economic efficiency of input costs. 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2004. 
Table 3- 8 Comparison of Economic Efficiency between SOEs and Other Firms (Per cent of all firms) 
Year Assets to Industrial 
Output 
Assets-Liability Labour Productivity 
SOE COE Foreign- SOE COE Foreign- SOE COE Foreign- 
funded funded funded 
6.77 10.39 8.46 61.98 66.62 56.45 35741 31577 79046 
1999 
8.43 10.98 10.52 60.99 65.59 56.30 45998 35581 89976 
2000 
8.17 10.93 10.74 59.19 64.24 53.91 54772 38916 98413 
2001 
8.71 11.77 11.30 59.30 63.54 53.73 65749 43556 106075 
2002 
10.09 12.76 12.71 59.24 61.46 55.43 87095 53168 123891 
2003 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2004. 
Factors behind the worsening financial performances 
A number of factors, rather than any single explanation, account for the poor 
performances of SOE as well as the growing problems of many non-state enterprises. The 
following can be cited as the main proximate sources of these problems: 
cyclical developments; 
imbalances created during the early 1990s investment boom; 
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high debt burdens; 
policy-imposed burdens on SOE; 
chronic inefficiencies in enterprise operations, particularly of SOE. 
However, in many cases these proximate causes reflect more fundamental 
structural weaknesses in enterprise governance and external discipline. 
Cyclical developments, in particular the credit tightening in 1995-1996, 
the Asian crisis in 1997, and the resulting slowdown in economic growth have contributed 
to the decline in profit rates throughout industry. However, the impact on SOE has 
probably been modest, particularly given that the growth slowdown has been 
comparatively mild. Moreover, the downturn has been most pronounced for exports 
- 
due 
to the sharp fall in regional demand produced by the Asian crisis. This has led to a sharp 
reduction in profit rates for foreign-funded enterprises, but SOE should have been less 
affected. 24 The current growth slowdown does not explain why SOE profit rates were 
higher at the trough of the much sharper cyclical downturn in 1989-1990. Nor does it 
explain why those profit rates were falling through the first half of the 1990s, when real 
growth was considerably higher than now. 
Imbalances created during the 1993-1996 investment boom very likely have 
been important contributors to the low profit rates throughout Chinese industry over the 
past several years. The boom left many industries with capacity utilization rates of 50 
per cent or below and large overhangs of excess inventories that in turn have 
contributed to declining prices in much of the industrial sector since 1997. Although the 
overall impact is difficult to assess, the problems now being experienced by other Asian 
countries that underwent similar investment booms earlier in this decade suggest that 
the imbalances in China have been a major factor depressing current profits. 25 Over- 
investment in China and the resulting excess capacity are more fundamentally traceable 
to weaknesses in corporate governance and in external financial discipline. As in a 
number of Asian countries, the widespread availability of soft bank loans at virtually 
zero or negative real interest rates faced firms with a virtually zero cost of capital and 
resulted in strong incentives to maximise revenue by expanding capacity. In China, 
these incentives were reinforced by local government revenue needs and the policy 
imperative to maintain employment levels. The effects of the perverse external 
incentives were magnified by weaknesses in enterprise governance and management. 
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Indeed, reforms in the late 1980s probably made the situation worse by giving 
management greater autonomy to respond to the perverse incentives. 13 
The 1993-1996 investment booms also further aggravated the longer- term 
build-up in enterprise debt levels underway since the 1980s. High debt loads help to 
explain the large proportion of SOE that seem to be at best marginally profitable. "' Debt 
service charges in 1999 averaged 4 per cent of total sales for SOE. 15 However the 
burdens are considerably higher for loss-making or marginally profitable enterprises. 
Nearly one-fifth of large and medium-sized SOE have debt-service burdens exceeding 
10 per cent of their sales. 16 The high debt levels and their secular rise are largely due to 
the use of bank lending to make up for enterprise operating losses and other non- 
commercial objectives (practices partly attributable to the scarcity of government 
revenues for such purposes), and to the lack of alternatives to bank credit. 
Policy burdens on SOE include surplus labour that enterprises are not free to 
shed, disproportionately high tax burdens, and expenses for social benefits such as 
medical care, pensions, housing, and education that go beyond the levels that enterprises 
typically provide in other economies. Higher tax rates on SOE compared to other 
enterprises are a further policy burden. SOE policy burdens are quite large and are a 
major reason why SOE profitability is low (Lin, et al 1998). For example, as indicated 
in the next section, surplus workers amount to a substantial portion of the employees of 
industrial SOE. Policy burdens are largely a legacy of prior central planning 
mechanisms but their persistence is substantially attributable to structural problems such 
's In such situation, the incentive is for enterprises to expand production, even in the face of 
excess capacity in the industry at large. Since capital is virtually free, losses can be covered by 
new bank loans, and production even if unprofitable, still serves to cover part of the wages of 
workforce. 
14 Since the debt ratios, as well as interest rates, have fallen, they do not explain the fall in profit 
rates since 1996. 
'S The 1999 figure is from published data reported by the China Economic Information 
Network, March 9 2000. 
16 The figure is derived from the OECD analysis. The figures from that sample put financial 
charges of large and medium-sized enterprises at 4.9 percent of sales, somewhat higher than the 
text figure for all SOE for 1999. 
as the lack of socialized social benefit programmes and (again) the scarcity of 
government revenue. 
A rough but useful further illustration of the importance of these policy burdens 
can be obtained by comparing profits on sales (sales revenue less expenses directly 
related to production) to pre-tax profits (which deduct overhead costs not directly 
related to production) and then to after-tax profits (Ash and He 1998). Virtually all these 
profit measures have declined during the 1990s for all types of enterprises. However, 
sales profits, as a share of gross output, have been consistently higher for SOE than for 
non-state enterprises as a whole. The pre-tax profit rate is also higher for SOE, but the 
gap between the enterprise classes is somewhat narrower than for sales profits. The gap 
is reversed once taxes are deducted, with the after-tax profit rate for SOE less than half 
that for non-state firms. '? This pattern is especially pronounced for enterprises with 
relatively high total factor productivity and reflects the fact that the SOE tax burden is 
concentrated on the most productive and profitable enterprises in this group. These 
comparisons confirm that policy burdens are a major factor behind the lower 
profitability of SOE compared to non-state enterprises. 
Finally, it has been argued that, as the legacy of past central planning and years 
of poor governance, SOE suffer from chronic operating inefficiencies that would 
severely impair their profitability even if their policy burdens and heavy debt loads were 
alleviated. These chronic operating inefficiencies arise from poor organization, 
inefficient and obsolete productive capacity, outmoded technology, and low product 
quality. For example, the average size of SOE operations in key industry segments, 
particularly heavy industry, is low by international standards. Technological 
backwardness is also a major problem impairing the operating efficiency of many 
Chinese enterprises. As discussed further in the next section, much of the equipment 
used is relatively old, and research and development spending by SOE is low and 
" Taxes paid by SOE are more than twice as large in relation to their gross output as those paid 
by other firms. This situation reflects a long-standing policy to use SOE as the major revenue 
source for central and local authorities, while promoting development of non-state enterprises 
through preferential tax treatment. Foreign joint ventures have been particularly favoured in this 
regard with tax exemptions and other preferences applied within the special economic zones. 
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declining. Aggregate data appear to confirm the impression that SOE are relatively less 
efficient than comparable non-state enterprises. In particular, the portion of SOE 
industrial employment in firms with relatively low measured total factor productivity is 
about twice that of collectives. A recent study of the World Bank with the CNBS 
suggests that a significant portion of large and medium-sized SOE, accounting for 11.6 
per cent of total industrial SOE employment, have total factor productivity levels that 
are either negative (meaning that enterprise revenues are insufficient even to cover their 
wage costs) or too low for competitive viability (World Bank, 1999). 
It has been suggested that chronic operating inefficiencies are so wide-spread 
among SOE that the majority, if not most, would not be competitively viable even if 
their policy and debt burdens were alleviated. However, at least two considerations 
suggest that this impression is exaggerated. First, evidence also points to a substantial 
segment of SOE that appear to be relatively efficient and competitive. The figures 
derived from the World Bank/CNBS study indicate that SOE accounting for 78 per cent 
of value-added and 39 per cent of total employment have total factor productivity that is 
at least adequate (World Bank, 1999). Second, average productivity figures such as 
those quoted above very likely overstate the extent of chronic efficiency problems in the 
SOE sector. In particular, firms that are otherwise efficient but forced to carry large 
numbers of excess workers are likely to exhibit low measured factor productivity even 
though they would be more competitively viable if the excess labour could be shed. 
Given the substantial portion of excess workers in relation to total employment, the 
resulting understatement of SOE productivity could be quite substantial. Moreover, 
chronic operating inefficiencies are not confined to SOE but are also probably 
widespread among collective enterprises - although their full extent is again not known. 
On balance, it appears that much of the decline in profitability of SOE since 
1995 can be attributed to the combined effects of the excess capacity created during the 
prior investment boom and subsequent slowdown in aggregate real growth. Policy and 
debt burdens are major factors, possibly the most important contributors overall, to the 
low level of profitability of SOE as a whole and to the high incidence of loss-making 
firms. High debt burdens are also an important factor behind the low or negative 
profitability of many collective enterprises. The extent of these problems differs 
considerably across ownership classes, industries, as well as individual firms. A major 
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challenge in this regard is to identify the extent of chronic operating inefficiencies of 
firms which, because of policy burdens or other factors, have been unable to operate as 
efficiently as they are technically capable. 
3.3. Privatization and Restructuring of SOEs 
Restructuring and privatization are now widely seen as important instruments of 
government policy for creating appropriate conditions for enhanced economic growth 
and for redefining the role of the State. More than 100 countries in every continent have 
in recent years embarked on projects to privatize and restructure their state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), including Argentina, Chile and Mexico in Latin America; Malaysia, 
Pakistan and the Philippines in Asia; the United Kingdom and France in Western Europe 
and the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe; as well as Cie d'Ivoire, 
Nigeria and Togo in Africa. Some industrialized countries, including New Zealand and 
the United Kingdom, and several developing countries, such as Argentina and Mexico, 
have pursued privatization programmes that are both radical and ambitious in their scale 
and scope. 
What kind of privatization program is best suited to stimulate enterprise 
restructuring in former centrally planned economies? One view, expressed by most 
Western business and political leaders, is that privatization is best pursued case by case, 
with emphasis on sales to new owners, including foreign investors. Another view, 
espoused by a minority of radical economists and economists-turned-politician, was that 
restructuring is best pursued through economic incentives, combined with mass 
privatization of state enterprises so that they become widely held (public) joint stock 
corporations. For example, some of the Eastern European countries that have pursued 
mass privatization most actively and credibly, have also done best in restructuring its 
industries and reorienting them toward world markets. Hungary, for example, has 
followed the gradual, case-by-case approach; the Czech Republic and Russia have relied 
on mass privatization. In Poland, mass privatization has been held up for nearly four 
years. 
Privatization and restructuring of the SOE sector is intended to concentrate state 
ownership and control on a core of large enterprises in strategic industries while 
withdrawing state ownership and support from small and medium-sized enterprises. 
134 
SOE restructuring is closely linked to the economic restructuring of the enterprise sector 
as a whole and to corporate governance reforms. Creation of the strategic core of large 
SOE involves their conversion into modem enterprises and the formation of large 
enterprise groups that will be able to compete against large foreign multinationals. 
These groups face important challenges in overcoming the present problems of their 
SOE and in sustaining the efficiency and flexibility that will be needed to compete 
successfully in international markets. 
The withdrawal of state control from SOE outside the strategic core does not 
amount to wholesale privatization along the lines pursued in European transition 
economies. The majority of medium and smaller SOE are being transferred to insiders 
and converted into co-operative or other ownership forms that are intermediate between 
public and private ownership. Economic performances of these enterprises have so far 
been mixed and their structures are likely to continue to evolve. 
The overall purpose of SOE privatization and restructuring is to establish state 
enterprises as commercially viable entities in those industries where continued state 
involvement is seen as necessary to the longer-term development of the economy. The 
specific objectives are to transform SOE into modem corporate enterprises, concentrate 
their activities, improve their economic performances, reduce their burdens on 
government finances, and enhance China's ability to compete with foreign 
multinationals in international markets. In these respects, SOE restructuring is both 
complementary and closely related to economic restructuring of enterprises and to 
corporate governance reforms. SOE restructuring is similar to the privatization 
programmes of FCE countries during their transitions in that it involves large scale 
reallocation of assets from the state to non-state sectors. However, it differs from the 
European programmes in two key respects: first, SOE will remain more important in the 
overall economy; and the exit of firms into the non-state sector does not amount to their 
wholesale privatization. 
Starting in the early 1990s, authorities began to experiment with reforms to SOE 
control structures that have now become a key element in the SOE privatization and 
restructuring strategy. The current phase in privatization and restructuring was officially 
launched by the Decisions on Issues Related to State-Owned Enterprise Reforms and 
Development issued by the 15th Party Congress held in September 1997. In addition to 
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restating the principle that the state and state ownership would continue to have a major 
role in the economy, the Party document defined three specific principles governing the 
strategy of SOE restructuring. 
- 
China is a "mixed" economy in which a variety of ownership forms, 
including private ownership, co-exist. 
- 
The state will retain full control of defence industries and the dominant 
position in "strategic" industries deemed critical to economic development. 
State ownership will be progressively divested in other ("competitive") industries. 
Ownership in these industries will be broadened through a variety of means, and private 
stakes in even large enterprises will be allowed in principle. 
The latter two principles are typically summarized as "grasp the big" while 
"release the small" (Zhua Da Fang Xiao); and transforming the distribution and 
structure of state owned assets (Zhan Lue Tao Zhen). "Seize the large" means that state 
ownership will ultimately be restricted to large SOE in the strategic industries. Although 
they have not yet been fully identified, these industries are expected to include all or 
most of: utilities, energy, natural resources; transportation and other major infrastructure; 
and industries requiring very large-scale investment projects, such as steel, ship building, 
and petrochemicals. 51 Certain key services, such as grain distribution, finance, and some 
foreign trade activities are also likely to remain under state control. However, while the 
state will retain the controlling interest, ownership of SOE in strategic industries is to be 
diversified to allow non-state (including foreign and private) equity shares. State 
ownership in the "competitive" industries is to be progressively withdrawn and 
ultimately curtailed. 
While reflective of the status quo, the first principle represents the first official 
acknowledgement of the legitimacy of non-state ownership in industry. It also allows in 
principle for private ownership in sectors previously reserved for SOE, including private 
equity stakes in even large SOE. The status of the private sector was further 
strengthened in March 1999 by the Ninth National People's Congress, which approved a 
constitutional provision upgrading the non-state sector from an "important complement" 
to a state dominated economy to an "essential component" of a mixed economy. 
While the Decisions made a clear distinction between large, strategic SOE and 
small SOE, the treatment of medium-sized enterprises remained somewhat ambiguous. 
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In 1999, however, the formal decision was taken to withdraw state control from 
medium-sized SOE. Under these plans, the number of industrial SOE is expected to fall 
from the existing nearly 75,000 to at most one or two thousand. 
The complete transformation of the SOE sector is envisaged to extend through 
the current decade. Much of the conversion of SOE into corporate entities is supposed 
to be completed by 2005. Completion of the programmes to establish large enterprise 
groups and to consolidate industries is not expected before 2010. 
3.3.1. Formation of the SOE Core 
The transformation of the large SOE into commercially viable entities has become 
the major objective of recent SOE reform under the programme of establishing a "modem 
enterprise system". Three complementary modalities are being used to create the strategic 
core of large SOE that will remain under state control. These modalities are: 
corporatization; ownership diversification; and formation of large enterprise groups. 
Corporatization 
Under the pre-reform central planning system, Chinese SOE existed as an 
integrated part of government departments. Although early reforms attempted to dilute 
the ties between the government and the SOE, Chinese SOEs have remained closer to 
government agencies than to commercial business entities in terms of their control 
structures. The major problem arising from this arrangement has been the ambiguous 
property rights and ownership of the SOE, as the assets of the SOE are subject to the 
control of a range of government departments or agencies but ultimately belong to no 
one in particular (although in principle the SOE assets belong to the Chinese people, 
they do not have direct control rights). The "corporatization" programme is an attempt 
to clarify property rights of SOE by making them separate legal entities with a defined 
sphere of autonomy. The overall objective is to transform SOE into "modem corporate 
enterprises" with commercial objectives and clearly defined rights and obligations under 
the law, so that they can be held accountable for their performance. This 
"corporatization" process is seen as a necessary precondition for the creation of the 
strategic core. It entails separating government functions from enterprise operations and 
allowing the introduction of governance mechanisms that establish accountability of 
management to the enterprise's owners (the state). Corporation is also a necessary step 
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to introduce diversified ownership of the SOE as well as to list them on domestic and 
foreign stock exchanges. 
Efforts to transform large enterprises into corporate form began in the early 
1990s. The enactment of the Company Law in 1993, which became effective in July 
1994, provided the national legal framework. This framework provides for SOE to 
become either limited liability companies (LLC) or joint stock limited companies (JSC), 
i. e. limited by shares. By the end of 1999, more than 7,000 medium and large SOE are 
estimated to have been corporatized. Among the 2,562 large SOEs that were selected for 
the original pilot programme, more than half became JSC while another 28% became 
wholly state-owned LLC. This transformation is accompanied by the implementation of 
the structures mandated by the Company Law for ensuring effective corporate 
governance, such as the shareholders' general meeting, the board of directors and the 
supervisory board. 
Ownership diversification 
"Ownership diversification" has become the chosen modality of ownership 
restructuring for larger corporatized SOE in China, in contrast to the wholesale 
privatization pursued in European transition economies. In China's context, ownership 
diversification for large SOE has meant the encouragement of shareholding among 
various state entities. While non-state interests are allowed in principle, their role has 
been only limited, although as indicated below, it is now increasing. The introduction of 
multiple ownership is intended as a way to sever more fully the direct ties between a 
SOE and its controlling authority; and to encourage a more commercially oriented 
operation of corporatized firms by subjecting them to the checks and balances of 
multiple shareholders. 
Ownership diversification has been part of the SOE restructuring strategy since 
the early 1990s but, until recently, it has been largely limited to encouraging multiple 
ownership through the cross-shareholding among various state institutions such as 
provincial and local governments, local state asset management companies or other 
SOE. As a result, state ownership has dominated even the listed companies, with about 
70 per cent of the shares of the listed companies held by the state as of 1999. The scope 
for further expansion of non-state interests in SOE has been substantially limited by two 
provisions governing share listing. The first is the legal requirement that the state 
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directly hold a minimum of 35 per cent of the shares of listed SOE, these shares cannot 
be traded on the stock exchanges. The second stems from restrictions that largely 
prevent the trading of shares held by other entities under state control ("legal person 
shares"). As a result, in practice, only about one-third of a companies" shares have been 
actively traded. However, the scope for diversification of SOE ownership among 
different state owners (e. g. state asset management companies controlled by various 
localities) is somewhat greater, at least potentially; and could provide at least some of 
the benefits that broader diversification is intended to achieve. 
More recently, ownership diversification through the participation of non-state 
investors has been given increased emphasis. It was most recently endorsed by an 
official statement in September 1999 that "effective methods of public ownership" will 
be reinforced through "mixed forms of ownership". 18 Under present plans, ownership of 
SOE remaining under state control will be broadened to include minority stakes by 
private, foreign, or other non-state investors. The recent drive for further ownership 
diversification through the stock markets has been motivated by two main factors. First, 
it is seen as a means to expand SOE equity, thereby providing funds for investment and 
to reduce SOE debt burdens. At the same time, participation of outside shareholders is 
seen as a vehicle for the much needed improvement in corporate governance of large 
SOE. The pressing financial needs of social security programmes have provided another 
motivation for relaxing restrictions on holding of state shares. In late 1999, authorities 
announced plans to sell a further portion of state equity in SOE. 57 It was subsequently 
announced that the capital raised by the sale would be used to fund the pension system. 
In part to facilitate these sales, authorities announced plans, in June 2000, to relax 
restrictions on the trading of directly state-owned shares. 
There have also been signs that restrictions on the majority or full ownership of 
SOE by foreign or private capital are being relaxed. For example, the provincial 
government of Guangdong announced that it would allow private enterprises to wholly 
acquire the state-owned power plants, which are affiliated with the Provincial Power 
Bureau. In addition, private capital is being allowed to participate in investment in some 
18 Statement of the Fourth Plenum of the 15th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party, held in September 1999. 
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infrastructure projects, such as roads, bridges, information service sector projects and 
sewage disposal facilities. In a rare move, the authorities also allowed one foreign 
company to purchase 100 per cent of a state-owned carbon plant in the Northwestern 
Ningxia Autonomous Region. 19 Although this move might have been primarily driven 
by the desperate need for outside capital in an inefficient plant located in a backward 
region, it may indicate increased flexibility in the terms that local authorities are willing 
to offer to potential investors. At the same time, other cities including Wuhan, 
Chongquing, Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin have announced that licences for solely 
state-owned firms would no longer be given in their industrial sectors. The authorities in 
these cities also intend to promote diversified forms of ownership through measures 
such as withdrawing all or part of state capital from SOE and encouraging private 
companies to merge with and to restructure SOE. 
Large enterprise groups 
Another modality of the current reform strategy to create the SOE core is the 
formation of large enterprise groups (EG) modelled after Korea's conglomerates 
(chaebol). Chinese EG were first established at the beginning of the reform period as 
horizontal associations among SOE controlled by provincial and local governments. 
The original purposes of the groups, which often spanned several industries and 
localities, were to increase supplies of key products, facilitate specialization in 
production, and to help co-ordinate economic activities among regions. In the process, 
they helped to offset the effects of regional barriers to trade and factor mobility. These 
groups have subsequently expanded greatly through a largely spontaneous "bottom up" 
process involving joint ventures and a variety of other business arrangements (Lee 
1999b). By the late 1990s, there were nearly 2300 of these enterprise groups throughout 
industry, many of them highly competitive and profitable (Ding 1999). 
Beginning in the early 1990s, authorities began to establish large EG from 
central government-controlled SOE. As with the earlier groups, these EG typically 
include firms in a number of industries and regions, but they are generally much larger 
and they have been formed through a top-down process directed by government 
19 Elkem, a Norwegian light metals group, agreed to acquire full ownership of Ningxia 
Shizuishan No. 1 Carbon Plant (Financial Times, 7 June 2000) 
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authorities. Their establishment was motivated by the increasing competition the 
enterprises were facing in domestic markets from enterprises funded by foreign 
multinationals. 60 Formation of the large EG is being pursued to achieve the scale, scope, 
and diversity of operations that authorities see as necessary to allow China's industries 
to compete with foreign multinationals in domestic and international markets. 
Large enterprise groups were given a central place in the effort to establish the 
strategic core of SOE industries following the 15th Party Congress in 1997. The 
government gave preferential treatment to enterprise groups in credit access, support for 
technical upgrading and listing. Some of the enterprise groups are sector specific, while 
others are conglomerates that control companies in several industries. The number of 
EG has grown from 57 groups in 1991 to 120 groups directly under the central 
government in 1997. Together, these groups controlled 1.6 trillion yuan in assets (US$ 
192.7 billion or about 5 per cent of the assets of all large industrial SOE) and had total 
sales of 931 billion yuan (US$ 112 billion) (see Table 3-9). 
Table 3- 9 General situations of pilot enterprise groups in selected industries 
Total assets Net Sales Profits Export 
Type of No. of assets income and taxes income 
industry groups (billion (billion (billion (billion (billion 
yuan) yuan) yuan) yuan) yuan) 
Metallurgy 8 35.7 19.2 17.8 2.8 228.0 
Energy 11 41.3 20.3 14.7 1.7 30.9 
Chemical 7 7.7 2.9 3.5 0.5 25.5 
Automobile 6 26.3 9.0 21.9 2.4 42.1 
Machinery 14 4.4 1.3 2.5 0.3 26.2 
Electronics 10 4.3 1.5 4.3 0.4 103.6 
Transportation 8 23.4 8.1 10.3 0.6 256.1 
Pharmaceutical 5 3.9 1.3 2.4 0.3 31.4 
Construction 3 15.5 3.1 10.7 0.5 48.3 
Foreign trade 8 11.9 2.3 13.6 0.3 764.7 
Average of 120 13.4 5.4 7.8 0.7 117.3 
groups 
Note: Figures refer to enterprise groups controlled by the central government 
Source: Shen (1999). 
The economic performance of enterprise groups has been somewhat mixed. In 
some cases, the groups have attained their goals for improved competitiveness and 
expanded business. Some of the groups have become strong competitors in international 
markets. However, many enterprise groups have experienced a decline in the 
competitiveness of their companies. As in other countries, "big" has not always been a 
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guarantee of "better". 
Several reasons can be cited for the problems of these enterprise groups. 
Weaknesses in their corporate governance mechanisms. Many groups were 
formed before they were fully transformed into corporate entities, and government 
agencies have continued to be involved in their management. Partly as a result, the 
groups have often been insufficiently flexible to meet changing market demands. 
Weak financial discipline coming from implicit government backing. Given their 
important ("too-big-go-fail") role in the economy, the government has been reluctant to 
allow large loss-making EG to go bankrupt and thus has continued to provide bailout 
loans to those on the brink of bankruptcy, as was the case in Korea before the financial 
crisis (OECD, 1998c). In this situation, the managers of large EG have little incentive to 
improve productivity or profitability, thereby increasing the burden on public finance. 
Formation of groups by government fiat with insufficient attention to their 
economic merits. As with government directed M&A, the top down process gives at 
best limited weight to the economic motivations ("culture") or expertise of the 
management of the individual enterprises. Moreover, as the larger firms are frequently 
asked to absorb smaller, debt-ridden firms, the potential economic benefits in terms of 
profitability or efficiency are questionable. 
Formation of groups to obtain preferential policies from the government. In such 
cases, longer-term economic efficiency tends to become a secondary consideration in 
the formation of the group. 
3.3.2. Privatization of SMEs 
The disengagement of the state in SMEs in the state and collective sector has 
occurred in various ways. On the principle of "grasping the big and releasing the small", 
local governments were empowered to choose how to reform state and collective SMEs. 
The exit ("divestiture") of small SOE from state control and responsibility was first 
officially endorsed by the Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Congress in 
November 1993, but pilot programmes organized by the central government and 
initiatives undertaken by local governments were already in place a few years earlier. 
Following the official decision, local governments quickly embarked on programmes to 
privatize and divest their small SOE. The emphasis has been on the divestiture of loss- 
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making firms, in order to reduce the burden on local governments of supporting their 
workers. Divestiture of smaller SOE is part of a broader process of ownership 
transformations underway in the business sector, including the extensive conversion of 
TVE into joint-stock co-operatives (Chai 1997; Clarke and Du 1998; Li, Li, and Zhang 
1998). A large portion of TVEs have become effectively privatized under this process, 
although in many cases they remain officially registered as collectives. 20 The objectives 
are similar in both cases: namely to reduce government burdens and responsibilities for 
public enterprises, while improving their capabilities to successfully compete in a 
market environment. 
Since 1994, China has closed or bankrupted 3,080 companies, written off 199.54 
yuan to account for non-performing loans, and relocated to new jobs 5.3 million 
workers once worked in SOEs. 80 percent of Small and medium-sized state enterprises 
at country level and 60 percent at municipal level had been privatized (Collier 2003). 
A number of modalities are being used to move small and medium-sized SOE 
out of state control and responsibility. These include: restructuring of the existing 
operations; formation of business alliances with other firms; M&A; transformation into 
leasing companies or contract operations; formation of "joint-stock co-operatives", i. e. 
enterprises owned by their workers and management, and outright sale to outsiders 
(Table 3-10). Some of these modalities involve conversion into legally private 
enterprises, while others, notably the joint-stock co-operatives, do not. The predominant 
pattern has been divestiture to "insiders" in which existing management is largely 
retained, although as indicated below there are important differences in this respect 
among regions. While, in principle, transformations are subject to strong requirements 
on employment and compensation for separations and debtors' claims, in practice these 
conditions are less strict. Enterprises and employees are free (in principle) to choose the 
form of transfer, but conversion of SOE into shareholding co-operative enterprises have 
been the most prevalent modality, particularly in industry. Creation of legally private 
enterprises from former SOE has been predominant only in retail and other service 
sectors where the average size of firms is quite small. 
20 International Finance Corporation (2000), "China Private Enterprise Study", Nico Howson, 
April 26. 
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Table 3- 10 Transformations of SMEs by 2000 
Region No. of Trans- Method (%) 
firms formed 
(0) RMLC JSC Sale B Other 
Coastal 17,629 83 17 13 11 9 22 88 12 
Central 20,713 83 14 11 14 9 22 9 11 10 
West 21,068 80 20 12 98 19 9 11 12 
Notes: R-restructuring, M-merger, L-leasing, C-contracting, JSC joint-stock company, B-bankruptcy. 
a. Liaoning, Hebei, Be jing, Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhe fang, Fujian, Guangdong. 
b. Heilongjiang, Jilin, Shanxi, Henan, Hubei, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hunan, Hainan 
c. Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang Tibet, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Guangxi. 
Source: State Economic and Trade Commission, Be jing, China 
Divestiture by these modalities has proceeded quite rapidly since 1996. 
According to estimates prepared by the SETC, as much as 80 per cent of small SOE had 
been converted into one of the above forms by the end of 1998; although the number of 
enterprises formally transferred into the non-state sector seems to be substantially less 
. 
Regionally, the coastal and southern provinces were reported to have transformed 
almost all of their smaller SOE by the end of 1998, while many North-eastern provinces 
had also made significant progress. For example, Liaoning province, a heavy-industry 
centre in the northeast, had shed at least 60 per cent of its smaller state companies, while 
Hubei province in the middle of China divested about 84 per cent of their smaller SOE. 
Various factors have contributed to the differences in the pace and modalities of 
small SOE divestiture among provinces. First, the central government did not set clear 
rules on the method of transfer, so local authorities have been left to formulate their own 
criteria and procedures. Second, local financial conditions played a role. Provinces that 
have long been plagued by huge losses of their SOE and limited government financial 
resources have had strong incentives to divest their small SOE as rapidly as possible. 
These provinces have given more emphasis to outright sales and other modalities 
entailing little or no further assistance from local authorities. On the other hand, 
wealthier areas with a relatively low incidence of loss-makers and more rapid economic 
growth have placed less emphasis on sales to outsiders. In Shanghai municipality, the 
strategy has been to "support the small" SOE by facilitating their restructuring. 
The performance of divested small SOE has been mixed. Some have become 
profitable within a short period. 
Other firms are finding it difficult to survive without state support. With no local 
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government guarantees and increased stringency of bank lending standards, poorly 
performing small SOE are generally unable to obtain bank loans. Moreover, many SOE 
continue to be burdened by inefficient equipment, outdated technology, and poor 
management that impaired their performance under state control. 
The divestiture process suffered an apparent setback in mid-1998 following 
growing reports of widespread asset stripping and other abuses by SOE managers. In 
addition, to make companies more attractive for sale, local authorities had written off at 
least 100 billion yuan in debt without consulting the creditors. In response to these 
problems, the central government in July 1998 ordered local governments to exercise 
increased care in transforming small SOE and to slow the pace of divestiture. However, 
the actual pace does not seem to have slowed greatly; while continuing to divest their 
SOE, local governments apparently under-reported their extent to central government 
authorities. 
There have been important recent developments that signal further broadening 
and deepening in the letting-go process. The most important of these was the decision in 
1999 by the National People's Congress endorsing the divestiture of medium-sized SOE. 
This decision provides the official sanction for provincial and local governments to 
begin transforming their medium-sized SOE along the lines that have been applied to 
the small SOE. Most of medium-sized SOE will be transformed into joint stock co- 
operatives or contract management firms (rather than privatized) and the process is 
expected to be largely completed within the next five-year plan. The Shanghai 
municipal government has announced plans to sell 101 industrial companies (ranging 
from textile firms to fire-fighting equipment producers) worth 744 million yuan (US$ 
90 million) to foreign investors. 21 The city of Shenzhen plans to phase out state 
ownership of all its enterprises over the next five years to eight years, including its large 
SOE. 22 The Nanjing municipal government has also announced its plan to withdraw 80 
per cent of the state shares from small and medium-sized SOE by the end of 2000. The 
city of Wuhan is promoting divestiture of its small and medium-sized SOE through the 
sale of shares to employees or other individuals. Under the new policy, employees can 
21 Zhonghua Gongshang Shibao (Business Times, 16 June 1999) 
22 Zhongguo Xinwen She (China News Service, 8 July 1999) 
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buy shares in state assets through cash or with proceeds from special loans for the 
purpose; they may also receive shares in lieu of their normal compensation, or through 
conversion of their interests in benefit funds. A number of other localities are also 
implementing pilot privatization projects involving employee ownership of the shares of 
the small and medium-sized enterprises. 
3.3.3. The Changing Role of Government in SOE Restructuring 
Large-scale and aggressive SOE restructuring carried out in China since the 
mid-1990s is one of the most daunting challenges faced by economic policymakers. The 
government is forced to take a leading role, even if indirectly, because of the need to 
prioritize policy goals, address market failures, reform the legal and tax systems, and 
deal with the resistance of powerful interest groups. The objectives of large-scale 
corporate restructuring are in essence to restructure viable firms and liquidate nonviable 
ones, restore the health of the financial sector, and create the conditions for long-term 
economic growth. 
Stone (2002) argued that successful government-led corporate restructuring 
policies usually follow a sequence. First, the government should formulate 
macroeconomic and legal policies that lay the foundation for successful restructuring. 
After that, financial restructuring must start to establish the proper incentives for banks 
to take a role in restructuring and get credit flowing again. Only then can restructuring 
begin in earnest with the separating out of the viable from nonviable firms 
-restructuring 
the former and liquidating the latter. The main government-led corporate restructuring 
tools are mediation, incentive schemes, bank recapitalization, asset management 
companies, and the appointment of firm directors to lead the restructuring. After 
achieving its goals, the government must cut back its intervention in support of 
restructuring. 
Choosing the Form of Government Involvement 
Experience has shown that large-scale corporate restructuring requires the 
government to take a leading role so as to establish priorities, limit the economic and 
social costs of crisis, address market failures, and deal with the obstructions posed by 
powerful interest groups. The government's role in corporate restructuring is highly 
country 
-specific owing to its complexities, social consequences, and involvement of 
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different elements of society. Thus, there are relatively few overarching operational 
principles or obvious ways to organize the policy choices, especially in comparison with 
other structural policy areas such as capital account liberalization and labour market 
reform. The approach taken here is to examine five government-led corporate 
restructuring methods in ascending order of government involvement. 
Government mediation 
Government mediation between corporations and banks or between banks is 
warranted if creditors are unwilling or unable to lead corporate restructuring. Reasons 
may include a lack of bank capital, excessive negotiating power by either debtors or 
creditors, or a lack of incentives for banks or corporations to work out debt problems. 
These factors can prolong restructuring and result in avoidable costs and even the 
unnecessary liquidation of debtors. To avoid these pitfalls, the government can mediate 
informally or in a more structured framework. The best known form of official 
mediation is the "London Approach, " which is implemented in the United Kingdom 
under the aegis of the Bank of England. 
The government mediation framework is appropriate if corporate restructuring is 
limited in scope and the environment supportive. This approach offers flexibility and 
adaptability, but requires a credible government mediator, macroeconomic stability, and 
the appropriate regulatory setting 
- 
all of which are attributes of the United Kingdom 
where the London Approach has been successful. This approach has proven to be less 
useful when there are a great many creditors, especially foreign creditors. 
Government-financed incentive schemes 
Financial incentives through a preset government-financed scheme can help if 
corporate distress is systemic, market or regulatory failures inhibit restructuring, and the 
government has adequate fiscal resources at hand. These schemes usually involve 
insurance or subsidy incentives made available to creditors and debtors on a voluntary 
basis. Incentives include compensation to creditors for lengthening debt maturities and 
grace periods, interest rate and exchange rate guarantees, and equity injections. The 
government must trade off the fiscal costs of the plan against the systemic benefits of 
alleviating corporate distress. Government strategies were employed by Mexico in the 
147 
early 1980s and in the mid-1990s, and Chile. 
Recapitalizing banks 
Bank recapitalization is warranted if corporate debt problems are pervasive 
enough to undermine the health of the banking system, and if banks are willing and able 
to restructure corporations on their own. The widespread interruption of corporate loan 
payments, which usually reflects macroeconomic instability, will reduce and can even 
wipe out bank capital. If new capital is all that banks need to restructure debt (that is, 
they have the incentives and capacity for working out loans), and if new private capital 
sufficient to restore the banks to normal operation is not forthcoming, then public 
financing is needed to restore bank capital. 
A new bank-restructuring agency is typically established to help coordinate the 
policies needed to ensure the success of recapitalization. The agency must gauge 
carefully the potentially large fiscal costs of bank recapitalization against the benefits. 
Existing shareholder equity should be written down before public funds are used to 
recapitalize banks to ensure that taxpayers do not bear more than their fair share of the 
burden. Requirements for the restructuring agency to unwind its equity positions upon 
the meeting of pre-specified conditions accelerate the return of banks to private control. 
Finally, the agency in most cases will play a key role in deciding whether banks should 
manage their own impaired assets or spin them off into an asset management 
corporation or other entity. 
Recapitalization costs tend to be higher than for the average banking sector crisis, 
given the severity of systemic financial crises examined here. Bank resolution costs in a 
typical bank crisis tend to be equivalent to about 7 14 percent of GDP, but in Indonesia 
it reached more than 50 percent and in Chile 41 percent. 
Bank recapitalization is warranted under similar conditions as for government 
schemes but where banks are better qualified to work out debt. However, 
recapitalization creates a fresh "moral hazard" problem: that is, banks may have 
incentive to gamble the new capital on risky loans with the expectation that they will 
again be recapitalized if these loans do not pay off. Further, newly recapitalized banks 
holding large equity shares in restructuring corporations may face conflicting objectives. 
To avoid moral hazard, recapitalization should be complemented by measures that 
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improve bank supervision and governance, especially if banks end up owning a large 
share of the corporate sector. Tying bank recapitalization to specific bank measures to 
restructure corporate debt can be helpful. 
Asset Management Corporation 
A new government-financed asset management corporation is called for if the 
number of troubled corporations is large and there are microeconomic elements that 
severely inhibit restructuring. The most important of these are recapitalized and poorly 
managed banks, a shortfall of bank debt workout expertise, an uneven balance of power 
between banks and corporations, a lack of corporate capacity and willingness to provide 
reliable financial information, and, again, adverse systemic consequences. A 
government-financed asset management corporation can buy bad loans, provide equity 
to banks and corporations, negotiate with debtors, and take an active financial and 
operational role in restructuring. If bankruptcy courts are ineffective an asset 
management corporation can also serve as an out-of-court bankruptcy mechanism, since 
the passing of legislation and the building of institutional infrastructure for effective 
bankruptcy procedures can take time. The debt taken on by the asset management 
corporation can be converted to equity and eventually sold to the public. The asset 
management corporation realizes economies of scale in the specialized area of corporate 
debt restructuring and can develop secondary debt markets. Banks benefit from higher 
capital, while corporations can expect to have their debt restructured more quickly. 
Asset management corporations were used in Hungary, Indonesia, Korea, and 
Malaysia. In East Asia, asset management corporations have taken on large amounts of 
debt, ranging from the equivalent of 10 to 35 percent of GDP. However, disposal and 
resolution of the assets have proven to be quite slow. An asset management corporation 
is appropriate if bank-led debt restructuring is unfeasible, but it also has risks. To be 
successful, an asset management corporation should have clear and predefined goals 
and aim to maximize loan recovery, remain clear of politicization, and be sufficiently 
funded. 
Restructuring director 
The complexities of the corporate and financial restructuring efforts of many of 
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the recent corporate crisis countries have led to the appointment of a restructuring 
director to accelerate the pace of reform. A director can clearly and transparently define 
the goals of restructuring, overcome excessive leverage by creditors or debtors, marshal 
and prioritize government financial support, and establish a place at the table for 
elements of society that might otherwise be excluded. Typically, restructuring directors 
are appointed by and report to the country's chief executive and oversee mediation 
efforts, corporate restructuring committees, asset management corporations, and the 
bank-restructuring agency. 
Restructuring directors are a relatively recent development. None of the crisis 
episodes of the 1980s and early 1990s appear to have had such a director. In Korea, 
financial restructuring was directed after early 1998 by the Financial Supervisory 
Commission. The Commission's chairman was a member of the cabinet and reported to 
the President. 
A restructuring director can help accelerate the pace of restructuring when there 
are a large number of players with conflicting interests and systemic consequences 
increase the costs of delays. Naturally, there are potential problems with centralizing 
supervision of restructuring, including excessive politicization and the absence of 
market incentives to guide decision making. However, as restructuring becomes ever 
more complicated and the systemic consequences of corporate crisis remain severe, 
directors may become a more regular feature of large-scale restructuring efforts. 
Reducing the Role of Government 
The need for the government to first expand and then shrink its role helps 
explain the long time needed to complete restructuring. The new restructuring 
institutions are subject to economic and political constraints that force the government 
to weigh difficult tradeoffs, especially between restructuring's short-term costs 
(unemployment, dramatic falls in asset prices, learning curve of new corporate 
managers, for example) and long-term benefits (improved resource allocation, and safer 
balance sheets). Initially, the crisis atmosphere quells disagreements between interest 
groups brought on by unemployment and the removal of corporate owners. However, 
after the crisis passes and economic activity recovers broad support for reform often 
wanes. Crucially, the influence of vested interest groups can delay bankruptcy reform 
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and privatization that would dilute their ownership. 
The completion of restructuring is marked by the sale of most or all of the 
government's ownership of the private sector, which can grow to large levels after a 
crisis. Government ownership of the corporate sector can be direct 
- 
after the conversion 
of debt into equity 
- 
or indirect via government-owned asset management corporations 
and government recapitalization of banks. Successful privatization requires a transfer of 
control not only from the government, but also from current management. The 
introduction of a strategic investor who, in a small or medium-sized economy, is likely 
to be a foreign financial institution is usually needed to improve corporate governance. 
The successful completion of large-scale corporate restructuring can often take a 
long time-a minimum of perhaps five years. In Chile, the initiation of restructuring can 
be marked by the takeover of ailing financial institutions in late 1981, while the last 
takeovers and debt restructuring programs took place in 1986; the bank privatization 
and upgrading of the institutional framework was not finished until 1989. By 1998, 
government ownership of banking sector capital in Poland had been reduced to one- 
third and foreigners owned 40 percent of bank capital, while for Hungary government 
ownership was down to 20 percent, with most of the remaining share owned by 
foreigners. 
Delays in restructuring can be costly. The perpetuation of government 
ownership can inhibit restructuring and long-term growth prospects by obstructing the 
market forces needed to promote efficiency. In addition, a slow pace of restructuring 
will lead foreign investment to other, competing countries 
-a process that may be 
difficult to reverse. Finally, there are fiscal costs to delaying restructuring especially 
from inefficient state-owned banks and corporations. 
The time needed to complete restructuring can be shortened if the strategy is 
properly designed. As noted earlier, early and transparent formulation of an overall 
strategy can build public support, counter the resistance of vested interest groups, and 
improve policy effectiveness. Rapid establishment of a supporting legal environment is 
essential. A clear statement of the restructuring goals makes it plain later on when the 
government should pare back its role and shut down restructuring institutions. Sunset 
provisions for government restructuring institutions can help limit their life spans. 
The stages and process of SOE reform and restructuring in China suggests that 
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the reform and restructuring was initially promoted and guided by the government, and 
gradually mediated partially by the market force and partially directed by government, 
and finally some of the restructuring is completely driven and led by the market. The 
study, undertaken by Jefferson and Rawski (2002), contrasts state-directed and market- 
mediated restructuring of enterprise ownership rights in transition economies. Market- 
mediated restructurings aimed at commercial objectives, and government-directed 
motivated by a mix of economic and political objectives. 
Government-directed Restructuring 
Governments, including provincial and local as well as central agencies, stand 
out as the chief actors in China's emerging property rights market. Direct official 
intervention arises from two distinct motives: limiting instability arising from layoffs 
and other manifestations of enterprise failure; and building large and powerful firms and 
enterprise groups that can complete successfully in global markets. 
Early experimentation with mergers and acquisitions focused on small firms. 
More recently, large enterprises have entered the market for ownership rights. Capital 
Steel, First Auto Works (FAW), and Konka, a Shenzhen-based television manufacturer, 
are among the large firms that have employed multiple mergers to expand the breadth 
and scale of their operations. 
Initially, government was the prime mover in most mergers. Non-commercial 
objectives predominated, as officials sought to escape the burden of supporting loss- 
making enterprises by merging them with stronger firms. These policies persist. 
Enterprises that hope to be listed on the stock exchanges must merge with or purchase a 
loss-making enterprise before they are listed. One author says that buyouts in China 
"basically represent low-payoff government activity" (Wei Feng 1999). 
But in recent years, enterprises initiate acquisitions purely for business reasons: 
to acquire land-use rights, expand the scale of production, rationalize product lines, 
penetrate new markets, or ensure access to key inputs. Commercially motivated mergers 
include tie-ups among strong firms, such as the 1997 merger of four powerful 
petrochemicals firms in the Shanghai-Jiangsu region (Wang Shouan 1998) China's 
banks have begun to promote mergers as a means of strengthening client firms and 
reducing their own inventory of bad loans. The China Construction Bank has helped to 
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arrange 39 mergers among firms in the cement sector, "slashing the non-performing 
loans ratio of cement makers from 80 percent in 1996 to 34 percent" in 2000 (Wang 
2000). 
During the 1980s, most mergers involved enterprises in the same trade, locality, 
and ownership system. Although these limitations still exist (Wei 1999, p. 10), they 
have begun to erode. Mergers that link firms in different industries, regions, and 
ownership systems are no longer uncommon. The television producer Konka is one of 
many firms that now operates plants in several provinces. Conglomerates like Capital 
Steel span diverse industries. Asset transfers involving state and collective firms, or 
state and private enterprises predate the recent policy of "retaining large state firms and 
releasing small ones, " which has vastly expanded the opportunities for transactions 
formerly viewed as unorthodox. Another novelty is the entry of foreign firms into 
China's nascent property rights market. By the end of 1996,10 of China's 59 largest tire 
manufacturers, 12 of the 13 largest pharmaceutical firms, and 70 percent of the largest 
beer producers have come under the control of foreign firms. 
We also see a notable increase in the financial complexity of asset transfers. 
Initially, standard practice involved the acquiring firm gaining control of a target 
enterprise in exchange for full or partial absorption of the target's workers, retirees, and 
financial obligations. These transfers remain common, although policy shifts have 
repeatedly relaxed the financial requirements imposed on firms acquiring weak merger 
partners (Wei Xiangyun 1998). More recently, firms have begun to use capital markets 
as vehicles for mobilizing funds to finance corporate acquisitions. The Shenzhen-based 
Baoan group mounted China's first corporate raid in 1993, launching a surprise share- 
buying campaign that enabled it to become the largest holder of shares in Shanghai- 
based Yanzhong Ltd. (Wang 1998, p. 150). Konka, the television producer, has 
repeatedly used share issues to finance corporate takeovers (Wang 1998, p. 160). 
Although firms require official approval to gain access to domestic or international 
markets for shares or corporate bonds, some firms have succeeded in gaining indirect 
capital-market access through the device of purchasing shell corporations. 
The creation of asset management companies associated with the four big banks 
adds a new dimension of enterprise re-organization. The government has provided these 
new entries with war chests amounting to hundreds of billions of yuan and instructed 
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them to undertake debt-equity swaps and other approaches to workouts for heavily 
indebted firms. These amounts, while not large in relation to the total of bad bank debt, 
are quite substantial relative total non-performing assets. For example, Huarong, the 
AMC responsible for acquiring non-performing assets from the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China has purchased over 400 billion yuan of the Bank's non- 
performing assets, including stakes in over 70,000 enterprises. During 2000, Huarong 
began disposing of these assets, initially through auctions, judged to be the easiest 
method, and subsequently through direct restructuring, including mergers and 
acquisitions. Huarong executives are also confident that China's WTO membership will 
further the interest of major multinationals and investment banks in the purchase of 
large numbers of enterprises (Wang 2000). 
It is anticipated that specification of control rights over publicly-held assets will 
continue to improve with the development of new systems of state asset management, 
the accelerated divestiture of assets under the 1998 policy of "retaining large public 
enterprises and releasing small firms, " and the ongoing reorganization of rural 
enterprises. 
Market-mediated Restructuring 
Market-mediated restructuring also seems poised to expand, partly because of 
the accumulated impact of reforms-especially the on-going privatization of small firms, 
partly as a result f liberation measures linked to China's WTO accession, but particular 
because massive debt-equity swaps have quickly established China's four bank asset 
management firms as major players in the commercial segment of china's market for 
industrial property rights. 
Despite strenuous efforts to implement the policy of separating government from 
business, firms and property remain enmeshed in a dense web of public ownership, 
official control, and bureaucratic regulation. Enterprise managers do hold substantial 
power and authority. In the areas of merger and acquisition or asset disposition, however, 
their capacity for independent action remains limited, even when legal provisions or 
national policies specifically ban official interference. 4 
Managers and workers of weak firms often resist proposed mergers. In some 
instances, labour unions or workers' associations wield effective veto power over 
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enterprise restructuring. Managers may seek to obstruct proposed mergers in order to 
protect their own positions (Wang Kexia 1999). In such instances, the ambiguity of 
property rights may prevent a weak firm's owners from overriding insider opposition to 
change. As a result, restructuring may require direct official intervention. 
Bureaucratic efforts to manage the restructuring process also create many 
difficulties, as when governments seek to escape the burdens of debt and redundancy by 
pushing strong firms into unprofitable alliances with weak partners. The recent merger 
between Shanghai's Baosteel and several floundering regional steel-makers, which 
saddled Baosteel with an enormously increased workforce, appears to represent this sort 
of forced merger, which Chinese authors describe as "forced marriages" (lalangpei). 
Even when government plays no direct role in attempts to restructure specific 
enterprises, official policy exerts strong influence over the environment within which 
asset transfers occur. Ambiguous policy reflecting disagreements within official circles 
as well as shifting responses to changing economic circumstances creates additional 
barriers to the expansion of China's market for enterprise assets. The policies of 
"separating government from enterprises" and "retaining large state enterprises and 
releasing small ones" encouraged governments at all levels to reorganize public-sector 
enterprises under corporate, shareholding, cooperative, or private ownership, which 
facilitated the extraction of productive assets from the state sector (and by extension, 
from collectives as well). As local administrations move to transfer large numbers of 
enterprises and their assets out of the state sector, central officials attempt to slow down 
the process of restructuring, calling on "local governments to stop haphazardly selling 
off small State-owned enterprises". 
3.4. Developing an Effective Corporate Governance System 
Establishment of effective corporate governance mechanisms has become a key 
priority of reforms to ensure that SOE function effectively in a market environment. 
Two major objectives have guided the reforms in this area. The first is to establish 
mechanisms to exercise the state's ownership interest in SOE that are separate from the 
government's regulatory functions. The second objective is to set up internal 
governance mechanisms to provide incentives and accountability for managers to act in 
the interest of their owners. 
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Governance reform has involved a series of institutional and organizational 
transformations including: termination of the managerial functions exercised by 
government bureaus; establishment of a multi-tiered state asset management system; 
and the introduction of boards of directors and other modem governance mechanisms 
into corporatized firms. The success of the reforms in improving enterprise governance 
has been uneven: governance has improved most for SOE in competitive sectors and 
much less, if at all, for those in protected industries. Overall, the corporate governance 
mechanisms have not functioned nearly as effectively as was expected. This outcome is 
due largely to the fact that external discipline has remained weak; the state shareholder 
and regulatory functions have not been sufficiently separated in practice; and 
institutional and regulatory weaknesses prevent effective enforcement of the rights and 
obligations entailed in modem corporate governance mechanisms. 
Like other transition economies, China faces the major challenge of establishing 
effective corporate governance systems in its SOE to ensure that they are competitive 
and can adapt to the changing demands of the market. Establishing effective govemance 
of the SOE has become a key priority of China's current reform programme to set up a 
"modern enterprise system. " Authorities are developing modem governance systems to 
push SOE to restructure and reorient managerial incentives to engage in profit-oriented, 
value-augmenting activities, in line with the owner's interest. Strengthening corporate 
governance is seen as an urgent task as Chinese policy makers have come to realize the 
increasingly adverse impact of the weak governance and ensuing inefficiency of the 
SOE sector on macroeconomic performance and the health of the banking sector. The 
imperative has also become urgent in view of China's prospective accession to the WTO. 
To deal with the increased competition from WTO membership, China's enterprises 
need to improve their decision-making mechanisms to compete successfully in domestic 
and international markets. Adoption of corporate governance mechanisms in line with 
international practice is also essential to the ability of China's enterprises to attract 
foreign capital in increasingly competitive global capital markets. 
Ensuring that SOE are effectively managed is the ultimate challenge of 
corporate governance reforms. The key question is how owners 
- 
the state 
- 
can provide 
managers with incentives to use the firms' assets efficiently and act in the owners' best 
interests. Establishing effective governance systems in the context of SOE, however, has 
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proven to be a difficult task throughout the world. International experience suggests that 
SOE usually suffer from the imposition of non-commercial objectives by the state, 
which hampers the ability of the enterprise managers to respond efficiently to market 
forces. SOE also tend to lack incentives and sanctions needed for good management 
found in private firms. This is primarily because the ambiguity of property rights 
associated with state ownership creates a situation where there is usually no clearly 
accountable representative of the state to monitor the performance of managers (Estrin 
1998; Pannier 1996). In transition economies, SOE reform is usually made all the more 
difficult by the lack of external disciplinary mechanisms to support internal governance 
practices, such as efficient financial markets, competitive product and factor markets, 
and developed legal and accounting frameworks and enforcement mechanisms (Lin 
2000). 
The governments in OECD countries as well as in other transition economies 
have used a range of measures to improve the governance of their SOE, with varying 
degrees of success. These measures include: corporatization and restructuring; 
bankruptcy and other exit measures; and privatization (Iskkander 1996). The approach 
taken in most other transition countries has been to transform SOE into non-state 
companies through massive privatization. The different approach being taken by China 
is to force the SOE that will remain under state control to act more like private 
commercial firms through corporatization and the creation of governance structures to 
provide the incentives and disciplines that operate in private firms. Under this approach, 
the government is withdrawing from the management of enterprises while exercising its 
functions as owner and shareholder through separate entities created for those purposes. 
3.4.1. Reform Measures to Improve Corporate Governance of SOE 
Since the launching of the economic reforms, the Chinese government has 
attempted to improve the governance of SOE by introducing market-oriented incentives 
and disciplines. The earlier reforms introduced in the 1980s cantered on expanding 
managerial autonomy and incentives through contracts between managers and 
government supervisory agencies. In particular, the Contract Responsibility System 
provided greater material incentives for managers and workers by tying management 
autonomy, pay, and retained profits to the performance of SOE. 71 Control over SOE was 
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decentralized, with all but 2,000-3,000 of the 118,000 SOE placed under the supervision 
of provincial and local governments instead of under the central government. 
These earlier experiments led to considerable success in increasing productivity, 
but they also produced new, and initially unanticipated, problems. These problems arose 
because the reforms significantly increased the autonomy and control rights of insiders 
without adequately strengthening the oversight functions of the state/owners. On the one 
hand, reform measures centred on the use of incentive contracts were successful in 
improving the efficiency of SOE by motivating managers and workers to make and 
keep profits (Groves et al 1994). However, they also hindered longer-term enterprise 
performance by creating conditions for moral hazard, where managers and workers 
could make small gains at a large cost to the firm or to the economy by passing losses 
and liabilities to the state (Broadman and Xiao 1997). The rent-seeking behaviour of 
insiders led to such widely observed phenomena as speculative or uneconomic 
investments, asset stripping, diversion of enterprise funds to the insiders/managers, and 
excessive wage increases. At the same time, the decentralization of reforms led to the 
reduction in the ability of the central ministries to supervise the firms. The oversight 
ability of the government was substantially undermined because information necessary 
for monitoring could be distorted by insiders through a variety of means, such as false 
reporting of profits or soft loans to augment poor cash-flow. The decentralization of 
reforms also aggravated the problem of government intervention in day-to-day 
enterprise operations by creating additional layers of local agencies. The interference by 
numerous, uncoordinated government agencies (dubbed "mother-in-law") hindered the 
efficient decision-making of firms. The overall result of these conditions has often been 
characterized as "insider control under administrative intervention" (Zhang, 1998), 
Since the early 1990s, policy makers and academics in China have increasingly 
adopted the view that poor SOE performance and weak governance is attributable to the 
"unclear property rights" and "lack of separation between government and enterprises". 
In the subsequent SOE reform programme, a major focus has been given to clarify 
property rights through corporatization; and to separate government ownership and 
regulatory functions by establishing the state as a shareholder with functions similar to 
those performed by private shareholders in other countries. A second major focus is to 
transform SOE into commercially oriented corporations with effective internal and 
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external governance mechanisms. As discussed in Chapter IV, the shareholding of 
corporatized SOE is to be diversified through public listing in the stock exchanges, 
although the extent to which non-state shareholding in large SOE will be allowed is not 
yet clear. These reforms are intended to clarify property rights of SOE; delineate the 
roles of the state and the enterprises more clearly; and clarify and enforce the rights and 
responsibilities of the various actors participating in corporate governance. 
Separating state shareholder function from regulatory functions 
One of the major objectives of China's state shareholding reform is to separate 
the state's ownership/shareholder function from its regulatory functions by creating 
distinct agencies to manage state assets according to commercial principles. 
Accordingly, line ministries or departments that were responsible for SOE in the past 
are to be phased out so as to terminate their managerial functions in the enterprises. The 
rationale is that the government must delegate its ownership responsibilities if SOE are 
to have effective management and the internal governance mechanisms are to function 
effectively. 
The reform of the state asset management system has created a multi-tiered 
network of institutions at the national, provincial, and municipal government levels to 
oversee and manage state assets. At the national level, the State Council acts as the 
ultimate owner of SOE assets on behalf of the Chinese people, with the National 
Administrative Bureau of State-Owned Property (NABSOP) acting as its administrative 
arm. At the provincial and municipal levels, State Asset Management Committees 
(SAMC) serve as similar upper-level bodies that are responsible for preserving and 
increasing the value of state assets. 73 Each SAMC oversees a number of state holding 
(sometimes called state asset management) companies (SHC) that manage the assets of 
SOE entrusted to their responsibility. In the case of large enterprise groups, their lead 
companies have been authorized to carry out the functions of SAMC and SHC for their 
constituent firms. 
Under the division of labour established by these reforms, SHC are responsible 
for the management of the state assets and exercise of the state's ownership rights, but 
are accountable to the SAMC. 
In most cases, the SHC have been constituted by transforming the traditional 
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industry line government bureaus. The SHC have diverse ownership stakes in the 
companies under them, ranging from wholly owned to non-controlling interests in some 
joint-stock limited companies. Each individual SOE manages its own operations and is 
responsible for its own profits and losses. But they are subject to the ultimate control of 
the SHC, which have the legal claims to the returns on their shares in the SOE and bear 
limited responsibility for their enterprises' debts. SHC can also acquire shares of 
companies outside the group, including those affiliated with other SHC; in principle, 
this allows them to engage in restructuring through mergers and acquisitions with 
outside firms. 
A parallel restructuring of the central government administration has 
complemented the new state asset management system. A major step in this regard was 
the reduction of central government ministries from 40 to 29 during the latter half of 
1998. The primary rational of this restructuring was to eliminate most remaining 
industrial branch ministries in order to terminate their managerial functions in SOE. 
Economic ministries have been ordered to sever administrative ties with SOE and to 
maintain an arms-length relationship with their former affiliates. The central 
government has announced that this transformation will be carried out at the provincial 
and local levels during 2000. 
Introducing internal governance mechanisms 
Another major objective of the current reform is to strengthen internal incentives 
and monitoring mechanisms in shareholding firms by introducing modem corporate 
governance mechanisms into corporatized firms. The Chinese Company Law prescribes 
a system of corporate governance through three main bodies for joint stock limited 
companies (JSC): the shareholders' general meeting; the board of directors; and the 
board of supervisors. These internal governance mechanisms are intended to ensure 
effective corporate governance through the accountability of management to the board 
and shareholders; supervision and oversight of the board of directors and senior 
management by the supervisory board; and the accountability of the directors to the 
shareholders. The inspiration for the Company Law came largely from the civil law 
tradition of continental Europe, Germany in particular, and from Japan (Lin, 2000). As 
in Germany, the shareholders' meeting in China in principle has much broader power 
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than in Anglo-Saxon countries. Like the German corporate model, China's corporate 
governance system requires employee representation on the supervisory board. 
Mandatory employee representation on the supervisory board reflects China's 
stakeholder orientation toward corporate governance, which is consistent with the 
traditional role of SOE in China and the continued emphasis on an economy with 
"socialist characteristics". 
Efforts are also being made to introduce measures to strengthen managerial 
incentives for effective performance in corporatized SOE, although most of them are 
still on an experimental basis. Market-oriented behaviour of managers in China has 
been hampered by the lack of market-based selection of managers and weak managerial 
incentives. The market-based selection of managers has been constrained by the 
political and bureaucratic influence in the selection process as well as by the 
underdeveloped labour market for managers in China. Managers of state-owned or 
state-controlled companies also generally have weak material incentives due in part to 
the limited scope of performance-related compensation schemes for individual 
managers. To address these problems, the government has sought to encourage 
competition and other marked-based procedures in the selection of managers. The 
government has introduced, on an experimental basis, stock options as well as other 
remuneration packages more closely tied to company performance for managers and top 
executives of shareholding companies. It has also sought to improve training of SOE 
managers and to promote adoption of modern business techniques used in private firms. 
New training programmes for SOE managers have been set up in various localities; 
sometimes managers have been sent overseas to learn modern business techniques. 
3.4.2. Weaknesses in the Corporate Governance Reforms in China 
Overall, the reforms to improve corporate governance of large SOE in China 
have sought to establish the mechanisms that have been shown to be essential for 
efficient corporate governance of large firms in advanced market economies. In theory 
these reform measures were expected to improve the corporate governance practices of 
China's SOE. However, the general perception in China as well as available evidence 
seem to suggest that these reforms have not resulted in any appreciable improvement in 
the actual practices of corporate governance in either SOE or listed JSC, In fact, the 
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those of other transition economies, have inherited a number of policy burdens as 
legacies of pre-reform policies. These include: state mandates to operate in capital- 
intensive industries; distorted output prices; pension burdens and other social welfare 
costs; and the inability to reduce redundant workers for the sake of social stability (Lin, 
2000). In theory, the state should be responsible only for the SOE losses that arise from 
the policy burdens, not for those arising from the SOE's own operational inefficiencies. 
However, in practice, it is very difficult for the state to distinguish between these two. 
As a result, the managers can always ascribe their losses to the state's policies, not to 
their incompetence or opportunistic behaviour. Consequently, the state ends up taking 
responsibility for all the SOE's losses through direct subsidies or policy lending through 
banks. The poorly performing large SOE have been repeatedly bailed out by the state- 
owned banking system through policy lending and thus have not faced any real threat of 
bankruptcy or other exit measures. As a result, soft budget constraints, the absence of 
exit mechanisms and monopolistic rents have created especially large opportunities for 
rent-seeking by managers and government agencies. As long as these external 
disciplines remain weak, rent-seeking does not clearly affect the bottom line of firm. 
Continued state dominance in ownership, control and governance 
Second, the creation of mechanisms to separate government ownership and 
regulatory functions and to reduce government interference in SOE has not 
fundamentally changed the essential nature of the ownership and control by the state. 
Rather it has largely involved a shift of formal control rights from a single controlling 
(state) authority to a small number of alternative government institutions such as the 
SHC (Lin, 2000). The resulting control structure does not represent a clear improvement 
in the governance of SOE, in that the fundamental problem of multiple principles with 
insufficient incentives or ability to act as true owners in SOE governance has not been 
resolved; moreover, the multiple state institutions which now control the Chinese 
corporations are ones that suffer from weak corporate governance themselves. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the newly established SHC, which in principle 
should operate as commercial entities, continue to be more bureaucratically, rather than 
commercially, oriented. They tend to be heavily influenced by their upper-level agencies, 
state asset management committees (SAMC), which continue to function like 
government administrative departments. The predominant method of creating holding 
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process of corporatization since the early 1990s has been correlated with a significant 
deterioration in the performance of China's corporate sector (Lin, 2000). There is 
anecdotal evidence at the firm level that corporatization and public listing have tended 
to be viewed mainly as an inexpensive way to raise capital in the equity markets, 
involving at best limited obligations to improve corporate governance in the interests of 
shareholders (Steinfeld 1998). 
The reasons underlying the continued weak corporate governance practices in 
China in spite of the reform measures are complex. But three main factors have been 
especially important. 
Weak external discipline 
First, the reform measures so far have put a major emphasis on delegating 
control rights and autonomy to managers and local governments, but have failed to 
impose strict external discipline or constraints on the main players involved in the 
corporate governance of large SOE. International experience in SOE reform suggests 
that the success of corporate governance reforms, regardless of the particular approach 
being taken, is only ensured when effective external disciplinary mechanisms are 
available to reinforce the internal corporate governance mechanisms (Iskander, 1996). 
Even without changing ownership, SOE can be forced to significantly improve their 
performance when strict financial discipline is imposed, as shown by New Zealand's 
experience. In China also the effectiveness of corporate governance has been shown to 
vary greatly across sectors according to their degree of product market competition and 
exposure to financial discipline. In particular, growing competition from non-state 
enterprises has been most instrumental in inducing market-oriented behaviours and 
improving profitability of the SOE located in the competitive sectors (Naughton, 1994; 
Jefferson and Rawski 1994). Evidence suggests that managers and the boards of these 
firms tend to be most responsive to external market forces and most effective in meeting 
their demands (Richet and Huchet 1999). In contrast, the economic behaviour of the 
large SOE or state-shareholding firms operating in the protected sectors 
- 
which largely 
comprise the "strategic" core - has been most resistant to the changes brought by 
various reform measures. 
Large SOE in the core sectors have continued to enjoy state support in various 
forms, which partly results from the policy burdens imposed on them. China's SOE, as 
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structures along industry lines further contributes to their bureaucratic orientation and 
tends to mix regulatory and commercial objectives. In particular, the SHC have been 
used to implement government-led restructuring of enterprises and workforce 
reductions in the industrial sectors for which they were previously responsible. 
Even if these problems could be overcome, the international experience in many 
OECD as well as non-OECD countries has shown that the intended benefits of the 
public sector holding companies tend to be outweighed by their drawbacks. A range of 
additional difficulties have been associated with public sector holding companies in 
these countries. As in China, such holding companies tend to impose an additional layer 
of bureaucracy when the upper-tier institution is not effectively separated from the 
regulatory function of the state. Non-economic objectives frequently govern the 
functioning of state-owned holding companies, to the detriment of the commercial 
principles they are supposed to promote. Public sector holding companies formed along 
industry lines have often created obstacles to the development of competitive markets. 
In practice, public sector holding companies have proved effective only for: managing 
the largest natural monopolies and some strategic enterprises; or in specialized services 
such as corporate restructuring, dealing with financial crisis and managing bailouts, and 
preparation for subsequent commercialization and/or privatization (Baumann 1998). 
At the same time, despite the reform objective of separating the government 
from enterprise management, the political/bureaucratic intervention by the state in the 
internal management of the SOE has continued. In particular, government involvement 
in the selection of senior management in large SOE is most problematic. The selection 
of managers continues to be heavily influenced by political and bureaucratic 
considerations, with various government authorities and their personnel departments 
influencing the appointment of senior managers (Steinfeld, 1998; Zhang, 1998). In the 
corporatized firms, the general manager tends to be pre-selected by the dominant or 
controlling shareholder, despite the statutory requirement that they should be appointed 
by the board of directors. 
Ineffectual role of internal governance mechanisms 
Third, the internal governance mechanisms introduced under the Company Law, 
such as the two-tier board structure, are potentially powerful mechanisms conducive to 
good corporate governance within the firm. However, in practice, the board structure 
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does not appear to function as effectively as initially expected because it lacks several 
necessary checks and balances. First, the supervisory board in China tends to have very 
little power and independence to carry out its intended oversight functions. In the 
German model, the supervisory board appoints the board of directors, whereas under 
China's Company Law, they are appointed by the shareholders' meeting. Hence in 
China, the board of directors is directly accountable to the shareholders' meeting, rather 
than to the supervisory board as is the case in Germany. In addition, the supervisory 
boards in China are largely chosen by and subject to the controlling shareholder and do 
not effectively represent minority shareholders or other stakeholders. In fact, the 
members of the supervisory board have often come from retired company officials (Lin, 
2000). 
The effective control of corporatized firms tends to be concentrated in the hands 
of the general manager acting on behalf of a single majority or controlling shareholder 
(the state). Despite the statutory requirements, there is in practice little effective 
accountability of senior management to directors that are genuinely independent. The 
roles of the chairman of the board and the general manager are often combined; and the 
board is dominated by executive directors who have managerial responsibilities. The 
appointment of the general manager and other members of the board are largely 
dominated by the controlling shareholder. As a result, the board of directors is neither 
independent from management nor accountable to minority shareholders. This limits its 
ability to provide effective, independent monitoring of management in the interests of 
all the share and stake-holders. 
The lack of independence of the supervisory board as well as the board of 
directors from insiders, and hence their ineffectual roles in China's corporate 
governance, suggest that there is a large room for improvement by clarifying and 
reinforcing the functions and responsibilities of the boards and other statutory 
arrangements in the Company Law. Both international experience and the corporate 
governance literature suggest that the role of the boards can be substantially 
strengthened by appointing a sufficient number of independent, outside directors. For 
example, the Cadbury Codes of the UK recommend at least three non-executive 
directors in the board. The OECD Principles also recommend that boards assign a 
sufficient number of non-executive members capable of exercising independent 
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judgment to tasks where there is a potential for conflict of interest. 23 Effective oversight 
by boards also requires improved transparency and timely disclosure of financial 
information of the companies. 
In developing and transition economies like China, the market and legal 
institutions and processes, which support good corporate governance practices in 
developed market economies, are relatively absent. China has made much progress in 
developing the legal and regulatory framework that supports its transition to the market 
economy. Critical legislation enacted recently includes: Company Law (1993), Central 
and Commercial Banking Laws (1995) and the Securities Law (1998) The government 
has also been paying more attention to strengthening the regulations concerning 
accounting and disclosure standards. Nonetheless, the institutional and regulatory 
mechanisms that are necessary for ensuring good corporate governance practices are 
still relatively underdeveloped, which prevents effective enforcement of the rights and 
obligations entailed in modern corporate governance mechanisms. Thus, the challenge 
is not only to design and develop the legal and regulatory framework but also to ensure 
that the laws and regulations have the intended impact on the day-to-day decisions of 
economic actors. Establishing "rule of law" 
- 
rather than "rule by law" or "rule of man" 
- 
is another critical challenge facing China's enterprise reforms. 
3.5. Mitigating the Social Impact of Restructuring: Social Security Reform 
3.5.1. Social Impact of Enterprise Restructuring 
The main concern in implementing enterprise privatization and restructuring is 
the social impact in terms of social service provision, unemployment, and social security. 
These concerns have been limiting the speed, scope, and quality of enterprise reform. 
Three key social dimensions need to be addressed in enterprise restructuring: (a) 
Enterprise social burdens would be reduced, and social service provision enhanced, 
through assistance to the transfer of social assets from state industrial enterprises to non- 
state operators or municipalities. (b) Unemployment would be addressed through 
strengthened retraining of labour for service sectors, and for the creation of micro and 
23 OECD Corporate Governance Principles 1999 
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small enterprises. (c) The funding of social security liabilities by enterprises would be 
facilitated by better using the value of enterprise excess assets. 
Employment is typically a serious issue in restructuring SOEs. Inefficiency of 
SOEs is partly blamed for lifelong employment policy and lack of well-functioning 
labour market under a central-planned economy. Therefore, one of major purposes of 
restructuring is to eliminate redundant workforce and improve productivity and 
efficiency. For example, 435 large and medium-sized money-loss enterprises were 
closed down in 1998, and 32,000 small mines, 70 small oil refineries and 5,600 small 
petroleum plants were shutdown by the end of 1999. Some 4.1 million workers had 
been laid off in SOEs along with 2 million or so from non-state enterprises by the end of 
2002. The re-employment rate for laid off in SOEs slid from 42% in 1999 to 36% in 
2000, and 30% in 2001. The registered jobless in cities reached 7.1 million, or 4% of 
overall labour force by the end of 2002 (Xie 2003) 
Redundancies and lay-offs arising out restructuring process have eroded the state 
workers contract of the iron rice-bowl. This has resulted in growing and sometimes 
violent labour unrest. The last decade has seen widespread redundancies in urban China 
Appleton et al (2002) estimate in their survey of 13 cities in 1999/2000 that 11 % of 
urban workers had been retrenched since 1992. Appleton et al also claim that the 
redundancies have no doubt contributed to an improvement in the efficiency of state 
enterprises. However, there have been costs, at least in the short term, and there have 
been bome unevenly. Some of the redundancy criteria are consistent with efficiency 
objectives, but others look to be discriminatory. Redundant workers generally suffer a 
long and uncertain period of unemployment and bear a heavy loss of income; and 
possession of certain characteristics-not all of them related to efficiency- appears to 
impede reemployment. The subsequent outcome of the labour retrenchment has been 
labour unrest across the country. 
Labour unrest in China since 1997 has shown that workers are not given 
advance notice of job losses or eased through a transitional period before actually being 
thrown out of work, the mood of acceptance which seems still to prevail among many 
employees of large SOEs can quickly shift to one of angry protest. The lack of 
communication with employees over the fate of loss making SOEs and the taking of 
crucial decision behind closed doors seem to be key factors causing these protests to 
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escalate rapidly from the sending of delegations to officials to street demonstration s 
and sit-ins. 
In addition to meeting the needs of China's ageing population, social security 
reforms are necessary to reduce financial burdens on enterprises and to provide a social 
safety net to deal with the human consequences of economic reform and industrial 
restructuring. Labour redeployment centres are the key instrument being used in the 
near term to support workers laid off from SOE and to assist them in finding new jobs. 
However, their scope has been limited by the scarcity of government revenues needed 
for their support; and their success in finding jobs for workers has been mixed. 
Key priorities over the longer term are to extend unemployment insurance to 
improve labour market performance; to improve the distribution of medical care costs 
among workers, government, and enterprises; and to reform pension programmes. 
Current reforms are confined mainly to urban areas but extension of some programmes 
to rural areas is planned to begin in the next five - year plan. Over the longer term, the 
reforms will ultimately involve substantial further burdens on public finances and are 
likely to require changes in tax policies. 
The traditional social welfare system prevailing in China since the early 1950s 
has guaranteed SOE workers a full range of social benefits including: lifetime 
employment; pensions; and health care. Many SOE have provided social services, such 
as education and housing, which in other countries are provided by local governments 
or the workers themselves. During the pre-reform period, these benefits were partly 
borne by employees in the form of low nominal wages (i. e. below their marginal 
product) while the rest were paid for by fiscal appropriations from the government. 
Under the enterprise management reforms instituted at the beginning of the 
1980s, SOE became responsible for these social welfare programmes but their scope 
remained largely as before. Direct contributions by employees to the programmes were 
minimal. The programmes continued to be administered by each individual enterprise, 
subject to government mandated standards, rather than incorporated into provincial or 
nation-wide schemes. Non-state enterprises, including township and village enterprises, 
were not required to provide comparable benefits and there has been no formal social 
welfare or safety net programme for the rural population. Benefits provided by SOE 
typically are not portable; nor has there been any unemployment insurance until very 
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recently. 
This antiquated social welfare system has become an increasing impediment to 
modernization of China's enterprise sectors in several ways. The system imposes benefit 
expenses on SOE that are relatively high on average and unevenly distributed (Table 3- 
11). Total outlays by SOE for social benefits (excluding the new unemployment 
insurance programme) have averaged around 30 per cent of their payrolls, but are 50 per 
cent or higher in the most heavily burdened cases. 107 These burdens have increased over 
time as the ratio of retired to active employees has risen with the ageing of the 
population. 
Table 3- 11 Average social benefit expenses of SOE 
Proportion of total payroll (per cent) 
Medical care 5.5 
Pensions 20.0' 
Worker's compensation 0.5 
Housing 5.0 
Unemployment insurance 3.0 
Total 1 34.0 
I. the statutory responsibility of enterprises. In practice, the proportion is often higher. 
Source: Figures are based on estimates given in interviews with Chinese officials. The data are approximate 
averages and vary significantly among enterprises. 
Apart from the direct effects on SOE, the system has also led to some broader 
problems. As indicated in Section 3.4, limits on social safety net facilities have not 
infrequently blocked efforts to reduce excess SOE workers and impeded M&A and 
other restructuring as well as bankruptcy. The lack of unemployment insurance and 
portability in benefits limit labour mobility. As in other countries, the provision of 
medical benefits at no cost to beneficiaries encourages their over-use and inefficiency in 
their provision. 
Reforms of social benefit programmes have been actively underway in China 
since the early 1990s. The reforms have focused on unemployment insurance, health, 
and pension systems and are directed nearly entirely at urban workers and residents. A 
major reform to reduce SOE burdens for worker housing was scheduled to begin in 
1998 but was postponed and no new date has been set. 108 Current policies are focused 
on urban areas but creation of a nation-wide social benefit system that would include 
rural areas is a longer-term goal. 
3.5.2. Reforms to Deal with Lay-offs and Redundant Workers 
The official rate of urban registered unemployment in China has been increasing 
since 1992 and reached 4.3 per cent during 2002-2003. However, this figure is 
acknowledged to seriously understate the true level of urban unemployment since lay- 
offs ("xiagang") workers resulting from SOE downsizing typically are not registered as 
unemployed. Estimates suggest that including these lay-offs would raise China's urban 
unemployment to more than ten per cent, and quite possibly as high as fifteen per cent. 
The number of unemployed workers is expected to swell further in the year 2000 
as Chinese companies shed staff to increase efficiency in preparation for the stiffer 
competition that WTO membership is expected to bring. Eleven million new workers 
will enter the urban work force in 2000. At least 4 to 5 million additional workers are 
likely to be laid off from SOE, urban collectives, military industries, and the civil 
service. Prospects for finding jobs for these workers are not good. Given their financial 
difficulties, urban collectives and SOE 
- 
even those without surplus labour 
- 
are 
unlikely to have much capacity to increase their employment. Increases in productivity 
have reduced the demand for the number of workers needed in many professions. "' At 
recent trends, only about 6 million new urban jobs are likely to be created - less than 
half the total needed. 
Mechanisms to provide lay-offs with basic living expenses for a transition 
period and to assist in finding new jobs are thus vital if SOE restructuring is to proceed. 
The existing strategy for accomplishing these objectives relies heavily on the 
"reemployment centres" (REC) discussed below. However, these centres are essentially 
a transitional arrangement. Under current plans, the centres have been phased out by the 
end of 2002 and replaced by the unemployment insurance arrangements that are now in 
the process of being developed. 
Re-employment centres 
REC were established to facilitate the large-scale exit of surplus workers from 
SOE and to better allocate the burden for their support among enterprises and local 
governments. 112 Before their emergence, local governments were solely responsible for 
providing living support to displaced workers and for assisting them in finding new jobs. 
This assistance was provided through re-employment agencies jointly managed by local 
government labour and finance bureaus and by trade unions. Funding for these re- 
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employment agencies came mainly from local budgets, unemployment insurance funds, 
and social donations. However since funding was quite limited, permitted lay-offs were 
few and the cost of most surplus workers continued to be borne by the enterprises 
themselves. 
The first REC was established by Shanghai Textile Holding Company (the 
former Shanghai Textile Bureau) as a pilot project in July 1996. The arrangements were 
subsequently expanded to other cities and regions and their use throughout the nation 
was mandated in the summer of 1998. REC typically are created and administered by 
local governments. Their functions are threefold: provision of a basic living allowance, 
re-training, and assistance in locating new jobs. Workers are allowed to stay with the 
REC for a maximum of three years; those who fail to find new jobs within this period 
are transferred into the unemployment insurance network. Access to REC has so far 
been limited to workers laid-off from SOE (workers transferred to subsidiaries or 
auxiliary units of SOE are not eligible). Financing for the centres is supposed to be 
shared on an equal basis by the SOE, local governments, and local social insurance 
funds. 
According to figures compiled by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 
11.9 million workers were in reemployment centres for at least part of 1999. In Hubei 
province alone, 7,492 RECs had been set up and were supporting about 350,000 former 
SOE workers (80 per cent of them from industrial SOE); a further 300,000 newly lay- 
offs are expected to enter the centres in 2000. 
The overall record of the REC has been somewhat mixed. Nearly half of laid off 
workers have come from enterprises or localities that have insufficient financial 
resources to fully support the centres. In the worst cases, lay-offs have received virtually 
none of the basic income support to which they are theoretically entitled. Profitable 
SOE have often borne considerably more than one-third of the expenses of REC. Local 
governments have often required these firms to finance all or most of the expenses of 
their workers in the REC. 115 Abuses have also occurred, with many workers reported to 
have taken unreported jobs while remaining on the centres' rolls. 
On the key criterion, the location of new jobs, the performance has been better. 
More than half of the workers that have entered the centres are reported to have since 
found new jobs; official figures indicate that 4.5 million laid-off SOE workers found 
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new positions in 1999 alone. In Shanghai, 92 per cent of 1 million laid-off have found 
new jobs in the past three years. Not surprisingly, progress has been less in slower 
growing regions: in Hubei province only 30 per cent of the workers in REC managed to 
find new jobs in 1998. However, the overall record seems good considering the rising 
unemployment rate and falling employment growth in urban areas over the past several 
years. The majority of the new jobs have been in service industries, and a large fraction 
has come from private firms. The role of the REC in these placements, as well as their 
effectiveness in retraining workers, has been questioned, since a large proportion, and 
perhaps most, of the jobs seem to have been found through friends or relatives. 
Nevertheless, the ability of local labour markets to absorb a relatively high fraction of 
the lay-offs has been critical to allowing SOE to continue to shed substantial amounts of 
their surplus workers. 
Unemployment insurance 
The unemployment insurance system was first established in China in the mid- 
1980s to ensure that urban unemployed workers had a basic living allowance. The 
system is now being expanded and reformed with the ultimate goals of providing 
interim support for all unemployed workers, relaxing constraints on enterprises' ability 
to adjust their labour forces, and improving labour market integration and labour 
mobility. While now confined to urban areas, extension of unemployment insurance 
coverage to rural areas is envisaged to begin in the next five-year plan beginning in 
2001. 
Nearly half of China's urban workers were registered with the system by the end 
of September 1999. Registered workers who become unemployed are eligible to receive 
basic living subsidies for up to two years; in the first year, the subsidy level equals that 
given to workers in the REC, but the subsidy is reduced by 50 per cent in the second 
year. 
Under the new unemployment insurance regulation that came into effect on I 
November 1999, coverage has been extended to all urban workers including those in 
private enterprises, self-employed workers and contract rural workers. Required 
contributions are 3 per cent of wage payments, of which two-thirds is paid by the 
enterprise and the remainder is paid by the worker through a payroll deduction. 
Unemployed workers who have received subsidies for two years, and workers 
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who have been in REC for three years, are transferred into the more general welfare 
programme providing a minimum allowance for living expenses that is available in 
principle to all urban residents. In 1999 this programme, which is funded from local 
government budgets, was functional in 668 cities and 1,689 counties. The amount of the 
allowance varies by region, according to their cost-of-living. 
3.5.3. Health and Pension System Reforms 
Reform of health and pension programmes is essential not only to reduce current 
burdens on enterprises but also to meet the needs of China's rapidly ageing society. As 
with unemployment insurance, health and pension programmes are now largely 
confined to urban workers and residents. 
Health care 
For most of the reform period, SOE have been fully responsible for the medical 
costs of their employees. Initially, SOE were compensated for these expenses by 
government appropriations. However under the management reforms instituted in the 
mid-1980s, SOE became responsible for their own expenses and profitability. 
Government reimbursement for medical care was withdrawn in principle, although in 
practice the government continued to provide funding for SOE unable to meet the 
expenses on their own. Medical care responsibilities have led to steadily rising costs in 
relation to payrolls in a manner quite familiar in many OECD countries. As in the 
OECD, the costs have been aggravated by the limited incentives to economize on health 
care services that are largely provided to workers without explicit charge to themselves. 
The heavy burden of health care costs has become one of the constraining factors on the 
economic performance of SOE. As with pensions, health care burdens vary considerably 
among SOE, and even more between SOE and non-state enterprises, as well as across 
regions. Disparities in health care coverage as well as the lack of portability of benefits 
have discouraged labour mobility. 
Pilot programmes to unify the management of medical funds under local 
governments were carried out in certain cities in the beginning of 1990s. The unification 
diminished to a certain extent disparities in health care burdens among SOE. But it did 
not drastically reduce the overall burden on SOE, nor did it address the gap in burdens 
between SOE and other enterprises. 
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In November 1993, a new health reform plan was instituted, with the objective 
of reducing financial burdens on SOE and increasing the responsibility of workers for 
the cost of their health care. The plan creates a two-tier system of benefits comprising 
individual medical accounts and a community wide pool ("unified" account). Workers 
contribute 2 per cent of their salaries through payroll deductions to the individual 
accounts. Enterprises contribute a further 6 per cent of salaries, 30 per cent of which 
goes into the individual accounts and the remainder into the unified account. Medical 
expenses are paid in the first instance from the individual medical accounts. Once the 
account is exhausted, a worker is normally responsible for paying any additional 
medical expenses. "" 
Implementation of the reforms is still at an early stage: by 1999,24 of China's 
41 provinces had established reformed medical insurance programmes. Partly because 
of the early stage of the reforms but also because of rapidly rising medical care costs, 
there has as yet been little if any reduction in SOE burdens for medical care. The 
reforms represent a very initial and limited step toward improving incentives to 
economize on health care provision. Although workers now contribute a modest amount 
out of their own payroll, choices among plans, co-payments for specific treatments, and 
other provisions that have been needed to improve incentives elsewhere do not yet exist. 
Pension reforms 
China's demographics alone pose a formidable problem for its pension 
programmes. The proportion of the population above the age of sixty is expected to 
increase by nearly fifty per cent over the next 10 years, to reach 10 per cent by 2010.24 
Public pension plans, which presently cover SOE workers together with government 
employees and the military, are virtually entirely pay-as-you-go. Pension burdens vary 
markedly: the average ratio of retirees to current workers is nearly 2 to 1 for SOE 
established during the 1950s versus half that ratio for enterprises established in the 
1970s or later. The divergence in pension obligations is the major source of the 
discrepancies in overall SOE social welfare expenses. A large and growing number of 
SOE are financially unable to meet their pension obligations. 
24 OECD(1998), "OECD Labor/Management Programme: Policy Implications of Ageing 
Societies", OECD Working Papers No. 21; "Maintaining Prosperity in an Ageing Society". 
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Since 1993, authorities have been instituting major pension reforms in order to 
achieve three basic objectives. The first is to provide more sustainable funding 
mechanisms to meet current needs and especially to deal with the rapid projected rise in 
outlays in the future. The second objective is to reduce overall SOE pension burdens as 
well as the divergences in these burdens among enterprises. The third objective is to 
extend the coverage of pension programmes to the non-state sector, in part to level the 
competitive playing field among various types of enterprises and to improve labour 
mobility. 
Policies to address these problems began in 1993 with the establishment of 
individual pension accounts. The system that has since emerged is based on three 
"pillars". The first is a basic defined-benefit plan financed by contributions proportional 
to a worker's salary. The second is an individual pension account financed by 
(compulsory) contributions from workers; while the third is a voluntary supplementary 
plan financed by individual firms or insurance policies purchased by workers. In 1997, 
the three elements were integrated and the separate funds were unified and placed under 
the management of agencies of the provincial and local governments. Contributions 
were standardized at 13 per cent of salary for the basic benefit (currently being paid by 
enterprises); with a further employee contribution of 11 per cent of salary paid into the 
individual pension accounts. In principle, total contributions paid by the enterprise itself 
are supposed to be limited to 20 per cent of workers' salaries. 
By the end of June 1999, the new pension network had been expanded to cover 
110 million retirees, 26 million more than in 1998. Beginning in 1999, the coverage of 
pensions is being gradually extended to include the non-state sector. 
As yet, the pension reforms have not appreciably reduced financial burdens on 
SOE as a whole. This is partly because the social pooling in the new arrangements 
applies mainly to new workers and so does not address the pensions due to current 
retirees. Burdens have been shifted somewhat, but mainly from loss-making and low 
profit SOE that are unable to meet their obligations to more profitable SOE, which in 
some cases are required to pay more than the theoretical maximum of 20 per cent of 
salaries. 
Beyond the near term, the success of the pension reforms is limited by the poor 
financial conditions of the two main pillars, SOE and local governments. With the 
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deterioration of the financial situation of SOE, the collection rate of the social security 
fund has been decreasing. Moreover, local governments, particularly those in the less 
developed central and western areas, are often too financially strained to fully meet their 
obligations. The fall in payments from these sources has been only partly made up by 
additional contributions coming from non-state enterprises as coverage is expanded. 
Largely as a result, the deficit of the pension pools has been rising rapidly, and reached 
an estimated total of 100 billion yuan in 1999. 
The gap between pension obligations and the present and prospective resources 
available to meet them is growing. Expanded coverage, while it has alleviated the near- 
term squeeze on the funds, increases pension obligations over the longer term. 
Financing of the unfunded pension obligations solely through existing mechanisms 
would likely increase burdens on enterprises to untenable levels. 
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Chapter 4 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
In the preceding chapter, I developed and described alternative models of 
enterprise restructuring and relationships between CSR, corporate governance and firm 
performance. Drawing on the models and theories from the literature, in this Chapter, 
the theoretical framework and the hypotheses will be developed. In Section 4.1, the 
theoretical framework will be proposed based on the stakeholder theory, and Section 4.2 
describes the hypotheses with regard to relationships between corporate social 
performance (CSP) and financial performance (FP) during pre-and post-restsrcuturing. 
4.1. Theoretical Framework for Analysis 
Over the past years, research into the relationship between CSP and FP has been 
based on several theoretical arguments; three main different views or perspectives have 
dominated these discussions and research (Carroll & Buchholtz 2003). The perspective 
one is built on the belief that socially responsible firms are more financially profitable. 
To those who advocate the concept of social performance, it is apparent why they would 
like to think that social performance is a driver of financial performance and, ultimately, 
corporation's reputation. If it could be demonstrated that socially responsible firms, in 
general, are more financially successful and have better reputations, this would 
significantly bolster the CSP view, even in the eyes of its critics. Over the past two 
decades, the Perspective one has been studied extensively. Unfortunately, the findings 
of most of the studies that have sought to demonstrate this relationship have been either 
flawed in their methodology or inconclusive. Numerous studies have been done well, 
but even these have failed to produce conclusive results. In spite of this, some studies 
have claimed to have successfully established this linkage. 
Perspective two, which has not been studied as extensively, argues that a firm's 
financial performance is a driver of its social performance. This perspective is built 
somewhat on the notion that social responsibility is a "fair weather" concept; that is, 
when times are good and companies are enjoying financial success, we witness higher 
levels of social performance. In their study, Preston and O'Bannon found the strongest 
evidence that financial performance either precedes, or is contemporaneous with, social 
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performance. This evidence supports the view that social-financial performance 
correlations are best explained by positive synergies or by "available funding. " 
Perspective three argues that there is an interactive relationship among social 
performance, financial performance, and corporate reputation. In this symbiotic view, 
the three major factors influence each other, and, because they are so interrelated, it is 
not easy to identify which factor is driving the process. Regardless of the perspective 
taken, each view advocates a significant role for CSP, and it is expected that researchers 
will continue to explore these perspectives for years to come. 
Figure 4-1. Relationships among Corporate Social Performance (CSP), Corporate 
Financial Performance (CFP) and Corporate Reputation (CR) 
Perspective 1. CSP Drives the Relationship 
Good Corporate 
Social Performance 
<;; j Good Financial Good Corporate 
Performance Reputation 
......................................................................... 
............... 
Perspective 2. CFP Drives the Relationship 
............................... Good Financial 
Performance 
ý: 
LS<lff yj. 
.................................... .................. ......... 
................................................................................................... 
... ý.....,....,.. ý. M.,. ý,..... ý,. ý. 
...................................................................... 
Perspective 3. Interactive Relationships among CSP, CFP and CR 
Good Corporate 
Social Performance "ý<ý. 
Good Corporate.. Good Corporate 
Social Performance Reputation 
Good Financial 
Performance 
Good Corporate 
Reputation 
Source:. /9usiness & Society: Ethics and Stakeholder Management, " Carroll & Buchholtz 2003. 
Figure 4.1 depicts the essentials of each of these views. A basic premise of all 
these perspectives is that there is only one "bottom line" 
-a corporate bottom line that 
addresses primarily the stockholders', or owners', investments in the firm. An 
alternative view is that the firm has "multiple bottom lines" that benefit from corporate 
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social performance. This stakeholder-bottom-line perspective argues that the impacts or 
benefits of CSP cannot be fully measured or appreciated by considering only the impact 
of the firm's financial bottom line. 
To truly operate with a stakeholder perspective, companies need to accept the 
multiple-bottom-line view. Thus, CSP cannot be fully comprehended unless we also 
consider that its impacts on stakeholders, such as consumers, employees, the 
community, and other stakeholder groups, are noted, measured, and considered. 
Research may never conclusively demonstrate a relationship between CSP and financial 
performance. If a stakeholder perspective is taken, however, it may be more 
straightforward to assess the impact of CSP on multiple stakeholders' bottom lines. 
Figure 4- 2 Theoretical Framework for Analysis of CSR, SRR and Firm 
Performance 
.ýw,....,,...., . , wý.,.. ý,.,, ý,. FP is positively or negatively 
associated with SRR? 
Figure 4-2 presents the theoretical framework built on the multiple stakeholders' 
bottom lines. The theorectical framework follows the previous views in literature in 
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seeking to link firm performance and socially responsible performance to the four key 
factors such as enterprise restructuring, stakeholders, corporate governance, and 
corporate social responsibility. These four factors directly and indirectly interact with 
each other through stakeholder actions, and the joint forces of the factors influence the 
extent of the firm's performance. This framework is used to examine the relationship 
between socially responsible restructuring and firm's financial performance. 
Enterprise restructuring: Enterprise restructuring involves some substantial 
change in the organization, activities and relationships in which the enterprise is 
involved with the stakeholders, such as employees, shareholders, suppliers, government, 
customers, environment, etc. As reviewed in Chapter 2, restructuring is defined as the 
changes that state-owned enterprise has to undergo in order to emerge as equivalent to a 
private sector firm (Aghion et al 1997). It typically entails changes in internal 
organization such as the separation of core from non-core activities, the closure of 
unviable units and spin-off of social assets; labour shedding and the reform of the 
incentive structure for employees and managers; and the modernization of equipment. 
Restructuring takes many different forms, for example, portfolio restructuring, financial 
restructuring and organizational restructuring. Some forms of enterprise restructuring 
can promote sustainable and efficient economic development when a firm understakes 
restructuring programme in a socially responsible way, while other forms represent 
ways to resist change or to insulate the enterprise from economic challenges in a 
socially irresponsible way. For example, laid-off of workers may reflect a reactive 
reduction in scale of operations, while preserving employment levels may represent an 
effective internal reorganization of work. Thus, enterprise restructuring may cause 
negative or positive effects on stakeholders who are affected, and lead to socially 
irresponsible behaviour; or it may also lead to socially responsible behaviour, this 
depends on the restructuring practices which management might take to balance 
economic and social goals and take into consideration of the interests of various 
stakeholders and society as a whole. 
Stakeholder groups: As I described in Chapter 2.4, stakeholder theory (Freeman 
1984, Blair 1995) is becoming dominant corporate governance model in recent years. 
This model claims that the firm should serve wider interests of stakeholders rather than 
shareholders only. It is a core concept in this framework. On the one hand, gaining a 
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better understanding of the firm's performance and social responsibility, has been 
accounting for and managing the interests or "stakes" of key players inside and outside 
of the organization. Difference in and conflict among various stakeholders can have a 
dramatic effect on the ability of any organization to perform efficiently and in socially 
responsible way (Becker and Potter 2002). On the other, different stakeholders have 
different types and degrees of power such as voting power, economic power, and 
political power (Freeman 1984). Stockholders typically have an opportunity to vote on 
such major decisions as mergers, acquisitions, and other extraordinary issues. Through 
the exercise of informed, intelligent voting, they may influence firm policy so that their 
investment is protected and produces a healthy return. Customers, suppliers and retailers 
have a direct economic influence on the firm. Their power is economic in nature. 
Customer can choose to boycott products or an entire firm if they believe the goods to 
be too expensive, poorly made unsafe, or inappropriate for consumption. Suppliers can 
withhold supplies or refuse to fill orders if a firm fails to meet its contract responsibility. 
Government exercises political power through legislation, regulations or lawsuits. Other 
stakeholders also exercise political power, using their resources to pressure government 
to adopt new laws or regulations or to take legal action against a company. 
It's argued that stakeholder action is part of the mechanism linking social 
performance with FP, based on the assumption that for socially responsible 
(irrisponsible) behaviour to influence financial performance, stakeholder groups must be 
cognizant of the firm's behaviour, be willing to take action to influence the firm, and 
have the capability to do so. 
In this framework, the main stakeholders who can be affected by or influence the 
design, implementation, and outcomes of enterprise restructuring, include the 
shareholders, employees, government, customers, communities, business partners, and 
the general public. 
Corporate social responsibility: CSR is defined as companies integrate social 
and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with 
their stakeholders on a voluntary basis. CSR can result in a wide range of stakeholder 
reactions including political action, purchase decisions and investment decisions. 
Corporate stakeholder theory (Cornell and Shapiro 1987) suggests that a firm must 
satisfy not only stockholders and bondholders, but those with implicit claims. The 
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stakeholder theory contends that the value of a firm depend on the cost not only of 
explicit claims but also of implicit claims. If a firm does not act in a socially responsible 
manner, parties with implicit contracts concerning the social responsibility of the firm 
may attempt to transform those implicit agreements into explicit agreements that will be 
more costly to it. For example, if a firm fails to meet promises to government officials 
in regard to actions that affect the environment, government agencies may find it 
necessary to pass more stringent regulations, constituting explicit contracts, to force the 
firm to act in a socially responsible manner. Moreover, socially irresponsible actions 
may spill over to other implicit stakeholders, who may doubt whether the firm would 
honor their claims, thus, firm with an image of high corporate social responsibility may 
find that they have more low-cost implicit claims than other firms and thus have higher 
financial performance (Cornell and Shapiro 1987). 
Corporate governance: Corporate governance is defined as the process by 
which organizations are directed, controlled and held accountable, and requires 
balancing the interests of various stakeholders and society as a whole with the economic 
goals of the organizations. It involves a set of relationships between a company's 
management, its board, its shareholders and its stakeholders. It deals with the rights and 
responsibilities of a company's management, its board, shareholders and other 
stakeholders. CSP can be analyzed and evaluated more effectively by using a 
framework based on the management of a corporation's relationships with its 
stakeholders than by using models and methodologies based on concepts concerning 
corporate social responsibilities and responsiveness (Clarkson 1995). 
Good corporate governance should strive to protect different stakeholders of the 
firm against the need to give managers and controlling owner's excessive incentives and 
freedom to manoeuvre. The corporate governance literature increasingly recognizes that 
fairness of treatment, job satisfaction, high quality of work environment and particularly 
income and job security are important factors in generating investments in firm-specific 
capital by employees (Blair 1995; Kelly and Parkinson 1998; Slinger and Deakin 2000). 
Corporate governance is concerned with all of the dimensions of CSR identified above; 
it is the way that ethics is dealt with at the governance level. 
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4.2. Hypothesis Development 
The statistical hypothesis testing was employed to estimate whether a 
relationship on the cases studied suggests there is a relationship among the population 
from which the sample was drawn. This research hypothesis will address a directional 
issue, whether a relationship is positive or negative. 
4.2.1. Managers' Attitudes toward CSR and Socially Responsible Behaviours 
I start with the assumptions that the managers, whose attitudes are more in 
favour of CSR, can engage in a more socially responsible restructuring than those are 
against CSR. Katz (1960) has suggested that attitudes provide people with a framework 
within which to interpret the world and integrate new experiences. Ajzen and Fishbein 
(1977) further suggested that by understanding an individual's attitudes toward 
something, one could predict that individual's "overall pattern of responses" to the 
object. They argued that a single behaviour is determined by the intention to perform the 
behaviour in question. A person's intention is in turn a function of his attitude towards 
performing the behaviour. Therefore, not only will managerial values frame the issues 
evaluation process but they are also likely to directly shape the issues management 
process as well. 
Management's intentions as represented by their beliefs, attitudes, and desires, 
are primary motivators that influence organizational processes and ultimately are 
reflected in corporate programmes and policies. Wood's model (Wood 1991b) 
underscores individual or managerial intentions as the motivators of socially responsible 
behaviour, the management of stakeholder expectations as an integral part of the process, 
and an emphasis on programmes and policies as the primary outcomes of those 
processes. 
Whereas managerial intentions are presumed to drive behaviour, it is the 
manager's attitudes toward CSR that predispose action. Attitudes have always been 
assumed to be extremely important elements in social cognition. Defined as a broad 
disposition to respond positively or negatively to a stimulus (Fiske and Taylor 1991), 
attitudes predispose actions that are consistently favourable or unfavourable toward 
some object (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977). An Assessment of a manager's attitudes toward 
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to CSR, then, shall provide an indication of the manager's predisposition to respond in a 
particular way to CSR. Therefore, on the basis of the attitudes-behaviour theory, the 
hypothesis is developed to test the relationship between the manager's attitudes and his 
socially responsible behaviour. 
Hypothesis 1: The managers orientated towards social responsibility pay more 
attention to social issues arising from restructuring than other managers. 
4.2.2. Socially Responsible Restructuring and Firm's Performance 
The aim of the present study is to extend the previous research into relationships 
between CSR and financial performance by using the special Chinese case. The 
hypotheses with regard to socially responsible restructuring (SRR) and financial 
performance will be formulated based on the theoretical framework and arguments. 
Social Impact Hypothesis 
In the literature on CSR, the stakeholder theory (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987a) 
believes that favourable social performance, e. g. meeting the needs of various corporate 
stakeholders, will ultimately lead to favourable financial performance. ), and failure to 
meet the expectations of various non-shareholder constituencies will generate market 
fears, which, in turn, will increase a company's risk premium and ultimately result in 
higher costs and/or lost profit opportunities. According to their analysis, serving the 
implicit claims of major stakeholders (e. g., employees, and customers) enhances a 
company's reputation in a way that has positive impact on its financial performance; 
conversely, disappointing these groups may have negative financial impact. This "social 
impact" version of the stakeholder theory implies a lead-lag relationship between social 
and financial performance; external reputation (favourable or unfavourable) develops 
first, then financial results (favourable or unfavourable) follow. However, previous 
statistical tests of this hypothesis have not produced supportive results (McGuire, 
Sundgren, and Schneeweis 1988; Preston, Sapienza, and Miller 1991), in this study, I 
attempt to investigate the relationship socially responsible performance and firm 
financial performance in the context of enterprise restructuring in China. 
Hypothesis 2a: SRR is positively related to financial performance, higher 
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(lower) socially responsible performance leads to higher (lower) financial performance. 
Trade-off Hypothesis 
The trade-off hypothesis asserts that social performance is the independent 
variable and that social accomplishments involve financial costs. This hypothesis 
reflects the classic Friedman position and is supported by the well-known early finding 
of Vance (1975) that corporations displaying strong social credentials experience 
declining stock prices relative to the market average. More recently, the trade-off 
hypothesis has been carefully articulated by Aupperle et al (1985). They point out that 
socially responsive activities (e. g., charity, environmental protection, community 
development, etc. ) may siphon off capital and other resources from the firm, putting it at 
a relative disadvantage compared to firms that are less socially active. Hence, a firm's 
higher levels of social performance may lower its financial performance as compared to 
competitors and/or other norms. 
Hypothesis 2b: SRR is negatively related to financial performance, higher 
(lower) socially responsible performance leads to lower (higher) financial performance. 
Available Funds Hypothesis 
Another possibility is that social and financial performance are indeed 
positively associated, but that the causal or lead-lag relationship is from financial to 
social performance. Although firms may wish to follow the normative rules of good 
corporate citizenship at all times, their actual behaviour may depend on the resources 
available. Hence, profitability in one time period may increase a firm's ability to fund 
discretionary projects, including social performance projects. In the previous lead-lag 
studies, McGuire et al (1988) found a stronger positive relationship when financial 
performance was viewed as the leading variable, and their results were partially 
supported by Preston et al (1991). Kraft and Jerald Hage (1990) found that the 
availability of slack resources (i. e., previous profits), the values and goals of managers, 
strongly influenced the level of community service undertaken by corporations. I 
explore these lead-lag relationships in my third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2c: Financial performance is positively related to SRR, higher (lower) 
financial performance leads to higher (lower) socially responsible performance. 
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Managerial Opportunity Hypothesis 
It is argued in the literature that corporate managers may pursue their own 
private objectives, to the detriment of both shareholder and other stakeholders 
(Williamson 1967; Weidenbaum and Vogt 1987). Recent surveys support the view that 
top managers consider their own interests of primary importance, or second only to 
those of customers, in corporate decision making (Posner and Schmidt 1992; Alkafaji 
1989). The "managerial opportunism" hypothesis states that pursuit of private 
managerial goals, in the context of compensation schemes closely linked to short-term 
profit and stock price behaviour, might lead to a negative relationship between financial 
and social performance. The reason is that when financial performance is strong, 
managers may attempt to "cash in" by reducing social expenditures in order to take 
advantage of the opportunity to increase their own short-term private gains. Conversely, 
when financial performance weakens, managers may attempt to offset, and perhaps 
appear to justify, their disappointing results by engaging in conspicuous social programs. 
Hypothesis 2d: Financial performance is negatively related to SRR, higher 
(lower) financial performance leads to lower (higher) socially responsible performance. 
The hypothesis about relationship between the managers' attitudes towards CSR, 
and their behaviours in restructuring will be tested against the data collected by the 
structured management survey in 250 Chinese firms. The hypotheses about the 
relationship between socially responsible restructuring and firm performance will be 
examined against the data collected from 318 listed firms over seven years from 1997 
to 2003. 
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Chapter 5 Data and Methodology 
This Chapter presents the research methodology and data analysis for the study. 
In section 5.1, I will describe the methodology and research design including what 
reserch methods and why I use them in the study; Section 5.2 suggests the sampling 
strategy in the survey. Section 5.3 discusses the qualitative and quantitative data, and in 
Section 5.4,1 will present the data analysis techniques to interprete the collected data. 
5.1. Research Methodology 
According to Margolis and Walsh (2002), 122 published studies between 1971 
and 2001 empirically examined the relationship between CSR and financial 
performance (FP). Empirical studies of the relationship between CSR and FP comprise 
essentially two types. The first uses the event study methodology to assess the short-run 
financial impact (abnormal returns) when firms engage in either socially responsible or 
irresponsible acts. The second type of study examines the relationship between some 
measure of CSP and measures of long term financial performance, by using accounting 
or financial measures of profitability. 
This study employs the second type of methodology by using a combination of 
survey, financial statements, and articles on companies in the popular press, company 
reports, and other online database to assess CSP. The financial data were collected to 
investigate the change in firm's financial performance in pre- and post-restructuring of 
318 sampled listed firms over the 7 years (1997-2003). 
5.1.1. Research Design 
The research questions of this study address the phenomena of CSR, socially 
responsible restructuring and firm's performance and their relationships. Specifically, 
the study empirically examines the attitudes of the managers towards CSR, and whether 
their attitudes influence their behaviours in restructuring; investigates the relationship 
between socially responsible restructuring and firm's financial performance, and the 
case study of state-ownded defence industry. The three perspectives that the study 
examines are logically integrated. It is assumed that by understanding an individual's 
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attitudes toward something, we can predict that individual's overall pattern of response 
to the object. An assessment of a manager's attitude toward CSR may provide an 
indication of the manager's predisposition to respond in a particular way to CSR. Thus, 
different attitudes toward CSR (in faviour of or against) might result in the different 
behaviours (socially responsible or socially irresponsible actions), and different 
behaviours might lead to various firm's performance (higher or lower). By analyzing the 
case study, we can have comprehensive and deep insight into the CSR issues, and have 
a fuller understanding of the process of socially responsible restructuring in China. 
I employed two main models of data collection and strategies, i. e. the survey 
method and the case study. 
Survey Method 
In this study, the management survey was conducted in 250 sampled firms 
between 2003 and 2004. The objective is to investigate how the Chinese managers 
perceive CSR, and whether the socially responsible value-oriented managers undertake 
restructuring in a more socially responsible way. 
This survey is a cross-sectional study and stem from a random sample based on 
the whole population. I am interested in accurate assessment of characteristics of a 
whole population and from the samples I can infer the characteristics of the defined 
population. The survey was conducted by the structured questionnaires which was 
developed in 2003. The questionnaires was designed by drawing information from 
sources of CSR literature; SOE reforms, industry and government studies and surveys 
of ownership restructuring. The questionnaires were pre-tested in some of the Chinese 
enterprises in late 2003 to determine whether the questions are realistic, and could be 
generalized across firms, and are understandable in the general context of the overall 
study. Resultant comments and suggestions have been incorporated into the final 
questionnaires. The questionnaire contains 56 multi-part questions, most of which the 
forced-choice questions with an open-end provision for suggested additional entries. 
Case Study Method 
The case study method provides an opportunity to make an in-depth 
investigation, but has a limitation on the number of companies to be studied due to time 
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and cost constraints. Therefore, this research will be limited to few cases in order to 
conduct an in-depth investigation of the cases. 
The case study was conducted to assess attitudes of managers toward CSR and 
how managers are restructuring their enterprises during the transition period. In 
selecting cases from the manufacturing sector, I focused on the following characteristics: 
- 
Large enterprises: The industry should contain large enterprises, which have a 
significant effect on the Chinese economy in terms of employment, production and 
capital investment. This study includes firms, which employ a relatively large number 
of employees and companies which had a large amount of capital. 
- 
Good cases: The enterprises under study should be suitable for an in-depth case 
study of the phenomenon under investigation. 
- 
Comparability. The companies should present comparable accounting 
information, but should also be distinctive on other aspects. 
Using the above criteria, China South Industries Group Corp. (CSIGC) was 
selected as the case study because of its unique feature in the restructuring. CSIGC is 
one of large State-owned enterprises in defence industry, it has been converted to 
civilization industries such as automobile and motorcycle manufacturing, optical and 
electronic industries. It started enterprise restructuring in 2001 with the focus on 
structural adjustment, debt-to-equity swap, mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy. Over 
the past few years, over 12 companies were bankrupted and 20 companies was planned 
to close down or go bankrupt, and another 20 firms implement spin-off programmes, 
and more companies were encouraged to set up shareholding companies with multiple 
ownerships. It's inevitable that more employees and workers have to be downsized and 
laid off. For example, on the basis of the policy CSIGC made "determining staff size 
according to the scale of the enterprise", CSIGC laid off 27,000 redundant workers in 
2001 (Yang 2002). However, CSIGC management has developed restructuring strategy 
by adopting the socially responsible approaches to assist lay-offs to find new jobs, 
13,800 people found new jobs in 2001. Many of the companies in the group have been 
doing well in the socially responsible restructuring, but I selected only 3 companies as 
the case studies, and paid a visit and conducted interview with top managers in early 
2004. 
The case study was developed in two phrases. The first step focused on 
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management survey on perceptions of managers toward CSR and socially responsible 
restructuring. The survey was designed with the structured questionnaires, and was 
conducted in 2003-2004. The in-depth interviews were held with 55 executives and 
managers from the group. The second stage was the field visits which were carried out 
from 16 February to 1 March 2004. The visits were organized in four cities respectively 
in Beijing, Henan, Jiangxi and Chongqing. In Beijing, where CSIGC headquarters is 
located, senior executives and managers were interviewed about the recent reforms in 
defence industries; the major issues and problems confronted by defence industry 
restructuring, and the restructuring strategies and policies. 
The first firm I visited was COSTAR Group Corp. in Henan Province. It is one 
of large optical and electronic industries under control of CSIGC. COSTAR was 
successfully acquired the bankrupted defence industry in Henan province, and adopted 
active labour re-deployment programme and successfully deploy the redundant and 
unemployed workers. Then, I visited the Yangtze Chemical Company (YCC) in Jiujiang 
city of Jiangxi Province. It is one of the defence SOEs under CSIGC engaged in the 
research and production of non-metal synthetic materials. YCC is one of the most 
successful cases in enterprise restructuring in CSIGC. The case is characterized by 
adoption of employee share ownership programme (ESOP) after spin-off of social 
assets and ownership restructuring. All the displaced workers were redeployed, and 
contributed to local economic development. During the visit to YCC, I met the senior 
managers, and interviewed managers from the new spun-off firm. This case study will 
be analyzed in detail late in this chapter. In Chongqing, which is one of the defence 
industry bases, I interviewed the managers from Chang'an Automobile Co., Ltd, Jianshe 
Motorcycle Industrial Co., Ltd, and Jialing Industrial Co., Ltd. After the field visits, The 
firsthand information and data were collected to give me the in-depth insight of recent 
enterprise restructuring in defence industry in recent years. 
5.1.2. Data Collection 
In this study, I have two datasets, the primary data were collected through the 
structured survey and interviews. The secondary data were mainly financial data 
collected from companies under study and policy documents. 
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Qualitative Data 
The qualitative data of the managers' attitudes toward CSR, stakeholder 
orienation, and involvement of CSR activities were collected by the The questionnaire 
The questionnaires are divided into five main parts: 
1). Enterprise profiles and background: including industrial sector, start-up date, 
location, supervisory authority, company size, ownership. 
2). Perceptions of managers about CSR: covering 11 questions concerning the 
attitudes toward relationship between CSR and Financial performance; CSR and public 
image and reputation, CSR and public relation positioning, CSR and legislation, CSR 
and labour relations, and CSR and constituencies (government officials, bank and 
investor), and interpretation of socially responsible behaviour in restructuring. 
3). Enterprise Restructuring: including the indicators for determining socially 
responsible performance in restructuring including the extent of involvements of 
employees, local community and government; effective communication, alternatives of 
restructuring, downsizing, social service package for laid-off and redundant workers, 
redeployment of redundant workers, labour disputes, spin-off of social functions, etc.. 
4). Business environment: covering the indicators influencing firm performance 
such as competition, business environment, financial constraints, and soft budget 
constraints. 
5). Corporate governance: covering boards of directors, supervisory boards, and 
selection of top managers. 
Quantitative Data 
Accounting data collected include financial data such as income statements, 
balance sheets and other supporting financial documents and the questionnaires data 
collected to assesss the response of managers with respect o restructuring activities. 
The financial data were collected for the period of 1997 to 2003 for 318 listed 
firms when the state-owned enterprises underwent a national-wide and aggressive 
transformation from SOEs to shareholding companies. The financial data indicate, in 
terms of financial measures, the response of managers to the economic reforms, whether 
they are adjusting to the new market environment and whether they are improving firm 
performance after restructuring. 
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In order to assess the change in firm's performance of pre-and post-restructuring, 
I have collected financial variables relating to company operations (sales, costs and 
operating profits), company investments (total assets), and company finances (total 
debet, ownership equity). These variables are used to answer the firm's performance 
change. The objective of collecting these financial variables is not only to assess the 
firm's performance, but to identify the factors which affect the performance and 
behaviours of managers in restrucutring activity. 
I referred to three additional sources to ensure the quality of my data,. First I am 
able to access a wide range of online database of Chinese business and economic 
development such as Global M&A Research Centre, 25 China Security Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC)26' and China Entrepreneurs' Survey System (CESS). 27 Second, I 
also made broad use of official publications related to enterprise reform and 
restructuring, i. e. China M&A Yearbook (2001,2002,2003 and 2004); China M&A 
Review (2003); China Listed Company Reports (2003). Third, whenever possible I 
interviewed senior managers and executives from Chinese state-owned and private 
companies. 
5.2. Sampling Strategy 
My sample was based on the list which I compiled of about 1256 firms in China 
which had undergone substantially restructurings during 1997-2003. The three main 
sources for the list are the database of managers, who have attended the courses of 
International Training Centre of the ILO (Turin, Italy), the data of restructurings of 
listed firms between 2000 and 2001,28 and database of CSRC and SINA Financing and 
25 The updated information on M&A in China is available at the website: http: //www. mergers- 
china. com/ 
26 All information about China listed firms is available at the website designated by CSRC: 
http: //www. cninfo. com. cn/default. him 
27 CESS was established in 1993. It covers most of the datasets of enterprise surveys since 1993 
(see detail at the website: http: //www. cess. gov. cn/cess/jianjie. asp) 
28 It's available at Review of China M&A, 2003 and 2004. 
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Stock. 29 
The first sample was taken from the list of firms for the purpose of management 
survey. I selected a random sample of 250 large and medium-sized firms to whom I sent 
a detailed questionnaires by mail. The questionnaires were addressed to the senior 
managers and executives with recommendation to direct it to managers who were 
involved in restructuring activity. 
The second sample was selected from the firms listed in domestic stock market 
(both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges) since the 1990s. The rationale for 
choosing the listed firms for the analysis is that (1) most of my sampled firms were 
transformed from SOEs or partially privatized through ownership restructuring and 
shareholding reform; (2) after listing, the listed/partially privatized firms have 
undergone asset restructuring in order to configure and optimize industrial structure and 
improve profitability and efficiency; (3) the financial and accounting data are easily 
available and reliable, it is standardized against the international accounting standard, 
and comparable; (4) the listed firms are the typical modem corporations, and they are 
responsible for not only creating values for shareholders, but for protecting other 
stakeholders such as employees, investors, customers, communities and environment. 
Therefore, the data collected from the listed firms can provide me with 
multidimensional measurements of corporate social performance, although the selective 
bias for financial data of listed firms need to be taken into consideration, because 
falsification and fabrication of financial data has taken place in listed firms very often. 
For the purpose of sample of the listed firms, for the original compiled list, I 
draw a systematic sample by using a sampling fraction of 1/3 and select every third firm 
after a random start. By using sampling fraction of 1/3, I got the total 415 firms. 
However, the firm should be in line with the selection criteria: (a) The firm shall be 
restructured in 1997-2003; (b) At least three years of pre- and post-restructuring 
financial data; (c) At least three years of pre-and post-employment data. In the end, only 
318 firms were kept in my sample against the criteria. The required 1995-2003 
consumer price index (CPI) values for China come from the World Development 
19 The full list of restructured list firms is available at the website: 
http: //finance. sina. com. cn/stock/company/calling/0201060000. shtml (2004) 
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Indicators Database (World Bank 2005). 
5.2.1. Sample of Management Survey 
Table 5-1 describes the results of collected data. Out of 250 cases targeted I 
ended up collecting data for 83 firms representing 33.2 percent of total sample. Of those, 
18 are failed to provide complete information, and 149 didn't respond or denied to 
provide information I requested. 
Table 5- 1 Observations in the Sample of Management Survey 
Finns in my final sample 
Firms that supplied incomplete information 
Firms that didn't respond or denied to give 
information 
All sampled firms 
No. of firms % of sample 
83 33.2 
18 7.2 
149 59.6 
250 100 
Table 5-2 reveals the summary of my final sample. The distribution of sample by 
region indicates that the data covers the whole country, but mainly most of sample is 
from North China (41%), South China (30%) and West China (23%), where most of 
large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises are located and have undergone the 
significant restructuring and privatization since the late 1990s. In the sample, over 84 
percent of the sample is state-owned enterprises, and more than 96 percent of large and 
medium-sized. The result of data also shows that my sample covers seven industries, 
however, mainly focus on manufacturing industry such as metal and machinery (47%), 
and automobile manufacturing (15.7%). 
Table 5- 2 Summary of Data of Management Survey 
Location of the firm 
North China 
South China 
East China 
West China 
Industrial Sector 
Petrol and chemical 
Motor 
Electronic and optical 
No. of firms % of sample 
34 41.0 
25 30.1 
5 6.0 
19 22.9 
11 13.3 
13 15.7 
10 12.0 
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Metal and machinery 
Construction 
Electricity and power 
Transportation and storage 
Firm Size 
Large 
Medium 
Small 
Ownership 
State-owned 
Collective-owned 
Shareholding 
Private 
39 47.0 
5 6.0 
3 3.6 
2 2.4 
59 71.1 
21 25.3 
3 3.6 
70 84.3 
3 3.6 
8 9.6 
2 2.4 
Table 5-3 shows the profile of managers responding to the structured survey. 
Although Over 14 respondents couldn't provide their personal information, we still can 
see that most of our respondents are between 45 and 65 years old, most of them are men. 
More than 60 percent received high education, in peculiar, on management and 
polytechnic areas. 
Table 5- 3 Profile of Managers Responding to the Survey 
No. of respondents % of Sample 
Age 
35-45 17 20.5 
46-55 28 33.7 
56-65 22 26.5 
Missing 16 19.3 
Sex 
Male 68 81.9 
Female 1 1.2 
Missing 14 16.9 
Education 
Above university 24 28.9 
University 37 44.6 
Below university 8 9.6 
Missing 14 16.9 
Professional 
Economic 7 8.4 
Management 22 26.5 
Polytechnic 40 48.2 
Missing 14 16.9 
5.2.2. Sample of Listed Firms 
Table 5-4 presents the final sample of 318 firms comprising of 17 industries and 
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32 provinces throughout China (see Table 5-5). 
Distribution of sample by industry 
Table 5-4 shows that the sample covers most of sectors, but it focuses on 
pharmaceutical (21.1%), automobile (16.4%), electricity (12.9%), and chemical (11.6%) 
industries. Most of companies in these industries have been listed on stock market 
through transformation of ownership and spin-off, for example, in 2003, there were 
totally 1250 listed firms in China, of these, 58% (722 firms) were related to 
manufacturing industries including pharmaceutical and biological, machinery and 
mechanic, petrol and chemical, automobile, electricity, gas and etc (Wang and Shen 
2004). Since the late 1990s, these sectors have been very active in restructuring driven 
by both market competition and government restructuring strategy after listing in the 
stock market. In 2003, firms in manufacturing industries underwent significant M&A 
transactions, particularly in the areas of machinery, equipment, IT, electricity, gas and 
energy, and petrol and chemical (Wang and Zhang 2003). 
Table 5- 4 Characteristics of Sampled Firms by Industry 
Industry 
Pharmaceutical and biological 
Motor 
Electricity, gas and energy 
Petrol and chemical 
IT 
Real estate 
Electrical 
Metal and machinery 
Transport and storage 
Post and telecommunications 
Food, beverage and tobacco 
Retail and wholesale 
Textile and leather 
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery 
Construction 
Publishing and media 
Tourism and Hotel 
No. of firms 
67 
52 
41 
37 
22 
17 
16 
14 
10 
9 
8 
7 
7 
5 
2 
2 
2 
318 
ö of sample 
21.1 
16.4 
12.9 
11.6 
6.9 
5.3 
5.0 
4.4 
3.1 
2.8 
2.5 
2.2 
2.2 
1.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
100 Total 
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Distribution of sample by location 
It's assumed that the firms headquartered in economically advanced regions 
usually experienced more restructuring events and more likely are listed in stock 
markets because of the dynamic economic development. Most of the sampled firms are 
located in the well developed areas. It shows in Table 5-5 that 107 sampled firms are 
located in East China (33.6%), and 75 in Central China (23.6%). It's interesting to 
notice that most of the sampled firms are from North East (Liaoning, Jilin, 
Heilongjiang), and South West (Chongqing, Sichuan). Northeast China is the country's 
old industrial base. However, dragged by the legacy of a planned economy, the region's 
contribution of industrial output value to the national total decreased from a remarkable 
17% in 1978 to 9% in 2002. In view of this, revitalizing the old industrial base of 
Northeast China was put on top of the central government's agenda at the 16th 
Communist Party Congress in November 2002. By speeding up the restructuring of 
SOEs and attracting investment by foreign companies, China aims to rebuild the 
Northeast region into a competitive industrial base for the essential equipments and raw 
materials. 
Sichuan and Chongqing are the most populous and industrialized regions in 
Southwest China, in 1983, they became the first areas to experiment with 
comprehensive economic restructuring. Along with the cities in Northeast, Sichuan and 
Chongqing are among the oldest industrialized regions and have more SOE problems. 
Many SOEs in Sichuan and Chongqing were built in remote mountain areas and 
statutory towns where an enterprise functioned as their social roles. A number of the 
enterprises were experiencing management dilemmas. The losses incurred in the large 
and medium-sized enterprises were 20 percent higher than the nation's average in 1998. 
In recent years, the proliferation of national defence research establishments in Sichuan 
and Chongqing have concentrated on non-military, i. e. commercial applications. It 
provides a technology-rich industrial environment, in particular on the three principal 
industrial sectors: automotive, pharmaceutical and metallurgical. Sichuan and 
Chongqing have been forced to address critical restructuring problems with urgency. 
Great progress has been achieved in this area and, in 2000, large and medium-sized 
industries in Sichuan and Chongqing began to turn a profit for the first time in many 
years. 
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Table 5- 5 Characteristics of Sampled Firms by Geographic indicator* 
No. of f rms % of sample 
Region 
No. ojfrms % of 
Region 
East China 107 33.6 North East 40 12.6 
Central China 75 23.6 North China 39 12.3 
South West 42 13.2 North West 15 4.7 
City City 
Beijing 17 5.3 Henan 5 1.6 
Tianjin 6 1.9 Hubei 21 6.6 
Hebei 6 1.9 Hunan 9 2.8 
Shanxi 5 1.6 Guangdong 32 10.1 
Inner 5 1.6 Guangxi 6 1.9 
Mongolia 
Liaoning 19 6.0 Hainan 2 0.6 
Jilin 9 2.8 Chongqing 11 3.5 
Heilongjiang 12 3.8 Sichuan 22 6.9 
Subtotal 40 12.6 Guizhou 2 0.6 
Shanghai 40 12.6 Yunnan 3 0.9 
Jiangsu 18 5.7 Tibet 4 1.3 
Zhejiang 12 3.8 Shaanxi 4 1.3 
Anhui 8 2.5 Gansu 5 1.6 
Fujian 8 2.5 Qinghai 2 0.6 
Jiangxi 1 0.3 Ningxia 1 0.3 
Shandong 20 6.3 Xinjiang 3 0.9 
Note: East China includes Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong; Central China includes 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan; South West includes Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, 
Tibet; North East includes Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang; North West Includes Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, 
Xinjiang. 
* The Geographical classification is in line with the China Statistical Yearbook 2003 
Distribution of sample by ownership 
Table 5-6 represents the ownership before ownership transformation. My sample 
focuses on SOEs accounting for 85.8 percent, and the rest are collective enterprises 
(7.2%), private firms (4.4%), and joint venture (2.5%). What's more, all the firms in my 
sample underwent the ownership restructuring into shareholding system, but of which, 
62.9% were done during the period of 1992-1995, and 26.7% in 1996-1999 (Table 5-7). 
Table 5- 6 Original Ownership before Ownership Restructuring 
SOE 
Collective Enterprise 
Private firm 
Joint venture 
Total 
No. of firms % of sample 
273 85.8 
23 7.2 
14 4.4 
8 2.5 
318 100.0 
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Table 5- 7 Ownership Restructuring by Dates 
No. of firms Percent of sample 
1985-1991 
1992-1995 
1996-1999 
Total 
33 10.4 
200 62.9 
85 26.7 
318 100.0 
Table 5-8 shows that more half of the firms in my sample were listed in the stock 
markets during the period of 1996-1999, and about 35% listed in 1990-1995. In other 
words, more firms had undertaken shareholding restructuring programmes in the late 
1990s than in the early 1990s. The reason is that since 1990s, when SOEs were 
transformed into shareholding companies, the company stock listing was constantly 
expanding in size and the relevant rules and regulations were being refined constantly. 
From 1992 to 2001, the number of listed companies rose from 53 to 1160; the fund 
raised annually rose to 125.234 billion yuan from the initial 9.409 billion yuan, with the 
fund raised in 2000 rising as high as 2103.08 yuan; the ratio of the market stock price 
and the GDP rose from 3.93 percent to 45.37 percent. During that period, regulations 
and laws including the Opinions on Standardizing the Joint Stock Limited Companies, 
the Provisional Regulations on the Administration of Issuing and Trading of Stocks, the 
Securities Law of the People's Republic of China and the Criterion Governing the 
Listing Companies were successfully issued, constituting important guaranty for the 
standardized operation of the listed companies (China Business 2003). 
Table 5- 8 Listing on Stock Markets by Dates 
1990-1995 
1996-1999 
2000-2002 
Total 
No. of funs % of sample 
110 34.6 
172 54.1 
36 11.3 
318 100.0 
Sample of assets restructuring 
As I introduced previously, the main strategy for reviving listed firms' fortunes 
in the late 1990s was asset restructuring. This is a broad category denoting a 
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reorganization of a firm's assets and liabilities in order to restore it to long-term 
financial health. In the sample, 53.1% of firms underwent the asset restructuring in 2000, 
and 46.9% in 1999 (see Table 5-9). The methods which were used in the restructuring 
include transfer of shareholding (38.1%), merger & acquisitions (34.6%), asset disposal 
(20.8%) and others (6.6%) (see Table 5-10). Therefore, M&A and share transfer 
agreement for the transfer of either state shares or legal person shares are the principal 
corporate restructuring vehicles. The alternative methods for corporate restructuring 
such as asset sales, assets for equity swaps also become more common. 
Table 5- 9 Assets Restructuring by Dates 
1999 
2000 
Total 
No. offirms % of sample 
149 46.9 
169 53.1 
318 100.0 
Table 5- 10 Assets Restructuring by Methods 
No. of firms % of sample 
Shareholding Transfer 
M&A 
Asset Disposal 
Asset Sale 
Shareholding 
Total 
121 38.1 
110 34.6 
66 20.8 
16 5.0 
5 1.6 
318 100.0 
The samples constitute a small sample share of the firms in China; therefore, the 
data might be not representative. However, the selection bias is, however, minimized 
whenever possible. Enterprises were sorted alphabetically by name and random draws 
will be taken. The sample does include firms located in different regions in China. 
The sample is unique in several dimensions. First, it is based on a consistent 
survey methodology to study socially responsible restructuring and firm performance in 
China's corporations. Second, it contains enterprises from different sectors and regions 
within a country thus allowing me to control for the importance of sectoral and regional 
factors in analysis of financial performance. Finally, it covers a dynamic period in the 
transformation process when redistribution of ownership was rapidly taking place. This 
in turn enables me to document the evolution of ownership structure. 
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5.3. Data Analysis 
As stated in the preceding chapter, the data for this study has two parts, part one 
is about the survey of management attitudes toward CSR; and part two about the data of 
examination of relationship between socially responsible restructuring and financial 
performance in the listed firms. The characteristics of the both datasets are described as 
follows. 
5.3.1. Qualitative Data Analysis 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the managers were interviewed with 
structured questionnaires. They were asked to respond to the statements. The statements 
address the attitudes for and against CSR, and the perceptions of managers toward 
socially responsible restructuring. The questions consist of a mixture of `favourable and 
unfavourable' statements to which managers were asked to respond for expressing their 
extent of agreement and disagreement. A favourable attitudes toward CSR gets a high 
score, thus for `positive statements' `strongly agree' gets a high score, while for 
`negative statements', `strongly disagree' gets high score. Then, each score of each item 
is added up to obtain scale score. The scale score was used to assess the extent of 
managers' attitudes to which managers were in favour of or against CSR, and the extent 
of managers' behaviours to which they acted in a more socially responsible manner in 
restructuring. 
The questions in the structured questionnaires are given on a five-point interval 
scale which ranges from (5) strongly agree to (1) strongly disagree. The questions on 
determinants of socially responsible restructuring are also determined on a five-point 
scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree, and then, socially responsible 
performance in restructuring were ranked on a five-scale ranging from "major concern" 
(1) and "concern"(2) on the low side, through a neutral ranking (3) 
, 
to "strength"(4) 
and "major strength" (5) on the positive side. 
Analysis of Managers' Attitudes toward CSR 
Two different perceptions of managers toward CSR shall be determined by 
assessing the statements of CSR in the survey. 
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Attitudes in favour of CSR: there are seven statements: (1) engagement of a firm 
in socially responsible actions doesn't conflict with pursuit of profit; (2) a business that 
wishes to capture a favourable public image will have to show that it is socially 
responsible (3) If business is more socially responsible, it will avoid additional 
regulations of the economic system by government, and reduce restricts in firm's 
operation; (4) involvement by business in improving its local community's quality of 
life will also improve long run profitability; (5) firm perceived as being socially 
responsible can encounter relatively low level of labour problems; (6) socially 
responsible activities can improve a firm's standing with bankers and access source of 
capital; (7) socially responsible activities can improve a firm's standing with investors 
and reduce financial risk. 
Attitudes against CSR: four statements: (1) business already has too much social 
power and should not engage in social activities that might give it more; (2) there is no 
difference between involvement of a firm in socially responsible activities and public 
relations positioning; (3) high social responsibility can put a firm at an economic 
disadvantage compared to less socially responsible one; (4) business will participate in 
social responsibility more actively in prosperous economic times than in recession. 
Measurement of CSP in Restructuring 
Corporate social performance (CSP), which is defined in Chapter 1, refers to a 
business organization's configuration of principles of social responsibility, process of 
social responsiveness , and policies, programmes , and observable outcomes as they 
related to the firm's societal relationships (Wood 1991a). Building on this definition, 
Wood and Jone (1995) propose that stakeholder theory is the key to understanding the 
structure and dimensions of the firm's societal relationships. They redefine the policies, 
programmes, and outcomes as "internal stakeholder effects, external stakeholder effects 
and external institutional effects", and argue that stakeholders set norms for corporate 
behaviour, experience the effects of corporate behaviour, and evaluate corporate 
behaviour. I adopt Wood and Jone's modification of Wood's definition of CSP. To 
operationalize this definition, I use outcome measures on the relationships that firms 
have with stakeholders. 
I used two sets of indicators produced from two sources to measure CSP in the 
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restructuring activity. The first set of indicators was produced from the management 
survey, and the second for listed firms was identified from database of Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, and other sources as I explained preceding section. 
CSP indicators in the Survey 
The indicators of socially responsible performance are developed as a tool for 
measuring extent to which a company lives up to socially responsibility in restructuring. 
The indicators provide a broad measurement of a company's social responsibility 
covering the following elements: 
- 
The extent to which employee/workers' representatives and local community 
is kept involved by the management in the process of restructuring; 
- 
The extent to which communications are opened to those who are influenced 
by the restructuring; 
- 
The extent to which the innovative approaches to restructuring such as 
upgrading of existing production line, opening of new plant, successful development of 
major production line, increasingly investment in R&D are developed; 
- 
The extent to which workforce is downsized (less than 20%); and 
- 
The extent to which social support programme such as re-deployment of lay- 
offs is provided to assist workers in finding new jobs. 
CSP Indicators for the Listed Firms 
CSP is determined on the basis of the sources provided by the ratings on quality 
of information disclosure, ethical and moral issues and workforce reduction 
(downsizing). 
1) Disclosure of information to shareholders: The basic framework for 
information disclosure in the Chinese security markets has been established by CSRC 
and other relevant authorities. According to the rules of CSRC, information disclosure 
is an ongoing responsibility of listed companies. A listed firm should truthfully, 
accurately, completely, and timely disclose information required by laws and regulations. 
The information disclosed to shareholders should cover listed firm's ongoing 
information, corporate governance in accordance with laws, regulations, and other 
relevant rules, and controlling shareholder's interests. The ratings of information 
disclosure for each firm were produced by Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges 
cover the year 2000,2001,2002, and 2003. The quality of disclosure was assessed on 
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the statutory disclosure requirements by CSRC regulations and Code of corporate 
governance: whether the information disclosed to shareholders and other stakeholders is 
timely, accurate, complete and legal, and also extent of impact of information disclosure 
on stock market and investors. A four point scale was produced: -1= below the average; 
0= average; 1= above average; and 2= well above average. The information disclosure 
was regarded as one of the CSP indicators in the restructuring activity. 
2) Ethic and moral issues: The extent to which a firm abides by the company 
laws and other related regulations and rules was accessed on the lawsuit cases brought 
up to courts by the company stakeholders, and punishments made by CSRC. The data is 
available in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The cases of lawsuits were 
involved in the weak protection of stakeholder rights such a disputes of shareholding 
transfer, labour disputes in restructuring, frequent insider trading, self dealings, 
collusions in market manipulations; falsification and fabrication of financial data. All 
these cases were concerned about the ethic and moral problems in management and 
corporate governance. 
3) Workforce reduction: workforce reductions (downsizing) is regarded as 
another important indicator for measuring CSP. The extent to which downsizing 
influences stakeholders was accessed on the scale of workforce reduction. The five 
point scale of downsizing was produced on the basis of comparison of concurrent- 
restructuring year and post-restructuring year. If the company has reduced its workforce 
by over 15% after restructuring year, the firm has "major concern"; by less than 15% 
but more than 10%, "concern", by less than 10%, but more than 5%, "neutral"; by less 
than 5% "strength", and firms with no job cuts or created new jobs have "major 
strength". 
The above three dimensions of CSP indicators are taken to reflect the interests of 
some important stakeholders- shareholders, investors, creditors and employees. Each 
item was ranked on a five-point scale - which meant putting numerals to KLD's 
ratings, ranging from "major concern" (1) and "concern" (2) on the low side, through a 
neutral ranking (3), to "strength" (4) and "major strength" (5) on the positive side. The 
scores for each dimension were then added up to provide each firm with overall scores 
for scale score. A high score indicates the firm has higher CSP in restructuring, while a 
low score indicated the firm has lower CSP. 
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5.3.2. Financial Data Analysis 
The financial data were collected to investigate the change in firm's performance 
in pre- and post-restrtucturing in listed firms under study, and to test the hypotheses 
about the relationship between socially responsible performance and financial 
performance in restructuring. 
The four indicators of financial performance are used: profitability which I 
measure by sales growth, return on sales (ROS), return on assets (ROA), and return on 
equity (ROE); efficiency which I measure by the sales efficiency and net income 
efficiency ratios (real sales and net income per employee respectively). ROE reflects 
profitability of the firm by measuring the investors' return. Return on equity is measured 
by the mean net income / owners' equity. Return on assets reflects the asset utilization 
of the firm in the capital intensive industry. Return on sales was also selected as a 
profitability measure because of its sensitivity as an overall indicator of profitability. 
ROE offers a useful signal of financial success since it might indicate whether the 
company is growing profits without pouring new equity capital into the business. A 
steadily increasing ROE is a hint that management is giving shareholders more for their 
money, which is represented by shareholders' equity. ROE indicates know how well 
management is employing the investors' capital invested in the company. ROA gauges 
how efficiently a company can squeeze profit from its assets, regardless of size. A high 
ROA is a telltale sign of solid financial and operating performance. 
The sales efficiency (the sales-per-employee ratio) is used to compare 
companies that are similar. Companies with high sales-per-employee figures are 
generally considered as more efficient than those with lower figures. A higher sales-per- 
employee ratio indicates that the company can operate on low overhead costs, and 
therefore do more with fewer employees, which often translates into healthy profits. 
It has been argued that all governments launching restructuring/privatization 
programmes have specific, and generally very optimistic, expectations about what these 
programmes will yield. Governments expect that restructured/privatized firms will 
increase total sales, become significantly more efficient and profitable, increase their 
capital spending, and become financially healthier; yet all governments fear these 
benefits will come at the economically (and politically) painful cost caused by reduced 
employment in the restructured/privatized firms. 
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Since 1992, China has been experimenting with Western style corporate forms 
as a way to improve the profitability and efficiency of SOEs. More SOEs have been 
transformed into different modem corporations through restructuring of SOEs into 
limited liability firms and joint stock firms under the Chinese Law (1993). 
In the context of SOE restructuring and privatization, the Chinese government 
objectives include: improving firm's profitability and efficiency through market 
discipline and competition; getting rid of SOEs bad debt and reducing government 
subsidies to inefficient SOEs; optimizing industrial structure through efficient allocation 
of resources; and defining and transferring property rights. This study, beyond 
investigating the relationships between socially responsible restructuring and financial 
performance, also examines whether after restructuring, governments or management 
are able to achieve the objectives. Drawing on the standard methodology of Megginson 
and Nash (1994); D'Souza and Megginson (1999); Wei et al (2003); Narjess and Jean- 
Claude (1998), the hypotheses were developed and tested in the study. The hypotheses 
are concerned with (1) a firm's profitability increases; (2) a firm's operating efficiency 
increases, (3) a firm's employment decrease, and (4) a firm's leverage decreases after 
restructuring. Table 5-11 details the economic characteristics I will examine for changes 
resulting from restructuring, based on the avowed objectives of the governments 
launching restructuring programmes. I also present and define the preferred and 
alternative empirical proxies I employ in my analyses. The index symbols pre and post 
in the predicted relationship column stand for before and after, respectively. 
Characteristics 
Profitability 
Operating 
Efficiency 
Employment 
Leverage 
Table 5- 11 Summary of the Testable Hypotheses 
Proxies 
Return on sales (ROS)=Net income/Sales 
Return on assets (ROA) = Net income / total assets 
Return on equity (ROE) = Net income / total equity 
Sales efficiency (SALEFF) = Sales / total 
employment 
Net income efficiency (NIEFF) = Net income / total 
employment 
Total Employment (EMPL) = total number of 
employment 
Debt to assets (LEV) Total debt / total assets 
Predicted 
Relationship 
ROSPost > ROSP 
ROAPost > ROApr, 
ROEPon > ROEP 
SALEFFPýt> 
SALEFFP, 
e NIEFFP,, > NIEFFP,. 
EMPL, ý. < < EMPLp,  
LEVD,, 
< < LEV,,, 
I use local currency data in my performance measurements. Whenever possible, 
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the ratios include nominal data in both the numerator and denominator. In computing 
sales efficiency and net income efficiency, I deflate the sales revenue data using the 
appropriate consumer price index (CPI) values taken from the World Development 
Indicators Database of World Bank, and aggregating across companies, I normalize each 
year's observation relative to sales efficiency in year 0 (the year of restructuring). A 
similar procedure is employed to compute net income per employee. 
My initial tests follow the techniques of Megginson, Nash, and Van 
Randenborgh (1994). To determine post-restructuring performance changes, I utilize a 
matched pair methodology (i. e., compare pre- and post-restructuring results). I begin by 
computing empirical proxies for every company over a seven-year period: the three 
years before through the three years after restructuring. And then, I calculate the mean 
value of each variable for each firm over the pre- and post-restructuring (pre- 
restructuring = year 
-3 to -1; post-restructuring = year +1 to +3). Since the year of 
restructuring (year 0) includes phases of both state and private ownership, I exclude 
year 0 from my mean calculations, though I examine several variables that are 
normalized relative to that firm's value in year 0 (variable value in year 0 equals 1.00). 
Having computed pre- and post-restructuring means, I use the Wilcoxon signed- 
rank test as my principal method of testing for significant changes in the variables. This 
procedure tests whether median difference in the variable values between pre- and post- 
restructuring samples is zero. I base on my conclusions on the standardized test 
statistical Z, which for samples of at least 10 follows approximately a standard normal 
distribution. In addition to Wilcoxon test, I utilize a (binomial) proportion test to 
determine whether the percentage (p) of firms experiencing changes in a specified 
direction is greater than would be expected by chance (typically testing whetherp =0.5). 
5.3.3. Econometric Estimation Model 
The multivariate techniques was taken to examine the relationship between the 
attitudes of managers toward CSR and their behaviours; and relationship between CSP 
and financial performance in restructuring. Correlation and regression are statistical 
procedures appropriate for identifying these relationshops between a dependent 
variables and on or more independent variables. 
I first investigate which variables have the strongest relationship with the 
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dependent variable by using partial correlation 
, 
second, I work out which variable has 
the greatest impact on dependent variable by using partial regression, third, I use a 
whole set of independent variables to predict the dependent variables by using logistic 
regression. 
The partial porrelations procedure is used to compute partial correlation 
coefficients between attitudes, age and education of managers and CSR indicators while 
controlling for for the effects of firm's size, industry, ownership and location. The focus 
is what factors might influence managers' attitudes toward CSR and whether socially 
responsible value-oriented managers attach more importance to social issues in 
restructuring. 
The multiple regression equation is developed to estimate the effects of 
managers' attitudes on managers' CSR behaviours controlling for age and education of 
managers: 
Y; 
=a+ßYxi. X2XX1, +f'Yx2. XIXX2, +s, 
Where a is regression intercept; Y is the dependent variable of managers' 
behaviours, ßYXº. x2 is partial regression coefficient, the change in Y for a unit change in 
X1 controlling for X2, and analogously for ß, X2X1, s is the error term. 
Logistic regression is useful for situations in which researchers want to be able 
to predict the presence or absence of a characteristic or outcome based on values of a set 
of predictor variables. It is similar to a linear regression model but is suited to models 
where the dependent variable is dichotomous. Logistic regression coefficients can be 
used to estimate odds ratios for each of the independent variables in the model. 
In this study, logistic regression is used to examine the impact of socially 
responsible performance on firm's financial performance in post-restructuring based on 
values of a set of predictor variables. For a binary response Y and an explanatory 
variable X, let 'r(x) denote the probability of being in high CSP, when X take value x. 
This probability is the parameter for the binomial distribution. The logistic model has 
linear form for the logit of the probability, 
109 it [mi(x)] = a+ ß, x1 + ß2i2 +... + ßkxk 
The detail descriptions of the variables and equations will be given in Chapter 6 
and Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 6 The Effects of Managerial Values on Socially Responsible 
Restructuring 
6.1. Introduction 
This Chapter presents the empirical study on how the managers perceive and 
interpret CSR in the context of China's economic reforms, and especially, whether 
managers with socially responsible value-oriented tend to undertake restructuring in a 
more socially responsible manner. The data for this analysis was collected by the survey 
conducted in 2003-2004 (see Chapter 5). I believe that the study in this area is 
particularly important, as it will provide greater insight on the extent to which CSR has 
developed and is interpreted in recent years in China. By comparing with other studies 
in this area, this research will also show the difference in interpretation and perceptions 
of CSR in the different cultural and economic context between China and other 
countries. 
6.1.1. Attitude 
- 
Behaviour Theory 
Many studies argue that the attitudes and intentions of top management are 
central to the strategy process of a firm. Katz (1960) claims that attitudes provide people 
with a framework within which to interpret the world and integrate new experiences. 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) further suggest that by understanding an individual's 
attitudes toward something, one can predict that individual's "overall pattern of 
responses" to the object. They argued that a single behaviour is determined by the 
intention to perform the behaviour in question. A person's intention is in turn a function 
of his attitude towards performing the behaviour. Not only will, therefore, managerial 
values frame the issues evaluation process but they are also likely to directly shape the 
issue management process. 
Wood (1991a) underscores individual or managerial intentions as the motivators 
of socially responsible behaviour, the management of stakeholder expectations as an 
integral part of the process, and an emphasis on programmes and policies as the primary 
outcomes of those processes, an assessment of a manager's attitudes toward CSR, then, 
may provide an indication of the manager's predisposition to respond in a particular 
way to CSR. One striking case could illustrate their arguments. It is reported in Europe, 
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the French-based food group Danone has long had an image as a "socially responsible 
company". Antoine Riboud, head of the company until 1996, cultivated a reputation as a 
"socially-oriented boss". He and his successors always live up to the socially 
responsible-oriented value, although since late 1990s, Danone Group has undergone 
restructurings in different sectors, the restructurings have been undertaken in a more 
socially responsible manner. Danone becomes the model of socially responsible 
restructuring in Europe. 
6.1.2. Changing Conduct and Moral of Doing Business in China 
In China, CSR has been introduced to practitioners and Chinese academic 
researchers only in recent years. The introduction is driven by both external and internal 
factors. Externally, in recent few years, particularly after China's entry into WTO, more 
multinational corporations have expanded their businesses in China, with the rise in 
trade, the requirements for good quality of products and services are increased, and 
hence the attention of trading with China has caused the tension between business 
practice based on profit-making and anti-capitalist campaign promoting operation 
standards, best business practices, western values and moral standards. Internally, more 
Chinese corporate activities have expanded into the global market; it is imperative for 
managers to adapt to different business culture when the firm operates in other 
countries. Such cultural expectations from host countries include corporate citizenship 
behaviour of their firms, dealing with different culture-based corporate conduct for 
managers in international business. It is important for these enterprises to better 
understand and anticipate the expectations that different host countries may have for the 
corporate social responsibility in the context of international business. These companies 
may serve as change agents to promote ethical and responsible business behaviour in 
China. 
CSR has been of major concerns in China's society since the economic reform, 
especially in recent decade. It is argued that since economic reform, role of the Chinese 
businesses in the new division of social responsibilities has been changing, but often 
changing in the opposite direction to that prescribed by advocates of increased CSR. 
The goal of economic freedom and individual wealth has grown rapidly in China and 
has replaced the former Confucian and Maoist values. More and more attention is paid 
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to economic gain, while balancing profits and moral standards is becoming less 
important. These changes have led to and influenced CSR and definition of key 
stakeholders. More and more Chinese business people are generally motivated by profit 
and view profitability as the primary overriding goal. Professional morality has 
weakened, social responsibility has dimmed and the phenomenon of money-worship has 
grown. Problems have grown with over-stressing material interests, putting profit before 
everything. Under increasing pressure from market competition, enterprises may pay 
too much attention to economic gains and leave loopholes in balancing profits and 
moral standards. 
Chinese SOEs are increasingly liberated from welfare provisions and allowed to 
get down to profit maximization. Some of the most economically dynamic sectors of the 
economy, such as the nominally "collective" rural industries have driven in an almost 
complete unregulated environment. Many of these frontier industries have been highly 
polluting and have offered low wages and minimal health and safety standards to non- 
unionized rural migrants, of whom there is nonetheless a steady supply. Such industries 
have been highly profitable (Young and MacRae 2002). The paradoxical phenomenon is 
that the more profits people are making, the less social responsibility they are assuming. 
The integrity and ethics of managers have been questioned, and it leads the heated 
debate with regard to whether the corporate responsibility to society should be one of 
the most important standards to assess firm's performance. 
6.2. Descriptions of Variables and Analysis Techniques 
I start with the assessment of attitudes of managers toward CSR. The managers 
were asked to respond to the questions in the survey. The questions consist of a mixture 
of `favourable and unfavourable' statements to which managers are asked to express 
their extent of agreement and disagreement. A favourable response to the attitudes gets a 
high score, thus for `positive statements' `strongly agree' gets a high score, while for 
`negative statements', `strongly disagree' gets high score. Then, each score of each item 
is added up to obtain scale score. The scale score was used to assess the extent of 
managers' attitudes to which managers were in favour of or against CSR, and the extent 
of managers' behaviours to which acted in a more socially responsible manner in the 
restructuring activity. This Chapter focuses on analysis of following five areas: 
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(1) Attitudes of managers toward CSR: In the structured survey, the managers 
were asked to express their views on whether they agree or disagree on the statements 
of CSR. For ease of discussion, the factor analysis was used to reduce data size and in 
particular, identify the number of underlying factors which can explain most of the 
variance observed in the eleven variables. Attempt is also made to determine what 
factors might influence managers' attitudes by employing regression analysis. 
(2) Managers? orientation to stakeholder groups: The orientation of managers to 
the stakeholder groups were examined to identify which stakeholders groups are 
perceived as the primary stakeholders in China, and to examine the extent to which 
managers' orientations influence their relationships with stakeholders. The stakeholders 
in the survey include shareholders, employees, government, general public, community, 
and business partners. 
(3) Perceptions of socially responsible restructuring: The different cultural and 
economic context may lead to various perceptions of socially responsible restructuring. 
In this study, the managers were asked to assess what strategies and practices were 
relatively more socially responsible in restructuring in China. 
(4) Determinants of CSP in restructuring: The respondents were asked in the 
survey to rank what dimensions are the main determinants for measuring socially 
responsible performance in restructuring. The indicators were developed on the basis of 
the extent to which employees involvement, government involvement, open 
communication, innovative production initiatives, and provision of social support 
programme, workforce reduction and labour disputes arising from the process of 
restructuring 
(5) Relationship between managers? attitudes and CSR behaviours in 
restructuring: Against the attitudes and behaviours theory, the relationships between 
managers' attitudes and their behaviours are examined to test the hypothesis: whether 
managers who are more in favour of CSR engage in a more socially responsible 
restructuring. 
The multivariate analysis will be employed to investigate whether the attitudes 
of managers toward CSR are influenced by some factors such as firm's size, ownership, 
industry, location that a firm operates, manager's age and education level (equation 1). 
The focus is placed on testing the hypothesis with regard to whether socially responsible 
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value-oriented managers pay more attention to social issues arising from restructuring 
activities than other managers (equation 2). The variables for the analysis are presented 
in Table 6-1. The regression equations are developed as follows: 
CSRATD 
=A +F'2SIZE+/i, OWNSHIP+/J, IND+/i, LCTN+/i6AGE+/i, EDU+v (1) 
CSRBHV 
=r, + y2SIZE + y, OWNSHIP + y, IND + y, LCTN + y6AGE + y, EDU + y8CSRATD +e 
(2) 
Where, in equation (1) dependent variable CSRATD represents the ratings of 
manager's attitudes toward CSR, other variables in the equation include control 
variables: firm' size (SIZE), ownership (OWNSHP), industry (IND) and location 
(LCTN); the independent variables cover ages (AGE) and education (EDU). a is the 
error term. In the equation (2), the dependent variable CSRBHV refers to the managers' 
CSR behaviour, the rest of the variables are the same as the equation (1). 
I omitted gender variable in the regression analysis since there was only one 
female respondent in the survey (see Table 5-4 in Chapter 5), it doesn't make sense to 
analyze the difference against gender. 
Table 6- 1 Definitions of Explanatory Variables for Relationships between 
Attitudes and Behaviours 
Proxy for Empirical Definition 
Control Variables 
SIZE The size of firm Indicator variable with value =1 if a firm is large; 2= 
medium-sized, 3= small. 
LCTN Location Indicator variable with value =1 if a firm is located in 
(Geographic North China; 2= South China, and 3= East China, and 
Indicator) 4= West China. 
IND Industry sector Industry is grouped into 7 categories. Indicator 
variable with value =1 if firm is from Chemical; 2= 
motor; 3= electronic and optical; 4= machinery; 5= 
construction; 6= electricity and power, and 7= 
transportation and storage. 
OWNSHP Ownership Indicator variable with value =1 if a firm is state- 
owned, else = 0. 
Independent Variable 
AGE Age of respondents Indicator variable with value =1 if manager's age is 
between 35 and 45; 2= 46 
-55; and 3= 56-65. 
EDU Education level Indicator variable =1 if manager's education is below 
university; 2= university and 3= above university. 
CSRBHV Ratings of CSR Indicator variable with value =1 if a manager's 
behaviours behaviour is more socially responsible, else 0. 
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Dependent Variable 
CSRATD Ratings of attitudes Indicator variable with value =1 if a manager is in 
toward CSR favour of CSR, 0= against CSR. 
6.3. Findings and Analysis 
6.3.1. Attitudes of Managers toward CSR 
The eleven statements were selected to examine the perceptions of managers 
toward CSR. In the survey design, the response to the questions was scored 
consistently, i. e. a favourable response to the attitude gets a high score. the statements in 
the structured questionnaires are ranked on a five-point interval scale which ranges from 
(5) strongly agree to (1) strongly disagree, for positive statements "strongly agree" gets 
a high score, while for negative statements also gets a high score. The scores for each 
question were then added up to provide each respondent with overall score for the set of 
questions (scale score), This scale score is taken to indicate a respondent "position" on 
the abstract dimension which the individual questions are intended to tap. Thus, to 
create an interpretable scale score, all the items were coded in the same direction, the 
existing variables were recoded so that the scores on the scales were compared and so 
that the items with each of the scales were combined to form the scale in the first place. 
A high score indicated the executives and managers are in favour of CSR while a low 
score indicated managers against CSR. The statistical analysis in Table 6- 2 revealed the 
result of all the eleven variables. 
Table 6- 2 Statistical Description of Variables for Measuring Attitudes (%) 
Statements N 5 4 3 2 1 
1. Engagement of a firm in socially 83 27.7 30.1 9.6 28.9 3.6 
responsible actions does not conflict with 
pursuit of profit 
2. Business will participate more actively 83 2.4 6.0 10.8 45.8 34.9 
in social responsibility in prosperous 
economic times than in recession 
3. A business that wishes to capture a 83 49.4 41.0 3.6 6.0 0.0 
favourable public image will have to 
show that it is socially responsible 
4. There is no difference between 83 7.2 47.0 22.9 16.9 6.0 
involvement of a firm in socially 
responsible activities and public relations 
positioning 
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5. Business already has too much social 83 4.8 26.5 20.5 27.7 20.5 
power and should not engage in social 
activities that might give it more 
6. If business is more socially 83 4.8 20.5 28.9 39.8 6.0 
responsible, it will avoid additional 
regulations of the economic system by 
government, and reduce restricts in firm's 
operation 
7. Involvement by business in improving 83 22.9 49.4 18.1 8.4 1.2 
its local community's quality life will 
also improve long run profitability 
8. A firm perceived as high in social 83 18.1 48.2 13.3 16.9 3.6 
responsibility can face relatively low 
level of industrial conflicts 
9. High social responsibility can put a 83 9.6 57.8 16.9 13.3 2.4 
firm at an economic disadvantage 
compared to less socially responsible one 
10. Socially responsible activities can 83 3.6 36.1 30.1 26.5 3.6 
improve a firm's standing with bankers, 
and access ources of capital 
11. Socially responsible activities can 83 6.0 36.1 32.5 20.5 4.8 
improve a firm's standing with investors, 
and reduce financial risk 
Note: 5= strongly agree, 4= agree, 3= neutral, 2= disagree, and 1= strongly disagree 
For ease of discussion, I attempt to categorize all the questions (eleven 
statements). I employ the factor analysis with a principal components extraction to 
reduce the data size. The results of the factor analysis are shown in Table 6-3. I found 
that the first component is most highly correlate with regulations of economic system by 
government (factor loading 
. 
750), bankers (. 690) and with investors (. 803). CSR with 
investors is a better representative, however, because it is less correlated with the other 
three components. The second component is most highly correlated with public image 
(. 595), communities (. 801) and industrial conflicts (. 793). The third component is most 
highly correlated with profits (. 718), economic performance (. 718) and social power 
(. 651), and the fourth is highly correlated with public relations (. 818). This suggests that 
I can focus on these four factors in further analyses. 
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Table 6- 3 Results of Factor Analysis for Attitudes towards CSR 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
1. Engagement of a firm in socially 
. 
197 
. 
133 
. 
718 
-. 
015 
responsible actions does not conflict with 
pursuit of profit 
2. Business will participate more actively in 
. 
024 
-. 
090 
-. 
744 
. 
427 
SR in prosperous economic times than in 
recession 
3. A business that wishes to capture a 
. 
412 
. 
595 
. 
043 
-. 
040 
favourable public image will have to show 
that it is socially responsible 
4. There is no difference between 
-. 
101 
. 
040 
-. 
047 
. 
818 
involvement of a firm in socially responsible 
activities and public relations ositionin 
5. Business already has too much social 
. 
216 
-. 
074 
. 
651 
. 
306 
power and should not engage in social 
activities that might give it more 
6. If business is more socially responsible, it 
. 
750 
-. 
136 
. 
315 
. 
187 
will avoid additional regulations of the 
economic system by government, and reduce 
restricts in firm's operation 
7. Involvement by business in improving its 
. 
196 
. 
801 
-. 
006 
. 
113 
local community's quality life will also 
improve long run profitability 
8. A firm perceived as high in social 
-. 
201 
. 
793 
. 
187 
-. 
203 
responsibility can face relatively low level of 
industrial conflicts 
9. High social responsibility can put a firm at 
. 
198 
. 
401 
-. 
101 
-. 
441 
an economic disadvantage compared to less 
socially responsible one 
10. Socially responsible activities can 
. 
690 
. 
348 
. 
156 
-. 
337 
improve a firm's standing with bankers, and 
access sources of capital 
11. Socially responsible activities can 
. 
803 
. 
229 
. 
079 
-. 
260 
improve a firm's standing with investors, and 
reduce financial risk 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analy sis. Rotation Method: Varimar with Kni. cor 
Normalization. 
I labelled the four factors as indicated in Table 6-4. It shows the factor loadings, 
mean of each statement, and weighted score. Factor 1 mainly deals with the relationship 
between CSR and constituencies such as government, bankers and investors. Factor 2 is 
concerned with firm's relationship with the public image, local community, and 
industrial relations, which could be the contribution to long-term financial performance. 
Factor 3 is concerned with the relationship between CSR and firm's economic 
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performance. Factor 4 is mainly concerned with whether CSR and public relation 
campaign is linked. 
Table 6- 4 Statistical Description of Factor Analysis of Attitudes towards to CSR 
Factor Mean Weighted 
Loadings Score 
Factor 1- Firm with CSR can improve its standing with 3.29 2.46 
Constituencies 
If business is more socially responsible, it will avoid additional 
. 
750 3.59 2.69 
regulations of the economic system by government, and 
reduce restricts in firm's operation 
Socially responsible activities can improve a firm's standing 
. 
690 3.10 2.14 
with bankers, and access sources of capital 
Socially responsible activities can improve a firm's standing 
. 
803 3.18 2.55 
with investors, and reduce financial risk 
Factor 2- CSR produces better environment for business 3.93 2.84 
to grow 
A business that wishes to capture a favourable public image 
. 
595 4.34 2.58 
will have to show that it is socially responsible 
Involvement by business in improving its local community's 
. 
801 
quality life will also improve long run profitability 3.84 3.08 
A firm perceived as high in social responsibility can face 
. 
793 
relatively low level of industrial conflicts 3.60 2.85 
_ Factor 3- CSR and Economic Performance are mutual 2.72 1.98 
benefit 
Engagement of a firm in socially responsible actions does not 
. 
718 3.49 2.51 
conflict with pursuit of profit. 
Business will participate more actively in SR in prosperous 
. 
744 1.95 1.45 
economic times than in recession 
Factor 4- CSR = or # Public Relations 3.33 2.72 
There is no difference between involvement of a firm in 
. 
818 3.33 2.72 
sociall responsible activities and public relations positioning 
Note: 1= strongly disagree through 5= strongly agree. 
Table 6-4 presents the factor loading, means and weighted scores. The Factor 1 
revealed managers' perceptions of relationship between a firm's socially responsible 
performance and constituencies. The means of Factor 1 (3.29) does support the 
arguments of previous studies, which is that socially responsible activities may improve 
a firm's standing with such important constituencies as banks, government and investors. 
In particular, the managers tend to rank the relationship with government as the most 
important factor (3.59). It is argued that if business is more socially responsible, it will 
avoid additional regulations of the economic system by government, and reduce restricts 
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in firm's operation. This is in conformity with modem stakeholder theory (Cornell and 
Shapiro 1987b), which contends that the value of a firm depends on the cost not only of 
explicit claims but also of implicit claims. If a firm does not act in a socially responsible 
manner, parties to implicit contracts concerning the social responsibility of the firm may 
attempt to transform those implicit agreements into explicit agreements that will be 
more costly to it. For example, if a firm fails to meet promises to government officials 
in regard to actions that affect the environment (dumping, etc. ) government agencies 
may find it necessary to pass more stringent regulations, constituting explicit contracts, 
to force the firm to act in a socially responsible manner. Moreover, socially 
irresponsible actions may spill over to other implicit stakeholders, who may doubt 
whether the firm would honour their claims. Thus, firms with an image of high CSR 
may find that they have more low-cost implicit claims than other firms and thus have 
higher financial performance (Cornell and Shapiro 1987b). 
The statistical analysis also shows that CSR can create better environment (e. g. 
public image, communities and industrial relations) for firms to grow. The means of 
Factor 2 (3.93) concerning CSR and business environment indicates that a firm with 
high CSR can capture a favourable public image, which is closely associated with firm's 
long-term self-interest, and may gain more customers, better employees and other 
benefits; and face relatively few labour problems. The result of analysis shows that 
respondents contend that a business that wishes to capture a favourable public image 
will have to show that it socially responsible (4.34); involvement by business in 
improving its local community's quality life also improve long-term profitability (3.84), 
and a firm perceived as high in social responsibility can face relative low level of 
industrial issues (3.60). 
The questions examining managers' attitudes toward the relationships between 
CSR and profitability were asked in the survey, which are: whether the exercise of CSR 
is inconsistent with the profitability; and whether business participates more actively in 
social responsibility in prosperous economic times than in recession. In response to the 
first positive statement, the means (3.49) in Table 6-4 shows that managers agreed that 
the CSR is consistent with pursuit of profits. This argument shows that a better society 
produces a better environment for businesses; in the meanwhile, spending money for 
social programmes will actually result in more profit for the business. However, there is 
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a small proportion agreed that businesses' function is to maximize profits, and firm 
should concentrate on business. This argument is in line with the classical economic 
doctrine of profit maximization, which argues that economic values are the sole criteria 
used to measure success. The manager is the agent of the stockholders, and all of his 
decisions are controlled by his desire to maximize profits for them. Responding to the 
second negative argument, the means (1.95) reveals that managers don't agreed that the 
businesses will actively participate in socially responsible activities, only in prosperous 
economic times, not in recession. This implies that being a socially responsible firm 
should assume the social responsibility at any time. 
In terms of the relationship between CSR and Public Relations, the means (3.33) 
shows that respondents agreed that there is difference between CSR and public relations 
positioning. The low means also indicate that some of the respondents regard CSR as a 
kind of public relations. Obviously, there was a slight difference between the two 
groups; it indicates that most of Chinese managers haven't a clear idea of what is CSR 
and what is public relations positioning. The three fundamental principles could be used 
to distinguish the two concepts. The first is to judge whether the socially responsible 
activities contribute to social benefits, second is whether socially responsible activities 
include much substance of a firm business. 
Table 6- 5 Statistical Results of CSR Attitude Ratings 
Ratings 
In favour of CSR 
Against CSR 
Total 
N% 
49 59 
34 41 
83 100.0 
The result of attitudes ratings in Table 6-5 shows us that over 59% of managers 
are in favour of CSR, and 41 % against CSR. 
6.3.2. Managers' Stakeholder Orientation 
As is defined in Chapter 4, stakeholders refer to all groups who are affected by, 
or that can affect, an organization's decisions, policies, and operations (Post, Lawrence, 
and Weber 2001). Although relevant stakeholder groups will vary from firm to firm 
over time, Freeman (1984) has proposed a "generic set" of stakeholder groups as a 
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starting point for a more thorough analysis. This set comprises stockholder, customer, 
employees, managers, government, and community groups. On the basis of this defined 
stakeholders, and in the context of Chinese firms, I chose seven "general stakeholder 
groups", which are slightly different from Freeman's generic set in this research: 
shareholder, employees, customers, government, general public, community, and 
business partners. Each stakeholder group presents a different and often conflicting set 
of expectations to the organization (Ansoff 1984, Freeman 1984). Shareholders or 
owners of the firm have an obvious stake in the organization and an interest in its 
financial performance; customers focus on the perceived value delivered by goods 
relative to their cost; employees have expectations of management and must be induced 
to cooperate on behalf of the firm (Barnard 1968); community and governmental 
influences shape philanthropic and political activities that arise directly from the 
complex relationships between the organization and environment (Preston 1978). 
Government, for example, exerts its power by passing laws or writing new regulations 
with which business is expected to comply. 
The survey investigates extent to which the orientation of managers to seven 
stakeholder groups has any difference, and identifies which stakeholder groups might be 
the primary stakeholder in China. The managers were asked to answer the following 
two questions which are: (a) to what extent, do the impact stakeholders groups have on 
your firm's public image/reputation? (b) to what extent the relationship does your firm 
have established with the stakeholder groups? Each item used a 5-point Likert-type 
response scale indicating the relative degree of impact, relationship and as well as 
importance attached to the specific stakeholder-oriented activity. The statistical result is 
shown in Table 6-6 and 6-7. 
Table 6- 6 Results of Survey on Impact of Stakeholders on Firm's Reputation 
Stakeholder Groups 
Shareholders 
Customers 
Employees 
Business partners 
The general public 
Local communities 
Governments 
No To great To some extent To little Not at all 
extent extent 
83 36.1 47.0 12.0 4.8 
83 55.4 34.9 7.2 2.4 
83 33.7 57.8 7.2 1.2 
83 19.3 62.7 16.9 1.2 
83 26.5 44.6 27.7 1.2 
83 7.2 62.7 26.5 3.6 
83 61.8 37.3 10.8 0.0 
220 
Table 6- 7 Results of Survey on Firm's Relationship with Stakeholders 
Stakeholder Groups 
Shareholders 
Customers 
Employees 
Business partners 
The general public 
Local communities 
Governments 
Best Better Good Bad Not at 
all 
83 30.1 51.8 13.3 1.2 3.6 
83 26.5 63.9 9.6 0.0 0.0 
83 22.9 62.7 14.5 0.0 0.0 
83 16.9 63.9 16.9 1.2 1,2 
83 14.5 53.0 30.1 0.0 2,4 
83 4.8 56.6 33.7 1.2 3.6 
83 25.3 56.6 16.9 0.0 1.2 
Corporate image is a function of organizational signal which determine the 
perceptions of various stakeholders regarding the actions of an organization. Because of 
its relations to actions of an organization, image has been studied as an indicator of the 
social performance of the organization. Image perceptions are critical to both the 
stakeholders and organization because they influence market transactions. Research has 
consistently demonstrated that corporate image is related to stakeholder decisions about 
the organization such as consumers' perceptions of price level for goods and services 
(Klein and Leffler 1981), job seekers' decisions to apply for employment (Gatewood, 
Gowan, and Lautenschlager 1993), investors' decisions to invest in the firm (Milgrom 
and Robert 1986), and employees' attitudes and behaviours toward their organization 
(Dutton and J. M. Dukerich 1991; Richardson, Welker, and Hutchinson 1999). 
The result of statistical analysis in Table 6-6 shows that the managers regarded 
government (61.8%), customers (55.4%), shareholders (36.1%) and employees (33.7%). 
as the most influential stakeholder groups and followed by the general public (26.5%) 
business partners (19.3%). It was also found that local community has less influence on 
firm's public image. Table 6-7 reveals that majority of respondents highly ranked their 
relationships with shareholders (30.1 %), customers (26.5%), government (25.3%) and 
employees (22.9%), and moderately with business partners and the general public. The 
local community was again ranked as the lowest. By comparing the two results, it is 
interesting to find that the managers who attach the importance to the stakeholder 
groups intend to establish good relationships with the same stakeholders. This implies 
that the greater impact the stakeholders have on firm's public image/reputation, the 
221 
more importance the executives and managers may attach to the same stakeholders, and 
in turn, they intend to establish better relationships with them. 
The results reveal that designated responsibility for four stakeholder groups: 
government, customers, shareholders and employees, as the most important social 
responsibility. For other stakeholders, managers placed business partners and general 
public as the second and third important stakeholder groups. In China, the degree to 
which firms have the relations with the stakeholders depends on the importance of the 
stakeholders' contribution to firm's economic performance. On the basis of the results 
of survey, we are able to articulate the four concentric circles which define the relations 
between firm and stakeholder groups. The firm is sited in the centre of the circle, and 
then the more important the stakeholder groups are, the closer they are to the firm. In 
this case, the government and customers are located in the inner circle, shareholders and 
employees, business partners in the intermediate circle, and the general public and local 
community in outer circle. 
If we compare the results with the attitudes of managers in other countries, we 
can find the difference in different regions. According to the 5`s Annual Global CEO 
survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2001), in North America, 93% of CEOs regard 
responsible actions toward all stakeholders as a key influence on their firms' social 
reputation. The CEOs recognize that corporate social reputation has less to do with 
earnings and more to do with reputation across a broad array of stakeholders. In Europe, 
the foremost issue is provision of sound working environment (93%), followed at a 
slight distance by responsibility to all stakeholders (82%), and ensuring shareholder 
value (67%). In France and Germany, the survey found that the firm serves the interests 
of its employees; provide employees with an occupation, but also with extensive 
benefits, a pleasant work environment, and a place where social interactions are 
cultivated (Maignan and Ferrell 2003). 
The results of the survey were shown in Table 6-8 about the perceptions of 
managers to the socially responsible behaviours. The result indicates that over 60 % of 
respondents strongly agree that responsibility to government, customers, environment, 
employees and shareholders are more important. However, actively participating in 
social benefit activities (communities) was regarded as the least important activity. 
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Table 6- 8 Results of Survey on Perceptions of Socially Responsible Behaviour 
Statements 
1. Complying with state law and being a good tax 
payer (Government) 
2. Provision of quality products and services for 
customers (Customers) 
3. Improving environmental quality and pollution 
control (Environment) 
4. Provision of a healthy and safe working 
environment (Employees) 
5. Creating value for company shareholders 
(Shareholders) 
6. Doing business with its partners with integrity 
(Business partners) 
7. Actively participating in social benefit activities 
(Communities) 
N54321 
83 72.3 25.3 2.4 0.0 0.0 
83 67.5 26.5 6.0 0.0 0.0 
83 63.9 32.5 3.6 0.0 0.0 
83 61.4 33.7 4.8 0.0 0.0 
83 60.2 32.5 6.0 1.2 0.0 
83 45.8 48.2 6.0 0.0 0.0 
83 24.1 59.0 15.7 1.2 0.0 
Note: 5= strongly agree, 4= agree, 3= neutral, 2= disagree, and 1= strong! disagree 
6.3.3. Perceptions of Socially Responsible Restructuring 
The concept of socially responsible restructuring is defined in Chapter 1 and 4, 
as restructuring a firm undertakes to balance and take into consideration of the interests 
and concerns of stakeholders who are affected by the changes and decisions, involve 
affected stakeholders in the process of whole restructuring through open and effective 
communications and consultation, and adopt social support programme to assist those 
who are affected after restructuring. 
Against the definition of SRR, nine representative statements were identified, 
which were derived from prior studies and literatures measuring socially responsible 
performance in restructuring. The respondents were given the structured questionnaires 
and asked to express their perceptions of which actions or practices are more socially 
responsible in restructuring. Each item used a 5-point Likert-type response scale 
indicating the relative degree of importance they attached to the specific determinant of 
socially responsible restructuring. This scale ranged from 5 (strongly agree) to 1 
(strongly disagree). Nine variables were grouped into three categories: 1) prior to 
restructuring including restructuring announcement; involvements of employees, trade 
unions and local communities; and communications; 2) in the process of restructuring 
including internal support programme, provision of severance package for earlier 
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retirement; 3) post-restructuring including continuous financial support and 
redeployment of terminated and redundant workers (see Table 6-9). 
The results of statistical analysis in Table 6-9 reveal that in the prior 
restructuring, over half of the managers strongly agree that it's important to keep the 
stakeholders who are influenced by restructuring informed of restructuring decision in 
very early stage. Open communications with employees (47.6%) was also regarded as 
the most important practice of socially responsible restructuring, and followed by 
seeking inputs from stakeholders (39. %). In the second stage, the respondents strongly 
agree with provision of supports for business start-up (42.7%), and outplacement 
services (42.7%). In the post-restructuring, it's agreed that it's necessary for a firm to 
continue offering salary and benefits to terminated employees for a period time in order 
to allow reasonable time for job search (84.1%). 
Table 6- 9 Statistical Result of Perceptions of Socially Responsible Restructuring 
Statements NS4321 
1. Prior to restructuring 
Announcements of restructuring decision in 82 56.1 26.8 12.2 3.7 1.2 
very early stage 
Seeking inputs from employees, trade unions 82 39.0 53.7 6.1 1.2 0.0 
and local communities 
Open communications with employees about 82 47.6 48.8 3.7 0.0 0.0 
the restructuring event 
2. During restructuring 
Assisting employees in obtaining government 82 28.0 61.0 8.5 2.4 0.0 
benefit and job training support, job search 
allowance 
Providing severance benefit package for 82 32.9 54.9 11.0 1.2 0.0 
voluntary early retirement 
Encouraging and supporting employees to start 82 42.7 47.6 7.3 2.4 0.0 
up their own businesses 
Providing internal or external outplacement 82 42.7 48.8 8.5 0.0 0,0 
service such as training for employability, job 
counselling, financial planning and information 
on government benefits 
3. After restructuring 
Continuing to offer salary and benefits for a 82 31.7 52.4 14.6 1.2 0.0 
period time in order to allow reasonable time 
for job search 
Organizing the transfer of redundant and laid- 82 30.5 45.1 20.7 2.4 1.2 
off employees to other units, giving them 
priority for job vacancies 
Note: 5= strongly agree, 4= agree, 3= neutral, 2= disagree, and 1= strongly disagree. 
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In conclusion, I found that the stage of prior to restructuring was ranked as the 
most important, and followed by duration of restructuring and post-restructuring. It also 
indicates that before implementation of restructuring, it is important to communicate 
openly and sincerely to employees about restructuring decision and other information; 
announce restructuring decision in very early stage; and seek inputs from employees 
and trade unions, and local communities. During the process of restructuring, practices 
should be taken to encourage and support employees to start up their own business; 
provide severance benefit package for voluntary early retirement and assist employees 
in obtaining government benefit and job training support, job search allowance; and also 
internal and external outplacement shall be provided such as training for employability, 
job counselling, financial planning and information on government benefits, After 
restructuring, the firm shall continue to offer salary and benefits for a period time in 
order to allow reasonable time for job search; organize the transfer of redundant and laid 
off workers to other units giving them priority for job vacancies. 
6.3.4. Socially Responsible Behaviour in Restructuring 
Many researchers have attempted to measure CSP employing various ways such 
as forced-choice surveys (Aupperle 1991; Aupperle, Carroll, and Hatfield 1985b), the 
Fortune reputation index and social responsibility index (McGuire, Sundgren, and 
Schneeweis 1988), content analysis of firm's reports and documents (Wolfe 1991), 
behavioural and perceptual measures (Wokutch and McKinney 1991), and case study 
(Clarkson 1991), however, it's difficult to measure it consistently because of the 
limitations. Now, researchers use social data from Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) & 
Co. to assess CSP. For example, since 1996, the Journal of Business Ethics ranks the 
100 Best Corporate Citizenship based on KLD social index. It looks at the strength and 
concerns in the areas of environment, community relations, employees relations, and 
diversity and customer relations. 
In this study, I used the forced-choice survey as a tool to measure socially 
responsible performance in restructuring undertaken by a firm. In the survey, the 
managers were asked to answer pre-determined questions concerning the measurement 
of CSP, which are used as index of CSP in restructuring. A literature review was 
conducted to select CSP dimensions in restructuring, and then I screened most of the 
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items from the previous research and literature, combining the result of evaluation of 
importance of determinants of socially responsible performance in restructuring I 
conducted in the survey, eleven variables in Table 6-10 were identified to be used to 
measure socially responsible performance in restructuring: 
Table 6- 10 Dimensions of Measurement of CSP in Restructuring 
Dimensions 
Employees 
Community 
Government 
Communications 
Production 
Downsizing 
Social support 
Labour disputes 
Deployment 
Restructuring 
approaches 
Social functions 
Descriptions 
The extent to which employees were kept involved in restructuring 
The extent to which local community were kept involved in restructuring 
the extent to which government were kept involved in restructuring 
The extent to which communications were open to those who were 
influenced by restructuring. 
The extent to which the innovative production were initiated in 
restructuring. 
The extent to which workforce was reduced in restructuring. 
The extent to which social support programmes were provided for 
redundant/lay-offs. 
The extent to which labour disputes took place in restructuring actions 
the extent of laid-off/redundant workers deployed after restructuring 
the extent of approaches employed in the restructuring 
The extent of social functions split off from firms after restructuring 
These dimensions and the definitions are based on criteria used by Casio (2000), 
KLD' Social Rating Service. The selection of dimensions was influenced by the 
availability of evaluation data and the fact that these dimensions reflect the social issues 
that were used in prior research. Each item was ranked on a five-point scale 
- 
which 
meant putting numerals to KLD's ratings, ranging from "major concern" (1) and 
"concern" (2) on the low side, through a neutral ranking (3), to "strength" (4) and 
"major strength" (5) on the positive side. Table 6-11 shows the result of means, medians 
and standard deviations of the eleven dimensions of socially responsible restructuring 
Table 6- 11 Statistical Description of Measurement of CSP in Restructuring 
Item Total Mean Median Std 
deviation 
1. the extent of employee involvement 70 4.73 5.00 
. 
563 
2. the extent of local community involvement 70 4.31 5.00 
. 
971 
3. the extent of government involvement 70 4.20 4.00 
. 
910 
4. the extent of communication with 70 4.43 5.00 
. 
734 
employees 
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5. the extent of innovative production 70 4.44 5.00 
. 
792 
initiatives 
6. the extent of workforce reduction 70 3.83 4.00 1.167 
7. the extent of the social programme 70 4.70 5.00 
. 
622 
provided for redundant/laid-off workers 
8. the extent of laid-off workers deployed 70 4.57 5.00 
. 
693 
after restructuring 
9. the extent of labor disputes in the 70 4.11 5.00 1.043 
restructuring 
10. the extent of approaches employed in the 70 2.66 3.00 7.00 
restructuring 
11, the extent of social functions split off from 70 2.80 3.00 
. 
809 
firms 
Note: 1= major concern through 5= major strength 
The most of the dimensions of CSP measurement were served as the index of 
socially responsible restructuring (SRR), for example, involvement of employees, 
government, and communities; communication tactics, deployment of redundant 
workers and social support programme. The statistical analysis of socially responsible 
performance in Table 14 shows that to the great extent that the restructured firms kept 
involved of employees (4.73), community (4.31), and government (4.20). Provision of 
social support programme (4.70) and redeployment of laid-off workers (4.57) were 
regarded as the most important socially responsible practices after restructuring. The 
result also shows that development of innovative production strategies such as 
upgrading or developing new production lines; upgrading of existing production lines, 
opening of new plant, and redeployment of lay-offs are also very important. 
Whether these dimensions are closely relevant to measurement of socially 
responsible performance, bivariate correlations were used to measure the importance 
and strength of each variable for the measurement of SRR, and as well the correlations 
with the overall scores of each company which were computed over the eleven 
variables. The correlation reported Table 6-12 shows that there is a significant and fairly 
strong positive correlation between employee involvement (. 442) at the 
. 
01 level; 
community involvement (. 545) at the. 01 level, communications (. 598) at the level 
. 
01, 
production initiatives (. 579) at the. 01 level, workforce reduction (. 267) at the level . 05, 
social support programme (. 411), redeployment of laid-off/redundant workers (. 356) at 
the level 
. 
01, and labour disputes (. 273) at the level 
. 
05, and the rest of three variables 
were not significantly correlated with the determinants of socially responsible 
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restructuring, I, therefore, used these eight variables to measure socially responsible 
performance of enterprise restructuring: the extent of employee involvement; the extent 
of community involvement; the extent of communications with employees; the extent of 
innovative production initiatives; the extent of workforce reduction; the extent of social 
support programme for redundant/lay-offs; the extent of laid-off and redundant workers 
deployed after restructuring; the extent of labour disputes in restructuring actions. 
Finally, I compute overall score of each respondent and added them up, and 
developed ratings of CSR behaviour in restructuring on the basis of their scores. CSR 
behaviour ratings were grouped into two categories: higher CSR behavour (53%) and 
lower CSR behavour (31.3%) (see Table 6-13). In combining CSR behaviour ratings in 
restructuring and attitude ratings, I will analyze whether the socially responsible 
values-oriented managers pay more attention to social issues in restructuring than other 
managers. 
Table 6- 12 Statistical Results of CSR Behaviour Ratings 
Ratings 
Higher CSR 
Lower CSR 
Total 
N% 
44 53.0 
26 31.3 
70 100.0 
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Table 6- 13 Correlations among the Variables of Determinants of Socially 
Responsible Restructuring 
I. Employee 
involvement 
2. Community 
involvement 
3. Government 
involvement 
4. Communications 
5. Production 
6. Downsizing 
7. Social support 
8. redeployment 
9. Labour disputes 
10. Approaches 
11. Social functions 
12. Overall SRR 
1234S6789 
0.1 85 
-0.119 -0.007 
0.321** 0.296* 0.087 
0.176 0.363** 0.076 0.517** 
0.061 0.087 
-0.117 -0.065 0.036 0.219 0.230 
-0.123 0.286* 0.274* 
-0.232 0.069 0.095 
-0.138 0.195 0.219 
-0.074 0.571** 0.128 
-0.065 0.082 
-0.141 0.008 0.254* 
-0.192 
-0.011 0.018 0.012 0.093 0.069 
- 
-0.007 0.051 
-0.184 0.393** 
-0.185 
-0.029 -0.024 
-0.024 -0.109 0.040 
-0.336* 0.062 -0.174 
0.442** 0.545** 0,119 0.598** 0.579** 0.267* 0.411** 0.356** 0.273' 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 kvel (2-taikd). 
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6.3.5. CSR Activities of Firms 
Since the managers attached great importance to CSR, what socially responsible 
activities have the Chinese firms been involved over the past 3 years? 
The result of survey shows that over the past 3 years, the majority of firms have 
been involved in public welfare activities (86.6%), encouraging employees' voluntary 
welfare programme (91.5%), improving employee welfare (98.8%), active contribution 
of tax to government (97.6%), environment protection and pollution control (97.6%), 
contribution to assist the vulnerable group (82.9%), donation to charitable and public 
welfare organizations (42.7%) and contribution to cultural and literary programmes 
(62.2%) (see Table 6-14). 
The results imply that the managers allocated more importance to employee 
welfare and benefits, contribution of tax to government, and environmental protection, 
and less to corporate philanthropic responsibility (donation and contribution). It seems 
that the Chinese executives and managers didn't perceive the philanthropic activities as 
CSR. 
Table 6- 14 CSR Activities of firms Involved 
1. Organizing or participating in public welfare activities 
2. Encouraging employees' voluntary welfare programmes 
3. Improving employee welfare (facilities and benefits) 
4. Active contribution of tax to government 
5. Improving pollution control/environment impact 
6. Contribution to vulnerable group 
7. Donation to charitable and public welfare organizations 
8. Contribution to cultural and literary programmes 
Total 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
86.6 
91.5 
100.0 
97.6 
97.6 
82.9 
42.7 
62.2 
6.3.6. Relationship between Manager's Attitudes and Socially Responsible 
Behaviours 
Against the attitudes and behaviour theory, this study intends to investigate 
relationship between managers' attitudes and their behaviours in restructuring. In the 
preceding section, the attitudes of managers toward CSR and the dimensions of CSR 
behaviours were statistically analyzed, in this section, I will use the those results (Table 
6-5 and 6-13) to test the hypothesis about the relationship between managers' attitudes 
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and their behaviours, and to identify what factors might influence managers' attitudes 
toward CSR. 
I compute the partial correlation coefficients between attitudes, age and 
education of managers and CSR indicators while controlling for firm's size, industry, 
ownership and location. Table 6-15 displays partial correlations matrix of managers' 
attitudes, age and education of managers and manager's CSR behaviour. The results 
show that the managers' attitudes have significantly positive relationships with 
managers' age, education, and CSR behaviour. This implies that managers in favour of 
CSR may behaviour in a more socially responsible manner in restructuring. 
The regression is used to examine effects of the independent variables on 
managers' attitudes, and the managers' attitudes on CSR behaviours. The regression 
analysis was also employed to 
. 
examine effects of age and education on managers' 
attitudes (controlling for firm's size, industry, ownership, and location). 
Table 6- 15 Partial Correlations between Attitude, Age, Education and CSP 
CSRATD 
AGE 
EDU 
CSRBHV 
CSRATD AGE EDU CSRBHV 
1.000 0.095* 0.020* 0.019* 
0.095* 1.000 
-0.522** 0.137* 0.020* 
-0.522** 1.000 0.061 * 0.019* 0.137* 0.061* 1.000 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Note: Control variables are Firm size, industry, ownership and location 
The results of analysis in Table 6-16 shows that the p-value associated with F 
value is very small (p <. 01), it indicates that the independent variables in both 
regression equations can reliably predict the dependent variables. The first equation 
shows that age, education and other independent variables can explain about 6.9 percent 
of variance in managers' attitudes. In the equation (2), the managers' attitudes and other 
independent variables were found to explain about 4.1 percent of variance in CSR 
behaviour difference. 
CSRATD = 1.224 
- 
0.105*SIZE 
-0.016*IND -0.103*OWHSHP +0.003*LCTN 
+ 0.082*AGE + 0.049*EDU. (1) 
CSRBHV = 
. 
525 
- 
0.005*SIZE 
- 
0.063*IND + 0.169*OWHSHP 
- 
0.008*LCTN 
+ 0.090*AGE + 0.010*EDU+ 0.005*ATD. (2) 
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The first equation tells us that manager's age and education level have the great 
impact on their attitudes toward CSR. The second equation shows that unit increase in 
attitudes of managers, a 0.005 increase in CSR behaviour is predicted. This provides 
some support for hypothesis HI, which is the socially responsible value-oriented 
managers pay more attention to social issues in restructuring than others 
Table 6- 16 Regression Analysis of Attitude against CSP 
Independent Variabl 
Dependent 
variables 
SIZE IND OWNSHP LCTN AGE EDU CSRATD 
CSRATD 0.105 
-0.016 0.103* 0.003 0.082* 0.049* 
Intercept = 1.224*; Fvalue =2.737**; AR` = 0.069 
CSRBHV 1 0.005 f 
-0.063 1 0.169* 1 
-0.008 ( 0.090* 0.010* 0.005* 
Intercept= 0.525; Fvalue = 3.311**, and aR '0.041 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
6.4. Conclusion 
This Chapter investigates CSR phenomena of the managers' attitudes toward 
CSR, stakeholders and socially responsible restructuring, and particularly examines the 
factors that influence the managers' attitudes, and whether managers holding socially 
responsible values intend to behaviour in restructuring in a more socially responsible 
way. 
The result of the survey demonstrated that a large proportion of respondents 
(about 60%) have a better understanding of the concept of CSR and are moderately in 
favour of CSR. It implies that CSR has gained higher awareness among the Chinese 
managers in recent years, and are willing to engage in socially responsible activities, 
and integrate CSR in firm's business routine activities. 
The survey also illustrates that in the context of current economic development, 
the managers allocated more responsibilities to such main three stakeholder groups as 
government, customers and employees, because these groups have great impact on their 
reputation and the firm's performance. The managers recognize that the benefits of 
being a good corporate citizenship which enjoys attracting the best employees, winning 
deep-seated customer loyalty, minimizing lawsuits, and possibly lowering the cost of 
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capital. The managers tend to create harmonious relations with these groups, and 
provide quality products and services for customers, create favourable working 
environment for employees, and contribute more tax to government. 
The result implies that higher levels of managers' knowledge about both social 
responsibility issues and the social responsibility records of firms influence managers' 
socially responsible behaviours. The regression analysis shows that the managers' age 
and education are the main factors that influence their attitudes toward CSR; the 
managers who hold highly socially responsible oriented values attach more importance 
to socially responsible practices, and act in a more socially responsible manner in 
restructuring. 
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Chapter 7 Socially Responsible Restructuring and Firm's Performance 
in the Listed Firms 
This Chapter empirically explores the relationship between corporate social 
performance (CSP) and financial performance (FP) of 318 firms which have undergone 
restructurings from 1997 to 2003, and to test the hypotheses in Chapter 4 about whether 
there are positive or negative associations between socially responsible performance and 
financial performance. In addition, I attempt to further investigate whether the financial 
performance was improved after restructuring by comparing pre-and post- restructuring 
financial and operating performance, and to identify the factors which influence changes 
in financial performance over the same period. 
The 318 sampled firms was selected from the firms listed in domestic stock 
market (Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges). The rationale for choosing listed 
firms for the study is that listed firm is a typical modern corporate, the financial and 
accounting data are easily available and reliable, it is standardized against the 
international accounting standard, and comparable. Second, all the sampled firms were 
transformed from SOEs and partially privatized through ownership restructuring and 
shareholding reform. After listing in the stock markets, the listed/partially privatized 
firms have undergone aggressive asset restructuring to configure and optimize industrial 
structure and improve profitability and efficiency. Third, in the process of 
transformation and asset restructuring, the social performance and financial 
performance have been kept recorded by the China Security Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC), and two Stock Exchanges, where I was able to collect the data for measuring 
corporate social performance and financial performance. However, the selective bias 
should be taken into consideration for financial data of listed firms, because falsification 
and fabrication of financial data take place in listed firms very often. 
7.1. Brief description of Statistical Techniques and Variables 
The data and variables used for the study have been described in detail in 
Chapter 5, in this Chapter, I will briefly explain the variables which will be used to 
estimate the relationship between CSP and financial performance. The variables for 
measuring CSP in restructuring include information disclosure, ethical and moral issues, 
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workforce reduction (downsizing). The variables for measuring financial performance 
include return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS) and sales 
growth (SG). The control variables are firm's size, ownership, industry and location, 
and dependent variables includes CSP and financial performance. CSP and financial 
performance are also used as independent variables in the regression analysis. Table 7-1 
defines these variables and others which are used in the regression analysis. 
The multivariate techniques (e. g. OLS model and logistic models) will be used to 
answer the research questions about the links the relationship between socially 
responsible restructuring and financial performance. First, I investigate which variables 
have the strongest relationship with the dependent variable (partial correlation), second, 
I work out which variable has the greatest impact on dependent variable (partial 
regression), third, I use a whole set of independent variables to predict the dependent 
variables (multiple regression). 
The first regression equation is developed to estimate the effects of the factors 
(e. g. firm's size, CSP) on financial performance: 
FP=/+/ + 1P+fi) D+p, GC7N+41AFFiýDc+4EllM"L+Q, DWE+ACSP+e (1) 
Where the dependent variable FP represents the average financial performance 
in pre- or post-restructuring, which is measured by return on assets (ROA), return on 
equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS). The control variables include firm's size (SIZE), 
ownership (O)&NSHP), industry (IND), and location (LCTN). The independent 
variables include information disclosure (INFODC), ethical and moral issues (ETHML), 
downsizing (DWNZ), and corporate social performance (CSP), e is the error term. 
Similar to the OLS regression equation, the prediction equation of logistic 
regression is used to assess whether the four predictor variables, sales growth (SG), 
firm's size, industry, and ownership, significantly predicted whether or not CSP 
improved 
ln(p/I-p) =yo+y, SIZE+y2OWNSHP+y3IND+y4SG+e (2) 
Where p is the probability of being in higher CSP, SG is sales growth defined as 
percentage increase (or decease) in sales between pre-and post-restructuring periods, 
and c is the error term 
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Table 7- 1 Definitions of Explanatory Variables Used in Regression Analyses 
I Proxy for Empirical Definition 
Control Variables 
SIZE The size of firm Indicator variable with value =1 if it is the large firm (total 
standardized by the assets >400 million Yuan), otherwise else 0 (total assets 
total assets of the <=400 million Yuan). 
firm 
LCTN Location Indicator variable with value =1 if a firm is located in North 
(Geographic China, else = 0; North East =1, else = 0; East China = 1, else 
Indicator) = 0; Central China = 1, else = 0, South China =1, else = 0, and 
North West = 1, else = 0. 
IND Industry sector Industry is grouped into 18 categories. Indicator variable with 
value =1 if firm is from retail and wholesale, else =0; 
transport and storage =1 else = 0; motor = 1, else = 0; 
pharmaceutical nd biological = 1, else = 0; finance and 
insurance = 1, else =0; electricity, gas and energy = 1, else 0; 
construction = 1, else = 0; real estate = 1, else = 0; post and 
telecommunications = 1, else = 0; petrol and chemical = 1, 
else = 0; IT = 1, else = 0; food, beverage and tobacco = 1, 
else=0; textile and leather = 1, else = 0; publishing and media 
= 1, else = 0; metal and machinery = 1, else = 0; electrical = 
1, else = 0; tourism and catering = 1, else = 0, and agriculture, 
forestry, animal and husbandry = 1, else = 0. 
ÖWNSHp Ownership Indicator variable with value =1 if less than or equal to 30% 
of shares owned by the government after restructuring, else = 
0; mixed ownership (more than 30%, but less than 50%) = 1, 
else = 0, and state owned (more than or equal to 50%) = 1, 
else = 0. 
Independent Variable 
CSP CSP ratings Indicator variable with value =1 if the firm is with lower CSP, 
2= moderate CSP, and 3= higher CSP. 
WFODC Ratings of Indicator variable with value =2 if the information disclosed 
information by a firm is well above average; 1= above average; 0= 
disclosure average, and 
-1= below average. 
ETHML Ethical and moral Indicator variable with value =5 if a firm has major strength 
issues in ethical and moral issues; 4= strength; 3= neutral; 2= 
concern, and 1= major concern. 
DWNZ Downsizing Indicator variable =1 if a firm has major concern (reduced 
workforce at over 15%); 2= concern (10%-15%); 3= neutral 
(5%-10%), 4= strength (less than 5%); 5= major strength (no 
reduction or created new jobs). 
Dependent Variable 
OROE Return on equity Average pre- versus post-restructuring change of ROE 
AROS Return on sales Average pre- versus post-restructuring change of ROS 
AROA Return on assets Average pre- versus post-restructuring change of ROA 
4SG Sales owth Average pre-versus post-restructuring change of sales growth 
DEMPL Total employment Average pre- versus post-restructuring change of 
employment 
OLEV Ratio of total debt to Average pre- versus post-restructuring change of leverage 
total assets 
ýSALEFF Sales efficiency Average pre- versus post-restructuring change of Sales 
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ONIEFF Net income 
efficiency 
efficiency 
Average pre- versus post-restructuring change of net income 
efficiency 
The third regression analysis is used to examine the determinants that affect the 
change in financial and operating performance in post-restructuring: 
0%=ßo+ß, SIZE +ß2OWNSHP+ß3IND+ß4LCTN+e (3) 
Where the dependent variable 0% represents the average pre- versus post- 
restructuring change in seven performance measures: changes in return on sales 
(OROS), return on assets (AROA), return on equity (1ROE), sales efficiency 
(OSALEFF), net income efficiency (ANIEFF), leverage (ALEV), and Employment 
(EMPL). Seven separate regressions are performed, one for each variable. 
7.2. Empirical Analysis and Results 
7.2.1. Relationship between CSP and Financial Performance 
Before I proceed to estimate the relationships between CSP and financial 
performance, I will analyze whether the CSR measures are unidimensional by 
using the principal component analysis, and also the relationship between CSP and 
control variables (firm's size, industry, ownership and location). The result of the 
analysis of the three CSR performance variables (information disclosure, ethic and 
moral issues, and workforce reduction) identified one factor (explaining 48.1 per 
cent of the total variance). That confirms the unidimensionality of all three 
variables which seem to be manifestations of the same underlying factor, which is 
CSP 
- 
as defined here. Factor scores will be used as a proxy of the overall CSP 
which will be examined together with the three CSP variables. 
Table 7-2 shows that among the four control variables, only location is not 
correlated with industry and the rest are inter-correlated. The firm's size was found to 
have a significantly positive relationship with information disclosure (at p= 
. 
05), and 
ethical and moral issues, and overall CSP (at p= 
.0 1), however, it is not statistically 
related with downsizing. Industry sector significantly negatively links to information 
disclosure and overall CSP (at p= 
. 
05). We also find that ownership has a positive 
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relationship with ethical and moral issues (at p =. 01), and as well as overall CSP (at p= 
. 
05). 
The information tells us that the large firms may be more inclined to disclose the 
information to stakeholders in a socially responsible way, and treat the stakeholders in a 
more ethical and moral manner. Thus this might result in the large firms with higher 
overall CSP. Different ownership structure might also influence the degree of CSP. 
Table 7- 2 Correlations between Info disclosure, ethical and moral, downsizing, 
CSR and Control Variables 
1 Information 
disclosure 
2 Ethical and 
moral 
3 Downsizing 
4 CSP 
5 Firm size 
6 Industry 
7 Ownership 
8 Location 
1234S67 
0.394** 
0.174* 0.120* 
0.672** 0.741** 0.700** 
0.183* 0209** 0.79 0.206** 
-0.19 -0.114* -0.068 -0.110* -0.154** 0.053 0.248** 
-0.035 0.142* 0.179** 
-0.154* 0.082 
-0.086 0.061 
-0.014 -0.153** 0.109 -0.148** 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Note: Control variables are firm size, industry, ownership and location 
7.2.1.1. The Effects of Financial Performance on CSP 
This is to investigate whether CSP is positively or negatively associated with 
financial performance, and how much impact that financial performance has on CSP, 
and to test the hypotheses: i. e. higher (lower) financial performance leads to higher 
(lower) CSP (H2c), and higher (lower) financial performance leads to lower (higher) 
CSP (H2d). 
Before doing so, I compute the partial correlation coefficients by past financial 
indicators versus CSP indicators. The financial indicators are measured by ROApm, 
ROEp, e, and ROSp, e (average 3-year pre-restructuring performance in 1997-1999). And 
then, I run the regression to estimate the relationship between financial performance and 
CSP taking into consideration of the control variables. 
Table 7-3 displays partial correlations matrix of financial performance 
indicators (pre-restructuring) and CSP. Possible effects resulting from a firm's size, 
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industry, ownership and location were controlled for (partialled out). The result reveals 
that information disclosure has statistically significant and positive relationships with 
ROApe (at p=. 05), ethical and moral issues are significantly and positively correlated 
with ROEp, e (atp =. 05). Overall CSP has significant and positive relationships with both 
ROAp (at p=. 05) and ROE (at p=. 05), but didn't significantly link to ROSA,,. This 
implies that the most of dimensions of CSP are statistically positively correlated with 
past financial performance of restructured firms. 
Table 7- 3 Partial Correlations between CSR and FP 
(pre-restructuring 1997-1999) 
Info disclosure Ethical and Moral Downsizing CSP 
ROApr, 0.195* 0.088 0.120 0.185* 
ROEpr, 0.131 0.198* 0.119 0.222** 
ROS 
r, 
0.085 0.115 0.053 0.123 
"" Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Note: Control variables are Firm site, industry, ownership and location 
In addition, the regression analysis was taken to estimate the effects of the 
financial performance (pre-restructuring) (controlling for firm's size, industry, 
ownership, and location) on the information disclosure, ethical and moral issues, 
downsizing and overall CSP. The variables entered the regression equation at two steps. 
At the first step, the control variables, and at the second step, ROAp,., ROEA,,,, ROSp 
were entered. At each step, changes between the consecutive R2s (Z Res) were estimated. 
aR2s together with unstandardized regression coefficients (betas) were used to evaluate 
the size of the independent variables' effects on information disclosure, ethical and 
moral, downsizing and CSP. The results of analysis in Table 7-4 shows that the p-value 
associated with F value is very small (. 000), it indicates that the independent variables 
in the regression equation can reliably predict the dependent variables (CSP). The 
financial performance (ROAp,,,, ROEp,.,, and ROSA, 8) was found to explain about 4.1 
percent of variance in CSP difference. The regression equation is as follows: 
CSP = 2.768 + 0.590*SIZE 
- -0.017*IND + 0.108*OWNSHP + 0.024*LCTN + 
0.131 *ROApn + 0.125*ROEp, c + 0.001 *ROSp, e 
The equation shows that every unit increase in past financial performance (e. g. 
ROApr, ), a 0.131 increase in CSP is predicted. This provides some support for 
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hypothesis H2c, which is higher (lower) of firm's financial performance leads to a 
higher (lower) level of CSP in restructuring. 
However, the result can't tell whether higher (lower) of financial performance 
leads to a lower (higher) level of CSP in restructuring (H2d), therefore, the logistic 
regression is used to work out whether the negative association between the two 
variables exists. 
Table 7- 4 Regression Analysis of FP against CSP (Pre-restructuring) 
Independent Dependent Variables 
variables Info disclosure 
NFODC 
Ethical and moral 
(ETHML) 
Downsizing 
(DWNZ) 
CSP 
Firm size (SIZE) 0.504* 0.649* 0.389*** 0.590** 
industry D 0.002 
-0.017 
-0.023 
-0.017 Ownership 
OWNSHP 
0.042 0.306* 
-0.089 0.108 
Location (LCTN) 0.084 
-0.029 0.067 0.024 
Intercept 0.010 2.339** 3.539 2.704** 
F value 1.661 7.803** 1.630 4.954** 
aR 
, 
0.048 0.091 0.021 0.060 
ROA ret 0.194* 0.079 0.093 0.131 * 
ROE ret 0.133 0.136* 0.062 0.125* 
ROS re 0.091 0.070 
-0.061 0.001 Fvalue 1.921* 5.473** 1.626 4.456** 
Intercept 0.791 3.272* 3.743 3.407* 
dR i 0.56 0.050 0.15 0.041 
Fvalue 1.921 5.728** 1.596 4.136** 
Final intercept 0.013 2.433 3.518 2.768 
Final dR 0.094 0.115 0.035 0.086 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Logistic regression was conducted to assess whether the predictor variables 
significantly influence CSP. The outcome (response) variable of CSP is binary: higher 
CSP or lower CSP. The predictor variables are sale growth, firm's size, industry, and 
ownership. When all four predictor variables are considered together, they significantly 
predict whether the effects of financial performnace on CSP, x2 = 21.49, df= 4, N= 308, 
p <. 001. Table 7-5 shows that only firm's size and sales growth are statistically 
significant while the other two variables are not. The result presents the odds ratios, 
which suggest that the odds of estimating correctly CSP improves by 82.9% if sale 
growth increases. It suggests that there are no negative association between financial 
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performance and CSP (rejectHd). 
Table 7- 5 Logistic Regression Predicting Effects of FP on CSP (Pre-restructuring 1997-1999) 
Variable B S 
.K Wald Odds ratio 
Firm's size 1.177 
. 
479 6.026 3.244 
. 
014 
Ownership 
. 
429 
. 
250 2.937 1.535 
. 
087 
Industry 
Sales growth 
Constant 
. 
001 
. 
604 
-1.918 
. 
028 
. 
270 
. 
540 
. 
001 
5.002 
12.608 
1.001 
1.829 
. 
147 
. 
980 
. 
025 
. 
000 
7.2.1.2. The Effects of CSP on Financial Performance 
This is to investigate whether higher (lower) CSP leads to higher (lower) 
financial performance (H2a), or whether higher (lower) CSP leads to lower (higher) 
financial performance CSP (H2b). I will utilize the same statistical techniques as in 
Section 7.2.1.1. I will compute the correlation coefficients: financial indicators 
(average 3-year post-restructuring in 2001-2003: ROAAWt, ROEpo. t, ROSp,. t) versus CSP 
indicators. 
The results of statistical analysis in Table 7-6 indicate that information disclosure 
has statistically positive relationships with ROAp. t (at p =. 01) and ROE (at p =. 05), 
ethical and moral issues are significantly and positively correlated with ROA (at p 
=. 01). Overall CSP has significant and positive relationship with ROA (at p=. 01), but 
didn't significantly link to ROEpw and ROSp,,,. 
The same methods in the above section were used to investigate the effects of 
overall CSP (controlling for firm's size, industry, ownership, and location) on 
subsequent financial performance (post-restructuring). The results of the analysis in 
Table 7-7 shows that p- value associated with F value is very small (. 000), it indicates 
that the independent variables (CSP) can reliably predict the dependent variables (FP). 
CSP was found to explain about 10.8% of variance in FP (ROA). The regression 
equation is as follows: 
FP (ROAp-d = 
-2572 - 0.107*SIZE + 0.970*IND 
- 
0.562*OWNSHP + 
0334 *LCTN + 0.334 *INFODC + 0.092 *ETHML + 0.109 *DWNZ + 0.229 *CSP. 
The equation shows us that every unit increase in CSP, a 0.229 increase in FP 
(ROAp,, r) is predicted. This provides some support for hypothesis H2a. 
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Table 7- 6 Partial Correlations between CSR and Financial Performance 
(Post-restructuring 2001-2003) 
Info disclosure Ethic and moral Downsizing CSP 
ROApost 0.331** 0.723** 0.108 0.227** 
ROE, 0.136 0.081 
-0.037 0.072 
ROS 
osr 
0.186* 0.006 
-. 
104 
-0.011 
* *Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Note: Control variables are Firm size, industry, ownership and location 
Table 7- 7 Regression Analysis of FP against CSP (Post-restructuring 2001-2003) 
Independent 
variables 
Firm size (SIZE) 
Industry (IND) 
Ownership (OWNSHP) 
Location (LCTN) 
F value 
Intercept 
Info disclosure (INFODC) 
Ethical & Moral (ETHML) 
Downsizing (DWNZ) 
CSP 
F value 
Intercept 
y 
Final F value 
Final intercept 
Final ZR2 
Dependent Variables 
ROAD, J ROE ROSoo1 
-0.107 29.071 ** 133.717** 
0.970* 
-0.942 
-7.799* 
-0.562 
-4.321 
-10.568 0.334 0.912 5.583 
1.053 3.153* 3.156* * 
-4.063 
-12.760 
-76.326 0.031 0.087 0.087 
0.334** 0.133 0.182* 
0.092 0.081 0.006 
0.109 
-0.036 
-0.138*** 0.229** 0.070 
-0.010 5.411** 1.509 3.272* 
-2.572 
-6.876 25.038 0.108 0.033 0.068 
3.086* 2.234* 3,308** 
-4.290 
-10.257 47.127 0.142 0.107 0.151 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The reference category is Higher CSP; The parameter for higher FP (ROA, ROE and ROS) is 
set zero because it is redundant. 
The same technique of logistic regression is conducted to assess whether the 
four predictor variables, CSP, firm's size, industry, and ownership, significantly 
predicted whether or not sale growth increased. The outcome (response) variable of 
financial performance (sales growth) is binary: improved or non-improved. The 
predictor variables are CSP, firm's size, industry, and ownership When all four predictor 
variables are considered together, they significantly predict whether or not financial 
performance (sales growth) improved, x2 = 14.36, df = 4, N= 317, p <. 001. Table 7-8 
presents the odds ratios, which suggest that a one unit increase in CSP, the odds of sale 
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growth increased by a factor of 3.067. It suggests that there are no negative association 
between CSP and financial performance (reject Hb). 
Table 7- 8 Logistic Regression Predicting Effects of CSP on Financial Performance (Post-restructuring) 
Variable B S. E. Wald Odds ratio 
Firm's size 
. 
120 
. 
453 
. 
070 1.127 
. 
791 
Ownership 
. 
437 
. 
369 1.405 1.549 
. 
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Industry 
CSP 
Constant 
-. 
011 
1.121 
1.154 
. 
035 
. 
370 
. 
528 
. 
097 
9.154 
4.776 
. 
989 
3.067 
3.171 
. 
755 
. 
002 
. 
029 
7.2.2. Financial and Operating Performance of Listed Firms 
7.2.2.1. Changes in Financial Performance in Post-restructuring 
In this section below, I present and discuss my empirical results concerning each 
of China's enterprise restructuring objectives set by the central government), and 
predicted financial changes described in Chapter 5 (testable hypotheses). I first present 
(in Table 7-9) and discuss my results for the complete sample of all 318 firms 
undergone restructurings. And then, I attempt to identify the determinants of financial 
performance improvements after restructuring. 
Profitability Changes 
My first round of empirical tests measures post-restructuring financial and 
operating performance. My data confirm that, following restructuring, firms experience 
significant decreases in profitability in the three-year post-restructuring period, 
compared to the average values from the 3-year pre-restructuring period. This table 
presents empirical results for my full sample of restructured firms. The table presents, 
for each empirical proxy, the number of useable observations, the mean and median 
values of the proxy for the three-year periods prior and subsequent to restructuring, the 
mean and median change in the proxy's value after versus before restructuring, and a 
test of significance of the mean change. I employed the Wilcoxon rank sum test (with its 
z-statistic) as my test for significance for the change in mean values. The final two 
columns detail the percentage of firms whose proxy values change as predicted, as well 
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as a test of significance of this change. Finally, sales efficiency is computed by using 
inflation-adjusted sales figures divided by the number of employees each year. Deflated 
sales per employee is normalized to equal 1.00 in year 0 so other year figures are 
expressed as a fraction of base year in the year of restructuring. Net income efficiency is 
computed similarly. 
Table 7-9 summarizes the specific results. I measured profitability with return on 
sales, (net income/sales), return on assets (net income/total assets), and return on equity 
(net income/shareholder's equity). Following restructuring, average (median) return on 
sales decreases from 
-13.54% (9.73%) to -20.87% (8.17%), mean (median) of return on 
assets, and return on equity as well decreases respectively from 5.70% (5.18) to 0.39% 
(2.41), 1.26% (10.15) to 
-8.64% (5.60), This decrease is significant at the 5% level. I 
further note that a statistically significant 39.24% of my sample firms have positive 
changes in return on sales, 30.19% on return on assets, and 29.25% on return on equity. 
Therefore, my data strongly confirms that firms become more non-profitable after 
restructuring. 
Table 7- 9 Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for the Full Sample of All Restructured Firms 
Variables 
PROFITABILITY 
Return on Sales 
Return on Assets 
Return on Equity 
EFFICIENCY 
Sales Efficiency 
Net Income 
Efficiency 
EMPLOYMENT 
Employment 
LEVERAGE 
Debt to Assets 
N Mean Mean Mean Z-Statistic for Percentage z-Statistic for 
Before After Change Difference in of Firms that Significance of 
Means (After- Changed as Proportion 
4e 
, 
fore) Predicted Change 
316 
-13.54 
-20.87 -7.33 
-3.03** 39.24 
-2.21 (9.73) (8.17) (-0.56) (. 000) 
318 5.70 
-. 
39 
-6.09 -6.00** 30.19 
-26.49* (5.18) (2.41) (-3.29) (. 000) 
318 1.26 
-8.64 -9.90 
-5.54** 29.25 
-6.63* 
(10.15) (5.60) (-6.14) (. 000) 
202 1.63 8.98 7.36 
-6.13" 71.78 
- 
12.20* 
(0.25) (0.55) (0.30) (. 000) 
202 0.18 1.48 1.30 
-2.75* 55.94 
-41.630 (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (. 006) 
205 5392 4871 
-520 0.78 44.23 
-1.03 (1745) (1457) (-288) (. 433) 
318 47.73 56.45 8.71 
-3.653** 40.06 
-10.22* (47.57) (49.15) (2.42) (. 000) 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Efficiency Changes 
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To test for post-restructuring efficiency improvements, I used inflation-adjusted, 
sales efficiency (sales per employee: SALEFF) and net income efficiency (net income 
per employee: NIEFF). Deflated sales per employee is normalized to equal 1.000 in 
year 0 so that other year figures are expressed as a fraction of base year in the year of 
restructuring. I find that sales efficiency and net income efficiency increase significantly 
after restructuring. Average (median) sales efficiency rises from 1.63 (. 25) of year-0 
values in the three-year pre-restructuring period to 8.98 (0.55) after restructuring; 
average (median) net income efficiency rises from 0.18 (0.03) to 1.48 (0.03). This 
highly significant increase indicates that the post-restructuring firm uses its resources 
with much greater efficiency. My proportion test also reflects greater efficiency since 
71.78% and 55.94% of my sample firms report higher values of sales efficiency and net 
income efficiency in the years after restructuring. 
Employment Changes 
The great fear of all governments contemplating restructuring/privatization 
programmes is that efficiency and profitability will be achieved only at the cost of large- 
scale job losses and mass redundancy. Just as advocated by the Chinese government in 
the Decision on Major Issues Concerning the Reform and Development of SOEs (1999) 
that laying off redundant workers and employees to increase enterprise efficiency. The 
government is concerned about employment changes for listed SOEs. Most of listed 
firms underwent a ownership restructuring before listing, during which the government 
encourage firms to downsize redundant employees to increase productivity and 
efficiency. I examine this by computing average employment levels for the three-year 
period 
-3 to -1 and +1 to +3, and seeing if employment falls after restructuring, 
The result of my analysis is in line with the prediction. I found that employment 
indeed decreases by an average (median) 520 (288) after restructuring. While the 
Wilcoxon test is not significantly at the conventional level, the proportion test is also not 
significant at the 5 percent level, and the fact remains that employment levels decreases 
44.23%. 
Leverage Changes 
While most governments do not place great priority on improving the financial 
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soundness of the newly privatized firms, most do expect leverage ratios do drop after 
restructuring, for several reasons. For one thing, SOEs traditionally have extremely high 
debt levels, at least in part because they cannot sell equity to private investors, and thus 
the only forms of "equity" available to the firm are capital injections from the 
government and retained earnings. Given the "mushiness" of the equity accounts of 
both SOEs and newly privatized firms, I rely primarily on a total leverage measure, total 
debt to total assets (LEV). As predicted, I document a significant increase in leverage. 
The average (median) increases in leverage, 8.71%, and only 40.6% of the sampled 
firms decrease their leverage ratios after restructuring. 
Having confirmed that restructured firms experience significant decreases in 
profitability and increase in efficiency, I next turn to my search for the causes of these 
performance changes. 
7.2.2.2. Determinants of Financial Performance Improvements 
The regression analysis is used to identify the sources of performance 
improvements in restructured firms. The dependent variables in the seven models are 
change in return on assets (ROA), change in return on equity (ROE), change in return 
on sales (ROS), change in sales efficiency (sales per employee), change in net income 
efficiency, change in leverage, and change in employment respectively. Change in each 
of the dependent variable is defined as the average financial and operating performance 
changes of 3-year post-restructuring versus 3-year pre-restructuring. The independent 
variables which are used in the analysis include firm's size, ownership, industry sector 
and location the firms are headquartered. The result of analysis is shown in Table 7-10. 
Table 7- 10 Regression Results to Identify Sources of Performance Improvements 
Independent De pendent Variable 
Variable AROA AROE GROS ASALEFF ANIEFF ALEV AEMPL 
SIZE 32.814** 
-28.273 29.559 
-. 
019 0.993 
-63.216* 650.162 (. 000) (. 337) (. 728) (. 998) (. 768) (. 000) (. 705) 
OWNSHP 1.073 10.472 
-1.460 5.967 1.981 
-2.737 -752.821 (. 653) (. 320) (. 961) (. 998) (. 153) (. 548) (. 240) 
IND 0.783 3.131 6.350 
-0.336 -0.071 
-1.171 -144.890 (. 099) (. 135) (. 288) (. 747) (. 776) (. 196) (. 247) 
LOCATION 1.073 
-8.387 44.205* 6.195* 2.120* 
-2.982 760.574 
(. 501) (. 232) (. 028) (. 021) (. 018) (. 326) (. 077) 
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N 314 313 316 204 318 200 201 
Intercept 
-46.515** (. 444) -6.376* (. 991) -222.459 
. 
096 -21.656 (. 196) -9.709 (. 084) 
88.401* 
(. 000) -958.833 (. 725) 
F Value 6.604** 
(. 000) 
1.277 
(. 279) 
1.651 
(. 161) 
1.764 
(. 138) 
1.797 
(. 131) 
6.701 * 
(. 000) 
1.385 
(. 237) 
Adjusted 0.78 0.016 0.021 0.035 0.079 0.079 0.027 
" Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
"" Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
""" Significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
Firm size and location are the most significant determinants of changes in post- 
restructuring profitability. First, a significantly positive relation between profitability 
and firm size was identified. This suggests that a one unit increase in firm size leads to a 
32.8 increase in ROA. My finding also shows that the firms located in well-developed 
eastern and southern areas seem to be more profitable. The location has statistically 
significantly positive association with ROS. 
The regression analysis shows that only the variable of location has significantly 
positive relationships with operating efficiency. According to Table 7-10, firms located 
in the developed areas show a 6.2 point greater increase in sales efficiency, and a 2.1 
increase in net income efficiency than the ones located in the undeveloped areas. Firm 
operating in the well-developed areas are likely to be more efficient. 
My model also reveals that only firm size is the main determinant of changes in 
leverage after restructuring. The analysis result shows that the firm's size is negatively 
related with leverage. It suggests that larger of the firm, less leverage it has. 
The results of the analysis reveal that statistically, employment has no effects on 
the changes of financial performance. It implies that downsizing or lay-offs as 
advocated by the government in the restructuring programme does not leads to 
profitability and proficiency improvements. 
7.3. Conclusion 
This Chapter focuses on the two aspects: investigating the relationships between 
socially responsible restructuring and financial performance in restructuring, and 
examining whether there are some changes in financial and operating performance after 
restructuring. The results of the empirical study of relationships between CSP and 
financial performance are significant and have more implications for a number of 
reasons. First, the major theories concerning social responsibility which had been 
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developed in the developed economy context was tested within the distinct cultural and 
economic environment of China. The second, a multi-dimensional measure of CSP was 
used, which allowed for a more comprehensive measurement to be undertaken. The 
results of the empirical research supported some of the postulated relationships between 
CSP and financial performance in restructuring. For example, the firms with more CSP 
may outperform the ones with less CSP in restructuring. 
This study supports the studies undertaken previously (McGuire et al 1988, 
Rosen et al 1991, Graves and Waddock 1994, and Pava and Krausz 1996, with regard 
to the relationships between CSR and financial performance. The studies argue that 
there is a positive association between CSR and financial performance, the reason is that 
a firm perceived as high in social responsibility may face relative fewer labour problems 
or perhaps customers may be more favourably disposed to its products. Alternatively, 
CSR activities might improve a firm's reputation and relationship with bankers, 
investors and government officials. Improved relationship with them may well be 
translated to economic benefits. A firm's CSR behaviour seems to be a factor that 
influences banks and other institutional investor investment decisions. Thus a high CSR 
profile may improve a firm's access to sources of capital. The event study by Frooman 
(1997) also finds that for firms engaging in socially irresponsible and illicit behaviour, 
the effect on shareholder wealth is negative (wealth decrease). It also provides support 
for a moral position called enlightened self-interest, which prescribes that firms should 
act in a socially responsible manner to promote the shareholders' interests. 
The results show that following restructuring, firms significantly decrease 
profitability, but significantly increase sales efficiency. The results are inconsistent with 
the growing empirical evidence that after privatization/restructuring in transition 
economies, firms become more profitable (Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh 
1994; Megginson and Nash 1994; Narjess and Jean-Claude 1998; D'Souza and 
Megginson 1999; Wei, Oscar, Juliet, and Hassan 2003; Huang and Song 2005; Boubakri, 
Cosset, and Guedhami 2004). However, my study further confirmed the research done 
by Wei, et al (2003), which argues that in China, there is general trend towards 
decreased profitability after privatization/restructuring. 
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Chapter 8 Balancing Economic and Social Priorities in Restructuring 
China's Defence Industry 
8.1. Introduction 
This Chapter presents a case study which is typical model of enterprise 
restructuring in the defence industry. The main purpose is to illustrate how Chinese 
firms attempt to poise themselves on the economic and social priorities in the process of 
restructuring, whether the impacts of firm restructuring on the stakeholders are negative 
or positive, and in turn whether they would resist against any attempts for the firms to 
be socially responsible. 
The the case study was analyzed in two parts. The first part discusses the survey 
on the attitudes of the managers toward CSR. The survey was designed with the 
structured questionnaires, conducted in 2003-2004 and 55 executives and managers 
with CSIGC have participated in the survey. The second analyzes the data collected 
from the field visits I did from 16 February to 1 March 2004. 
8.1.1. Rationale for Selecting China Defence Industry as a Case Study 
Since SOE reforms were initiated, more and more academic researchers have 
increasingly been interested in study of effects of SOE reforms on economic and social 
performance by case studies in individual or multiple industries (Jefferson 1990; 
Kalirajan 1993; Smyth, Zhai, and Hu 2001; Sit and Liu 2000; Cooke 2000; Lee 2001; 
Ma et al 2002; Movshuk 2004; Zhang and Zhang 2001; Godfrey 2002; Mar and Young 
2001; Nolan and Wang 1998), but no study has been devoted to the defence industry, 
which plays a critical role in China's security and economy. 
After suffering technological and industrial stagnation and contraction over the 
past several decades, China's defence industry has undergone an extensive restructuring 
since the late 1990s, the objectives were to make defence industry become much leaner, 
more efficient and better able to meet the high-technology needs of the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) and compete in the global market. The Chinese government 
overhauled the defence industry's management and corporate structures in the late 1990s, 
and developed the comprehensive policies for reforms of defence industry to inject 
competition into a moribund apparatus. At the center of the organizational reforms was 
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the separation of the military and civilian components of the Commission of Science, 
Technology and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND), which oversaw the 
management of the defence industrial complex. 
A national-wide SOE restructuring was launched in China in 2002 in response to 
the policies that Premier Zhu Rongji made in the Report on Work of the Government in 
2002 (People's Daily 2002b), he calls for speeding up the strategic restructuring and 
reorganizing the SOEs as well as the reform of monopoly industries. The industrial 
monopolies must be broken up and the functions of the government be further separated 
from those of enterprises by restructuring programmes. In this context, the new goals 
were determined in 2002 for SOE restructuring, which concentrated on restructuring of 
the military, non-ferrous metal, coal and some other key industries after the textile 
sector's readjustment in 2001. More than 160 military industrial enterprises would be 
closed down or bankrupted to create more large enterprises which were strongly 
competitive in the world market (People's Daily 2002a). 
China South Industries Group Corp. (CSIGC), one of the largest defence 
industries can't escape the restructuring wave. According to the policy and 
arrangements of COSTIND, CSIGC launched the restructuring programme in the Group 
in 2001, with the focus on structural adjustment, debt-to-equity swap, mergers and 
acquisitions, bankruptcy. By 2004, there were 21 companies which were bankrupted, 
reduced the debt of 610 million Yuan30 
. 
Many companies in the Group have 
successfully completed the restructuring, because they can balance the economic and 
social priorities and take into consideration of all stakeholders that might be influenced 
by restructuring. 
This research investigates one of the cases in defence industry to illustrate 
process and practices of SOE restructuring in defence industry, and to have a better 
understanding of issues and problems which SOEs are facing in restructuring, and the 
roles that the government and managers played in promoting socially responsible 
restructuring. 
11 Annual Conference Report of China South Industry Group Corp. (2004) 
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8.1.2. Framework for Analysis of Case Study 
This chapter begins by reviewing the evolution of China's defence industrial 
policies since the beginning of economic reform efforts in the late 1970s, the particular 
attention is given to China's most recent round of defence industry reforms initiated in 
the late 1990s. The chapter then examines restructuring strategies and policies launched 
by CSIGC in recent years. The Chapter concludes with a typical case within CSIGC to 
illustrate socially responsible practices adopted in restructuring. 
Figure 8- 1 Framework for Analysis of the Case Study 
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Both of overview section and case study focus on changes in two key factors: 
the structure of institutions, and the nature of incentives for improved efficiency and 
innovation. Changes in these factors in the defence industry have begun to gradually 
reshape the operations and output of China's defence industries. Changes in the factors 
are examined at the levels of government operations (e. g. defence procurement 
decisions) and enterprise operations. Figure 8-1 illustrates the framework for analysis of 
the case study. 
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8.2. Reform and Restructuring of China's Defence Industry 
Since the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping initiated reform of China's planned 
economy, until recently, China's defence industries led a troubled existence. 
Government procurement of military goods declined dramatically following the 
adoption of Deng's "Four Modernizations Policy" which placed the military as the last 
priority. 31 As a result, many defence enterprises were officially required to convert their 
facilities to the production of nonmilitary goods or engage in arms sales to generate 
income to replace dwindling government purchases of military equipment. Many firms 
soon became dependent on these alternate sources of income for their very survival. 
Defence conversion was a troubled process for most Chinese firms. Despite 
Chinese government claims to the contrary, China's weapons producers found it difficult 
to shift production to goods that could be profitably sold on the booming domestic 
market. Military good producers were hampered by legal constraints and difficulties in 
attracting foreign partners who could provide new capital, know-how, and technologies. 
They also lacked the managerial flexibility to replicate the successes of the many new 
Chinese companies that emerged during the reform period. These problems were 
exacerbated by the general weaknesses of China's state-owned enterprises in terms of their 
ability to absorb new technologies, improve management, and improve the technical skills 
of their workforce. The Chinese government's commitment to self-reliance in military 
equipment production also hindered the ability of these enterprises to successfully sell to 
non-defence markets because factories had to remain capable of producing a full range of 
components and equipment for military production, thus preventing specialization and 
the accompanying increases in quality and technological sophistication that longer 
production runs potentially provide. As a result, many civilian goods produced by 
defence firms have been of low quality and relatively costly to produce and thus failed 
to generate profits. 32 
31 Frankenstein, John, "China's Defence Industries: A New Course? " in James C. Mulvenon and 
Richard H. Yang, eds., The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age, Santa Monica, 
Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1999. 
32 Zhang Yihao and Zhou Zongkui, China's Science, Technology, and Industry for National 
Defence Face up to WTO , Jiefangjun Bao (internet version) 13 March 2000. 
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These problems are becoming more acute because the entry of many new Chinese 
companies in all markets has intensified domestic competition. Competition from 
foreign producers has also emerged now that China has entered the WTO and China *s 
domestic markets for consumer goods have become more open to foreign manufacturers. 
China's defence firms, like many of China's large SOEs, staggered along for 
most of the 1990s by relying on significant government subsidies. As late as 2000, 
China's defence industries were described as facing tremendous challenges 33 
. 
The 
difficult circumstances faced by China's defence industrial enterprises were reflected by 
their financial circumstances. Despite the fact that supposedly over 80 percent of the 
aggregate output of Chinese defence enterprises were civilian goods; few firms were 
"profitable. " According to the director of the COSTIND, China's entire defence industry 
ran a net loss in aggregate terms for eight consecutive years from 1993 to 2001.34 
Aside from the financial problems of China's defence industries, the military 
systems have been unimpressive. The weaknesses of China's defence production 
capabilities are reflected by the technological backwardness of many of the systems, the 
long R&D and production timelines for most indigenously built weapons systems from 
foreign countries. The history of China's defence industry is replete with example of 
weapon systems with severe technologic weaknesses and limitations. In particular, 
manufactures appear to have difficulty in making technological leaps to qualitatively 
new, superior systems. Numerous sources acknowledge that China's defence industry 
has persistently failed to meet the needs of the military and has lagged behind the 
technologic development in the more market-oriented sectors of Chinese economy. 35 
8.2.1. Main Issues in Defence Industry Restructuring 
The main issues of military industry restructuring and public sector reform in 
33 Ke Wen, "Advantage and Disadvantage of WTO Accession to China's Military Industry, 
Science and Technology - Interviewing Liu Jibin, Minister in Charge of Commission of 
Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defence". Chiao Ching, 16 June 2000, pp. 46- 
48. 
34 "Defence Industry Breaks Even in 2002, " China Daily (internet version), 9 January 2002. 
35 Chen Zengjun, "Ordnance Industry Turns into Vital New National Economic Force, " Jingji 
Ribao, 20 November 1998, p. 2. 
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China can be grouped into macroeconomic and micro-economic categories. The macro- 
economic issues include the fact that the converted enterprises remain SOEs, with all 
the problems inherent to the SOEs, and that military industry restructuring in China was 
stimulated by the change in military procurement from simpler items of ordinance and 
military supplies to more sophisticated command and control equipment, Technology 
and systems with the corresponding redundancy of traditional military-industrial assets 
and labour which had to find other uses, lest unemployment would rise to intolerably 
high levels in communities over dependent on the military-industrial complex for their 
livelihoods (UNDP 1998). 
A further factor which increases the transaction costs of conversion is the 
coexistence of many conversion processes: from military to civilian markets; from 
remote locations to locations near markets; from centrally planned system to market 
economy; from present business approach and management style toward a competitive 
market economy; and from state-owned enterprises to other forms of ownership. 
Another macro-economic issue is enterprise reform, which got a boost from the 
15th Congress of the Communist Party of China, as well as from the meeting of the 
National People's Congress of March 1998, which provide for the reorganization, 
association, merger, joint stock partnership, leasing, contract operation and sell-off of 
SOEs. This represents a major impulse to the public sector reform process in China. 
The micro-economic issues include the possibility that the restructured 
enterprises could operate as truly commercial corporate entities, the equivalent of 
private firms, with clear ownership of assets and responsibility for liabilities. The setting 
up of joint ventures offers an opportunity to introduce such market-oriented 
management behaviour and to open up export markets, besides bringing in foreign 
investment and Technology. But, to get there the Chinese side must be prepared, in 
terms of public sector reform, investment promotion, strategic thinking, business 
planning, management training, information and business communication skills, and the 
regions of China hoping to host them must improve infrastructures, physical and 
otherwise. 
Other micro-economic issues include entrepreneurship, business communication, 
investment financing and social overheads. The general answer to these issues is to 
corporatize the enterprises and institutionalize the social services so far provided by the 
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military industries themselves, all of which are part of the process of public sector 
reform. 
8.2.2. Key Reforms in China's Defence Industry in the late 1990s 
After suffering technological and industrial stagnation and contraction over the 
past several decades, China's defence industry has undergone an extensive restructuring 
since the late 1990s to make it leaner, more efficient and better able to meet the high- 
technology needs of the People's Liberation Army. 
The Goals of Reforms 
The reforms implemented in 1998-1999 were designed to achieve a number of 
broad goals related to further reforming the organization and incentives of the defence 
industry establishment. 36 One goal was to further separate the state from enterprise 
operations. Although major defence firms had been converted from ministries into 
corporations in 1993, China's five defence companies had continued to behave very 
much like the ministries from which they had been created. These companies were not 
only involved in production but also in regulatory and policymaking issues. The 
tensions and conflicts of interest resulting from this model created major impediments 
to making defence industry firms more efficient. 
A second goal was to introduce a "moderate" level of competition into the 
defence sector. " Because all the enterprises in each of the defence sectors were 
controlled by a single corporation, improvements in technology and management 
practices occurred more slowly than they might have in an environment in which 
multiple companies were striving to outdo each other. 
Related to this, a third goal of the reforms was to provide more autonomy for 
individual enterprises within each defence corporation. The persistence of the 
36 Tang Hua, "Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence Increases Intensity of 
Innovation, " op. cit.; "Chinese Premier Underlines Science, Technology for National Defence, " 
Peoples Daily (English edition), 2 July 1999. 
37 Xinhua, PRC National Ordnance Industry Conference Opens, " January 7,1998; Bic Yixun, 
Xu Dianlong, Xinhua Domestic Service, 7 January 1998. 
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ministerial system of organization meant that, while individual enterprises were 
nominally independent subsidiaries of the five defence companies, in practice the 
relationship between enterprises resembled that of organizations within a bureaucracy, 
with subordinate enterprises having little autonomy in their decision-making and internal 
management. 38 This stifled initiative and creativity. 
At the same time as the reforms gave enterprises more autonomy, they also 
sought to make the various defence enterprises responsible for their bottom lines. Like 
many of China's state-owned enterprises, defence enterprises that suffered excessive 
losses had not been penalized. Loss-making enterprises were not allowed to go bankrupt 
but were simply given subsidies or bank loans to make up the difference between 
revenues and expenditures. This lack of financial accountability not only 
discouraged defence enterprises from taking steps to cut losses but also provided no 
incentive to innovate, because the survival of an enterprise was unrelated to the quality 
of its products. 
While providing enterprises with more autonomy, the reforms also sought to 
increase the degree of horizontal and vertical integration within each of the defence 
sectors. Despite their hierarchical organization, the defence enterprises tended to operate 
in isolation, with little coordination or information sharing among them. In particular, 
the reforms sought to combine the functions of research and production, which 
traditionally had been carried out separately. " 
Overall, the Chinese leadership's aim was to reshape the entire defence industry 
into three types of enterprises: "backbone enterprises" that would focus on military 
production, enterprises that would produce both military and civilian items, and 
enterprises that would focus on civilian production while using their technological 
capabilities to raise the overall level of China's science and technology base. 11 
38 Liu Zhenying, Sun Jie, "More on Zhu at Defence Group Ceremony", Central Television 
Program One Network, 1 July 1999. 
39 Bie Yixun, Xu Dianlong, "Wu Bangguo Speaks at Defence Industry Conference", 12 January 
1998. 
40 "Chinese Premier Underlines Science, Technology for National Defence. " Peoples Daily 
(English edition), 2 July 1999. 
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Organizational Reforms 
Beginning in 1998, Chinese government adopted a series of policies to 
overhaul the organization and operation of China's defence industry. Reforms occurred 
both at the central government level and at the enterprise level. In general terms, the 
reforms aimed to centralize and standardize weapons procurement decisions at the 
central government level while decentralizing defence enterprise operations in order to 
increase incentives for efficiency and innovation. 
Central Government Reforms 
The government adopted two major reforms that significantly changed the 
weapons procurement process. First, during the 9th National People's Congress meeting, 
the government abolished the military 
-controlled Commission on Science, 
Technology, and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND), which had been created in 
1982, and replaced it with a strictly civilian agency of the same name but under the 
control of the State Council and the Premier Zhu Rongji. The new State COSTIND, 
which was run by civilian personnel, was formed by combining the defence offices of 
the Ministry of Finance, the State Planning Commission, and the administrative offices 
of the five major defence corporations. " Previously, COSTIND had reported to the 
State Council and was staffed by both civilian and military personnel. It had been 
responsible for overseeing all aspects of China's defence industries, including 
involvement in the daily management of China's large defence firms. As a quasi-military 
agency, the old COSTIND had also been very heavily involved in decisions on R&D 
and the purchase of military equipment. It had acted as a bridge between the PLA and 
defence enterprises. In that role, COSTIND exerted heavy, and in some cases 
preponderant, influence over defence procurement decisions. COSTIND's leading role 
contributed to the inefficiency of the procurement process: The PLA was unable to 
acquire the weapons it needed, weapons were frequently delivered late, and they were 
41 Xinhua, 10 March 1998, "NPC Adopts Institutional Restructuring Plan, " 03/10/1998; Tseng 
Hai-tao, "Jiang Zemin Pushes Forward Restructuring of Military Industry Developments of 
State Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defence and Five Major 
Ordnance Corporations, " Kuang Chiao Ching, 16 July 1998, pp. 18 20. 
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of ten defective or of very poor quality. 42 
In terms of defence procurement and defence production, the restructured 
COSTIND's responsibilities, resources, and authority have been substantially 
circumscribed. It was no longer heavily involved in decisions on the acquisition of new 
military equipment or the direct management of defence industry enterprises. 43 In stark 
contrast to its previous incarnation, the new COSTIND controls no procurement funds 
and thus possesses much less influence over procurement decisions. The new 
COSTIND was tasked with coordinating procurement negotiations between the 
uniformed military and defence industrial enterprises. In that role, COSTIND was used 
by the military to coordinate multiple bids from defence enterprises and to ensure 
contract compliance by the enterprises. PLA officials have indicated that, because 
COSTIND was a government agency, they can trust it more than the production 
enterprises to ensure that contractual obligations were met. COSTIND also controlled 
some R&D funds for basic and applied research, although other institutions now appear 
to have control over most defence R&D funds. COSTIND's funds were not used to 
directly finance weapons production. 
COSTIND was also stripped of responsibility for direct management of defence 
enterprise affairs. The restructured COSTIND was meant to function as the 
administrative and regulatory agency for China's major defence enterprises. Its 
responsibilities included formulating laws and regulations to govern science and 
technological development for national defence, organizing international exchanges, 
defence cooperation and arms sales to other countries, and export control administration 
related to military exports. Thus, COSTIND took care of the government functions of 
China's defence enterprises while leaving the enterprises to manage themselves, a 
process in which COSTIND used to be heavily involved. This change was intended to 
allow the enterprises to focus on business decisions regarding production, cost control, 
42 Gallagher, "China's Military Industrial Complex" Gallagher was an assistant army attache in 
Beijing, and his account is based on participation in many negotiations with the Chinese in the 
late 1980s. 
43 Tang Hua, "Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defence Increases Intensity of 
Innovation, " Liaowang, 26 July 1999, pp. 16-17. 
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and profitability. " 
COSTIND's role, however, continues to evolve and its responsibilities may go 
beyond purely administrative and regulatory affairs. According to Liu Jibin, Minister of 
COSTIND from 1998 to 2003, COSTIND's responsibilities and functions include 
"supervising the management of science and Technology for national defence' and draw- 
ing up, organizing, and coordinating the implementation of development plans for the 
industry. What precisely this supervision, organization, and coordination entail is unclear 
and suggests that governmental and corporate functions are still entangled. As Chinese 
analysts put it in a 2000 article on the military economy, 
"China is likely to maintain her 
centralized and unified state management by employing planning, administrative, or 
legal means. Moreover, China is also likely to tackle certain special issues, which might 
come up, by employing such means or methods as administrative intervention. "45 
The second major organizational reform, following the 'civilianization' of 
COSTIND, was the creation in April 1998 of a new general department of the PLA known 
as the General Armaments Department (GAD). GAD assumed the old 
COSTIND's responsibilities for military procurement combined with the roles and 
missions of the General Equipment Bureau under the General Staff Department, as well 
as divisions from the General Logistics Department related to other military equipment 
and procurement. It was largely formed by appropriating the personnel that handled 
these activities from these organizations. The responsibilities of GAD include the life 
cycle management of the PLA s weapons systems (from R&D to retirement) and running 
China's Testing, evaluation, and training bases. 46 In addition, mainly through its Science 
and Technology Committee, GAD plays a role in broad policy debates about military 
modernization, defence procurement, and arms control and non-proliferation issues. 
In addition to these large organizational reforms, the government also adopted 
policies specifically related to changing the weapons procurement process. Although 
44 "Ten Military Industry Corporations are founded, " Zhongguo Hangtian (China Aerospace), 
August 1999. 
45 Xu Sailu, Gu Xianguang, Xu Xiangmin, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, 20 June 2000, pp. 66-73. 
46 Harlan Jencks, "The General Armaments Department, " in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew 
N. D. Yang, The People's Liberation Army as Organization: Reference Volume v1.0, Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002. 
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most of these policies are quite new and their effect on actual production output is not 
yet clear, their adoption and implementation indicate the seriousness of the central 
government's efforts to reform the military procurement process and, ultimately, to 
improve production capabilities. According to Chinese officials, these policy reforms 
are driven by several broad goals: standardizing and centralizing the procurement 
system for military goods, establishing a legally based procurement system to protect 
both the military's and enterprises' contractual rights and responsibilities, adopting a 
system of market competition with open contract bidding and negotiation for defence 
purchases, and improving the quality and professionalism of the personnel involved in 
weapons procurement. 47 
Enterprise-Level Reforms 
Since 1998, the Government adopted far-reaching policies to alter the 
relationship between the government and defence enterprises. The central government's 
main goals were to separate the government administrative units from enterprise opera- 
tions, to make the enterprises more market-oriented by exposing them to competitive 
pressures, to provide harder budget constraints, to make the enterprises less reliant on 
state subsidies, and to lessen the classic social burdens associated with the danwei (work 
unit) system. Chinese policymakers initiated several different types of reforms to 
change defence enterprise operations. 
The major enterprise reform, which occurred in July 1999, involved the bifurcation 
of each of China's five core defence companies into two defence industrial enterprise 
groups, or sometimes referred to group corporations. An eleventh enterprise group, for 
defence electronics, was established in late 2002. The Chinese government pursued two 
goals in undertaking this reorganization. The obvious goal was to inject competition into 
the defence industrial sector. China's government hopes that competition will cause defence 
enterprises to become more efficient, less of a financial burden on central and local 
governments, and more capable of independent innovation and absorbing and assimilating 
new technologies. The new head of COSTIND, Liu Jibin, explained in July 1999, the 
" Xie Dajun, "The Procurement and Supervision of the Manufacture of Foreign Armaments, " 
Xiandai Junshi, 15 August 1999, pp. 52 54. 
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core rational for this organizational change. He noted that each of the general companies 
is divided into two roughly equivalent groups in terms of capability. It is expected that 
through "proper competition each of the new companies' efficiency can be improved and 
management mechanisms can be transformed. "
The extent to which real competition has emerged between the enterprise groups 
in each sector is not clear. In some sectors limited competition over defence systems, key 
subsystems, and parts has emerged. In others, the products of the two group companies 
are different enough that there is little to no direct competition between the two 
companies. Some Chinese writings indicate that the real goal of the recent reforms was 
not to promote competition in terms of products but rather in terms of "systems of 
organization" and "operational mechanisms. ""' That is, splitting each defence sector into 
two enterprise groups was apparently supposed to allow them to separately explore 
different approaches to organization and management so that they can learn from each 
other's successes and failures. This was an approach that might be adopted for increasing 
the efficiency of government organizations, not an effort to allow the defence enterprise 
groups to behave as true competitors operating in a free market. It again suggests that 
China's defence industries were still to some degree treated like government agencies, 
not as truly independent economic entities. 
The other goal of the 1999 bifurcation policy was the formation of "group 
corporations" (Jituan Gongsi). This new category of company was an element of the 
government's broader effort to reform ownership structures in SOEs including defence 
enterprises 
. 
71 The group corporations were part of an effort to establish shareholder 
relationships within a company, and to further remove the government from firm opera- 
tions, to distribute risk, and to increase accountability for profits and losses. 19 Many of 
China's major firms under the large group corporations have a long list of shareholders 
that own non-controlling stakes in some operations. This effort at ownership reform is 
one of the newest policies aimed at orienting enterprise operations toward markets. 
48 Li Xiuwei, "Applying Technology to National Defence, "China Space News, 26 May 1999, 
pl. 
49 Peng Kai-lei, "Five Major Military Industry Corporations Formally Reorganized, " Xinhua, I 
July 1999. 
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Beyond these basic structural reforms, Chinese policymakers have also 
implemented a variety of smaller initiatives to improve defence enterprise operations. 
First, enterprises are beginning to use non-government funds for military-related 
production projects. Enterprises manufacturing military equipment may use capital from 
other firms, internal monies, or investment from foreign countries to fund projects that 
produce weapons that are then marketed to the PLA or abroad. so 
Second, some defence firms have created subsidiary organizations that have been 
listed on domestic Chinese stock exchanges in Shanghai or Shenzhen. These joint stock 
companies provide the controlling enterprise with an additional source of capital for 
reinvestment into enterprise operations. Listing on Chinese capital markets has the 
additional advantage of carrying with it minimal transparency requirements, an issue of 
concern to defence companies. To date, over 40 defence enterprises have been listed on 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. Although some of these companies have been 
fully converted to non-military production, some of the military companies listed 
continue to be involved in military projects as well as production of civilian goods. " 
A third emerging change in the defence industry is the expansion of 
partnerships with civilian universities and research institutes to improve educational 
training relevant to the development of new military technologies. The growing 
number of partnerships between the defence industry and national educational 
institutions is notable. GAD and COSTIND have begun to partner with universities in 
various parts of the country to improve the PLA's access to individuals with technical 
training. In 2002, COSTIND gave several million yuan to at least two aerospace and 
shipbuilding academies in Jiangsu Province that were not part of its past educational 
network, to develop their defence-related course offerings, to recruit students interested 
in defence research, and to give the staff of these academies additional training on 
defence technology issues. ' These partnerships are with institutions other than the 
numerous universities that have traditionally been linked to Chinas defence industry 
50 Data from Aviation Corporation Brochure in GuiZhou, 2002. 
51 "Jungong Shanshi Qiye 2001 Nian Pandian, " Zhongguo Junzhuanmin [China Defence 
Conversion], July 2002, p. 4. 
52 See Guangming Ribao, 27 August 2002; Guangming Ribao, 6 June 2002. 
262 
establishment. This government-industry-university cooperation is most notable in the 
information technology (IT) field but is rapidly growing in other sectors involved in 
defence R&D and production. 
Fourth, in recent years a limited amount of rationalization has occurred in the 
defence industry, although much more is needed in light of the continuing inefficiencies 
and redundancy still prevalent in the sector. Some shipbuilding and "ordnance" (ground 
systems) industrial groups, for example, have transferred ownership of large enterprises to 
provincial authorities in recent years. This has been a major trend in the shipbuilding 
industry where only 60 of China's shipyards are now controlled by the China State 
Shipbuilding Corp. (CSSC) and the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC); 
the remainder is run by provincial and local authorities. Another aspect of rationalization 
has been layoffs and downsizing. This has been occurring in fits and starts. According to 
one report, 61,000 ordnance industry workers were laid off in 2001, and 100 other 
enterprises were earmarked for bankruptcy or takeover the following years' 
A fifth reform initiated by COSTIND and GAD is the promotion of R&D and 
production cooperation among defence enterprises located in various provinces. In the 
past, one of the organizational deficiencies of China's defence industries was the 
extensive reliance on single source suppliers in production of defence platforms. This 
problem has been particularly acute in China's aviation industries. Such practices have 
contributed to the inefficiency, redundancy, and high degree of insularity in the defence 
industry. GAD and COSTIND are trying to address this problem by promoting greater 
integration and information sharing among defence enterprises and R&D institutes in 
various provinces. During 2000, for example, the Government Military Representative 
Bureau reportedly began to cooperate with its counterparts in the national defence 
departments of universities, colleges, and scientific research institutes of five cities in 
northern China The aim of this initiative was to facilitate better information sharing 
across provinces about technical innovations and potential markets for new products- 
both military and civilian. 54 While it is far from clear how successful this effort has been 
53 "Defence Commission Minister Sets Targets for 2002, " Zhongguo Xinwen She, 7 January 
2002. 
54 Jiang Huai and Fu Cheng, "Beijing Military Representatives Bureau Cooperates with Five 
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in overcoming deeply ingrained localism in defence production, the adoption of this plan 
to boost cross-province defence industry cooperation indicates that the government 
recognizes these problems and is making efforts to overcome them. 
Last, the reform of the military representative office (MRO) system became a 
recent priority for senior leaders in the GAD system. For years, the PLA used a system of 
military representative offices at the city, enterprise and factory level to ensure quality 
control and contract compliance of defence projects at factories and research institutes. " 
In light of the high degree of diversification of defence factories into civilian production 
since the 1980s, most MROs were based in civilian factories and institutes involved in 
defence work. The MRO system had been troubled and ineffective for many years. 
MROs were understaffed and military personnel were reportedly overworked. Many 
MRO personnel lacked the technical expertise to effectively oversee contract 
compliance and ensure quality, a problem that in some cases is exacerbated by high staff 
turnover. Overall, staffers have done a poor job of monitoring and evaluating ongoing 
equipment production. The objectivity and reliability of many MROs were problematic 
because representatives who reside at factories for a long time tend to shift their loyalties 
from the military to protecting the interests of local factories and townships. 56 
These weaknesses in the MRO system were significant because many 
manufacturers show a disregard for ensuring the quality and reliability of their products 
and often miss production deadlines. Factories often gave a higher priority to the 
production of civilian products than military ones due to their higher profit margins. 
Consequently, in recent years the government has initiated a major effort to overhaul the 
MRO system to improve contract compliance and quality control monitoring. Both the 
Provinces and Cities in North China in Building Regional Cooperation with Various Layers and 
Professions, " Jiefangjun Bao, 18 September 2000, p. 8. 
ss Chinese media reports have identified Military Representative Offices in Beijing, Wuhan, 
Shenyang, Changsha, Shanghai, and Wuhan. According to one report there were seven military 
representatives in a factory. See Jiefangjun Bao, 14 November 2001. 
56 Wu Ruihu, "Navy Military Representative Hard at Work in Supervising Armament 
Development, " Jiefangjun Bao, 10 April 2002. 
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State Council and COSTIND issued a series of new policies on improving the quality 
of military production. These new regulations included an entire system for 
improving monitoring and boosting education of military representatives. The 
effectiveness of these measures, however, was far from clear. " 
8.2.3. Constraints on China's Defence Industry Reform 
The government's ability to reform the management of defence procurement and 
to change the incentive structures among defence enterprises had a direct effect on the 
future production capabilities of China's defence industrial complex. Despite the many 
reforms in institutions and incentives in the defence industries since 1998, it was not 
yet clear how efficacious these reforms have been. The Government had a long and 
highly blemished history of adopting weak reforms and failing to implement more 
radical policy changes. It was not clear how quickly and effectively the post-1998 
measures could overcome the inertia and extensive problems that have plagued China's 
defence industrial establishment for the past several decades. Many of these problems 
were deeply entrenched in the central government bureaucracy, provincial-level 
agencies, and enterprise-level business operations. 
The government's uccess at fully implementing defence industrial reforms was 
broadly influenced by several tensions or "contradictions" that persisted at both the 
central government level and the enterprise level. These tensions constituted the broad, 
systemic constraints on China's newest, post-1998 effort to reform the defence industry 
system. The major tensions included the following: 
Reform Imperatives versus Social Stability. Efforts to rationalize and downsize 
China's large, bloated, and inefficient defence enterprises raised concerns about social 
stability, especially increasing unemployment, inability to fulfil pension commitments, 
and cutting off funding for enterprise-run social welfare programs. The 1998 reforms 
eliminated a number of the social welfare obligations of many state-owned defence 
enterprises, such as housing and health care. However, the managers of some defence 
enterprises have been reluctant to implement these reforms for fear of the impact on 
5' Zhang Yi, "The State Adopts Effective Measures for Improving Quality of National Defence- 
related Products, " Xinhua, 23 March 2000. 
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social stability. Riots and social unrest related to rationalization at defence factories have 
already occurred in China. Such concerns likely limited the pace and scale of defence 
enterprise reform. 
GAD Versus State COSTIND. The civilianization of COSTIND and the 
creation of GAD injected new Tensions into the 1998 round of defence industry 
reforms. GAD gained influence over central government procurement-related decisions 
at the expense of COSTIND. These new agencies often competed for influence in the 
defence procurement process. This tension contributed to delays and inefficient 
decision-making on specific military projects. The competition between these agencies 
will continue to complicate the government's ability to streamline the procurement 
process and to reform defence enterprise operations. 
Localism versus I ree Market? Practices. Historically China's defence 
industrial enterprises were highly vertically integrated and relied on single-source 
suppliers. These patterns have been exacerbated by long-standing political ties within 
regions and provinces that influence business relations among firms in the same localities. 
As a consequence, many defence enterprises were reluctant to seek cooperation with firms 
in other regions, even though they may offer higher-quality and lower-cost products. This 
constituted a significant barrier to improving the quality of weapon systems and reducing 
the costs of defence production. 
8.3. Strategic Restructuring in China South Industries Group Corp. 
8.3.1. Background 
China South Industries Group Corp. (CISGC) is one of large State-owned 
enterprises in defence industry, established in July 1999 with the approval of the State 
Council of the People's Republic of China and split-off from the former China North 
Industries Group (NORINCO(G). Under CSIGC, there are 51 large-and medium-sized 
industrial enterprises and 4 research institutes and 3 R&D centres. With registered 
capital of 12 billion yuan (RMB) and about 135,000 employees, CSIGC has established 
marketing institutions in over 30 countries and regions around the world, and their 
products have been exported to over 100 countries and regions. 
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Since it was converted to key civilian industries, while consolidating its role in 
developing and manufacturing military product, and improving R&D in defence 
industry, CSIGC succeeded in adjusting production structure, enhancing the civilian 
products as its core businesses such as automobile and motorcycle manufacturing, 
optical and electronic industries. Changan Automobile Corp. Ltd., China Dialing Group 
Corp. Ltd., China North Industries Corp. (NORINCO), and Jianshe Industries(Group) 
Co. Ltd. are some of its wholly-owned or holding companies. 
As I described in Section 3, beginning in spring 1998, during the 9th Meeting of 
the National People's Congress, China's leadership initiated a new series of policies to 
reform the operation of the defence procurement system at the government level and to 
restructure the defence industries at the enterprise level. These policies have set the 
stage for institutional changes in the management of China's defence industry that 
outstrip past efforts in both scope and depth. These reforms indicate an 
acknowledgement of the depth of the problems of China's defence industrial system, 
They include policies intended to genuinely transform the structure and operation of that 
system by seeking to streamline and reduce corruption and inefficiency in the 
procurement process and forcing a degree of rationalization and accountability at the 
enterprise level. 
The defence industry's corporate structure also has undergone major 
restructuring. The eleven leading state-owned defence industrial corporations that 
oversee the corporate management of the defence industry have undergone streamlining 
and management reform to inject greater efficiency, cut waste and adopt market 
discipline in their operations. 
In this context, after split from NORINCO, CSIGC has launched radical 
ownership restructuring in the whole group with a view to transform the group to 
become a competitive conglomerate in the global market. Before analyzing the 
restructuring strategies in CSIGC, I want to present the result of management survey 
about perceptions of executives of CSIGC toward CSR. 
8.3.2. Perceptions of Managers toward CSR 
The interview was conducted with the structured questionnaires to determine the 
profile of managers' attitudes on CSR. The survey contains five components: the 
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attitudes toward CSR in general; managers' orientation to the power and impact of 
stakeholder groups; determinants of socially responsible actions in the context of 
China's economic development; determinants of socially responsible performance in 
restructuring, and the areas of CSR activities the firms have involved in recent years. 
The statements in the structured questionnaires were given on a five-point interval scale 
which ranges from (5) strongly degree to (1) strongly disagree. 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
This part of questionnaire contains eleven statements addressing the attitudes for 
and against CSR It intends to investigate the perceptions of managers about various 
perspectives of CSR in terms of relationship between CSR and profitability, CSR and 
constituencies such as governments, banks and investor, CSR and firm's reputation, 
CSR and government regulations, CSR and business environment, CSR and public 
relations. 
Table 8-1 shows the distribution of sampled managers' attitudes toward CSR. 
The managers were requested to respond to the three statements in the questionnaire: 
Whether the exercise of CSR is inconsistent with the profitability; whether business 
should participate more actively in social responsibility in prosperous economic times 
than in recession, and whether high social responsibility can put a firm at a economic 
disadvantage compared to less socially responsible one. 
In response to first statement, the managers grouped into a large majority: 
61.8% agreed that the socially responsible actions do not conflict with pursuit of profits, 
while spending money for social programmes will actually result in more profit for the 
business. However, there is a small proportion (27.2%) agreed that businesses' function 
is to maximize profits, and firm should concentrate on business. This argument is in line 
with the classical economic doctrine of profit maximization, which argues that 
economic values are the sole criteria used to measure success. The manager is the agent 
of the stockholders, and all of his decisions are controlled by his desire to maximize 
profits for them. Only 10.9% held the neutral stance. Responding to the second 
argument, a large proportion (80%) agreed that businesses should actively participate in 
socially responsible activities; not only in prosperous economic times, but in recession. 
9.1% believed that the social programmes shall be suspended or stopped in recession. 
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This implies that being a socially responsible firm should assume the social 
responsibility at any time. In response to the third statement, about half of interviewed 
managers disagreed that high CSR could put a firm at an economic disadvantage. Only 
20% thought it could happen. 
Table 8-1 Attitudes of Managers toward CSR 
Statements Total Mean Sd'ongly Agr+ee Neutral Udtngroe ShrJnxfyý 
agree duagºoo 
1. Engagement of a finn in socially responsible 
actions does not conflict with pursuit of profit 
2. Business will participate more actively in 
social responsibility in prosperous economic 
times than in recession 
3. A business that wishes to capture a 
favourable public image will have to show that 
it is socially responsible 
4. There is no difference between involvement 
of a firm in socially responsible activities and 
public relations positioning 
5. Business already has too much social power 
and should not engage in social activities that 
might give it more 
6. If business is more socially responsible, it 
will avoid additional regulations of the 
economic system by government, and reduce 
restricts in firm's operation 
7. lnvolvement by business in improving its 
local community's quality life will also 
improve long run profitability 
g. A firm perceived as high in social 
responsibility can face relatively low level of 
industrial conflicts 
9. High social responsibility can put a firm at 
an economic disadvantage compared to less 
socially responsible one 
I O. Socially responsible activities can improve 
a firm's standing with bankers, and access 
sources of capital 
11. Socially responsible activities can improve 
a firm's standing with investors, and reduce 
financial risk 
55 3.64 32.7 29.1 10,9 23,6 
55 4,11 41.8 38.2 10.9 73 1.8 
55 4.35 50.9 40.0 1.8 0.0 00 
55 2.65 7.3 12.7 23.6 50.9 5.5 
55 3.40 25.5 23.6 20.0 273 36 
55 2.96 7.3 25,5 25,5 40.0 1.8 
55 4.00 29.1 50.9 12.7 5.5 1.8 
55 3.75 23.3 45.5 14.5 14 518 
55 2.51 1.8 18.2 20.0 49.1 10.9 
55 3.13 1.8 36.4 34.5 273 00 
55 3.18 3.6 34.5 40.0 20.0 1.8 
It is assumed by many people that engagement in CSR is just like to launch 
public relation campaign in favour of firm's business. The result reveals that over half 
(56.4%) of respondents didn't agreed that CSR is a kind of public relations positioning 
(pRP), they have difference in nature. Less than half (43.6%) agreed or held neutral 
stance in the argument. Obviously, there was a slight difference between the two groups, 
it implies that most of Chinese managers haven't better understanding of the difference 
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between CSR and PRP. 
Corporate image/reputation is a function of organizational signal which 
determine the perceptions of various stakeholders regarding the actions of an 
organization. Because of its relations to actions of an organization, image has been 
studied as an indicator of the social performance of the organization. Many companies 
know that being a socially responsible firm can get or keep a positive image, increase 
sales, being a socially irresponsible firm can be punished by the market, lose customers, 
and may even go out of business. The result of the survey shows that a large proportion 
(90.9%) of respondents agreed that a business that wishes to capture a favourable public 
image will have to show that it is socially responsible, only a very small proportion 
(1.8%) took the neutral stance. It sends a signal that a good corporate citizen requests its 
business partner to show it is social responsible, and a positive image. Moussavi and 
Evans (1986) argues that social responsible activities may also improve a firm's 
standing with such important constituencies as bankers, investors, and government 
officials, because improved relationships with these constituencies may bring economic 
benefits. However, my survey shows that less than half of interviewed managers didn't 
agree that if business is more socially responsible, it will avoid additional regulations of 
the economic system by government, it can improve a firm's standing with bankers and 
investors. This is in connection with the question that if business already has too much 
social power and should not engage in social activities that might give it more (49.1% 
agree, and 30.9 disagree); especially, it is true in the context of Chinese SOEs, where 
SOEs assume very heavy social services for their employees and as well as the 
communities they operate. Financial and administrative burdens associated with social 
services raise costs and prevent SOEs from being competitive, and it is considered as an 
additional barrier for external investors who might refrain from investments in 
enterprises with large social liabilities. 
In conclusion, judging from the means of eleven statements, which are 
composed of seven positive statements (means of 3.57), and four negative (means of 
3.17), the results of the means imply that the managers of CSIGC are moderately in 
favour of CSR. 
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Managers? Orientation toward Impact of Stakeholders 
To measure the orientation to seven stakeholder groups, the managers were 
asked to answer the following two questions which are: (a) to what extent, do 
stakeholder groups have impact on your firm's public imagelreputation; (b) what 
relationship your firm has established with the stakeholder groups. Each item used a 5- 
point Likert-type response scale indicating the relative degree of impact, and 
relationship. The table 2 reveals the result of interview analysis. 
The descriptive statistics are given in Table 5. In terms of the impact of 
stakeholder groups on firm's reputation, the means of the stakeholder orientation 
indexes show that the managers in CSIGC tend to rank customer, employees and 
government as the highest (the means of the three stakeholder groups are respectively 
4.45,4.31 and 4.36), closely followed by the general public, shareholders and business 
partners (4.13,4.04 and 4.04). The other stakeholders' impact ranked considerably 
lower among the managers, with communities ranked the lowest (3.72). Over 90 percent 
of respondents agreed that employees and customers can exert much more influence on 
a firm's reputation or image, and more than 80 percent perceived that governments and 
business partners play a important role in influencing a firm's business reputation. 
Table 8-2 Descriptive Statistics for Impact of Stakeholders on Firm's Reputation 
and Firm's Relationship with Stakeholders 
Stakeholder Extent of Impact on Firm's 
Groups No. Reputation* Extent of Relationship with Firm** 
Mean Percentage Rank by Mean 
Percentage 
of good 
Rank by y 
of impact mean 
relations mean 
Shareholders 55 4,04 78.2 5 3.95 81.8 4 
Customers 55 4.45 90.9 2 4.04 87.4 2 
Employees 55 4.31 92.7 1 4.05 83.6 1 
Business partners 55 4.04 83.6 4 3.98 80.0 3 
The general public 55 4.13 76.4 6 3.76 69.1 6 
Local communities 55 3.84 76.4 7 3.60 60.0 7 
Governments 55 4.36 85.4 3 3.91 76.4 5 
*Reputation Scale: 1= unsure, 5- great impact. ** Relationship Scale: 1- worse. 5- the best. 
Table 8-2 also reveals the views of managers about their firms' relationship with 
stakeholder groups. It shows that employees and customers again were ranked as the 
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highest (4.05 and 4.04), and closely followed by business partners, shareholders and 
governments (3.98,3.95 and 3.91), and once again, the general public and local 
communities were ranked as the lowest (3.76 and 3.60). Over 80 percent of managers 
reported that their firms have had a good relationship with employees, customers, 
shareholders, business partners. It seems that the extent of firm's relationship with 
stakeholder groups is associated with impact on firm's reputation. 
Determinants of CSR in the China $Context 
As shown in Table 8-2, and as well confirmed by some studies, one of the 
criteria for enterprise success, and not least important, is the quality of the enduring 
relationships which a firm develops and maintains with stakeholders uch as employees, 
customers, governments, business partners - all essential for a flexible and cooperative 
response to continual change and turbulence. This question in the survey is to 
determine what enterprise behaviour is more socially responsible in the context of the 
current economic development in China. 
Table 8-3 Survey Result of CSR Determinants in the China's Context 
1. Complying with state law and 
being a good tax payer 
(Governments) 
2. Provision of quality products and 
services for customers (Customers) 
3. Improving environmental quality 
and pollution control (Environment) 
4. Provision of a healthy and safe 
working environment (Employees) 
5. Creating value for company 
shareholders (Shareholders) 
6. Doing business with its partners 
with integrity (Business partners) 
7. Actively participating in social 
benefit activities (Communities) 
Total Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly, 
agree disagree 
55 69.1 27.3 3.6 0.0 00 
55 69.1 21.8 9,1 0.0 0,0 
55 61.8 34.5 3.6 0.0 0.0 
55 61.8 32.7 5.5 0,0 0.0 
55 61.8 27.3 9.1 0.0 0.0 
55 45.5 49.1 5.5 0.0 0.0 
55 23.6 54.5 20.0 1.0 0.0 
We found out in Table 8-3 that the degree of managers attached to the specific 
stakeholder-oriented activity. A 5-point Likert-type response scale was also used 
ranging from 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree). The result indicates that 69. I 
percent strongly agreed that a firm should comply with state law in doing business, and 
being a good tax payer (governments), and produce quality and services for customers. 
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61.8 % strongly agreed that a firm should pay attention to environment protection and 
pollution control, care about their employees by improving their working conditions, 
and also it's important to generate return to shareholders. Less than half of respondents 
agreed that attention of a firm should be placed on doing business with partners in an 
ethical manner and on involving social benefit activities. As a result of the interview, 
the socially responsible enterprise in the China's context could be defined as: does 
business within the framework of legal requirements (legal responsibility); protects 
environment from damage and pollution (environment responsibility); considers 
employees as its most important assets, provides meaningful work, fair wages and 
benefits, and provides an enabling working environment; and contributes to the 
prosperity and social cohesion of the communities in which it operates (social 
responsibility); rewards shareholders with a reasonable return over time and is customer 
focused (economic responsibility); and finally, applies the golden rule ("do unto others 
as you would have them do unto you") to its business partners (ethical responsibility). 
Determinants of Socially Responsible Performance in Restructuring 
Socially responsible restructuring means adopting business policies and practices 
to avoid the need for layoffs, embracing training programs that redeploy "redundant" 
employees to different jobs within the company, and employing other innovative 
instruments to avoid or reduce the need to downsize; adopting practices that eliminate 
or reduce potential problems when downsizing must occur, including open 
communications, fair severance benefits, transition services for those being downsized, 
and adequate attention to "survivors" - the employees left behind to work inside a 
downsized company. In the context of China's SOEs, the managers may perceive the 
socially responsible performance in restructuring in a different way. In my survey, the 
managers of CSIGC were asked to determine what enterprise behaviours or strategies 
are more socially responsible in restructuring. Nine statements were given in terms of 
social policies and strategies in the process of enterprise restructuring. 
The statistical analysis in Table 8-4 reveals that in the process of restructuring, 
in the pre-restructuring, the managers attached the most importance to open 
communications with stakeholders which are affected by the restructuring, in particular, 
employees, local communities (mean 4.36, and 94.5% agree), and followed by seeking 
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inputs from stakeholders, and early announcement. During the restructuring period, the 
means of specific practices shows that provision of internal or external outplacement 
service (4.38) was ranked as the most importance of determinant of socially responsible 
performance, and followed by support of self-employment through start-up their 
business (4.27), and provision of severance payment for voluntary early retirement 
(4.18). In the post-restructuring, 85.4% of respondents agreed that it's essential that 
salary and benefits for a period time should continue to be offered so that terminated 
employees can have reasonable time to find new jobs (4.15), and in the meantime, the 
redundant and laid-off employees and workers can be transferred to other units (4,07). 
Overall, the means of all nine measures related to determinants of the socially 
responsible performance in restructuring are more than 4.0; it indicates that all the 
practices are relatively important to socially responsible restructuring. It also implies 
that consultation process involving employees, trade unions, representatives of local 
government should be conducted before restructuring starts. It provides the parties 
involved, as early as possible, an opportunity for consultation on measures to be taken 
to avert or to minimize the impact of restructuring on stakeholders, particularly 
employees. Early communication and consultation with employees and other 
stakeholders who might be affected by restructuring is important to ensure fairness and 
transparency of the restructuring process. Voluntary redundancy arrangements and 
benefits can reduce workers' resistance to restructuring and facilitate transition. After 
restructuring, the temporary income support programmes (e. g. unemployment benefits, 
unemployment assistance, social assistance, early retirement schemes) should be offered 
to the displaced workers and employees, so that they can maintain the basic living 
standards and have time to do job research. 
Table 8-4 Perceptions of Socially Responsible Performance in Restructuring 
1. Prior to restructuring 
Open communications with employees about the 
restructuring event 
Seeking inputs from employees, trade unions and 
local communities 
Announcements of restructuring decision in very 
early stage 
Total Mean Strongly Agree Rank 
Agree by mean 
55 4.45 50.9 43.6 1 
55 4.35 43.6 49.1 2 
55 4,33 56.4 29.1 3 
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2. During restructuring 
Providing internal or external outplacement 
service such as training for employability, job 
counselling, financial planning and information 
on government benefits 
Encouraging and supporting employees to start 
up their own businesses 
Providing severance benefit package for 
voluntary early retirement 
Assisting employees in obtaining government 
benefit and job training support, job search 
allowance 
3. post-restructuring 
Continuing to offer salary and benefits for a 
period time in order to allow reasonable time for 
job search 
Organizing the transfer of redundant and laid-off 
employees to other units, giving them priority for 
iob vacancies 
55 4.38 47.3 43.6 1 
55 4.27 40.0 49.1 2 
55 4.18 30.9 56.4 3 
55 4.15 27.3 61.8 4 
55 4.15 30.9 54,5 1 
55 4.07 29.1 50.9 2 
Involvement in CSR Activities 
We notice that the managers in CSIGC attached great importance to CSR, this 
survey also intends to figure out what socially responsible activities the firms of CSIGC 
have involved over the past 3 years. 
The results found in Table 8-5 that over the past 3 years, all of the firms have 
involved in the social welfare for employees, and improvement of environment and 
pollution control. More than 80 percent involved in organization and participation of 
social benefit activities, employees voluntarism, contribution to state tax and 
contribution to assist the vulnerable and handicapped group. Few of firms were 
interested in financial supports for the cultural and educational programs (60%), 
donation to the social welfare organizations (41.8%). 
The results imply that the managers allocated less importance to corporate 
philanthropic responsibility than other responsibilities. It seems that the managers don't 
perceive the philanthropic activities as a proxy of CSR. This is because CSR embodies 
four kinds of responsibility: economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic. All these 
responsibilities have always existed to some extent, but it has been in recent years that 
ethical and philanthropic functions have taken a significant place (Carroll 1979,1991). 
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Table 8-5 Areas of CSR Involved by Firms In the Past Three Years 
9. Organizing or participating in public welfare activities 
10. Encouraging employees' voluntary welfare programmes 
11. Improving employee welfare (facilities and benefits) 
12. Active contribution of tax to government 
13. Improving pollution control/environment impact 
14. Contribution to vulnerable group 
15. Donation to charitable and public welfare organizations 
16. Contribution to cultural and literary programmes 
NO. % 
55 83.6 
55 89.1 
55 100.0 
55 98.2 
55 100.0 
55 80.0 
55 41.8 
55 60.0 
Conclusion 
The results of the management survey tells us that the managers in CSIGC have 
been getting more aware of the concept of CSR, and agree that it's important for a firm 
to engage in socially responsible actions, a better society can produce a better 
environment for the business to grow; and a socially responsible firm can capture a 
favourable public image to attract more investors and customers. The survey shows that 
managers in CSIGC regard employees, customers and government as their primary 
stakeholders, and pay more attention to establish good relationships with them. Most of 
respondents were willing to be a good tax payer, provide quality products and good 
services for customers, and a healthy and safe condition for employees to work. 
However, they ignore the importance of another stakeholder: local community. 
The survey also attempts to investigate in the context of Chinese economic 
development, how the managers interpret social responsibility and behaviour in 
restructuring. The result reveals that being a socially responsible firm, it does business 
within the framework of legal requirements; protects environment from damage and 
pollution; considers employees as its most important assets, provides meaningful work, 
fair wages and benefits, and provides an enabling working environment; and contributes 
to the prosperity and social cohesion of the communities in which it operates; rewards 
shareholders with a reasonable return over time. When the downsizing is inevitable to 
be implemented in the restructuring, the necessary support measures and programmes 
should be taken during the three stages of restructuring; much attention should be paid 
to the pre- and post-restructuring. For example, prior to implementation of restructuring, 
consultation process involving employees, trade unions, representatives of local 
government should be conducted. The parties should be involved as early as possible. 
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Early communication and consultation with employees and other stakeholders 
concerned is important to ensure fairness and transparency of the restructuring process. 
Voluntary redundancy arrangements and benefits can reduce workers' resistance to 
restructuring and facilitate transition. After restructuring, the temporary income support 
programmes (e. g. unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance, social assistance, 
early retirement schemes) should be offered to the displaced workers and employees, so 
that they can maintain the basic living standards and have time to do job research. 
8.3.3. Restructuring Strategy and Policy in CSIGC 
Since the beginning of the 21 century, SOE restructuring in China has 
concentrated on restructuring of the military, non-ferrous metal, coal and some other 
key industries after the textile sector's readjustment in 2001. More than 160 military 
industrial enterprises would be closed down or bankrupted to create more large 
companies and enterprises which were strongly competitive in the world market 
(People's Daily 2002a). CSIGC is one of the largest defence industries in China, 
therefore, in line with the strategies and principles laid by the central authorities in 
1998, which require all large and medium-sized SOEs to undertake restructuring 
through M&As, bankruptcy, lay-off and downsizing to streamline business and increase 
productivity and profitability, and the arrangements made by Commissions of Science, 
Technology and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND), by the end of 1998, the 
employees and workers in the defence industry must be downsized from 2.07 million to 
1.5 million. The requirements of labour force in the defence industry should be 
determined by the principle, which is that the production capability should be 
determined by the sale, and the size of workers/employees required by the company 
should be decided by production capability. COSTIND requires all enterprises in 
defence industry take aggressive measures to downsize and displace the workers 
through different restructuring approaches to improve competitiveness and productivity. 
In response to the strategies and policies, CSIGC launched group-wide 
restructuring since 2001, with the focus on divestiture of labour force through spin-off, 
structural adjustment, debt-to-equity swap, mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy. Over 
the past few years, the CSIGC has strengthened structural adjustments and reforms, 
restructured some enterprises, realized the debt-to-equity swap of nine enterprises and 
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bankrupted some insolvent enterprises. In light of the needs of debt-to-equity swap and 
adjustment of production capability, efforts have also been made to establish corporate 
operational mechanisms and to introduce standardized management. These measures 
accelerated the optimization of capital structure, promoted asset utilization; raised 
management levels and revitalized loss-incurring enterprises 
In 2004, a new strategy, called "622 Development Strategy", was approved by 
top management. The goals defined in the strategy are to double the profitability and 
productivity, and make CSIGC become the Fortune 500 in two different phrases within 
6 years. The first stage (2004-2006) will centre on: (a) restructuring to streamline the 
business through divesture of labour, getting rid of debts, and as well removing social 
burdens that firms shoulder; (b) developing system of corporate governance to legalize 
and modernize the firms; promoting diversification of ownership of SOEs. The second 
(2007-2009) will concentrate on developing CSIGC into the large global corporation 
which can compete in the global market through developing core competency such as 
civilian products and services. 
Re-adjustment of Production Capacity 
The vision of CSIGC is to take the special military products as foundation, and 
civilian products for prosperity; and make it become a competitive conglomerate at the 
international level. The current goal of CSIGC is to maintain 10 percent annual growth, 
and to increase the industrial added-value to over 4.7 billion Yuan. The strategy is to 
integrate the military production into civilian production, determine automobile, 
motorcycle, vehicle spares parts, and optics and electronics as the four core businesses, 
to maintain the position of its military equipment manufacturing, and particularly, to 
increase the competitiveness in the civilian product market. 
In the automotive field, CSIGC decided to make automobiles the principal 
driving force behind the development of automobile spare parts. Special emphases were 
placed in development of two joint-venture companies-"Chang'An-Ford" and 
"Chang'An-Suzuki", in enhancing the competitive advantages in minivans and mini- 
trucks. Chongqing in Southwest China was determined as the automobile manufacturing 
base, within which, the Chang'An Industry Development Garden will be established to 
realize the mission of 120,000 capacity of automobile production. In addition, other two 
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manufacturing companies will be set up in NanJing and Hebei to gradually develop the 
reasonable regional structure of automobile manufacturing in the country, to facilitate 
the trans-regional development of their automobile, and to capture more shares in the 
domestic automobile market. 
The strategy for motorcycle development is to accomplish the transfer of large 
undertakings by using as much resources as possible; to speed up internal restructuring 
through spin-off and bankruptcy, in the meantime, to encourage foreign-funded and 
private companies to participate in the enterprise restructuring. The engineering and 
modernization of production must be promoted. It is planned to reduce the cost of 
supply of raw materials and other accessory equipment, production and circulation, 
shorten the cycle of production, improve work organization system, and increase the 
investment in R&D to enhance the core competencies in the motorcycle design and 
production. 
In 2003, CSIGC also launched the restructuring plan for photo-electronic 
products, and made crucial progress in some programs, which laid the foundation for 
the new growth point. The focus will be concentrated on the spherical lens, model line 
of optical processing and new photo-electronic materials in the future. 
As far as vehicle spare parts are concerned, the efforts have been made to 
strengthen the cooperation with business partners, upgrade the production, and R&D 
capabilities. The internal restructuring has been undertaken to accelerate the 
development of vehicle parts manufacturing. 
Improving the Technological Capacities 
The overall strategy for improving the technological capabilities of China's 
defence industries has three main elements. The first is selective modernization, China's 
government realizes that given the size of China's economy and the overall 
technological level of the country, it would be too costly to attempt to acquire the 
capability to produce advanced weapon systems across the board. China's government 
is focusing on making breakthroughs in certain key areas. The second element of the 
strategy is civil-military integration. Despite the difficulties associated with defence 
conversion described above, China's leaders remain convinced that the integration of 
civilian and military production is the key to developing an advanced military. Although 
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in the early 1980s the primary hope was that China's defence manufacturers would be 
able to use their technological capabilities to generate profits on civilian markets, today 
the principal hope seems to be that, through participation in commercial production, 
China's defence manufacturers will acquire dual-use technological capabilities that can 
be used in the production of weapon systems. China's government also continues to 
count on civilian production by China's defence manufacturers to maintain their 
financial solvency, reducing the amount of funding the government needs to provide 
simply to keep these enterprises afloat. 58 
The third element of the Government's strategy is acquiring advanced foreign 
technology. With the aim of not undercutting the long-term goal of self-reliance in 
defence production, China sees importing foreign technology as essential to enabling it 
to achieve independence in defence production. Given the backwardness of China's 
defence industries relative to the advanced nations of the world, Chinese leaders believe 
that the best way to rapidly achieve this goal is to import both the Technology for 
producing state-of-the-art military equipment and the equipment itself until Chinese 
manufacturers can produce more technologically advanced products. 
CSIGC intends to take advantage of the high technology in the defence industry, 
and human resource, and financial resources on making breakthroughs in key fields, 
Mini-autos, motorcycles, parts and components for vehicles, and photo-electronics have 
constituted the backbone of the group's civilian products. The sales volume of the 
automobiles produced was 232,000 last year, an increase of 16.3 percent over the 
previous year, and occupied fourth position in the domestic automobile industry. Both 
the output value and sales volume of Chang'An Automobile Company Ltd. exceeded 10 
billion Yuan. Motorcycle sales were 1.471 million Yuan, of which'Jialing' motorcycles' 
accounted for 803,000 Yuan, up 7.9 percent over the previous year. The sales volume of 
automobile and motorcycle parts and components was 3.88 billion Yuan, an increase of 
4.2 percent over 2000. 
In terms of CSIGC's strategy for high technology and innovation, CSIGC has 
put forward the new objectives for the development of military and civilian productions 
58 Liu Jibin, "Implement the Guideline of Military 
-Civilian Integration, Rejuvenate the National 
Defence Science and Technology Industry, " Renmin Ribero, 2 February 1999, p12. 
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over the next few years: firstly, an open R&D system of military production should be 
set up by effective integration of internal resources, and by collaboration with external 
resources. The R&D system is featured by scientific structure, and core competencies. 
Secondly, the investment should be increased in development of high technology and 
innovation. Special attention should be focused on applying information technology in 
military production, and on developing independently new models of vehicles and 
optical-electronic products, by drawing on the advanced experience and practices of 
other countries. 
Restructuring Ownership 
During the 1990s, more and more corporations in China enhanced firm 
performance through restructuring their capital or ownership and assets. They have 
improved their multiples (price/earnings ratios) by improving their operating 
performance through incentives for managers and increasing strategic flexibility to 
acquire and form alliances. They have also appealed to new kinds of investors and have 
provided greater transparency and more relevant information about the company. There 
were different techniques of ownership restructuring, such as spin-off, bankruptcy, 
equity carve-out, management buyouts, employment ownership, and the break-up of 
parts of a corporation. 
The spin-off and bankruptcy have been frequently used in CSIGC to get rid of 
firm debts and improve its firm performance. The spin-offs were one solution for 
conglomerates concerned about their ability to remain competitive in some of their 
business. In terms of bankruptcy, the interests of all stakeholders were compromised 
when companies were forced into bankruptcy. Laws exist in most of developed 
countries to protect shareholders from creditors who may be ready to close down a 
company in order to claim repayment of debts without regard to the true stakeholders' 
concern about the company as an ongoing enterprise. In other countries, courts decide 
when a company can go into bankruptcy and how it will be managed. China began to 
carry out the merger and bankruptcy policy in 1996, mainly in coal, nonferrous metal, 
sugar, textile, iron and steel, and as well defence industries, in a bid to streamline and 
restructure SOEs. As a result, more than 6,400 large and medium-sized SOEs were 
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merged or downsized during 1996 to 1998, and 1,843 enterprises went bankrupt or 
closed down in 1999, writing off non-performing loans of 29.1 billion Yuan. 59 
One of the strategies and policies of ownership restructuring in CSIGC focused 
on the "10510 Scheme", which requires that by 2005,10 companies must go bankruptcy; 
5 others must start the bankruptcy process; and another 10 firms are expected to get 
approved by the central Government. Another one was to spin off subsidiary or non- 
core business from the core business in the large and medium-sized enterprises; then the 
spun-off subsidiary firm must be restructured to become the economic entity and create 
more job opportunities for re-deployment of laid-off and unemployed workers. The 
emphasis of the spin-off strategy is to divest the social assets in SOEs as an independent 
company with diversified ownerships. By 2004,143 spin-off programmes were 
identified and approved in 25 companies, and of which, 32 spin-offs in 15 companies 
completed. In 2004,20 companies were closed down, 7 companies divested and 
bankrupted. 20 companies will be closed down or bankrupted, and another 20 firms be 
spun off and the subsidiary businesses be separated from the core businesses. 
Liu Jibin, Minister of COSTIND claims that shareholding reform is the best 
solution for loss-making enterprises, which are now a common member of market and 
no longer the apple of the state's eye. 60 The shareholding reform has been carried out in 
CSIGC, 2-3 qualified enterprises will be restructured as shareholding companies, and 
another 2-3 firms will complete debt-swap-to stock programme. By 2005,47 companies 
will participate in the restructuring programmes, which involve total assets of about 
15.1 billion Yuan, debts of 12.1 billion Yuan, 140,000 workers, and 58,000 retired 
workers. By carrying out the strategy, it is expected that CSIGC will get rid of 800 
million Yuan debts. 
In the meanwhile, corporate governance structure is required to be developed in 
the restructured companies. In enhancing the process, CSIGC has decided to implement 
the system of chief accountant assignment, and set up office of board of directors to 
improve accounting standard and information transparency, and protect shareholder 
s9 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 
- 
Economic, "China drives enterprise reform by allowing more 
mergers, bankruptcies", London, August 3 2000. 
60 China Daily, "Defence industry eyes foreign cash", New York, July 4 2001. 
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rights and interests, as well as state assets. 
Restructuring and Firm Performance 
As a result of the restructuring and reform over the past six years, CSIGC was 
able to reduce the deficits of the enterprises through the adjustment of production 
capability, strategic enterprise restructuring, and policy support from the Central 
Government. 
Table 8-6 shows that the 64.5 billion yuan of total sales were generated in 2004, 
of which, sales of industrial production were 45.4 billion yuan, it was 2.68 times over 
the industrial sales in 1999, average 22 percent of annual growth over the past five years. 
In particular, in recent two years, the sales grew to 40%, CSIGC was the fastest growth 
company in the 10 defence industries. The value-added of industry amounted to 9.2 
billion yuan, which were more than 3.1 times of 1999. The labour productivity also 
increased from 13,200 yuan/per person to 60,000 yuan/person. 
Table 9-6 Comparison of Financial Performance in 1999,2003 and 2004 
Indicator 1999 2003 2004 
Sale (100 million) n. a. 500 645 
Industrial sale (100 million) 169 337 454 
Value-added of industry (100 million) 29.9 73 92 
Labour productivity (10,000 Yuan/per person) 1.32 46 
Employment (person) 228600 134784 
Production of Vehicle 10000 
Automobile (10,000 vehicles) 14 58 41 
Motorcycle (10,000 vehicles) n. a. 306 189 
Sale of Optical-electronics products (100 million) n. a. n. a. 15.2 
Source: Annual Conference Reports 2004 and 2005. 
The operating performance in recent years is shown in Table 8-7. We found that 
the sale growth was up from 23% in 2001 to 28% in 2004. CSIGC was ranked 31 in 
China Fortune500 in 2004, increased 11 levels compared to 2001, and ranked 8 in China 
Manufacturing Industries. Compared with other defence industries, CSIGC was rated as 
a number one in 7 defence industries of China Fortune500; number four in the 
automobile industry of China500; number one in the motorcycle industry of China 
Fortune500. This implies that CSIGC have relative advantage in the core competencies 
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over others. 
Table 8-7 Financial Performance of CSIGC 2001-2004 
Year Sale Sale profit Profit assets employees Rank 
growth growth 
2001 2508482 23.49 
-46022 43.45 4855526 205762 42 
2002 3969218 20.22 6522 121.29 7506347 187763 33 
2003 5015909 26.37 
-88380 
-86.75 7616559 134784 33 
2004 6435475 28.30 86838 656.82 7792612 1121230 31 
Source: China Report of Chinese Enterprise Report 2002,2003, and 2004. Rank refers to China 
Fortune500, which was rated in the Report. 
CSIGC's insistence on combination of the military and civilian has brought 
about productive results. Table 8-6 also reveals that CSIGC has become the third largest 
automobile production in terms of sales in China's market. In 2004,580,000 vehicles 
were sold, which was 4.14 times more than the sales of 1999 (140,000 vehicles), the 
sales of motorcycles always maintain the number one in China. The emerging 
enterprises in the fields of auto parts, optical-electronics, medicine, chemicals, and 
engineering machine have also improved their operating performance. This trend is 
shown in Table 8-8, where it reveals sales growth of the most two key motor companies, 
Chang'An Automobile Co. Ltd and Jialing Motorcycle Industrial Co., Ltd, and one 
optical and Electronics Company, Tianxing Instruments and Meters Co., Ltd. All these 
improvement in firm performance laid down a solid foundation for the group to strive to 
fulfill the "622 Development Strategy" in the coming years. 
Table 8-8 Financial Performance of Motor and Instrument Companies 1999- 
2004 
Indicator Firm Name 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Chan-An Automobile 8563 7874 7135 7077 7532 7944 
Co. Ltd 
Employment Jialing Industrial Co. 8995 4829 4378 4548 4230 4137 
(person) Ltd 
Tianxing Instruments 2519 1620 1286 1174 1176 1167 
and Meters Co. Ltd 
Chan-An Automobile 709392 757167 663675 870273 1090807 1469200 
Co. Ltd 
Total assets Jialing Industrial Co. 350249 385431 399431 377183 382797 391292 
(100,000 Ltd 
Yuan) Tianxing Instruments 29868 33239 35729 24210 25841 27852 
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and Meters Co. Ltd 
Chan-An Automobile 544676 670321 733181 988407 1440412 1852660 
Co. Ltd 
Sale Jialing Industrial Co. 331129 257252 259051 288733 298589 329200 
(100,000 Ltd 
Yuan) Tianxing Instruments 9977 7928 5113 6262 8132 11966 
and Meters Co. Ltd 
Chan-An Automobile 5372 14765 16022 83500 145068 131730 
Co. Ltd 
Net profit Jialing Industrial Co. 5272 234 975 
-16806 561 1265 (100,000 Ltd 
Yuan) Tianxing Instruments 9977 7928 5113 6262 8132 11966 
and Meters Co. Ltd 
Chan-An Automobile 60.40 60.00 53.30 51.20 47.90 44.75 
Co. Ltd 
Leverage Jialing Industrial Co. 56.20 63.10 65.70 68.30 68.90 69.51 
(percentage) Ltd 
Tianxing Instruments 25.80 37.70 54.80 55.00 56.60 59,52 
and Meters Co. Ltd 
Source: Annual Reports. 
Social Issues Caused by Organizational Downsizing 
Efforts to rationalize and downsize China's large, bloated, and inefficient 
defence enterprises raise concerns about social stability, especially increasing 
unemployment, inability to fulfill pension commitments, and cutting off funding for 
enterprise-run social welfare programs. The 1998 reforms eliminated a number of the 
social welfare obligations of many state-owned defence enterprises, such as housing and 
health care. However, the managers of some defence enterprises have been reluctant to 
implement these reforms for fear of the impact on social stability. Riots and social 
unrest related to rationalization at defence factories have already occurred in China. 
Such concerns will likely limit the pace and scale of defence enterprise reform. 
The policy made by COSTIND in 1998 requires that the employees and workers 
in the defence industry must be downsized from 2.07 million by the end of 1998 to 1.5 
million in the years to come. The labour force in the defence industry should be 
determined by the principle, which is that the production capability should be 
determined by the sale, and the number of workers/employees needed in the company 
should be by production capability. It was requested to take aggressive measures to 
downsize and displace the workers. In the meantime, it defines the social support 
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programme for re-deployment of laid-off and unemployed workers as a result of 
enterprise restructuring with downsizing. 61 
The downsizing trends can be found in Table 8-6. Table 8-6 shows that since 
1999,93816 workers have reduced through downsizing, early retirement, and other 
channels. 27,000 redundant workers were laid off in 2001 (Yang 2002). 3 companies in 
Table 8-7 have also reduced their workforce at about 20-30 percent. 
Table 8-9 Survey Result of Enterprise Restructuring 2003-2004 
Item 
1. Employee involvement 
2. Local community involvement 
3. Government involvement 
4. Communication with employees 
5. Innovative production initiatives 
6. Workforce reduction 
7. Social programme provided for 
redundant/lay-offs 
8. Lay-offs deployed after 
restructuring 
9. Labour disputes in the 
restructuring 
10. Approaches employed in the 
restructuring 
11. Social functions split off from 
firms 
Total To great To some To little Not at all 
extent extent extent 
55 83.6 10.9 5.5 0,0 
55 60.0 25.5 3.6 10.9 
55 50.9 36.4 5.5 7.3 
55 54.5 40.0 3.6 1.8 
55 58.2 29.1 10.9 1.8 
55 30.9 29.1 14.5 25.5 
55 80.0 18.2 1.8 0.0 
55 69.1 25.5 5.5 0.0 
55 3.6 38.2 58.2 0.0 
55 12.7 41.8 45.5 0.0 
55 5.5 5.5 45,5 43.6 
Table 8-9 reveals that most of enterprises of CSIGC have suffered substantially 
workforce reduction. However, thanks to the socially responsible approaches CSIGC 
undertook in the restructuring, the social support programmes were designed to assist 
lay-offs to find new jobs, for example, and 13,800 people found new jobs in 2001 (Yang 
2002). Table 8-9 also shows that restructured firms have substantially involved 
government, communities and employees in the restructuring, communicate frequently 
61 COSTIND, "the Guideline of Consolidating the Work on Laid-off of Workers and Re- 
employment", No. 675,29 November 1999. 
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with employees with restructuring information. Importantly, they have created more 
jobs through open new production lines and developing new products. 
Social Support Programme for Lay-offs and Unemployed Workers 
Strategies and principles laid by the central authorities, which are "encouraging 
M&As, regulating procedures of bankruptcy, laying off and displacing workers of 
SOEs, downsizing employees to improve profitability and efficiency, and in the 
meantime, carrying out re-employment project for lay-offs and the unemployed". And 
also set up the system of "Security on Three Fronts" (Bao Zhang Man), which includes 
basic livelihood guarantee for lay-offs of SOEs, unemployment insurance, and 
minimum livelihood guarantee for urban residents. 
Implementation of Re-employment Programme through various channels 
Re-employment Training shall be provided for the lay-offs and unemployed 
workers as a result of restructuring to improve employability and vocational skills. The 
training focuses on areas related to start-up business and skills in the service industry. 
The group corporations should provide financial supports for the training programmes. 
The tertiary industry is encouraged to be developed to create more jobs. The 
particular attention should be paid to community service trade, focusing on services for 
community residential living; logistics and security for institutions, enterprises and 
units, and community public management; and jobs of public, cleaning, greening, and 
maintenance of public facilities. 
Individual, private, foreign-funded, cooperative-share and other forms of 
economic ownership system are encouraged to expand employment, actively develop 
labour-intensive SMEs to continue to develop labour and employment service 
enterprises to absorb more laid-off and unemployed workers. 
Trans-regional labour cooperation and export of labour service to foreign 
countries should be encouraged. 
Start-up new business 
Employees in the enterprises who know business and management, and have 
professional expertise are encouraged to develop their own business. The privilege and 
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assistance shall be offered, provided that the economic entities they develop can re- 
deploy laid-off and unemployed workers over 60% of total employees. 
The managers shall be provided with working capital in the name of enterprise. 
The managers will be compensated with annual package, or rewarded by the return from 
the profit after tax when their businesses have been profitable for three years. The 
compensation, and rewards are closely linked to the firm performance, which shall be 
evaluated on the results of the maintenance of state assets values, redeployment of laid- 
offs and income tax they pay to the state. 
The individual-owned and private business shall be encouraged to develop. The 
owners can maintain the labour contracts with their enterprises for 3 years, and the 
social insurance can be managed and paid by the enterprises. 
Self-employment 
The laid-off and unemployed workers are encouraged to be self-employed or 
start up business with others. The self-employed workers, who break up labour relations 
with enterprises, shall be compensated according to the relevant laws and regulations. 
The laid-off and unemployed workers as a consequence of enterprises 
bankruptcy, closed-down, and transfer undertaking, they shall be compensated in the 
lump sum against criteria of some regulations for their self-employment, and also be 
exported to other regions for employment. 
Early retirement 
Those who want to take voluntarily 10-year early retirement; they can sign a 
contract with enterprises to maintain their social insurance. Contributions to the social 
security shall be made on the based of agreed rate. Those who want to take voluntarily 
5-year early retirement, after being approved by enterprises, they can take early 
retirement and leave the enterprises. They will be provided with living allowance. 
Contributions to the social security shall be paid by both individual and enterprise 
according to some regulations. After 5 years, they are entitled to enjoy full retirement 
benefits. 
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Consultancy and information on Reemployment 
It is required that all the institutions for the enterprises should keep in touch with 
enterprises, and provide consultancy and information about policies and practices that 
the state develop for re-deployment of laid-off and unemployed workers. The 
institutions also should provide labour market information about the job vacancies, re- 
training, and counselling and vocation guidance. 
8.4. Spin-off of Social Assets: Yangtze Chemical Plant Experience 
8.4.1. Introduction 
The Yangtze Chemical Company (YCC) was built in Jiujiang, Jiangxi Province 
in 1962, and it is one of the defence SOEs under CSIGC engaged in the research and 
production of non-metal synthetic materials. YCC now has seven manufacturing 
factories, 2 subsidiary plants, and one R&D institute, with total assets of 220 million 
RMB (US$ 27.16 million), and 2000 workers and employees. 
YCC is located in remote isolated region; it has developed a comprehensive 
system of social services in the past 40 years, covering the cradle-to-grave responsibility 
for their employees and community it operates. Like other defence SOEs, YCC took full 
responsibility for providing a wide array of social services for their employees and 
community, such as housing, education, day care and medical care, etc. Many 
departments and institutions were set up within YCC to provide such social services as 
school, hospital, kindergarten, administration, maintenance, hotel and catering, 
transportation, retirement office, residence council, etc. YCC acted as the dual role of 
government and enterprise in the company town. To play the role of government, YCC 
had to meet the social needs at the cost of less profit; to play the role of enterprise, and 
to succeed in the increasingly competitive market, YCC must concentrate on profit- 
maximization. These roles were often conflicting; therefore, separating the role of 
providing social services from the core business operation was an important strategy to 
modernize SOEs. 
In line with the requirements of the central government and CSIGC, all the 
qualified large and medium-sized SOEs shall divest the social assets from the core 
operation into independent subsidiary, undertake ownership restructuring in the spun-off 
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subsidiary company in order to displace and re-deploy lay-offs. 62 YCC initiated internal 
restructuring in 2002 through divesture of social assets including most of the social 
services and staff. 
8.4.2. Theoretical Background 
- 
Divesture of Social Assets from Core Business 
The problem of enterprise social assets is one of the most important issues 
facing enterprise restructuring. The extensive provision of social services to both 
employees and general public in surrounding communities diverts enterprises from their 
core activities. Financial and administrative burdens associated with social services 
raise costs and prevent enterprises from being competitive. Social assets are considered 
as an additional barrier for external investors who might refrain from investments in 
enterprises with large social liabilities. Additionally, in cases where large potentially 
insolvent enterprises provide a number of social services to their communities, it 
increases the bargaining power of such uncompetitive enterprises vis-? vis 
governmental authorities. It makes it very difficult for bankruptcy procedures to be 
initiated against them, and forces the state to continue to subsidize them. Users of 
enterprise social services are often not protected enough from arbitrary actions of 
enterprise managers and a general deterioration in the level of provided services. The 
downsizing of enterprises' social activities means that some other agents will have to 
perform these functions in their place. That is why the issue of enterprise social assets is 
not only one of the crucial components of industrial restructuring, but also is closely 
connected with both public and social sector reforms. There are a number of purposes 
for the public sector's involvement in substituting enterprise social functions: (i) 
protection of some critical elements of public services (e. g. kindergartens), which might 
otherwise disappear due to reductions in enterprises' funding; (ii) facilitating of reforms 
in both housing and delivering mechanisms for some public services (e. g. health 
services), which would be easier if all corresponding assets were temporarily 
concentrated under the management of municipal governments; (iii) guaranteeing 
62 "Outline of Propaganda on Further Accomplishing Re-employment Work for Laid-off and 
Unemployment Workers", CCP Central Committee Propaganda Department and Ministry of 
Labour & Social Security, 29 October 2002. 
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adequate access for citizens to important public services, largely because social 
activities of enterprises are sometimes delivered at a much higher, sometimes at a much 
lower, level than public ones; (iv) financial savings through rationalization of 
management and provision of services. At the same time, some former enterprise social 
assets could be either privatized or used to introduce new institutional reforms in the 
public sector. These assets are not necessarily to be transferred to existing public 
governance structures and fall under the control of prevailing interests therein. So, the 
divestiture of these assets could make them pioneers in social sector restructuring and, 
therefore, might facilitate social sector reforms in general (Freinkman and 
Starodubrovskaya 1996). 
In the transforming and conversion of defence production in the 1990s, YCC 
had attempted to transfer social assets to the public sector through different approaches 
for many times such as contract responsibility, and director's responsibility, since 
property rights over a major part of social assets, most notably housing, were not 
properly defined as the transfer decisions were largely left for the local level players to 
make. It failed to succeed in divesture of social assets. After many years' SOE reform, a 
considerable amount of housing and other social assets were still within YCC. After the 
efforts to transfer these assets from firm to the public sector in the mid 1990s, this 
phenomenon has not received much attention. YCC still provided a wide array of social 
services or finance them despite having divested of them. By 1997, YCC was still 
retaining 10 departments which offered the social services such as school, hospital, 
child care, administration, facility maintenance, hotel, transportation, retirement office, 
and local community office. The staff in the departments accounted for 11.3% of total 
workers in the firm, and overhead for 24.7% of total operating expenses of business. All 
of the social service provision became the heavy burden on preventing the firm from 
further reform and development. In 2002, in line with the CSIGC restructuring plan, 
YCC launched the restructuring programme with a special focus on divesture of social 
assets from the core business of firm, and got rid of the debt. The main objectives of the 
social services restructuring was to enable survival of the existing services; to retain 
workplaces; to improve the effectiveness and quality of services; to divest social 
services into a new economic entity, and to gradually reduce the subsidies provided by 
the firm. 
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8.4.3. Spinning off Social Assets into an Independent Subsidiary 
In 2002, complying with the requirements of central government, under the 
guidance of CSIGC, YCC launched enterprise restructuring to spin off the social 
service. The social services (e. g. the 10 departments) were divested from YCC and were 
reorganized as a separate company "Yangtze Chemical Community Co. Ltd Corp. 
(YCCCL)" with its own management and supervisory council. 
Spin-off of Social Services 
Prior to the implementation of divestiture, YCC designed and issued necessary 
documents in line with China Corporate Law, such as "Project for Establishment of 
YCCCL", "Company Charter", "Shareholding Scheme", "and Methods of Employee 
Shareholding Programme". The documents were regarded as the guidelines for the 
restructuring. In the meantime, the social assets of 10 departments were evaluated and 
audited by the accounting agency and State Assets Supervision and Management Office, 
The total social assets were about 1.902 million Yuan, and established the working 
capital of the new venture in total of 2.350 million Yuan (with the contribution of 0.448 
million Yuan from the mother company). The "Shareholding agreement" were passed 
and approved by the Workers' Council. On the agreement of the people to be 
transferred to the new company, their severance payment had been converted into the 
capital shares, which made them the shareholders of YCCCL. 
106 employees and workers in the social service departments voluntarily broke 
up with the parent company, and signed labour contracts with YCCCL, they were 
allowed to enjoy non-interrupt working age, pension, medical and unemployment 
insurance. According to the new Employee Share Ownership Programme (ESOP), 
seven shareholding commissioners were elected by the members to represent the 
interests of the stockholders. The workers shareholding capital (1.2633 million Yuan in 
total) constituted 53.76% of the total capital stock. The capital invested by the parent 
company in the form of the main assets in value -1.0867 million RMB constitutes 
46.24% of the total share capital. 
YCCCL was given self-sufficiency and required to develop new business from 
third parties to compete with other companies in the market. It was also allowed to bid 
for the contract to supply the inputs. The new businesses that YCCCL develops cover 
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management of community, resident service, medical service, logistics, construction 
and maintenance, hotel management, transportation of materials, provision of gas and 
electricity, and glass and metal production. YCCCL can sell its services and outputs to a 
third party at a higher price. 
Table 8- 10 JiuJiang Yanteize Chemical Company 1998-2003 
10,000 Yuan) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Employment 2468 1931 1883 1800 1714 2000 
(person) 
Assets 17938 19169 18142 18048 18219 22000 
Sales 3318 5015 8030 7509 7308 7670 
Net profit 626 670 1258 1505 1584 1698 
Leverage (/o) 70.97 64.51 64.89 62.53 60.80 58.65 
Source: Provided by the YCC in the interview 
After the divesture of social assets into a new firm, meaningful improvement of 
quality has been made. Table 8-10 shows that the operating performance of the parent 
company has been improved in terms of the sales growth (131% against 1998), and 
growth of net profit (171% against 1998), the leverage reduced from 71% in 1998 to 
59% in 2003. The direct costs of social services have been declined and the subsidy cut 
down 20% by the parent firm. The workforce was substantially cut down from 2468 to 
1714 workers, however, due to development of new production lines and upgrading of 
the existing production lines, more jobs have been created. The newly-established 
company has expended the scope of services to cover more areas which are in need of 
company and local community, for example, in addition to the traditional services, 
home sickbed service, home furniture maintenance, home food delivery can be provided 
by the new firm. In particular, in joint collabouration with local authority, the foreign 
language school, and kindergarten centre have been built to provide education for the 
companies and open to the public. The workers in both parent and subsidiary firms have 
improved their responsiveness and innovativeness, and were willing to take more 
responsibilities. The parent company has also benefited from rerouting the considerable 
managerial and financial resources for development of its core activities. 
Restructuring Corporate Governance 
Transition from social service departments to a modem corporation involves 
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restructuring the corporate governance. In line with "YCCCL Company Charter", 
YCCCL diversified its ownership structure from the sole state ownership to multiple 
ownerships including employee ownership, institutional ownership, and even foreign 
shareholder ownership. After completing the restructuring process, YCCCL developed 
corporate governance structure, which is composed of shareholder Assembly, board of 
directors (BOD: 7 members), board of supervisors (BOS: 3 members). Three members 
of BOD shall be recommended by the parent firm, and the rest of four members elected 
by shareholders. It was required that the board of chairmen of directors and supervisors 
should be elected by the shareholding meeting, and directors-general shall be nominated 
by chairman of BOD, and approved by BOD. Although the parent firm was required by 
the government to provide a limited contribution to the social services in the transition 
period, it has no control over the new firm. 
Socially Responsible Practices in Restructuring 
YCC started restructuring in October 2002, and successfully completed the 
divesture by the end of 2003. There were no any public protest action, no single appeal 
to the higher authorities on behalf of the personnel thanks to the socially responsible 
practices and well-defined strategy the management implemented during the whole 
restructuring process. 
Involvement of Stakeholders 
Prior to implementation of restructuring, YCC identified the main stakeholders, 
i. e. employees, local authority, local community, workers' representatives and other 
institutions who may be affected by or influence the design, implementation, and 
outcomes of restructuring, and then a working group was set up to agree on a consistent 
policy for restructuring, including to what extent "exceptional" safety net initiatives 
beyond the current provisions of social safety net programmes should be recognized; to 
adopt legal framework of restructuring; to clarify responsibility of the local authority 
and management in divesture of social assets; to assess the capacity of the local 
authority in restructuring strategies such as income support and labour redeployment 
schemes, and to develop a consistent communications strategy for restructuring based 
on stakeholder analysis. 
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Preservation of the workers rights and benefits 
As I described previously, divesture of social assets is usually followed by staff 
downsizing. 160 workers working in 10 social service departments were displaced, and 
voluntarily broke up with the parent company. But all of them were redeployed in the 
new firm with new contract and status of employment. All the benefits of the workers 
were retained in the newly established company such as working age and pension 
benefit, medical care and social insurance. 
Open communications and discussions were frequently conducted with 
employees who were influenced at the preparatory and implementation stages of the 
project. The management provided the clear vision of the future of the new company 
and the role of each individual, and the guaranty to the individual of the preservation of 
their workplaces. The displaced workers from the parent firm were allowed to 
participate in the new company share ownership via ESOP. Regular information on the 
progress of restructuring was communicated to employees and local community. 
Improvement of motivation and responsibility of workers 
ESOP is the best way for YCC to motive the employees to be more involved in 
policy-making, and become more productive, resulting in a sustained improvement in 
company performance. ESOP aligns employees' interests with those of shareholders, 
and retains or recruits key employees, increase loyalty and reduce staff turnover and 
raise working capital. ESOP in conjunction with employee involvement encourages 
employees and employers to work together to achieve the long-term success of the 
business. Employee share ownership might also be expected to lead to a better 
informed workforce who takes a close interest in the performance of the company and 
who also become more adept at understanding financial and accounting terms and 
practices. 
The YCC as a key agent of local community development 
The community that YCCCL operates had heavily relied on YCC to provide all 
the services in the past years. In addition to employees and workers, there were also 
over 1300 retired workers and 2000 families who live in the community. Thus, it's 
important to sustain the development of community after restructuring. YCC 
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consistently live up to the main mission when they undertook restructuring, which was: 
serving the community; improving community facilities and functions; contributing to 
development of local economy; and contributing to the prosperity of community 
Since its foundation, the new company undertook the following voluntary 
initiatives: first, it set up the Community's Representatives Committee of Public 
Security; community's real estate house property development network; environment 
control and fire prevention and fighting network, rebuilding of the dormitory for single 
workers; support of the families with the lowest income; arrangement of the public 
cultural and sport events. It's planned that by 2006, YCC devotes its effort and resources 
to developing a brand-new community with expanded new streets, improved ct 
environment, harmonious neighborhood, and more secure and orderly surroundings. 
8.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined to what extent SOE restructuring was undertaken in a 
socially responsible manner by investigating the case study of defence industry. The 
case study was designed to illuminate how socially responsible restructuring was carried 
out from the perspectives of macro-level (state) and micro level (firm). From the macro 
point of view, I described the strategies and policies which were developed for 
reshaping China's defence industry, with a special focus on SOE reform and re- 
organization in defence industry. Reviewing evolution of Chinese defence industry 
provides us the background of what the issues and challenges the defence industry were 
facing, and why it was essential for China's leadership to put forward the policy to 
restructure defence industry. Then, in this context, it is easy for us to have a better 
understanding of the specific strategies and policies designed by CSIGC which was 
analyzed at the micro level. 
In second part, I analyzed the perceptions of the managers toward CSR, and the 
relationship between the managers' attitudes and their socially responsible behaviours in 
restructuring. Although I can't draw definitive conclusions about the relationship 
between the attitudes of managers and socially responsible behaviours they might 
perform in the restructuring activities on the basis of a case study of just one company, 
it suggests that socially responsible values-oriented managers pay more attention to 
social issues in restructuring than other managers. The results show us that the managers 
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in CSIGC were more aware of CSR concept, and consider it's important for a firm to 
engage in socially responsible activities. The survey also shows that managers in 
CSIGC regard employees, customers and government as their most important 
stakeholders, and pay attention to establish good relationships with them. The survey 
also indicates that in the context of Chinese SOEs, the necessary support measures and 
programmes should be taken during the pre- and post-restructuring; for example, 
consultation process involving employees, trade unions, representatives of local 
government should be conducted. The parties should be involved as early as possible. 
Early communication and consultation with employees and other stakeholders 
concerned is important to ensure fairness and transparency of the restructuring process. 
In the third section, focus was put on the analysis of the case study at the group 
level and plant level. At the group level, strategy and policy developed for restructuring 
were described, and the impact of restructuring on firm's performance was 
economically and socially evaluated. At the plant level, the special attention was placed 
on the restructuring by divesture of social assets into an independent firm at Yangtze 
Chemical Company. The successful restructuring programme attributes to the socially 
responsible practices YCC took during the restructuring. For example, the stakeholders, 
which were affected by the spin-off, were identified and kept involved at the working 
group to discuss policy and strategy for restructuring and re-deployment of lay-offs. 
Employee Share Ownership Programme was introduced to align employees' interests 
with development of spun-off firm, and to motivate them to take more responsibility for 
improvement of firm performance. The necessary measures and practices were taken to 
preserve the workers' rights and benefits after the spin-off. Local community 
development was always put on high agenda of firm management during the 
restructuring. The newly-established company was served as a key agent in promoting 
the community development and property; therefore, more new services and facilities 
were developed and constructed after the restructuring. Overall, the both restructured 
and new firms have made much more contributions to the prosperity and stability of 
local community. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion and Implications 
9.1. Summary 
The financial performances of enterprises in China have deteriorated markedly 
over the past years. The majority of SOEs are at best marginally profitable and a large 
portion of collective enterprises were also in serious financial difficulties. The poor 
financial performances were attributable to a range of factors. These include excess 
capacity built up during the investment boom earlier in the 1990s; heavy financial 
burdens from high debt loads, surplus labour, and social welfare expenses normally 
borne by government or society at large in other countries. The government, therefore, 
came up with a new restructuring strategy to speed up China's enterprise reform. One 
strategy was to improve financial performance by getting rid of bad debts, laying off 
redundant workers, and hardening budget constraints in the short term; with the 
ultimate goal of achieving sustained improvement in efficiency and competitive 
viability in the long term. 
Radical restructuring and privatization, coupled with irresponsible actions of 
firms, brought severe problems of social instability, and a wide range of stakeholder 
reactions like labour protests. Issues of social responsibility arising from restructuring, 
therefore, have increasingly gained the attention of governments, management and 
academic researchers. Against that background, this study set out to empirically explore 
the phenomena of CSR, socially responsible restructuring and firm's performance in 
Chinese enterprises. 
The study has three parts. The first part investigates managers' attitudes towards 
CSR and relationship between managers' attitudes and their behaviours in restructuring. 
The data for this analysis was collected by the structured survey in the sampled firms in 
2003-2004. The second examines relationship between socially responsible 
restructuring and firm's performance in the listed firms over the seven years (1997- 
2003). The third is a case study of a state-owned defence industry restructuring. The 
case study is to give comprehensive and deep insight into the CSR issues, and to help us 
to have a fuller understanding of the phenomena and process of socially responsible 
restructuring in China. 
Chapter 2 and 3 provided the theoretical, conceptual and country 
-specific 
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context for this empirical examination of the Chinese case. The major theoretical fields 
relevant to this study were reviewed and analyzed. CSR is one of the key concepts in 
this research. CSR means companies integrate social and environmental concerns in 
their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary 
basis. The dimensions for measuring socially responsible performance were identified, 
and the previous researches on relationships between CSR and financial performance 
were examined. The second important area is enterprise restructuring. The concept of 
restructuring was clarified. The review of this field focused on what factors influence 
the degree of socially responsible performance in restructuring. The factors were used 
as indicators to determine socially responsible performance. Corporate governance is 
another key concept in this research. The review of corporate governance is to identify 
how the different corporate governance models (shareholder vs. stakeholder models) 
influence the degree of socially responsible performance in restructuring. All the main 
concepts and definitions were built on the stakeholder theory and model. The 
stakeholders are the core concept, which is integrated in all the areas in this study. 
Chapter 3 presents the macro-economic background, and Chinese government's reform 
strategies and policies over the past years. It also examined the issues and problems that 
enterprise reforms were facing and how the government was tackling them. 
Chapter 4 and 5 presented the conceptual framework and methodology of the 
study. The framework linked socially responsible restructuring and firm's performance 
to the four key aspects in literature review, including CSR, enterprise restructuring, and 
corporate governance, and socially responsible restructuring. The framework was used 
as an instrument for structuring survey design, collecting and analyzing data. 
Chapter 6,7 and 8 presented the results of three empirical examinations. The 
first examined the managers' attitudes toward CSR, and the relationship between 
managers' attitudes and their behaviours in restructuring. The second explored 
relationship between socially responsible restructuring and financial performance, and 
the sources of changes in financial performance after restructuring. The third was a case 
study of defence industry restructuring. It illustrated how a Chinese firm attempted to 
balance the economic and social priorities in enterprise restructuring, and to provide us 
with an insight into how socially responsible restructuring can be successful. 
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9.2. Conclusion 
9.2.1. Attitudes of Managers toward CSR 
The management survey examined the managers' attitudes toward CSR, 
stakeholders and socially responsible restructuring. The emphasis was on investigating 
the factors that influence the managers' attitudes, and whether managers who hold 
socially responsible values tend to behaviour in a more socially responsible manner in 
restructuring. 
The result of the survey demonstrated that a large proportion of respondents 
(about 60%) have a better understanding of the concept of CSR and are moderately in 
favour of CSR. It implies that CSR has gained higher awareness among the Chinese 
managers in recent years, and are willing to engage in socially responsible activities, 
and integrate CSR in firm's business routine activities. 
The survey also illustrates that in the context of current economic development, 
the managers allocated more responsibilities to such main three stakeholder groups as 
government, customers and employees, because these groups have great impact on their 
reputation and the firm's performance. The managers recognize that the benefits of 
being a good corporate citizenship which enjoys attracting the best employees, winning 
deep-seated customer loyalty, minimizing lawsuits, and possibly lowering the cost of 
capital. The managers tend to create harmonious relations with these groups, and 
provide quality products and services for customers, create favourable working 
environment for employees, and contribute more tax to government. 
The result implies that higher levels of managers' knowledge about both social 
responsibility issues and the social responsibility records of firms influence managers' 
socially responsible behaviours. The regression analysis shows that the managers' age 
and education are the main factors that influence their attitudes toward CSR, the older 
and highly educated managers are more in favour of CSR; the managers who hold 
highly socially responsible oriented values attach more importance to socially 
responsible practices, and act in a more socially responsible manner in restructuring. 
9.2.2. Socially Responsible Restructuring and Firm's Performance 
The results of the empirical examination of relationships between socially 
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responsible restructuring and financial performance are significant and have more 
implications. First, the major theories concerning social responsibility which had been 
developed in a developed-economy context, were tested within the distinct cultural and 
economic environment of China The second, a multi-dimensional measure of CSP was 
used, which allowed for a more comprehensive measurement. The results support some 
of the postulated relationships between CSP and financial performance in restructuring. 
More socially responsible performance leads to better financial performance in 
restructuring. 
This study supports the researches undertaken previously (McGuire et al, 1988, 
Rosen et al 
, 
1991, Graves and Waddock, 1994, and Pava and Krausz 1996). The results 
of those researches argue that there is a positive association between financial 
performance and CSR. The event study of Frooman (1997) shows that for firms 
engaging in socially irresponsible and illicit behaviour, the effect on shareholder wealth 
is negative (wealth decrease). 
The results of this study show that after restructuring, the financial performance 
of firms wasn't significantly improved, but sales efficiency was increased. The results 
are inconsistent with the growing empirical evidence that after 
privatization/restructuring in transition economies, firms become more profitable 
(Megginson, et al 1994; Naijess and Jean-Claude 1998; D'Souza and Megginson 1999, 
Wei, Oscar, Juliet, and Hassan 2003; Huang and Song 2005; Boubakri, et a! 2004). 
However, the study did confirm the result of the research done by Wei, et a! (2003), 
which argues that in China, there is general trend towards decreased profitability after 
privatization/restructuring. 
9.2.3. Balancing Economic and Social Priorities in Defence Industry Restructuring 
The case study was designed to illuminate how socially responsible restructuring 
has been carried out from the perspectives of macro-level (state) and micro level (firm). 
From the macro point of view, I described the strategies and policies which were 
developed for reshaping China's defence industry, with a special focus on SOE reform 
and re-organization in defence industry. Reviewing the evolution of Chinese defence 
industry provided the background to the issues and challenges the defence industry 
faced, and why it was essential for China's leadership to put forward a policy to 
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restructure defence industry. It gave us a better understanding of the specific strategies 
and policies designed by China South Industry Group Corp. (CSIGC) which was 
analyzed at the micro level. 
The results show that the managers in CSIGC have become more aware of CSR, 
and consider it important for a firm to act in a socially responsible way. The survey also 
shows that managers regard employees, customers and government as their most 
important stakeholders, and pay attention to the relationships with them. The survey 
indicates that Chinese SOEs should take support measures before and after restructuring; 
for example, launching a consultation process involving employees, trade unions, local 
government representatives as early as possible. Early communication and consultation 
with employees and other stakeholders concerned is important to ensure fairness and 
transparency in restructuring process. Voluntary redundancy arrangements and benefits 
can reduce workers' resistance to restructuring and facilitate transition. After 
restructuring, the temporary income support programmes (e. g. unemployment benefits, 
unemployment assistance, social assistance, arly retirement schemes) should be offered 
to the displaced workers and employees, so that they can maintain the basic living 
standards and have time to do job research. 
At the group level, strategy and policies of restructuring were described, and the 
impact of restructuring on firm's performance economically and socially was evaluated. 
In particular, I examined the social support programme CSIGC designed for 
restructuring. At the plant level, I paid the special attention to the restructuring achieved 
by divesting social assets into an independent firm in the Yangtze Chemical Company. 
The socially responsible practices YCC developed contributed to the successful 
restructuring. For example, the stakeholders, who were affected by the spin-off, were 
kept involved at the working group to discuss policy and strategy for restructuring and 
re-deployment of lay-offs. An Employee Share Ownership Programme (ESOP) was 
introduced to align employees' interests with development of spun-off firm, and 
motivate them to take more responsibility for firm performance improvement. Measures 
were taken to preserve the workers' rights and benefits after the spin-off. Local 
community Development was always put on high agenda of firm management in the 
process of restructuring. The newly-established company was served as a key agent in 
promoting the community development and property. Both restructured and new firms 
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have made much more contributions to the prosperity and stability of local community. 
9.3. Implications 
I conclude the study by discussing some implications for academics, 
practitioners and policy-makers. For the academic world, this is the first study that 
explores the phenomena of CSR and firm's performance in restructuring in China from 
the various perspectives: how do the Chinese managers perceive CSR and whether their 
attitudes influence their behaviours in restructuring? Whether the firms with more CSR 
outperform the firms with less CSR? The study provides more evidence that there is a 
positive relationship between attitudes and behaviours; and there is a positive 
association between socially responsible performance and firm's performance in 
restructuring. The first contribution of the study to the academic literature is that it fills 
the gap in the research on relationships between CSR and financial performance in the 
developing world with the specific Chinese case. The study in this field used to 
concentrate on Fortune500 and to be dominated by the researches in the developed 
world. Another contribution is to launch a new research issue: CSR, business ethics and 
firm performance in the context of transition economies like China's. More specifically, 
the study constructs the multi-dimensions of CSP built on the stakeholder model which 
can be used as indicators for measuring socially responsible performance in 
restructuring. 
For managers and executives, the results, in line with the previous studies, 
suggest that CSR challenges businesses to be accountable for the consequences of their 
actions that affect the firm's stakeholders while they pursue traditional economic goals. 
The firms involving CSR activities may benefit from social responsible actions in terms 
of employee morale, customer loyalty, etc.. A firm perceived as being socially 
responsible may face relative few labour problems, and customers may be favourably 
disposed to its products. Social responsible activity may also improve a firm's standing 
with such important constituencies as bankers, investors, and government officials. 
Improved relationships with these constituencies may bring economic benefits. High 
CSR may therefore improve a firm's access to sources of capital whereas low social 
responsibility may increase a firm's financial risk. Investors may consider less socially 
responsible firms to be riskier investments because they see management skills at the 
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firm as lacking. Investors and other constituencies may also anticipate an increase in 
firm costs owing to lack of social responsibility. For example, the government may levy 
fines, and law suits may be filed as this study shows. In contrast, a high degree of CSR 
may permit a firm to have relatively low financial risk as the result of more stable 
relations with the government and the financial community. 
However, being socially responsible does not mean that a company must 
abandon its primary economic mission, nor does it mean that socially responsible firms 
cannot be as profitable as other less responsible. Social responsibility requires 
companies to balance the benefits to be gained against the costs of achieving those 
benefits. For public policymakers, this study and the experience from other countries 
suggest that government has an important role to promote the business case for CSR, 
and provide leadership by helping to achieve consensus on overall vision and on 
priorities for action whilst recognizing the very diverse interests of the stakeholders 
involved. It can also ensure that it fosters a climate that encourages business to adopt 
CSR and does not inadvertently introduce barriers that prevent business from engaging 
in CSR 
9.4. Directions for Future Research 
Socially responsible investing (SRI) increasingly assumed a major role in the 
global financial markets, it raises numerous research questions about the processes 
through which SRI advocates have succeed in convincing investors to adopt socially 
responsible forms of investing. Some researches argue that the continued growth in 
investors seeking to align their ethical concerns with their investment strategies may 
influence the way in which the restructuring activity is managed in the publicly-listed 
firms. 
Although theory and research have focused primarily on the relationship 
between CSR and FP, an argument for a relationship between CSR and such measures 
of financial risk as variance in earnings and in stock returns can also be made. First, low 
levels of CSR may increase a firm's to be riskier investments because they see 
management skills at the frim as low Investors and other constituencies may also 
anticipate an increase in firm's costs owing to lack of social responsibility. Perceptions 
of low social responsibilty may also decrease a firm's ability to obtain capital at 
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consistent rates. A high degree of CSR may permit a firm to have relatively low 
financial risk as the result of more stable relations with government and financial 
community. A firm with high social responsibility may also have a low percentage of 
total debt to total assets. Firms with high social responsibility may have lower market- 
and accounting-based total risk because they are less sensitive to certain external events, 
like governmental actions and have a lower debt. The global rise in SRI is consistent 
with the broader movement of shareholder activism whereby shareholders exercise their 
capacity to become more involved in the strategies, objectives and activities of 
corporations. There are some SRI funds that file shareholder resolutions on behalf of 
their investors and use proxy votes to alter the behaviour or actions of companies they 
have invested in. 
The future research shall further explore, to what extent, social performance of 
restructuring (M&A) is influenced by SRI. SRI is the practice of making investment 
decisions based on both financial and social performance (Shapiro 1992). Potentially, it 
is a powerful way for investors to promote and reward firms whose behavior is socially 
responsible, although to date, the investor's ability to affect social change through 
investment decisions has been limitted. Institutional investors believed that low CSR 
companies tended to be involved in litigation, industrial action and for suffer from 
goverment imposed fines and sanctions; high CSR were better investments over the 
longer term since low CSR companies were more likely to be involved in business 
activities that were unsustainable. 
305 
Bibliography 
Aghion, P. and O. Blanchard (1994), "On Speed of Transition in Central Europe, " 
Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Aghion, P., O. J. Blanchard, and W. Carlin (1997), "The Economics of Enterprise 
Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe, " in Property Relation, Incentives 
and Welfare, J. E. Roemer, ed. London: The Macmillan Press. 
Aghion, Philippe, P. Bolton, and Steven Fries (1996), "Financial Restructuring in 
Transition Economies, " paper presented at the EBRD Workshop 25-26 April 
1996. 
Aghion, Philippe and Jean Tirole (1997), "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations, " 
Journal of Political Economy, 105(1), 1-29. 
Ajzen, I and M. Fishbein (1977), "Attitude-Behaviour Relations: A Theoretical Analysis 
and Review of Empirical Research, " Psychological Bulletin, 84(5), 888-918. 
Alan A. Bevan, Saul E. a. M. E. S. (1999), "Determinants of Enterprise Performance 
during Transition, " 1-40. 
Alkafaji, Abbass F. (1989), A Stakeholder Approach to Corporate Governance: 
Managing in A Dynamic Environment. New York: Quorum. 
Andrei, Shleifer and W. Robert, V (1997), "A Survey of Corporate Governance, " The 
Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737-83. 
Andrew, K. C. (2003), "Thousands of State Firms Face Closure; Restructuring May 
Take at Least Five Years as Failing Enterprises are Allowed to Die, " South 
China Morning Post. 
Ansoff, H. I. (1984), Implanting Strategic Management. Prentice Hall. 
Aoki, Masahiko and Hyung K. Kim (1995a), "Corporate Governance in Transition 
Economies, " Finance & Development, 32(3), 20-2. 
Aoki, Masahiko and Hyung K. Kim (1995b), Corporate Governance in Transition 
economies: Insider Control and the Role of Banks. Washington D. C.: The World 
Bank, Economic Development Institute. 
Appleton, S., J. Knight, L. Song, and Q. J. Xia (2002), "Labour Retrenchment in China 
- 
Determinants and Consequences, " China Economic Review, 13(2-3), 252-75. 
Ash, Robert and Liping He (1998), "Loss-making and the Financial Performance of 
China's Industrial Enterprises: Data from the New Accounting and Statistical 
System, " Journal of Contemporary China, 7(17). 
Ash, T. N. and P. G. Hare (1994), "Privatisation in the Russian Federation: Changing 
Enterprise Behaviour in the Transition Period, " Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 18(6). 
Aupperle, Kenneth (1991), "The Use of Forced-Choice Survey Procedures in Assessing 
Corporate Social Orientation, " in Research in Corporate Social Performance 
andPolicy, J. E. Post, ed. Greenwich: C. T. JAI Press, 269-80. 
Aupperle, Kenneth E., Archie B. Carroll, and John D. Hatfield (1985a), "An Empirical 
Examination of the Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Profitability, " Academy ofManagement Journal, 28(2), 446. 
Aupperle, Kenneth E., Archie B. Carroll, and John D. Hatfield (1985b), "An Empirical 
Examination of the Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Profitability, " Academy ofManagement Journal, 28(2), 446. 
Babic, Verica (2001), "The Key Aspects of the Corporate Governance Restructuring in 
the Transition Process, " Ekonomist, 33(2), 133-43. 
Bai, Chong E., Qiao Liu, Joe Lu, Frank M. Song, and Junxi Zhang (2004), "Corporate 
306 
governance and market valuation in China, " Journal of Comparative Economics, 
32(4), 599-616. 
Band, David C. and Charles M. Tustin (1995), "Strategic Downsizing, " Management 
Decision, 33(8), 36-45. 
Barnard, Chester I. (1968), The Functions of the Executive. Harvard University Press. 
Baucus, M. S. (1989), "Why Firms Do It and What Happens to Them: A Re- 
examination of the Theory of Illegal Corporate Behaviour, " Research in 
Corporate Social Performance and Policy, 11 93-118. 
Baumann, W. (1998), "Restructuring of Flying Training, ". 
BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific (2003), "China Tightens State-owned Enterprise 
Restructuring Procedures, " BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 
- 
Political. 
BBC News (2001), "China's Share Fraud Crackdown" (online), available at 
http: //news. bbc. co. uklllhilbusinessl]511565. stm (October 2005). 
Becht, M. and A. Roell (1999), "Blockholdings in Europe: An International 
Comparison, " European Economic Review, 43(4-6), 1049-56. 
Becker, Edmund R. and Sharyn J. Potter (2002), "Organizational Rationality, 
Performance, and Social Responsibility: Results from the Hospital Industry, " 
Journal of Health Care Finance, 29(1), 23-48. 
Berglfgt E. and E-Lu von Thadden (1999), "The Changing Corporate Governance 
Paradigm: Implications for Transition and Developing Countries, " Washington, 
D. C.: The World Bank. 
Berle, A. and G. Means (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New 
York: Macmillan. 
Betcherman, Gordon, Karina Olivas, and Amit Dar (2004), "Impact of Labour Market 
Program: New Evidence for Evaluations with Particular Attention to Developing 
and Transition Countries, " Washington, DC, World Bank: Social Protection 
Discussion Paper Series No. 0402. 
Black, B., R. Kraakman, and A. Tarassova (2000), "Russian Privatization and Corporate 
Governance: What Went Wrong? ", Stanford Law Review, 52(6), 1732. 
Blair, M. (1995), Ownership and Control. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
Blanchard, Olivier, Commander Simon, and Coricelli Fabrizio (1995), "Unemployment 
and Restructuring in Eastern Europe and Russia, " in Unemployment, 
Restructuring and the Labour Market in Eastern Europe and Russia, 
Commander Simon and Coricelli Fabrizio, eds. Washington, DC: EDI/World 
Bank. 
Blasi, Joseph (1997), Kremlin Capitalism: Privatizing the Russian Economy. Ithaca NY: 
Cornell University Press. 
Boardman, A. E. and A. R. Vinning (1998), "Ownership and Performance in 
Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed 
and State-owned Enterprises, " Journal of Law and Economics, (32), 1-33. 
Bonn, Ingrid and Josie Fisher (2005), "Corporate Governance and Business Ethics: 
Insights from the Strategic Planning Experience, " Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 13(6), 730-8. 
Boubakri, Narjess, Jean C. Cosset, and Omrane Guedhami (2004), "Privatization, 
corporate governance and economic environment: Firm-level evidence from 
Asia, " Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 12(1), 65-90. 
Bowman, E. H. and H. Singh (1993), "Corporate Restructuring: Reconfiguring the 
Firm, " Strategic Management Journal, 14 5-14. 
307 
Bradgon, J. H. and J. Marlin (1972), "Is Pollution Profitable? ", 9-18. 
Broadman, Harry G. and Geng Xiao (1997), "The Coincidence of Material Incentives 
and Moral Hazard in Chinese Enterprises, ", Harvard I. f. I. D. H. U. 
Development Discussion Paper No. 606, ed. 
Bromiley, P. and A. Marcus (1989), "The Deterrent to Dubious Corporate Behaviour: 
Profitability, Probability, and Safety Recalls, " Strategic Management Journal, 
10 233-50. 
Burkart, M., D. Gromb, and F. Pannunzi (1997), "Large Shareholdets, Monitoring and 
Value of the Firm", Quarterly Review of Economics & Finance, 112,693-728. 
Burke, Ronald J. and Debra L. Nelson (1997), "Downsizing and Restructuring: Lessons 
From the Firing Line for Revitalizing Organizations, " Leadership & 
Organization Development Journal, 18(7), 325-34. 
Carlin, W., J. Van Reenen, and T. Wolfe (1995), "Enterprise Restructuring in Early 
Transition: The Case Study Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe, ", 427-58. 
Carlin, Wendy (1998), "Privatization, Enterprise Restructuring and Corporate 
Governance in Transition: An Update on Empirical Studies, " London: 
University College. 
Carlin, Wendy and Mayer Colin (1992), "Restructuring Enterprises in Eastern Europe, " 
Centre for Economic Policy Research, London: CEPR Discussion Papers No. 
700. 
Carlin, Wendy, Steven Fries, Marke Schaffer, and Paul Seabright (2001), "Competition 
and Enterprise Performance in Transition Economies: Evidence from A Cross- 
Countries Survey, " Working Paper No. 376, the Villiam Davidson Institute at 
the University of Michigan Business School. 
Carlin, Wendy and M. Landesmann (1997), "From Theory into Practice? Restructuring 
and Dynamism in Transition Economies, " Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
13(2), 77-105. 
Carroll, Archie B. (1979), "A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate 
Performance, " The Academy ofManagement Review, 4(4), 497-505. 
Carroll, Archie B. (1984), "When Business Closes Down: Social Responsibilities and 
Management Actions, " California Management Review, 26(2), 125-40. 
Carroll, Archie B. (1991), "The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward 
the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders, " Business Horizons, 34, 
39-48. 
Carroll, Archie B. (1994)" Social Issues in Management Research: Experts' Views, 
Analysis and Commentary. Business & Society, 33,5-29. 
Carroll, Archie B. and Ann K. Buchholtz (2003), Business and Society: Ethics and 
Stakeholder Management. South-Western College Pub. 
Cascio, W. F. (2002a), "Strategies for responsible restructuring, " Academy of 
Management Executive, 16(3), 80-91. 
Cascio, Wayne F. (1993), "Downsizing: What do we know? What have we learned?, " 
The Executive, 7(1), 95. 
Cascio, Wayne F. (2002b), Responsible Restructuring: Creative and Profitable 
Alternatives to Layoffs. Berrett-Koehler Publishers. 
Cascio, Wayne F. (2003), "Responsible restructuring: Seeing Employees as Assets, Not 
Costs, " Ivey Business Journal, 68(2), n/a. 
Chai, Joseph C. H. (1997), China: Transition to a Market Economy. Oxford University 
308 
Press. 
Champlin, Dell (1998), "Toward an Ethics of Corporate Restructuring, " International 
Journal of Social Economics, 25(9), 1353-66. 
Charkham, J. (1994), Keeping Good Company: A Study of Corporate Governance in 
Five Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Che, Jiahua and Yingyi Qian (1998), "Institutional Environment, Community 
Government, and Corporate Governance: Understanding China's Township- 
Village Enterprises, " Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 14(1), 1-23. 
Chen, Feng. (2003), "Industrial Restructuring and Workers' Resistance in China, " 
Modern China, 29(2), 237-62. 
Chen, Kung H. and R W. Metcalf (1980), "The Relationship between Pollution Control 
Records and Financial Indicators Revisited and Further Comment, " The 
Accounting Review, 55(1), 168-77. 
Chen, Yi (2001), "The World Bank and Provision of Assistance to Redundant Workers: 
Experience with Enterprise Restructuring and Future Directions, " Washington 
DC.: The World Bank. 
Cheng, Allen T. (2003), "Sales of State Firms to be Stepped Up; While a Summit Seeks 
to Woo Investors, Officials Hope to Turn Strategic Ventures into Strong 
Enterprises, " South China Morning Post, Nov 12. 
China Business (2003), "Market-Oriented Reforms of China's Enterprises in Retrospect" 
(online). Available at 
http: //www. china. org. cnlenglish/2003chinamarket/79520. him (May 2005) 
China Daily (1998), "Wrongdoings Hurt SOE Reform, " New York: 23 November. 
China Daily (2003), "Judicial Explanation Clarifies SOE Reform, " New York: 4 
January. 
China Daily (2004), "SOE reform Heads in Right Direction, " 30 September. 
China Listed Company Reports (2003), China Listed Company Reports. China 
Financing and Economic Press. 
China M&A Review (2003), "Review and Analysis of Asset Restructuring of China's 
Listed Firms in 2001,2002 and 2003, " China M&A Review. 
China M&A Yearbook (2001), China Mergers and Acquisitions Yearbook. Beijing, 
China: Materials Press. 
China M&A Yearbook (2002), China Mergers and Acquisitions Yearbook. Beijing, 
China: Huaxia Press. 
China M&A Yearbook (2003), China Mergers and Acquisitions Yearbook. Beijing, 
China: Posts & Telecom Press. 
China M&A Yearbook (2004), China Mergers and Acquisitions Yearbook. Beijing, 
China: Posts & Telecom Press. 
Chubais, Anatoly and Maria Vishnevskaya (1993), "Main Issues of Privatisation in 
Russia, " in Russia's Economic Transformation in the 1990s, Anders ! JJ lund, ed. 
London and Washington: Pinter. 
Clark, E. and A. Soulsby (1998), "Organization-Community Embedded ness: The 
Social Impact of Enterprise Restructuring in the Post-Communist Czech 
Republic, " Human Relations, 51(1), 25-50. 
CLARKE, Donald C. (2003), "Corporate Governance in China: An Overview, " China 
Economic Review, 14(4), 494-507. 
Clarke, Thomas and Yuxing Du (1998), "Corporate governance in China: Explosive 
Growth and New Patterns of Ownership, " Journal of Long Range Planning, 
309 
31(2), 239. 
Clarkson, Max E. (1991), "Defining, Evaluating, and Managing Corporate Social 
Performance: The Stakeholder Management Model, " in Research in Corporate 
Social Performance and Policy, J. E. Post, ed. Greenwich: C. T. JAI Press, 331-58. 
Clarkson, Max E. (1995), "A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating 
Corporate Social Performance, " Academy ofManagement Review, 20(1), 92-117, 
Collier, Andrew K. (2003), "Thousands of State Firms Face Closure, Restructuring May 
Take at Least Five Years as Failing Enterprises Are Allowed to Die, " Hong 
Kong, China: 2. 
Commander, S., M. Dutz, and N. Stem (1999), "Restructuring in Transition Economies: 
Ownership, Competition, and Regulation", B. Pleskovic and J. E. Stiglitz, ads. 
Washington, DC: Washington DC. 
Commander, Simon. (1993), "The Behaviour of Russian Firms in 1992: Evidence from 
a Survey, " Washington D. C. World Bank. 
Commission of the European Communities (2001), "Promoting a European framework 
for Corporate Social Responsibility (Green Paper), " Brussels: Commission of 
the European Communities. 
Cooke, F. L. (2000), "Manpower restructuring in the state-owned railway industry of 
China: the role of the state in human resource strategy, " International journal of 
Human Resource Management, 11(5), 904-24. 
Cornell, Bradford and Alan Shapiro (1987a), "Corporate Stakeholders and Corporate 
Finance, " Financial Management, (16), 5-14. 
Cornell, Bradford and Alan C. Shapiro (1987b), "Corporate Stakeholders and Corporate 
Finance, " Financial Management, 16 5-14. 
D'Souza, Juliet and William L. Megginson (1999), "The Financial and Operating 
Performance of Privatized Firms during the 1990s, " Journal of Finance, 54(4), 
1397-438. 
Dar, Amit and Zafiris Tzannatos (1999), "Active Labour Market Program: A Review of 
the Evidence from Evaluations, " Washington, D. C.: The World Bank. 
Davidson, W. N. and D. L. Worrell (1988), "The Impact of Announcements of 
Corporate Illegalities on Shareholder Returns, " Academy of Management 
Journal, 31,195-200. 
Davis, Gerald F. and Michael Useem (2001), "Top Management, Company Directors, 
and Corporate Control, " in Handbook of Strategy and Management, Andrew M, 
Pettigrew, Howard. Thomas, and Richard Whittington, eds. SAGE Publications. 
Davis, Keith (1973), "The Case for and Against Business Assumption of Social 
Responsibility, " Academy ofManagement Journal, 16(2), 312-23. 
Dewatripont, M. and E. Maskin (1995), "Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and 
Decentralized Economies", 62,541-55. 
Dewatripont, M., E. Maskin, and G. Roland (1998), "Soft Budget Constraints and 
Transition, " in Planning, Shortage and Transformation, E. Maskin and A. 
Simonovits, eds. MIT Press, 541-55. 
Ding, Ningning (1999), "China Enterprise Groups", paper presented at the conference 
on "The Emergence and the Structuring of Corporate Groups in P. R. of China: 
An International Perspective". 
Ding, X. L. (2000), "The Illicit Asset Stripping of Chinese State Firms, " China Journal, 
43(January), 1-28. 
Djankov, S. and P. Murrell (2002), "Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A 
310 
Quantitative Survey, " Journal of Economic Literature, 40(3), 739-92. 
Domadenik, Polona, Janez Pragnikar, and Jan Svejnar (2002), "Defensive and Strategic 
Restructuring of Firms during the Transition to Market Economy: Theory and 
Evidence from Central Europe, " University of Michigan Business School: The 
William Davidson Institute Working Paper. 
Domadenik, Polona and Maja Vehovec (2002), "Defensive and Strategic Restructuring 
in Transition Economies: The Case of Croatia and Slovenia, " Bologna: 7a' 
Biennial EACES Conference "Globalization and Economic Governance". 
Domini Social Investments (1997), Domini Social Investments: 1997 Social Screening 
Criteria and Proxy Voting Guidelines. Boston: Domini Social Investments. 
Donaldson, Thomas and J. H. Davis (1994), "Boards and Corporation Performance - 
Research Challenges the Conventional Wisdom, " Corporate Governance, 2 151- 
60. 
Donnelly, S., A. Gamble, G. Jackson, and J. Parkinson (2001), The Public Interest and 
the Company in Britain and Germany. Blackwell. 
Dutton, G. R and J. M. Dukerich (1991), "Keeping an Eye on the Mirror: Image and 
Identity in Organizational Adaptation, " Academy ofManagement Journal, 34 
517-54. 
Dutz, Mark and Maria Vagliasindi (1999), "Corporate Governance and Restructuring 
Transition Economies: An empirical assessment, " London: EBRD, MIMEO. 
Earle, John and Saul Estrin (1996), Privatization versus Competition: Changing 
Enterprise Behaviour in Russia. Washington D. C.: The World Bank. 
Edward Freeman, R and William M. Evan (1990), "Corporate Governance: A 
Stakeholder Interpretation, " Journal of Behavioural Economics, 19(4), 337-59. 
Edwards, Tony (2004), "Corporate Governance, Industrial Relations and Trends in 
Company-Level Restructuring in Europe: Convergence towards the Anglo- 
American Model?, " Industrial Relations Journal, 35(6), 518-35. 
EIRO (European Industrial Relations Observatory) (2002), "Corporate Governance 
Systems and the Nature of Industrial Restructuring: Comparative Study". 
Eisenhardt, K., (1989a) "Building Theories from Case Study Research", Academy of 
Management Review, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp 532-550. 
Ellman, Michael (1994), "Transformation, Depression and Economics: Some Lessons, "
Journal of Comparative Economics, 19(1), 1-2 1. 
Ericson, Richard (1998), "Restructuring in Transition: Conception and Measurement, "
Comparative Economic Studies, 40(2), 103-7. 
Ernst, Maurice e. a. (1996), Transforming the Core. Westview Press. 
Estrin, Saul (1998), "State Ownership, Corporate Governance and Privatization, " in 
Corporate Governance, State-owned Enterprises and Privatization, OECD, 
Paris: OECD. 
Evans-Klock, Christine and Alexander Samorodov (1998), "The Employment Impact of 
Privatization and Enterprise Restructuring in Selected Transition Economies, " 
Geneva: ILO. 
Fahy, Martin, Jeremy Roche, and Anastasia Weiner (2005), Beyond Governance: 
Creating Corporate Value through Performance, Conformance and 
Responsibility. England: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Fama, E. F. (1980), "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, " Journal of Political 
Economy, 88(288), 307. 
Filatotchev, Igor, Mike Wright, Klaus Uhlenbruck, Laszlo Tihanyi, and Robert E. 
311 
Hoskisson (2003), "Governance, Organizational Capabilities, and Restructuring 
in Transition Economies, " Journal of World Business, 38(4), 331-47. 
Fiske, S. T. and S. E. Taylor (1991), Social Cognition. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Foley, Paul (2000), "Corporate Social Responsibility in the IT Industry" (online). 
Published by the Stationery Office in London, available at 
http: //www. thestationeryofce. com (June 2005). 
Ford, Robert and Frank McLaughlin (1984), "Perceptions of Socially Responsible 
Activities and Attitudes: A Comparison of Business School Deans and 
Corporate Chief Executives, " Academy ofManagement Journal, 27(3), 666-74. 
Franks, Julian and Colin Mayer (1996), "Hostile Takeovers and the Correction of 
Managerial Failure, " Journal of Financial Economics, 40(1), 163-8 1. 
Freeman, R. E. (1984), Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Perspective. Boston 
Englewood Cliffs: Pitman NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Freeman, R. E. and B. Jaggi (1994), "Pollution Disclosures, Pollution Performance, and 
Economic Performance, " Omega, 10 167-76. 
Freinkman, L. M. and I. Starodubrovskaya (1996), "Restructuring of Enterprise Social 
Assets in Russia: Trends, Problems, and Possible Solutions". Policy Research 
Working Paper Serial No. 1635. The World Bank. 
Fretwell, David H. (2004), "Mitigating the Social Impact of Privatization and Enterprise 
Restructuring". Social Protection Discussion Paper Serial No. 0405. 
Washington, DC.: The World Bank. 
Friedman, M (1962), Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Fries, Steven and S. Geifer (2000), "The Business Environment and Distribution of 
Stock Market Returns, " EBRD mimeo. 
Frooman, Jeff (1997), "Socially Irresponsible and Illegal Behaviour and Shareholder 
Wealth: A Meta-Analysis of Event Studies, " Business and Society, 36(3), 221-49. 
Frydman, Roman, Cheryl Gary, Merek Hessel, and Andrzej Rapaczynski (1999), 
"When Does Privatization Work? The Impact of Private Ownership on 
Corporate Performance in the Transition Economies, " The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 114(4), 1153-91. 
Gatewood, R, D. M. A. Gowan, and G. J. Lautenschlager (1993), "Corporate Image, 
Recruitment Image, and Initial Job Choice Decisions, " Academy of Management 
Journal, 36,414-27. 
Gedalovic, E. and Daniel Shapiro (2002), "Ownership Structure and Firm Profitability 
in Japan", 45(3), 565-75. 
Gibbs, P. A. (1993), "Determinants of Corporate Restructuring 
- 
the Relative 
Importance of Corporate Governance, Takeover Threat, and Free Cash Flow, " 
Strategic Management Journal, 14,51-68. 
Gill, Roger W. T. and Lisa J. Leinbach (1983), "Corporate Social Responsibility in 
Hong Kong, " California Management Review, 25(2), 107-23. 
Godfrey, Yeung (2002), "The implications of WTO accession on the pharmaceutical 
industry in China, " Journal of Contemporary China, 11(32), 473-95 
Gospel, Howard and Andrew. Pendleton (2004), Corporate Governance and Labour 
Management: An International Comparison. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Griffin, Jennifer J. and John F. Mahon (1997), "The Corporate Social Performance and 
Corporate Financial Performance Debate, " Business & Society, 36(1), 5-31. 
Grosfeld, Irena and Gerard Roland (1997), "Defensive and Strategic Restructuring in 
312 
Central European Enterprises", Journal of Transforming Economies and 
Societies, 3,21-46. 
Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1980), "Takeover Bids, the Free-rider Problem and the 
Theory of Corporation", Bell Journal of Economics, 11,42-64. 
Groves, Theodore, Yongmiao Hong, John McMillan, and Barry Naughton (1994), 
"Autonomy and Incentives in Chinese State Enterprises, " The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 109(1), 183. 
Hall, P. and D. Soskice (2001), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations 
of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hart, Oliver (1995), "Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications, " The 
Economic Journal, 105(430), 678-89. 
Hawley, J. and Oliver E. Williamson (1996), "Corporate Governance in the United 
States: The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism 
-A Review of the Literature, " The first 
prize of Lens 1996 Corporate Governance Paper Competition (available on line 
at: http: //www. lens-library. com/info/competition. html). 
Hoffer, G. E., S. W. Pruitt, and R. J. Reilly (1988), "The Impact of Product Recalls on 
the Wealth of Sellers: A Re-examination, " Journal of Political Economy, 96, 
663-70. 
Holmes, Sandra L. (1976), "Executive Perceptions of Corporate Social Responsibility, " 
Business Horizons, 19(3), 34-40. 
Hiner, M. (2005), "What Connects Industrial Relations and Corporate Governance? 
Explaining Institutional Complementarity, " Social-Economic Review, 3,331-58. 
Huang, Guihai and Frank M. Song (2005), "The financial and operating performance of 
China's newly listed H-firms, " Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 13(1), 53-80. 
Hussain, Athar and Juzhong Zhang (1996), "Pattern and Causes of Loss-making in 
Chinese Enterprises", CP 3. J. STICERD Discussion Paper Series. 
ILO (1997), "Labour and Social Dimensions of Privatization and Restructuring 
- 
Public 
Utilities, Water, Gas and Electricity, " Geneva: ILO. 
ILO (1999a), "Human Resource Implications of Globalization and Restructuring in 
Commerce, " Geneva: ILO. 
ILO (1999b), "Socially Responsible Enterprise Restructuring, " Geneva: International 
Labour Organization (ILO). 
ILO (1999c), "The Social and Labour Consequences of Technological Developments, 
Deregulation and Privatization of Transport, " Geneva: ILO. 
ILO (2000), "The Social and Labour Impact of Globalization in the Manufacture of 
Transport Equipment, " Geneva: ILO. 
Iskander, Magdi and Nadereh Chamlou (2000), Corporate Governance: A Framework 
for Implementation. Washington, D. C.: The World Bank. 
Iskander, Magdi, Gerald Meyerman, Dale F. Gray, and Sean Hagan (1999), "Corporate 
Restructuring and Governance in East Asia, " Finance & Development, 36(1), 
42-5. 
Iskkander, Magdi (1996), "Improving State-owned Enterprise Performance: Recent 
International Experience, " in Policy Options for Reform of Chinese 
. 
State-owned 
Enterprises World Bank Discussion Paper No. 35. 
Jackson, Gregory (2004), "Toward a Comparative Perspective on Corporate and Labour 
Management Enterprise Coalitions and National Trajectories, " in Corporate 
Governance and Labour Management: An International Comparison, Howard 
Gospel and Andrew Pendleton, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
313 
Jeffers, Esther (2005), "Corporate Governance: Toward Converging Models? ", Global 
Finance Journal, In Press, Uncorrected Proof. 
Jefferson, Gary H. (1990), "China's Iron and Steel Industry, " Journal of Development 
Economics, 33(2), 329-56. 
Jefferson, Gary H. and Thomas G. Rawski (1994), "How Industrial Reform Worked in 
China: The Role of Innovation, Competition, and Property Rights, " The World 
Bank Research Observer. 
Jefferson, Gary H. and Thomas G. Rawski (2002), "China's Emerging Market for 
Property Rights: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, " Economics of 
Transition, 10(3), 586-617. 
Jeffries, Jan (1996), A Guide to the Economies in Transition, New York: Routledge. 
Jones, Thomas M. (1980), "Corporate Social Responsibility Revisited, Redefined, " 
California Management Review, 22(3), 59-67. 
Kalirajan, K. P. (1993), "Can Chinese state enterprises perform like market entities: 
Productive efficiency in the Chinese iron and steel industry, " Applied Economics, 
25(8), 1071. 
Karake, Zeina A. (1997), "Relative Index for Downsizing Employees (RIDE): A 
Measure of Performance, " Logistics Information Management, 10(6), 264-74. 
Karake, Zeina A. (1998), "An Examination of the Impact of Organizational Downsizing 
and Discrimination Activities on Corporate Social Responsibility as Measured 
by a Company's Reputation Index, " Management Decision, 36(3/4), 206-17. 
Katz, D (1960), "The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes, " Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 24(2), 163-204. 
Keasey, Kevin, Steve Thompson, and Mike Wright (1997), Corporate Governance: 
Economic, Management and Financial Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kelly, G. and J. Parkinson (1998), "The Conceptual Foundations of the Company: A 
Pluralist Approach", Company, Financial and Insolvency Law Review, 2(2)174- 
197. 
Klein, B. and K. Leffler (1981), "the Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual 
Performance, " Journal of Political Economy, 89(4), 615-41. 
Kornai, J. (1980), Economics of Shortage. North Holland: Amsterdam. 
Kotrba, J. (1996), "Privatization and Restructuring: Friends or Enemies? ", CERGE-El, 
Working Paper, June 16, Prague. 
Kraft, Kenneth and Jerald Hage (1990), "Strategy, Social Responsibility and 
Implementation, " Journal of Business Ethics, 9(1), 11-9. 
Kuhndt, Michael, Burcu Tunlr, Snorre K. Anderson, and Christa Liedtke (2004), 
"Responsible Corporate Governance: An Overview of Trends, Initiatives and 
State-of-the-art Elements, " Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and 
Energy, Dpersberg 19,42103 Wuppertal. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (1999), "Corporate 
Ownership around the World, " Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471. 
Laffont, J. J. and J. Tirole (1988), "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts", 
Econometrics, 56(5), 1153-75. 
Lardy, Nicholas (1998), China Un-finished Economic Revolution. Brookings Institution 
Press. 
Lee, C. W. J. (2001), "Financial restructuring of state owned enterprises in China: the 
case of Shanghai Sunve Pharmaceutical Corporation, " Accounting 
Organizations and Society, 26(7-8), 673-89. 
314 
Lee, Ching K. (1999a), "From Organized Dependence to Disorganized Despotism: 
Changing Labour Regimes in Chinese Factories, " China Quarterly, 157(3), 44- 
71. 
Lee, Keun (1999b), "Market Competition, Plan Constraints, and Asset Diversion in the 
Enterprise Groups in China", paper presented at the conference on "The 
Emergence and the Structuring of Corporate Groups in P. R. of China: An 
International Perspective". 
Lei, David and Michael A. Hitt (1995), "Strategic Restructuring and Outsourcing: The 
Effect of Mergers and Acquisitions and LBOs on Building Firm Skills and 
Capabilities, " Journal of Management, 21(5), 835-59. 
Lerner, Linda D. and Gerald E. Fryxell (1994), "CEO Stakeholder Attitudes and 
Corporate Social Activity in the Fortune 500, " Business & Society, 33(1), 58-81. 
Letza, Steve, Xiuping Sun, and James Kirkbride (2004), "Shareholding versus 
Stakeholding: a Critical Review of Corporate Governance, " Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 12(3), 242-62. 
Levine, R. and S. J. Zervos (1993), "What We Have Learned about Policy and Growth 
from Cross-country Regressions, " American Economic Review, 83(2), Papers 
and Proceedings of the Hundred and Fifth Annual Meeting of the American 
Economic Association (May, 1993), 426-30. 
Li, Minqi (2004), "Aggregate Demand, Productivity, and "Disguised Unemployment" in 
the Chinese Industrial Sector, " World Development, 32(3), 409-25. 
Li, Shaomin, Shuhe Li, and Weiying Zhang (1998), "Competition and Institutional 
Change: Privatisation in China, " Department of Economics and Finance, City 
University of Hong Kong, Working Paper No. 1998E03. 
Liebeskind, Julia, Margarethe Wiersema, and Gary Hansen (1992), "LBOs, Corporate 
Restructuring, and the Incentive-Intensity Hypothesis", Financial Management, 
21(1), 73-86. 
Lin, Cyril (2000), "Corporate Governance in China", Paper presented at the 
OECD/DRC Conference, Beijing, China, January 2000. 
Lin, Justin Y., Fang Cai, and Zhou Li (1998), "Competition, Policy Burdens, and State- 
owned Enterprise Reform, " American Economic Review, 88(2), Paper and 
Proceedings of the Hundred and Tenth Annual Meeting of the American 
Economic Association (May, 1998), 422-27. 
Linz, Susan J. and Gary Krueger (1996), "Russia's Managers in Transition: Pilferers or 
Paladins? " Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 37(7), 397-425. 
Linz, Susan J. and Gary Krueger (1998), "Enterprise Restructuring in Russia's 
Transition Economy: Formal and Informal Mechanisms, " Comparative 
Economic Studies, 40(2), 5-52. 
Luss, Richard and Steven A. Nyce (2002), "How to Cut Costs without Cutting off 
Future Growth: Lesions from the Restructuring of the Early 1990s, " Washington, 
D. C.: Watson Wyatt Worldwide. 
Ma, Jinlong, G. E. avid, J. F. Robert, and F. S. Donald (2002), "Technical Efficiency 
and Productivity Change of China's Iron and Steel Industry, " International 
Journal of Production Economics, 76(3), 293-312. 
Maignan, Isabelle and 0. C. Ferrell (2003), "Nature of corporate responsibilities: 
Perspectives from American, French, and German consumers, " Journal of 
Business Research, 56(1), 55-67. 
Mallin, Chris and Ranko Jelic (2000), "Developments in Corporate Governance in 
315 
Central and Eastern Europe, " Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
8(1), 43-51. 
Mar, Pamela and Michael N. Young (2001), "Corporate Governance in Transition 
Economies: a Case Study of Two Chinese Airlines, " Journal of World Business, 
36(3), 280-302. 
Marcovitch, J. (1999), "Privatization, Restructuring and Economic Democracy, " 
Geneva: ILO. 
Margolis, Joshua D. and James P. Walsh (2002) "Social Enterprise Series No. 19 
Misery Loves Companies: Whither Social Initiatives by Business? " Harvard 
Business School Working Paper Series, No. 01-058. 
Marrewijk, M. (2003), "Concepts and definitions of CSR and corporate sustainability: 
Between agency and communion, " Journal of Business Ethics, 44(2), 95-105. 
Mayer, C. and I. Alexander (1990), "Banks and Securities Markets: Corporate 
Financing in Germany and the UK", CEPR Discussion Papers No. 433. 
McCarthy, Daniel and Sheila Puffer (2002), "Corporate Governance in Russia:: towards 
a European, US, or Russian Model?, " European Management Journal, 20(6), 
630-40. 
McGee, Robert W. and Galina G. Preobragenskaya (2004), "Corporate Governance in 
Transition Economies: the Theory and Practice of Corporate Governance in 
Eastern Europe". Available at SSRN: http: //ssm. com/abstract=538582. 
McGuire, Jean B., Alison Sundgren, and Thomas Schneeweis (1988), "Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Firm Financial Performance, " Academy of Management 
Journal, 31(4), 854-72. 
Megginson, W. L., R C. Nash, and M van Randenborgh (1994), "The Financial and 
Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical 
Analysis, " Journal of Finance, 49(2), 403-52. 
Milgrom, P. and J. Robert (1986), "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality, " 
Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), 796-821. 
Ministry of Labour & Social Security (2003), China Labour & Social Security 
Yearbook 2002. China Labour & Social Security Press. 
Mitnick, Barry M. (1993), "Organizing Research in Corporate Social Performance: The 
CSP System as Core Paradigm, " San Diego, CA: Paper Presented as a Showcase 
session at the Annual Meeting of the International Association for Business and 
Society (TABS). 
Mitnick, Barry M. (1995), "Systematics and CSR: The theory and processes of 
normative r, " Business and Society, 34(1), 5-33. 
Monks, Robert A. G. and Nell. Minow (2003), Corporate Governance (3rd Edition). 
Blackwell Publishing. 
Moskowitz, Milton R. (1972), "Choosing Social Responsible Stocks, " Business and 
Society, 1(1), 71-5. 
Moussavi, F and D. Evans (1986), "An Attributional Approach to Measuring Corporate 
Social Performance", Paper presented at the Academy of Management Meetings, 
San Diego. 
Movshuk, Oleksandr (2004), "Restructuring, Productivity and Technical Efficiency in 
China's Iron and Steel Industry, 1988-2000, " Journal of Asian Economics, 15(1), 
135-152. 
Narjess, Boubakari and Cosset Jean-Claude (1998), "The Financial and Operating 
Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: Evidence from Developing Countries, " 
316 
The Journal of Finance, 53(3), 1081-110. 
Naughton, Barry (1994), "What is Distinctive about China's Economic? Transition State 
Enterprise Reform and Overall System Transformation, " Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 18(3), 470-90. 
Nolan, Peter and Xiaoqiang Wang (1998), "The Chinese Army's Firm in Business: The 
Sanjiu Group, " The Developing Economies, 36(1), 45-79. 
Nelson, L., and I. Kuzes, (1995), Radical Reform in Yeltsin's Russia: Political, 
economic and social dimension, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York. 
OECD (2004), "OECD Principles of Corporate Governance", OECD, ed. Paris, France: 
OECD. 
Orpen, Christopher (1987), "The Attitudes of United States and South African 
Managers to Corporate Social Responsibility, " Journal of Business Ethics, 6(2), 
89-96. 
Ostlund, Lyman E. (1977), "Attitudes of Managers toward Corporate Social 
Responsibility, " California Management Review, 19(4), 35-49. 
Pagano, Marco and Paolo F. Volpin (2005a), "Managers, Workers, and Corporate 
Control", the Journal of Finance, 60(2), 841-69. 
Pagano, Marco and Paolo F. Volpin (2005b), "The Political Economy of Corporate 
Governance, " American Economic Review, 95(4), 1005-30. 
Pannier, Dominiqu (1996), "Corporate Governance of Public Enterprises in Transitional 
Economies", Dominiqu Pannier, ed. Washington, D. C.: World Bank. 
Parket, I. R. and Henry Eilbirt (1975), "Social responsibility: the underlying factors, " 
Business Horizons, 18(4), 5-10. 
People's Daily (2000), "China Re-employs 4.92 Million Laid off Workers in 1999, " 
(online) Beijing, China. January 25. Available at 
h ttp: //english 
. 
people. corn. cn/English/200001 /25/eng20000125NJ 28. h tm 1. 
People's Daily (2002a), "China Sets New Goals for SOE Restructuring" (online). 
Available at 
http: //english 
. 
people. corn. cn/English/200205/09/eng20020509 95369. shtml. 
People's Daily (2002b), "Premier Calls for Greater Efforts to Promote SOE Reform" 
(online). Available at 
http: //english 
. 
people. corn. cn/English/200203/05/eng20020305 91428, shim!. 
Perotti, Enrico. (1998), "Inertial Credit and Opportunistic Arrears in Transition", 
European Economic Review, 42(9), 1703-25. 
Portes, R. and D. Begg (1993), "Enterprise Debt and Economic Transformation: 
Financial Restructuring of the State Sector in Central and Eastern Europe", 
European Economic Review, 37(2/3), 396-407. 
Posner, Barry and Warren Schmidt (1992), "Values and the American Managers: An 
Update Updated, " California Management Review, 25(2), 80-94. 
Post, James E. and E. Baer (1980), "Analyzing Complex Policy Problems: The Social 
Performance of the Infant Formula Industry, " Research in Corporate Social 
Performance and Policy, 2,157-96. 
Post, James E., Anne T. Lawrence, and James Weber (2001), Business and Society: 
Corporate Strategy, Public Policy and Ethics. Mcgraw-Hill College. 
Pound, J. (1992), "Beyond Takeovers: Politics Comes to Corporate Control, " Harvard 
Business Review, (March/April), (702), 83-93. 
Pound, J. (1993), "The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, " New York University Law Review, 68(November), 1003-71. 
317 
Preston, Lee E. (1978), "Comparing Corporate Social Performance and Policy: A 
Synthetic Framework for Research and Analysis, " in Research in Corporate 
Social Performance and Policy Greenwich, CT: JA, 1-25. 
Preston, Lee E., Harry Sapienza, and Robert Miller (1991), "Stakeholders, Shareholders, 
Managers: Who Gains What From Corporate Performance? " in Social- 
Economics: Toward a New Synthesis, Amatai Etzioni and Paul Lawrence, eds. 
Armonk: M. E. Sharpe. 
Pucko, Danijel (2005), "Corporate Governance in European Transition Economies: 
Emarging Models, " Management, 10(1), 1-2 1. 
Quazi, A. M. and D. O'Brien (2000), "An Empirical Test of a Cross-national Model of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, " Journal of Business Ethics, 25(1), 33-51. 
Raj an, R. and L. Zingales (1995), "What Do We Know About the Capital Structure? 
Some Evidence from International Data, " Journal of Finance, 50(5), 1421-60. 
Rashid, Md Z. A. and Saadiatul Ibrahim (2002), "Executive and Management Attitudes 
towards Corporate Social Responsibility, " Corporate Governance, 2(4), 10-6. 
Rawski, Thomas G. (2002), "Recent Development in China's Labour Economy", Report 
prepared for the International Labour Office in January 2002. 
Reed, L., K. Getz, D. Colllins, W. Oberman, and R. Toy (1990),. "Theoretical Models 
and Empirical Results: A Review and Synthesis of JAI Volumes 1-10 Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Development in India, " in Corporation and Society 
Research: Study in Theory and Measurement, J. Post, ed. Greenwich: CT: JAI, 
27-62. 
Richardson, A. J., M. Welker, and I. R. Hutchinson (1999), "Managing Capital Market 
Reactions to Corporate Social Responsibility, " International Journal of 
Management Reviews, 1(1), 17-44. 
Richet, Xavier and Jean-Fran*tis Huchet (1999), "Between Bureaucracy and Market: 
China's Industrial Groups in Search of a New Corporate Governance System", 
Paper presented at the conference on "The Emergence and the Structuring of 
Corporate Groups in P. R. of China: An International Perspective". 
Robers, Dexter, Bruce Einhorn, and Frederik Balfour (2002), "China's Angry Workers; 
They're Protesting over Pay, Layoffs and Pensions. How Far will Beijing Go to 
Stop Them? " Business Week, (European Edition, April 8), 30-4. 
Roe, M. J. (2003), Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, 
Corporate Impact. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Roland, G. (2000), "Corporate Governance and Restructuring: The Lessons from 
Transition Experience, " B. Pleskovic and N. Stem, eds. Washington, DC: World 
Bank. 
Roland, Gerard (1994), "Privatization in Eastern Europe: Irreversibility and Critical 
Mass Effects, " Journal of Public Economics, 54(2), 161-83. 
Roland, Gerard and Khalid Sekkat (2000), "Managerial Career Concerns, Privatization 
and Restructuring in Transition Economies, " European Economic Review, 
44(10), 1857-72. 
Roubini, N. and X. Sala Martin (1992), "Financial Repression and Economic Growth, " 
Journal of Development Economics, 39(1), 5-3 0. 
Rowley, Tim and Shawn Berman (2000), "A Brand New Brand of Corporate Social 
Performance, " Business and Society, 39(4), 397-418. 
Scapens, R., (1990), "Researching Management Accounting Practice: The Role of Case 
Study Methods", British Accounting Review, Vol. 22, pp 259-281. 
318 
Shane, P. B. and Barry H. Spicer (1983), "Market Response to Environmental 
Information Produced Outside the Firm, " Accounting Review, 58(3), 521-38. 
Shapiro, J. (1992) "Community Development Banks. " Pp514-22 in P. D. Kinder, S. D. 
Lydenberg, and A. L. Domini (eds. ), The Social Investment Almanac. New York: 
Henry Holt. 
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny (1994), "Politicians and Firms, " Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 109(4), 995-1025. 
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny (1997), "A Survey of Corporate Governance, "
Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737-83. 
Sit, V. F. S. and W. D. Liu (2000), "Restructuring and spatial change of China's auto 
industry under institutional reform and globalization, " Annals of the Association 
ofAmerican Geographers, 90(4), 653-73. 
Slinger, G. and S. Deakin (2000), "Company Law: An Instrument for Inclusion- 
Regulating Stakeholder Relations in Takeover Situations, " in Social Inclusion: 
Possibilities and Tensions, A. Stewart and P. Askonas, eds. London: Macmillan, 
Smeltzer, Larry R. and Marie F. Zener (1994), "Minimizing the Negative Effect of 
Employee Layoffs through Effective Announcements, " Employee Counselling 
Today, 6(4), 3-9. 
Smyth, R., Q. G. Zhai, and W. G. Hu (2001), "Restructuring China's Petrochemical 
Enterprises: A Case Study of the Fushun Petrochemical Company, " Post- 
Communist Economies, 13(2), 243-61. 
Soloman, R. and K. Hansen (1985), It's Good Business. New York: Atheneum. 
Steinfeld, Edward S. (1998), Forging Reform in China: the Fate of State-owned 
Industry. Cambridge University Press. 
Stone, R. M. (2002), "Corporate Sector Restructuring: The Role of Government in 
Times of Crisis, " Economic Issue of International Monetary Fund, (31). 
Subbarao, K. and J. Braithwaite (1995), "Protecting the Poor during Adjustment and 
Transitions, " Social Protection Papers No. 58. Washington D. C.: The World 
Bank. 
Sutela, P. (1994), "Insider Privatisation in Russia: Speculations on Systemic Change", 
Europe Asia Studies, 46(3), 417-35. 
Tam, O. K. (2002), "Ethical Issues in the Evolution of Corporate Governance in China, " 
Journal of Business Ethics, 37(3), 303-20. 
Teoh, Hai-Yap and Gregory Thong (1984), "Another Look at Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Reporting: An Empirical Study in a Developing Country, " 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 9(2), 189-206. 
Thompson, Steve and Mike Wright (1995), "Corporate Governance: the Role of 
Restructuring Transactions, " The Economic Journal, 105(430), 690-703. 
Tricker, R. (1994), International Corporate Governance, Readings and Cases. 
Singapore: Prentice Hall International. 
Turnbull, Shann (1997), "Corporate Governance: Its Scope, Concerns and Theories, " 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 5(4), 180-205. 
Ullmann, A (1985), "Data in Search of a Theory: A Critical Examination of the 
Relationships among Social Performance, Social Disclosure, and Economic 
Performance of U. S. Firms, " The Academy of Management Review, 10(3), 540- 
57. 
UNDP (1998), "Restructuring and Reform: Business Development Opportunities in 
Military Industry Conversion to Civilian Markets, " New York: UNDP. 
319 
Urbanek, Piotr, Michal Cakrt, Krisztina Penyigey, Jana Matesova, Miklos Somai, Alena 
Ockova, and Piotr Urbanek (1997), "Corporate Governance in Transition 
Economies, " Eastern European Economics, 35(5), 1-95. 
Van Wijnbergen, Sweder. (1998), "Bank Restructuring and Enterprise Reform, " EBRD 
Working Papers No. 29. London. 
Vance, Stanley C. (1975), "Are Socially Responsible Corporations Good investment 
Risks? " Management Review, 64(8), 18-24. 
Vining, A. R. and A. E. Boardman (1992), "Ownership versus Competition: Efficiency 
in Public Enterprise", 73(2), 205-39. 
Vinten, Gerald (2001), "Shareholder versus Stakeholder 
- 
is there a Governance 
Dilemma? " Corporate Governance: An International Review, 9(1), 36-47. 
Wang Kexia (1999), "Improve Government's Role and Performance in Enterprise 
Mergers, " Gaige (Reform), (2). 
Wang Shouan (1998), Jianbing pochan zaijiuye: lilun, zhengce yu shizheng yanjiu 
(Merger, Bankruptcy, and Reemployment: Studies in Theory, Policy, and Cases). 
Beijing: Qiye guanli chubanshe (Enterprise Management Press). 
Wang, Wei and Qiusheng Zhang (2003), China Mergers and Acquisitions Yearbook. 
Beijing, China Posts & Telecom Press. 
Wang, ying (2000), "Bank to aid Cement Industry", China Daily, 26, May. 
Wang, Zilin and Yin Shen (2004), Report of Evaluation of Listed Firms' Performance in 
China in 2003. Beijing, China: Economic and Scientific Press. 
Wanous, J. P. (1973), "Effects of a Realistic Job Preview on Job Acceptance, Job 
Attitudes, and Job Survival, " Journal ofApplied Psychology, 58,327-32. 
Wei Feng (1999), "Surplus, Withdrawal, and the Power of Corporate Control, " Reform 
(Gaige), (6), 5-11. 
Wei Xiangyun (1998), "Debt Settlement in Cases of Merger and Acquisition, " Jingjl 
guanli (Economic Management), (6). 
Wei, Zuobao, Varela Oscar, D. 'S. Juliet, and M. K. Hassan (2003), "The Financial and 
Operating Performance of China's Newly Privatized Firms, " Financial 
Management, 32(2), 107-126. 
Weidenbaum, Murray and Sheldon Vogt (1987), "Takeovers and Stockholders: Winners 
and Losers, " California Management Review, 29(4), 47-168. 
William, Q. J., Naoumova Irina, and Koutzevol Nadejda (2003), "Corporate governance 
and firm performance in Russia: An Empirical Study, " Journal of World 
Business, 38(4), 385-396. 
Williamson, Oliver E. (1967), The Economics of Discretionary Behaviour: Managerial 
Objectives in a Theory of the Firm. Chicago: Markham. 
Williamson, Oliver E. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust 
Implications. New York: Free Press. 
Williamson, Oliver E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free 
Press. 
Williamson, Oliver E. (1988), "Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, " The 
Journal of Finance, 43(3), 567-59 1. 
Wokutch, R. E. and E. W. McKinney (1991), "Behavioural and Perceptual Measures of 
Corporate Social Performance, " in Research in Corporate Social Performance 
and Policy, J. E. Post, ed. Greenwich: C. T. JAI Press, 309-30. 
Wood, Donna J. (1991 a), "Corporate Social Performance Revisited, " Academy of 
Management Review, 16(4), 758-69. 
320 
Wood, Donna J. (1991b), "Social Issues in Management: Theory and Research in 
Corporate Social Performance, " Journal ofManagement, 17(2), 383-406. 
Wood, Donna J. and E. J. Jone (1995), "Stakeholder Mismatching: A Theoretical 
Problem in Empirical Research on Corporate Social Performance, " The 
International Journal of Organizational Analysis, 3(3), 229-67. 
World Bank (1997), "China's Management of Enterprise Assets: the State as 
Shareholder", the World Bank, ed. The World Bank, Washington DC. 
World Bank (1999), "China: Weathering the Storm, Learning the Lessons", the World 
Bank, ed. The World Bank, Washington DC. 
World Bank (2005), "World Development Indicators Database" (online). Available at 
http: //d`evdata. worldbank. org/dataline. 
Xie, Fuzhan (2003), "Employing the Unemployed, " Beijing, China: 15 August, China 
Daily. 
Yang, Qiuju (2002), "Marching Toward an International Leading Enterprise, " Beijing 
Review, 45(29), 15-8. 
Young, Nick and Pia MacRae (2002), "Three "C"s: Civil Society, Corporate Social 
Responsibility, and China, " China Business Review, 29(1), 34-9. 
Zhang, Weiying (1998), "China's SOE Reform: A Corporate Governance Perspective", 
Institute of Business Research Working Papers No. 01. 
Zhang, Xiao G. and Siqi Zhang (2001), "Technical Efficiency in China's Iron and Steel 
Industry: evidence from the new census data, " International Review ofApplied 
Economics, 15(2), 199-211. 
Zingales, Luigi (1998), "Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm, " in 
Corporate Governance in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the 
Law London: Macmillan, 497-503. 
321 
Appendix 
Questionnaire of Survey in 2003: Attitudes of Managers toward CSR and 
Enterprise Restructuring 
Interviewer Name: Telephone: Date of Interview: 
I. ENTERPRISE BACKGROUND (Please tick 0 with the right answer 
1. Name of Enterprise: 2. Industrial Sector: 
3. Location of Enterprise: Province City 
4. Start-up Date: 
5. Enterprise Size: Large0, Medium0 
, 
Small C3. 
6. Supervisory Authorit : 
1) State Asset Management Commission 0 4) Local government C3 
2) Ministry or Industrial Bureaus at 0 
central level 
5) No supervision O 
3) Provinince or Industrial Bureaus at 0 
provincial level 
6) Others (specify) 
7. Ownership 
1 State-owned 0 2) Shareholding 
3 Collective-owned O 4) Private 
5 Cooperative shareholding O 6) Other 0 
8. If enterprise is currently not state-owned, was it state-owned one in the past? Yes 0, No O. 
9. If your company is state-owned, when did the change in ownership occur? year 
II. ATTITUDES OF EXECUTIVE AND MANAGERS TOWARDS CSR 
10. To what extent, do you agree or disagree with the following statements ? ( Please mark your 
response on a scale of 5 to 1, where 5 is strongly agree, 4 agree, 3 neutral, 2 disagree and 1 is ) strongly disagree. 
54321 
1) Engagement of a firm in socially responsible actions doesn't conflict with OO C1 OO 
ursuit of rofit 
2) Business will participate more actively in social responsibility in prosperous 
economic times than in recession. 
3) A business that wishes to capture a favourable public image will have to O CJ O 
show that it is socially responsible 
4) There is no difference between involvement of a firm in socially responsible IJ 0 C3--5 O 
activities and public relations positioning 
5) Business already has too much social power and should not engage in social OOOOO 
activities that might give it more 
6) If business is more socially responsible, it will avoid additional regulations aaOCO 
of the economic system by government, and reduce restricts in firm's 
operation 
'n Involvement by business in improving its local community's quality of life OOOO0 
will also improve long run profitability 
8) A firm perceived as high in social responsibility can face relatively low level C] OOOO 
of industrial conflicts 
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9) High social responsibility can put a firm at an economic disadvantage 
compared to less socially responsible one 
10) Socially responsible activities can improve a firm's standing with bankers, 
and access sources of capital 
11) Socially responsible activities can improve a firm's standing with investors, 
and reduce financial risk 
M0o 13 o 
00000 
0o0o0 
11. To what extent, do stakeholder groups have impact on your firm's public Image/reputation? 
Please mark your response on a scale of 5 to 1, where 5 is to a great extent 4 to some extent, 3 not 
really, 2 not at all, 1 unsure) 
54321 54321 
1) Shareholder OO0OO 5) The general public O000 
2) Customers 00000 6) Local communities 0000 
3) Employees 00000 7) Governments 0000 
dIC33 
4) Business partners O0 Cl O0 
12. What relationship does your firm have with the stakeholder groups? (Please mark your 
response on a scale of 5 to 1, where 5 is the best, 4 better, 3 good, 2 bad and 1 worse. ) 
54321 54321 
1) Shareholder O0000 5) The general public 0000 
2) Customers 00000 6) Local communities O0OOO 
3) Employees 00000 7) Governments 00000 
4) Business partners 00000 
13. In your opinion, what enterprise behaviour is more socially responsible in the context of the 
current economic development in China? (Please mark your response on a scal e of 5 to 1 
, 
where 
5 is strongly agree, 4 agree, 3 neutral, 2 disagree and 1 is strongly disavee. 
5 4 3 2 1 
1) Creating value for company's shareholders 0 0 0 0 0 
2 Provision of a healthy and safe working environment for employees O O O O O 
3) Provision of quality products and services for consumers O O O O O 
4) Doing business with its partners with integrity O O O O O 
5) Actively participating in social benefit activities O O O O O 
6) Improving environmental quality and pollution control O O O O O 
'n Complying with state law, and being a good tax payer 0 0 5 -0 0 
14. In your opinion, what enterprise behaviour is more socially responsible in the restructuring 
activity? (Please mark your response on a scale of 5 to 1, where 5 is strongly agree, 4 agree, 3 
neutral, 2 disagree and 1 is strongly disagree. ) 
5432 1 
1) Announcements of restructuring decision in very early stage OOOO - O 
2 Seeking inputs from employees, trade unions and local communities OOOO O 
3) Open communication with employees in the process of the restructuring OOOO O 
4) Continuing to offer salary and benefits for a period time in order to allow 
reasonable time for 'ob search 
OOOO O 
5) Providing severance benefit package for voluntary early retirement OOO0 O 
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6) providing internal and/or external outplacement service such as training for OOOOO 
employability, job counselling, financial planning and information on 
government benefits 
7) Organizing the transfer of redundant and laid-off employees to other units, O0O0O 
giving them priority for job vacancies 
8) Assisting employees in obtaining government benefits such as extended 0OOOO 
unemployment benefits and job training support, search allowance 
9) Encouraging and supporting employees to start up their own business O0O0O 
15. What are area of CSR which your firm has been involved over the past three years? (Please 
choose all it may apply) 
Yes No Yes No 
1) Organizing or participating in O O 6) Contribution to vulnerable O O 
public welfare activities group 
2) Encouraging employees' voluntary O O 7) Donation to charitable and 0 O 
welfare programmes public welfare organizations 
3) Improving employee welfare O 0 8) Contribution to cultural and O 0 (facilities and benefits) literary programmes 
4) Active contribution of tax to O O 9) Other (specify) O O 
government 
5) Improving pollution control 7 O O 
environment impact 
NTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING 
16. Please indicate the reforms which your enterprise has ever under one 
Reform Events Started year Ended Year 
1. Factory director responsibility system 
2. Contract responsibility system 
3. Leasing system 
4. Corporation system 
5. Stockholding system 
6. Ownership restructuring under Company Law 
17. 
1 
What is the legal form of 
Wholl state-owned company 
ur com an 
0 
after restructuring? 
4) Cooperative shareholding company O 
2 Limited liabili com iny O 5) Private company cl 
3) Company limited shares O 6) Other (please specify) O 
18. In the process of restructuring, did the government get involved in the decision-making 
strategy and implementation? 
1) Controlled by government or supervisory authority of company, and implemented by O 
ente rise. 
2) Driven by market force, determined and implemented by enterprise with some government 
intervention 
3) Determined and implemented by enterprise without government involvement, adopting 
approaches uch as merger & acquisition, etc. 
4) Determined by Superior company, and implemented by subsidiary Q 
19. In the process of enterprise restructuring, to what extent did the employees and their 
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Committee get involved? 
Yes No 
1) Executive management sought input prior from employees to determining 
implementation action. 
OO 
2) Executive management communicated restructuring strategies and measures with 
employees in time 
OO 
3 Executive management kept employees involved in the whole restructuring process 0 C3 
4) After restructuring, executive management collaborated with employees and their 
committee in solving problems such as redeployment of redundant workers. 
5) Executive management determined needs/actions with little input from employees. 0O 
20. In the process of restructuring, to what extent, did the local community where your enterprise 
operates get involved? 
Yes No 
1) Seeking suggestions and advice from the local government authority before 
implementation 
O O 
2) Holding meetings with the local government authority during the restructuring process C3 
3) ly keeping the community informed of the restructuring event O O 
4) No involvement at all 0 O 
21. To what extent was the restructuring/downsizing information communicated to employees? 
Yes No 
1) Announcing restructuring/downsizing in very early stage through meetings and media O O 
such as publication, radio, interne email, etc. 
2) Informal briefing to employees by supervisors and managers in charge of O O 
restructurin downsizing 
3) Executives and senior managers were always available to answer questions and explain O O 
issues 
4) Information was only available to senior managers, not to employees before O O 
implementation 
5) No communication at all O O 
22. Did your company take any of following initiatives during the restructuring? 
Yes No Yes No 
1) Upgrading of existing production O O 6) Accreditation of ISO 14000 0 O 
line 
2) Opening of new plant O O 7) Closure of at least one existing O O 
plant 
3) Successful development of major O O 8) Discontinuation of at least one O O 
reduction line production line 
Increasin investment in R&D O 9) Reducing investment in R&D O O 
5) Accreditation of IS09000 O O 10) Reducing expenditures on O O 
environmental improvement 
23. If your company resorted to downsizing, please indicate how many employees were downsized 
over restructurin period (in pementaze). 
1) Less than 10% 4) 10 
- 
20% 
2) 20-3(r 5) more than 30 
24. What social support programmes were provided for the terminated and redundant employees? 
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Yes No 
1) Continuing to offer salary and benefits for a period time in order to allow reasonable OO 
time for 'ob search 
2) Offering severance package for voluntary early retirement OO 
3) Providing internal and/or external outplacement service such as training for O 
employability, job counselling, financial planning and information on government 
benefits 
4) Organizing the transfer of redundant employees to other units, giving them priority for 0O 
job vacancies 
5) Encouraging and supporting employees to set up their own business O0 
6) Assisting employees in obtaining government benefits such as extended unemployment OO 
benefits and job training support, search allowance 
25. How did your firm deploy the terminated and redundant employees? 
Yes No Yes No 
1) Placement within its own firm OO 5) Placed at re-employment service 
centre 
OO 
2) Early retirement OO 6) Self-employment or start-up own 
business 
OO 
3) Unemployment, awaiting for 
placement 
OO 7) Other (please specify) O Cl 
4) Transfer to other companies OO 
26. To what extent, did the labor disputes happen in your firm during restructuring ? 
Yes No 
1) Disputes over lack of communication with employees in objectives and strategies of 
restructuring in advance 
o a 
2) Disputes over mass layoff without taking any alternative approaches l L7 
3) Disputes over employees being fired without offering welfare payment O O 
4) Disputes over corruption issue in the process of restructuring C3 C3 
5) Disputes over the promise not being materialized to terminated employees O 0 
27. Which social functions that our firm bore in the past have been spun off after restructurin g? 
Yes No Yes No 
1) Education O O 4) Medical care service O O 
2) Pension benefits O 5) Public welfare facilities (sports, 
recreational centre etc 
O O 
3) Housing service 0 6) Other(specify) 0 O 
28. Please indicate how the equity was allocated to each of the following categories at the time of 
restucturnand after restructuring (2002) (in percentage)? 
In restructuring 2002 
1) National government or state asset management commission % % 
2) Provincial government or provincial asset management 
commission 
% % 
3) Municipal government or municipal asset management 
commission 
% % 
4) Supervisory authority of company % % 
5) Workers in the company % % 
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6) Managers in the company % % 
7) The company itself % % 
8) Individuls outside the company % % 
9) Other legal entities % % 
29. If there is important change in the distribution of equity between restructuring time and 2002, 
what was the nature of the change in the distribution of equity? 
1) Shares were sold to the public O 4) State shares were transferred to a new corporate O 
of administrative entity 
2) More shares were distributed to O 5) Other (please specify) O 
workers and managers 
3) Shares were granted to managers O 
as an incentive payment 
30. Does your firm own any assets that were formally classified as state-owned assets? Yes O 
No O. If yes, which of the following best describes the process through which company 
acquired these assets? 
Yes No Yes No 
1) Assets were created by investment from Cl Cl 6) Company purchased part of Cl Cl 
enterprise funds of SOE; assets were later assets from SOE after it went 
determined to belong to company bankrupt 
2) Government distributed assets to the Cl Cl 7) Company purchased a still Cl Cl 
company, its managers, or its workers operating SOE 
without payment 
3) Government distributed assets to the Cl Cl 8) Company purchased part of Cl Cl 
company, its managers, or its workers at a assets of a SOE 
concessiionary price 
4) Government distributed assets to the Cl Cl 9) Other (specify) Cl O 
company, its managers, or its workers at a 
market price 
5) Company purchased a SOE after it went Cl Cl 
bankru t 
31. Does your company issue stocks? Yes Cl 
, 
No Cl. If yes, what proportion of your company's 
outstanding stocks is owned by (in percentage)? 
1 Individuals outside the firm % 4) Managers of the firm % 
2) Employees of the firm % 5) Government % 
3) Insitutions % 6) Others cif % 
32. Does your company excise the voting rights for some shares held by workers of the company? 
Yes C3, No O. If yes, what is the voting method used? 
1 One share, one vote C II One person, one vote 
2) Ordinary shares have one vote, preferred O 4) Other (specify) O 
shares have more than one votes 
33. What approaches were em ployed in your enter prise restructurin g? 
1) Consolidation O 5) Tender-off 0 9) Reorganization 
2) Acquisitions O 6) Divestiture O 10) Leasing/contract O 
3 Merger O Selling off O 11) Bankruptcy O 
4) Takeover O 8) Spin-offs O 12) Downsizing C] 
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34. To what extent, did your firm attain restructuring goals? Please mark your response on a scale of 
5 to 1, where 5 to a great extent, 4 to some extent, 3 not really, 2 not at all and 1 unsure 
5 4 3 2 1 
1) Reduce debt 0 0 0 0 0 
2) Improve product quality and customer service 0 0 0 0 0 
3) Increase productivity 0 0 0 0 0 
4) Increase profitability 0 0 0 0 0 
5) Reduce costs and expenses 0 0 0 0 0 
6) Reduce bureaucracy and administration 0 0 0 0 0 
7) Improve autonomy and decision-making O O O 0 C3 
8) Increase sales and market share O O O 0 0 
9) Increase competitive advantage 0 0 0 0 0 
10) Achieving the goal of reducing redundant staff and increasing efficiency O O O O 0 
IV. EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
35. Who are your firm's main com etetors? Please select maximum 3 items) 
I Township and village enterprises O 4) Private enterprises cl 
2) State-owned enterprises O S Im rted product 0 
3) Newly established state-owned enterprises O 6) Other(specify) 0 
36. How problematic are these factors for the operation and growth of your business? Please mark 
your response on a scale of 5 to 1, where 5 for major obstacle, and 1 no obstacle 
5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 
1 Lack of autonomy 0 0 0 0 0 6) Tax re ulations 0 0 0 0 0 
2) Brain drain 0 0 0 0 0 Business licensing O Cl Cl Cl Cl 
3) Policy instability / 
uncertainty 
Cl Cl Cl Cl Cl 8) Infrastructure (electricity, 
water, roads, and land) 
Cl Cl Cl Cl Cl 
4) Unhealthy Financial 
system 
Cl Cl Cl Cl Cl 9) Other (specify) Cl Cl 0 Cl Cl 
5) Exchange rate 
37. How problematic are these different financing issues for the operation and growth of your 
business? Please mark your response on a scale of 5 to 1, where 5 for major obstacle, and I no 
obstacle) 
54321 54321 
1 Hi h interest rates Q0000 4) Collateral OQQ 00 
2) Access to long-term bank OOOOQ 5) Access to equity / OQOOO 
loans investors/ partners 
3) Access to connections OOOOO 6) Other (specify) OOO OQ 
with banks/financial 
institutions 
38. How significant are your firm's overdue payables (Please mark your response on a scale of 5 to 
1, where 5 for substantial, and 1 non owed) 
54321 54321 
1) to central government Cl Cl 0 Cl 0 4) to banks OOOO Cl 
2) to local government 00000 5) to employees OO0 Cl Cl 
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3 to utilities ooaoo I I 
39. How significant are other organizations overdue payables to your firm (Please mark your 
response on a scale of 5 to 1, where 5 for substantial, and 1 non owed) 
543 21 54321 
1) central government OOO00 4) new SOEs OOO00 
2) local government 00000 5) banks 00000 
3) old SOEs 0OO0O 
V. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
40. Is your enterprise part of a corporate group? Yes C3, No O. If Yes, how many firms are there in the 
group (or holding company) ?. In what year was the group established? 
. 
Was 
your firm an original member of the group? Yes O, No O. If No, in what year, did your firm become 
a member? 
41. Do you have legal subsidiaries? Yes O, No O, If Yes, how many? 
. 
Of these subsidiaries, 
how many are factories , how many are labour service companies , Is one of 
these subsidiaries the traditional SOE from which the corporation was formed? Yes O, No O. 
42. Is there Board of Directors in your company? Yes O, No O. If Yes, when was it established? In 
the year 
43. How was Board of Directors set up? 
1 Shazeholders' Meetin Q 4) Decided by Manager (Director) Q 
2) Delegated by supervisory authority of Q 
company 
5) Nominated by company and decided by Q 
supervisory authority 
3) Decided by mother company 0 
44. Is there Supervisory Board in your company? Yes O, No O. If Yes, in which year did the 
company first have individual supervisors? 
45. How was Supervisory Board set up? 
1) Shareholders' Meeting O 3) Board of Directors 0 
2) Delegated by supervisory authority of 
company 
O 4) Decided by mother company 0 
How does your company appoint or dismiss Vice-President (Deputy Director) and branch 
leaders? 
1 Decided by the Director-General O 5) Decided by shareholders' meeting 0 
2) Elected by management O 6) Nominated by Director-General, and 
decided by its supervisory authority 
O 
3 Decided by its supervisory authority 0 Position competition 0 
4) Decided b communist 0 8 Other Please specify): 0 
VI. MANAGER'S PROFILE 
47. Name: 48. Age: 49. Sex: Male 1, Female O 
50. Professional Title: 1) Advanced level 1,2) Medium level 0,3) basic level and lower C1. 
51. Education: 52. Educational Subject: 
1) Graduate and above l 4) Secondary education O 1) Polytechnic Cl 4) Social science 0 
2 Universi O 5) Elementary education Cl 2) Economics Cl 5) Other Cl 
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3) College I C3 3) Management O I 
53. When were you appointed as a director of the company? In the year 
i 
54. Did you have the formal appointment certificate when you took your office as Manager 
General? Yes O, No 0. If Yes, which organization issued it? 
1) Board of Directors 0 4) Communist party 0 
2) Supervisory authority of company 0 5) Other 0 
3 Em to ees' Committee 0 
55. How were you appointed director of your enter prise. 
1) Nominated by the enterprise, and approved by 
the s rviso authority of the en rise 
0 5) Elected by the Employees' 0 
Reprentative Committee 
2 Designated b the top authority 6) Post competition O 
3 A inted b board of directors O Other (Please s eci 0 
4) Decided by shareholders' meeting 0 
56. What did you do before your current position? 
1 Worker in the com O 4 Civil servant 0 
2 De u Director or Man a er O 5 Other 
3) Vice- resident De u General Mana er from other com an 0 
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